STATE v. LAPILLE (2025)

Following a guilty plea to a narcotics violation, which included a reservation of his right to appeal, Defendant, John Clarence LaPille, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence.¹ For the reasons herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court as amended and remand with instructions.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 25, 2023, Defendant was charged by bill of information with one count of possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule I Controlled Dangerous Substance, marijuana weighing less than two and one-half pounds, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1), along with three other felony narcotics offenses and one count of possession of firearms while in the unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance. Trial counsel for Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, seeking to suppress the illegal drugs and weapons seized from Defendant either pursuant to an alleged consent to search or pursuant to a search warrant at the time of or just prior to his arrest. The motion to suppress was heard on October 17, 2024, and was denied by the trial court.

On November 18, 2024, Defendant entered a guilty plea to possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress in accordance with State v. Crosby, 386 So.2d 584 (La.1976). The basic facts leading to the guilty plea were summarized by the State as follows:

[O]n July 27, 2023, Corporal Evan Nugent along with Agent James Bruce, Deputy Michael Garcia, they responded to a um, an alligator complaint at 11112 [sic] McKay Circle in Montgomery. Um, they state they got permission to do a walk around the residence, while walking around, Deputy Garcia uh, observed an odor he believed was marijuana coming from the resident's rear window.

Corporal Nugent also believe [sic] he could smell marijuana coming from the residence. Um, they applied for a warrant um, once they got the warrant, they went inside um, - - while searching Mr. Lapille's bedroom, observed a black cloth structure, the structure appeared to be a growing station, opened it up for - - observed five (5) uh, pots with soil in them, lights, gardening tools and chemicals. Uh, also located blue 5-gallon bucket containing a black garbage bag, looked inside, a large amount of green vegetable material suspected to be marijuana.

Um, and the lab results confirmed that the green vegetable material was marijuana, and it was uh, over five hundred (500) grams it looks like.

Defendant was sentenced to ten years at hard labor with the Louisiana Department of Corrections. That sentence was suspended, and Defendant was placed on supervised probation for a period of three years. The trial court further ordered Defendant to pay a $1,500.00 fine, subsequently reduced to $1,250.00, court costs, a $750.00 fee to the Public Defender's Office, and a $71.00 monthly probation supervision fee as conditions of Defendant's probation. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion and erred in denying the motion to suppress.

OPINION

Defendant asserts as the sole issue before the court whether law enforcement officers illegally searched the property belonging to his family, both before and after the issuance of the search warrant. He acknowledges, in brief, this court's standard of review of the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress: “The trial court is afforded great discretion when ruling on a motion to suppress, and its ruling will not be disturbed absent abuse of that discretion.” State v. Lee, 05-2098, p. 15 (La. 1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, 122, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 824, 129 S.Ct. 143 (2008).

The Louisiana and Federal constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. The Louisiana and Federal constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Constitution Ann. art. IV; La. Const. Ann. art. I, § 5. A search warrant may issue only upon probable cause established to the satisfaction of a magistrate, by the affidavit of a credible person, particularly describing the person or place to be searched and the things to be seized. La. Const. Ann. art. I, § 5; La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 162. Probable cause sufficient to issue a search warrant “exists when the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that evidence or contraband may be found at the place to be searched.” State v. Johnson, 408 So.2d 1280, 1283 (La.1982); La Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 162. The task for a reviewing court is simply to insure that under the totality of the circumstances the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Determination of probable cause does not rest on the officer's subjective beliefs or attitudes, but turns on a completely objective evaluation of all the circumstances known to the officer at the time of his challenged action. State v. Kalie, 96-2650 (La.9/19/97), 699 So.2d 879, 880. A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within certain limited, well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381 (La.1982); State v. Zito, 406 So.2d 167 (La.1981). Warrants therefore are generally required to search an individual's home or person, “unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. White, 399 So.2d 172, 175 (La.1981).

Id. at 122.

“A defendant adversely affected may move to suppress any evidence from use at the trial on the merits on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained.” La.Code Crim.P. art 703(A). “On the trial of a motion to suppress filed under the provisions of this Article, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the ground of his motion, except that the state shall have the burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or statement by the defendant or of any evidence seized without a warrant.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 703(D).

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Captain Will Roberts, of the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries Enforcement Division (LDWF), testified that the agency received an email complaint from the email address steveweems50@gmail.com, as follows:

I have reason to believe this man has killed this alligator out of season without a license. He lives in nantachie acres right outside of Montgomery, Louisiana he drives a New white F250 with a big welding machine in the back of his truck. His name is John C. Lapaille this is his picture and I would like my reward for the information thank you.

Captain Roberts then identified the picture sent with the complaint, which is undated and shows a man later identified as Defendant next to a dead alligator. Captain Roberts then forwarded the complaint to Sergeant James Bruce, of LDWF, to follow up.

Sergeant Bruce testified that he began investigating the complaint on July 27, 2023, about three days after he received it from Captain Roberts. Initially, he was unable to locate the property referenced in the complaint causing him to reach out to the complainant, Steve Weems, via text message. He read the response received from Mr. Weems:

Yes, sir, it's on McKay's [sic] Circle in Nantachie Acres, it's the second blacktop road on the right in Nantachie Acres. I want to say the 3rd trailer house on the right, there will be a new jackuped [sic] white Ford under the carport in the front of the house. When you turn on McKay Circle stay straight, don't turn left, across from the house will be a big carport with an older model green Chevy truck on the left, his house is on the right. This is his truck probably be a big welding machine in the back of it, he has a lot of guns in the house, possibly marijuana in 5 gallon buckets somewhere in the house or in the boat out front.

When Sergeant Bruce arrived at the location described, he was joined by Deputy Michael Garcia of the Grant Parish Sheriff's Office (GPSO). He encountered Defendant at the property, and the two discussed the complaint. Sergeant Bruce showed Defendant the undated picture accompanying the complaint, prompting Defendant to show Sergeant Bruce what appeared to be the same or a similar picture in a Facebook post from 2015. When questioned on cross examination about what appeared to be a colored tag on the tail of the alligator, Sergeant Bruce was unsure about the effect of that particular color tag. Nevertheless, he testified that he believed that if there had been a violation of the game laws, it would have been a prescribed misdemeanor if the complaint picture was actually from 2015. However, Sergeant Bruce testified that to follow up, he asked Defendant for permission to search the curtilage of the property, not the interior of the residence located on the property. He testified, “The words were, do you have any objection to me searching the outside, and I even specified that I did not want to go inside his home, but I would like to go around the exterior of his home and around the lake to search for any alligators or alligator parts.” Sergeant Bruce then testified that Defendant gave him permission to search the exterior of the property, saying, “I don't have a problem with that, I'll stand right here by this tree.”

Sergeant Bruce testified to what occurred next, as reflected in the following colloquy.

A ․ but while we were [sic], I made a loop from the north side of the house down to the lake and back up, and on my way back up, Deputy Garcia advised that he kept getting an odor of what he thought to be marijuana, ․

Q. Okay.

A. ․ um, I advised him that I thought I had gotten a whiff of it as well, as I got - - as I was walking back towards the back of the trailer.

Q. Do you know how close to the home were you [sic] when you smelled that?

A. I don't know if I can give you an exact - -

Q. Oh, I - - I certainly know you can't give an exact - - I don't think you had your tape measure out, but - -

A. I'd estimate fifteen (15), twenty (20) yards[.]

Deputy Garcia testified that while he personally did not ask Defendant for consent to search the exterior of the property, he was present when Sergeant Bruce asked for consent. Although he did not recall Defendant's actual words in response, he was certain that Defendant consented to the search. He testified that he smelled the odor of marijuana around the home while walking around the property searching for alligator parts.

Corporal Evan Nugent, an employee of the Rapides Parish Sheriff's Office, was employed by GPSO in July 2023. He testified that he arrived on the scene at approximately 12:10 p.m. to assist Sergeant Bruce and Deputy Garcia. After he arrived, and while the other officers were beginning to look around the exterior of the property, a baggie of what appeared to be methamphetamine was discovered laying on or at the edge of the driveway area. Sergeant Bruce had first discovered it and pointed it out to Corporal Nugent. He testified that he also smelled what appeared to be marijuana when he was a few feet from the residence located on the property. He asked for Defendant's consent to search the residence and stated that Defendant said he did not want to talk. Corporal Nugent stated that had Defendant given consent, he would have carried out the search then but because it was denied, he began the process of securing a search warrant, which was ultimately granted and executed upon.

Defendant testified at the hearing and stated that the picture accompanying the complaint was taken in 2015, when he had a state license tag to kill the alligator. He stated that the officers were on the property for one hour and twenty minutes before obtaining a warrant to search the residence. He testified that he did not give the officers permission to search the exterior or curtilage of the property, and when asked by Corporal Nugent for permission to search the inside of the residence, he told him that he needed a warrant.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court set forth its ruling denying the motion to suppress and its reasons therefore. After orally detailing its findings of fact, the trial court concluded as follows:

Based on the information that was submitted to - - hearing, the Court finds that Mr. Lapaille - - the Court does believe Off - - Sergeant Bruce and Officer Garcia that Mr. Lapaille granted verbal consent to search the surrounding property to look for alligator parts, and during that process, they detected the odor of marijuana and they were denied consent to search the interior of the residence, and therefore, applied for a search warrant which the Court granted.

․

Therefore, the Court finds there is no basis for suppression of any evidence.

On appeal, Defendant asserts several arguments in support of his position that the search of the property, including the curtilage and the exterior of the residence, was unconstitutional. As stated in his motion to suppress, Defendant argues that the “ ‘first reason the evidence must be suppressed is that the anonymous tip, which was the foundation for the entire investigation and entry on to the LaPaille [sic] property, was facially unreasonable.’ ” He argues that it was unreasonable for Sergeant Bruce to base reliance and subsequent law enforcement action on the tip which included the undated photograph of a tagged alligator, when the photograph did not support the tip but actually offered evidence to the contrary. We disagree.

Defendant argues that the reasonable suspicion test for stop and frisk encounters is applicable herein and cites multiple U.S. Supreme Court cases highlighting the law applicable thereto. We find them inapposite to the facts at hand. The actions of the LDWF agent and law enforcement personal were akin to a “knock and talk” encounter with Defendant, though not as invasive as the encounter and confrontation occurred not at the precipice of the residence but in the yard.

“Knock and Talk” is a law enforcement tactic where a police officer, who possess some information that they believe warrants further investigation, but that is insufficient to constitute probable cause for a search warrant, approach the person suspected of engaging in illegal activity at the person's residence (even knock on the front door), identify themselves as police officers, and request consent to search for the suspected illegality or illicit items.

State v. Warren, 05-2248, p. 5 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1215, 1221.

Moreover, law enforcement officers are not required to substantiate an anonymous complaint or tip before conducting a knock and talk. State v. Barnett, 24-69 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/30/24), 398 So.3d 826.

When officers possess information that they believe warrants further investigation, but which information is insufficient to constitute probable cause for a search warrant, they may approach the person suspected of engaging in illegal activity at the person's residence, knock on the door, identify themselves as police officers, request consent to talk to the individual about the alleged illegal activity, and request permission to enter the premises.

Id. at 838.

Here, the officers had information via the tip that Defendant had potentially committed wildlife violations and approached him as he was outside at the property. Thus, we find no merit to Defendant's argument that the officers had no basis to proceed to investigate the “tip.”

Next, Defendant argues that “[w]ithout reasonable suspicion to suspect any illegal activity, Sergeant Bruce proceeded to walk the area surrounding the home, purportedly looking for alligators or alligator parts, whether with permission or not.” He asserts that the officers’ search of the curtilage of the residence was unreasonable and, thus, unconstitutional. Defendant also argues that once the agent and deputies determined that there was no wildlife violation, they should have immediately left. Thus, they had no right to request consent to search or to look around the exterior areas of the property. We also disagree with this argument.

Sergeant Bruce testified that during his initial encounter with Defendant, he asked for and was given consent to search the curtilage of the property. This was confirmed by Deputy Garcia's testimony. This was done shortly after the officers arrived at the property. The fact that the entire encounter lasted significantly longer was due to the marijuana scent noted by the officers during their walk-around and the bag of suspected methamphetamines found laying by the driveway, giving them probable cause to proceed further by securing a search warrant for the residence.

While a valid consent search is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the burden is on the state to prove the consent was freely and voluntarily given. Voluntariness is a question for the trier of fact to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. The trial court's finding is to be given great weight upon appellate review. State v. Edwards, 434 So.2d 395 (La.1983); State v. Brown, 478 So.2d 600 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985).

State v. Bostic, 26,000, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/4/94), 637 So.2d 591, 596, writ denied, 94-1476 (La. 10/14/94), 643 So.2d 159.

[W]hen officers rely upon consent to justify a warrantless search, they have no more authority than they have been given by the consent. Therefore, any search beyond the permitted intrusion invalidates the voluntariness of the consent given to the extent that the search exceeds the parameters for which the permission was granted.

State v. Malone, 39,996, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/23/05), 912 So.2d 394, 398.

The officers admittedly only received Defendant's consent to search the exterior of the property, and they stayed within the scope of the authority granted to them. The trial court found as a matter of fact that Defendant consented to the search of the property, other than the interior of the house itself, stating specifically that it believed the testimony of Sergeant Bruce and Deputy Garcia. That finding is entitled to great weight, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court when its finding is based on the credibility of witnesses and the totality of the evidence. Accordingly, Defendant's argument in this regard lacks merit.

The actual search of the residence on the property was conducted pursuant to a warrant. During the consent search of the curtilage of the property, the agent and officers noted the scent of marijuana emanating from the residence. Effective August 1, 2022, La.Code Crim.P. art. 162.4 provides that “the odor of marijuana alone shall not provide a law enforcement officer with probable cause to conduct a search without a warrant of a person's place of residence.” Based on this information Corporal Nugent secured a warrant to search Defendant's residence. Defendant, however, argues that the affidavit in support of the search warrant “provided misleading information[,]” and “[a]ny evidence seized by law enforcement [was] in violation of [his] Fourth Amendment rights and should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.”

An affidavit supporting a search warrant is presumed to be valid. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Defendant at the hearing had the burden of proving that the representations in the affidavit by the affiants were false. State v. Wollfarth, 376 So.2d 107 (La., 1979) [sic]. When a defendant proves that an affidavit contains false statements, it should be determined whether the misrepresentations are intentional or unintentional. State v. Paster, 373 So.2d 170 (La., 1979) [sic].

State v. Brannon, 414 So.2d 335, 337 (La.1982).

Both the application for and the actual search warrant were introduced into evidence. Regarding Defendant's allegation that the affidavit in support of the search warrant provided misleading information, Officer Nugent's probable cause statement contained within the affidavit alleged:

On July 27, 2023, at approximately 12:00PM, I Corporal Evan Nugent of the Grant Parish Sheriff's Office, responded with LDWF Agent James Bruce to the residence of 1112 McKay Circle, Montgomery, LA in regards to an alligator complaint. The unknown complainant submitted a comlplaint [sic] to the LDWF Office via Operation Game Thief on Saturday July 22, 2023 stating that John C Lapaille on McKay Circle harvested an alligator closed season recently and provided social media photographs as evidence. The complainant also states that John has several firearms and will possibly have a 5 gallon bucket with marijuana, either inside the residence or outside the residence in a boat in the front yard. A criminal history check was conducted on John Lapaille and found that he was released from state probation in 2014 for a felony assault conviction from the state of California. Upon arrival, John was identified and the complaint was investigated. The alligator complaint was investigated by LDWF and found to be outside the statute of limitations. During investigation, Agent Bruce and Deputy Michael Garcia with permission did a walk of the exterior of the residence. Deputy Garcia states that he observed an odor he believed to be of marijuana coming from the rear window of the residence. I, Corporal Nugent, also observed an odor I believe to be of marijuana coming from the right rear left front side of the residence. John was questioned if he possesses a medical marijuana license, which he denied to answer [sic] and invoked his 5th amendment rights.

We fail to see how the affidavit supporting the search warrant is inaccurate or misleading in any respect. As set out in the affidavit, the tip was given, the officers investigated the tip, they received consent to search the exterior of the property, and they provided the trial court with probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for the residence based on the scent of marijuana coming from inside the residence. The burden was on Defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Corporal Nugent's affidavit contained intentional misrepresentations. The trial court did not note any in its ruling, and we find none in our review of the record.

Corporal Nugent's affidavit specifically noted that the complainant was unknown and that the marijuana tip was validated from personal observation by the odor emanating from the house. Assuming arguendo that Corporal Nugent did negligently or inadvertently make misrepresentations in his affidavit, the proper procedure would be to retest the warrant after striking the misrepresentations. State v. Williams, 448 So.2d 659 (La.1984). Even if every part of the affidavit were struck aside from Corporal Nugent's personal observation that he smelled marijuana coming from the residence, the search warrant would still be valid as “the smell of marijuana alone is sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant.” State v. Jarquin, 25-503, p. 1 (La. 9/24/25), 418 So.3d 898, ––– (per curiam). As such, Defendant's argument is without merit. The initial search of the perimeter or curtilage of the property was authorized by lawful consent, and the search warrant was lawfully issued and executed.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find one error patent. We further find that the trial court's minutes of sentencing need correction.

The trial court imposed a $1,500.00 fine (subsequently reduced to $1,250.00), court costs, a $750.00 fee to the Public Defender's Office, and a $71.00 monthly probation-supervision fee as conditions of Defendant's probation, but failed to establish a payment plan for the fine, court costs, and fee. Effective August 1, 2022, however, La.Code Crim.P. art. 875.1(C)(1) now requires the trial/sentencing court to hold a hearing to determine whether the payment in full of any fines and costs imposed would cause a substantial financial hardship to the defendant. If so, the court may establish a payment plan, waive some of the fines and costs, or both. Although La.Code Crim.P. art. 875.1(D)(2)(c) allows a defendant's probation and parole officer to impose a payment alternative, that section applies only after the trial court has established a payment plan and only for certain periods of time. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court to conduct a hearing pursuant to the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 875.1(C)(1).

A correction is also needed in the trial court minutes of sentencing. The court minutes show that the trial court imposed a $50.00 fee to be paid to the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement to be credited to the Drug Abuse and Treatment Fund, but the sentencing transcript does not reflect the imposition of this fee. “[W]hen the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Thus, the trial court is ordered to correct the sentencing minutes to delete the $50.00 fee to be paid to the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement.

DECREE

The trial court's decision denying the motion to suppress is affirmed, as are Defendant's conviction and sentence. The matter is remanded, and the trial court is ordered to conduct a hearing pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 875.1(C)(1) to determine whether the payment in full of the fines and cost imposed would cause a financial hardship to Defendant, and if so, to establish a payment plan for the payment thereof. Further, the trial court is ordered to correct the sentencing minutes to delete the $50.00 fee to be paid to the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant's name is listed as John Clarence LaPille in the bill of information and pleadings filed by the State. Throughout the majority of the record, Defendant is referred to as John Clarence LaPaille. In his handwritten Notice of Appeal, Defendant signed his name as John Clarence LaPaille Jr. For consistency with the spelling used in the bill of information, which is the name used in the lodging of this case on appeal, we will refer to Defendant as John Clarence LaPille.

KYZAR, Judge.