STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JALEEL MALIK DURISSEAU (2025)

This appeal follows Defendant's conviction for second degree murder and subsequent sentence to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. On appeal, Defendant raises issues relating to ineffective assistance of counsel and his confrontation clause rights. After review, we affirm Defendant's conviction and sentence but relegate one issue to post-conviction relief. We also order that the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order (USCO) be corrected to accurately reflect the trial court's imposition of Defendant's sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

On March 28, 2022, Defendant, Jaleel Malik Durisseau, was charged by true bill of indictment with the first degree murder of Corey Rosette, Jr., in violation of La.R.S. 14:30. The first degree murder charge was subsequently amended to second degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1.

At trial, the evidence revealed the following information regarding the offense. On February 14, 2022, police received reports that a deceased person had been discovered at an apartment in Opelousas. The person was identified as Corey Rosette, Jr., who died of gunshot wounds to the head and neck. The victim's neighbor and second cousin, Gwendolyn Jason, and his mother, Akecia Shaw, both saw the victim on Friday, February 11. Jason saw the victim earlier in the day and checked on his residence at 8:00 p.m. before going out with her sister, and at 3:00 a.m., after she came home. The victim did not answer the door on either occasion, but Jason assumed he was in the house because the back door and back storm door were both locked. She reported that there was loud music being played at 8:00 p.m. but not at 3:00 a.m.

Shaw testified that she last saw her son late in the afternoon on February 11, wearing the same clothes that he was ultimately found in by police on February 14. She attempted unsuccessfully to contact the victim on Saturday and Sunday, before asking Jason on Monday, February 14, to check on him.

When Jason arrived, Jason recalled that the back storm door was locked, so she went around to the front. She was surprised to find that the front storm door was wide open and that the front door itself was unlocked. Typically, Jason testified, the victim never used the front door because he sold drugs from this residence, and the front door posed security concerns. After cracking the front door and smelling an odd odor, Jason called one of her home health clients to come enter the residence with her. When they did, they found the victim wearing the same clothes that he wore on February 11, with his pockets flipped out, and the furniture tossed about as if someone had burglarized the residence. Jason also testified that the victim kept large quantities of cash in the sofa and in a blue backpack.

An early person of interest in the investigation was Lenny Bruce. Jason testified that Bruce had a close relationship with the victim and even lived at the victim's residence for a time leading up to the murder, but that the two had a recent falling out. Nonetheless, Jason testified that she saw Bruce at the residence on February 11. She testified that she also saw Defendant at the residence on occasion, always in Bruce's company, including as recently as February 10. Jason testified that she saw Defendant again on February 14. After Jason found the victim in his apartment, Defendant showed up at her apartment asking her questions. Defendant further contacted Jason later that night on Instagram.

When police arrived on scene, they found no sign of forced entry. They found numerous drugs in the residence, including marijuana, crystal methamphetamine, and a white powdery substance consistent with cocaine residue. Officers also found a receipt for a recently purchased PlayStation 4 with the console's serial number. Several other items were also collected and tested for DNA evidence, including cigarette butts found on the floor inside the apartment.

While at the crime scene, police were tipped off as to Bruce's presence in the crowd outside the residence while police were still investigating the scene, and he was subsequently detained and interviewed by police. While at the police station, Sergeant Derek Garrick noticed that Bruce was texting Defendant about a “game.”

Using the serial number from the receipt recovered at the victim's residence, police submitted a request to Sony to turn over the list of IP addresses that had recently connected to the PlayStation. Sony complied, and police quickly tracked the console to Gevontate Doucet,¹ who testified that he bought the console from Defendant in person on February 14 after seeing Defendant list it for sale on Instagram on February 12. That Instagram handle, papprroutte3x_, identified by Doucet and Jason as Defendant's, repeatedly posted selfie pictures of Defendant and audio clips containing his voice. Posts from his Instagram handle showed that he attempted to sell multiple items that police suspected were stolen from the victim's residence, including drugs and the PlayStation. In response to a request from a prospective buyer about the source of some of these items, Defendant sent an audio clip claiming that he shot someone several times and “took his stuff.” Police also recovered messages sent by Defendant on February 10 in a group chat, which discussed Bruce's recent fight with the victim and Defendant's intentions to get a teardrop tattoo. According to the testimony of several police officers at trial, this tattoo generally means that the bearer of the tattoo killed someone.

Police were able to recover data from Defendant's phone, despite him having performed a factory reset on the phone on February 13. Police recovered GPS data placing him in the vicinity of the murder and various searches he made on his phone, such as “how much jail time does homicide come with in Louisiana,” “Do [sic] god forgive murderers,” “homicide meaning,” and “Can a dog scent [sic] a gun buried.” Defendant searched for cabs and buses and made dozens of searches for the victim's name following the murder. When police arrested Defendant, Sergeant Mike Hidalgo overheard Defendant telling his mother, “I didn't have the phone during the murder.”

Lieutenant Brandon Harris, the lead investigator, testified that the cigarette butts collected at the murder scene and tested provided a positive match for Defendant. That evidence placed Defendant inside the victim's apartment, although Lt. Harris admitted he could not say when Defendant was there.

Defendant chose to testify at trial. He explained that the teardrop tattoo was in honor of his late father, whose birthday was February 11, and that he had the tattoo done on February 12, 2022, because he had turned eighteen that prior November and could legally have the tattoo done. He chose to wait until his father's birthday but could not get a ride until the 12th. Defendant also explained to trial counsel, Mr. Holt, why he chose a teardrop:

Q. Okay. What's on the other side of your face?

A. That's a teardrop and a cross.

Q. What's the significance of that?

A. For my daddy ․

Q. What about your dad? What's the connection?

A. He died, and my uncle and I was trying to be like them, my uncle and PaPa and them.

․

Q. Did they have teardrop tattoos?

A. Yes, Mr. Holt.

Defendant was asked about his Instagram messages in which he claimed he shot someone in the face. He testified that he was “false r[e]pping” “trying to get cool points” and “street cred.” He admitted to making the comments but denied the veracity of the statements. As to the drugs he was trying to sell online, he claimed that those came from “Speedy” also known as “Jaylon Hill.” Defendant admitted to seeing the victim on the day he died, but testified that he went over, by himself, around 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. to purchase marijuana, and denied going with Bruce to the victim's apartment that Friday.

After deliberation, the jury found Defendant guilty of second degree murder on October 25, 2024. On November 14, 2024, Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant filed a motion for appeal on December 2, 2024, which was granted on December 9, 2024.

Defendant asserts two assignments of error on appeal: first, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay evidence, prejudicial opinion testimony, and speculation based on evidence not in the record; and second, that his confrontation rights were violated by the introduction of hearsay statements made by Bruce, who Defendant refers to as a co-defendant.² For the following reasons, we find that these assignments are without merit.

ERRORS PATENT:

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, this Court concludes that the USCO needs correction. According to the transcript of sentencing, the trial court ordered Defendant's sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The sentencing minutes correctly reflect this, but the USCO does not indicate that any portion of the sentence is to be served without benefits. “[W]hen the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Although the sentencing minutes are correct, this court also orders correction of the commitment order when it conflicts with the transcript. See State v. Barker, 24-379 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/25), 407 So.3d 776. Thus, it is ordered that the trial court amend the USCO to reflect its imposition of Defendant's sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1:

In his first assignment of error, Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay statements, speculation, and unadmitted evidence. Defendant also asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to give an opening statement, issuing only one objection, and failing to file post-trial motions. Although ineffective assistance claims are generally relegated to post-conviction relief, the appellate court may address the issue when the record is sufficient enough to permit a definitive resolution. State v. Flemones, 23-742 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/17/24), 387 So.3d 751. We will address these subparts separately.

Standard of Review:

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), sets forth the test for ineffective assistance of counsel:

A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction ․ has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction ․ resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Hindsight judgments concerning trial strategy are disfavored and generally do not support claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Truehill, 09-1546 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/2/10), 38 So.3d 1246. See also State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 947, 108 S.Ct. 337 (1987). Trial strategy includes the calling of witnesses, the introduction of evidence, the cross-examination of witnesses, and the filing and pursuit of pretrial motions. State v. Reeves, 18-270 (La. 10/15/18), 254 So.3d 665; State v. Blank, 16-213 (La. 5/13/16), 192 So.3d 93; State v. Shed, 36,321 (La.App. 2 Cir. 09/18/02), 828 So.2d 124, writ denied, 02-3123 (La. 12/19/03), 861 So.2d 561; State v. Broadway, 17-825 (La. 9/21/18), 252 So.3d 878. Counsel is also not required to engage in futile efforts. Blank, 192 So.3d 93. Appellate courts afford strong deference to a trial counsel's trial strategy and a strong presumption that he has exercised reasonable professional judgment. State v. Batiste, 15-1008 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/16), 189 So.3d 580, writ denied, 16-1180 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So.3d 980.

Hearsay Testimony:

As to alleged hearsay statements, Defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to and for sometimes eliciting the imputed hearsay statements of Bruce and Fred Sibley. The record is sufficient to resolve this subset of claims rather than relegating them to post-conviction relief.

With one exception, all the statements that Defendant cites occurred during defense counsel's cross-examination of Lt. Harris or on the State's redirect of Lt. Harris. Indeed, one of the first questions that defense counsel posed to Lt. Harris on cross-examination was, “What did [Bruce] say?” Lt. Harris went on to describe what Bruce provided as his story of how the crime occurred. A defendant cannot object to hearsay testimony that he himself elicits. State v. Douglas, 23-331 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/28/24), 383 So.3d 266, writ denied, 24-434 (La. 10/23/24), 394 So.3d 1282. Further, both the State and Defendant quote the following exchange with Lt. Harris on redirect examination.³

Q. So, he stated they were coming from Magnolia [Street]?

A. Magnolia. That's correct. He stated that the whole time he was with the defendant, he said the defendant was mean mugging. He had some kind of frown on his face. It was obvious he had something on his mind. He stated as they were walking to the victim's residence, he stated that the defendant stated he was broke, and he was going to kill the victim to get the money and drugs that he had in the apartment.

Q. So, Lenny [Bruce] admitted to you that he knew what was going to happen when they entered that apartment?

A. That's correct. He stated once they got inside the apartment, he stated he said they were all in the kitchen at some point. At which time, the defendant and Mr. Rosette moved into the living room area. He continued to sit on the sink. He said the defendant asked to play the music, if he could play the music from the speaker that they had in the apartment. The music was turned up loud. He said just as soon as the music was turned up, he said he hears a single gunshot in the living room. He said he walked out and-- into the living room, and he observed the defendant shooting four or five more times at the victim. He said at that point after the victim was shot, he grabbed the victim, and pulled him down to the floor, and began to search his pockets, and remove-- removing crack cocaine from the pockets, a stack of money. I think, if I recall right, he stated that the stack of money consisted of several twenty dollar bills. He stated he thinks that he had some marijuana or mojo, better known for synthetic marijuana, in his pockets that were [sic] removed. He stated that the defendant began to flip the sofas in the living room looking for money and drugs in the sofas, and he stated that the defendant said that he needed more. So, he continued to search the apartment, and he stated that the defendant went into-inside the victim's bedroom and removed the PlayStation from the shelf, and he said-- he stated once they prepared to leave the apartment, the items that they had was [sic] too much for the defendant to carry, and I think it was mentioned that the defendant ordered Mr. Bruce to carry some of the items as they left. He stated that the defendant had some latex gloves on his hands. I think-- I think he said that they were purple in color that he had secured on his hands before he went into the apartment, and they left, and they walked back the same way that they came in ․

Because defense counsel had first asked Lt. Harris to relate Bruce's statements to the police concerning his account of the murder, defense counsel opened the door for the State to probe these same statements on redirect as it did. See State v. R.K., 10-982 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/11/11), 64 So.3d 426. Accordingly, defense counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to object to any of these hearsay statements.

The record supports the conclusion that eliciting these statements from Bruce was likely part of a larger trial strategy. During his cross-examination of Lt. Harris, permitting Lt. Harris to convey Bruce's statement, defense counsel stated:

Q. So from all of the other physical evidence, my question is was there any - - it seems to me that both of these guys were switching their stories. First, Lenny Bruce tells you one thing, then he goes to something else. Obviously, Mr. Durisseau tells you something, and then he tells you something else. So, how do we really know what happened?

Defense counsel later remarked, again, on Bruce's truthfulness:

Q. And you determined that he was not being truthful when he told you he lived at the Doucet's house, or some other residence?

․

Q. When you went- - Dominick's residence?

A. Yes. I learned that- -

Q. That turned out to be a lie?

A. That's correct.

And again, defense counsel pointed at the truthfulness of Bruce:

Q. So, according to your investigation, you have two guys who, according to your investigation, appeared to have been in that apartment, and one of the gentlemen, Lenny Bruce, tells you that my client is the one who basically shot the victim. My question to you is - - ․ how do you conclude which of the two gentlemen under this scenario that those are the only two that could've been in that apartment, how do you conclude that Jaleel Durisseau shot the victim, as opposed to Lenny Bruce, in view of the history, the track record, that Lenny Bruce [has] had with you of lying, previously?

Most of defense counsel's closing arguments concerned Bruce and his imputed statements, which defense counsel used both to lambast the State for not calling Bruce to testify, and to destroy Bruce's credibility so as to establish him as the true guilty party. In fact, Defense counsel's final words to the jury were:

And for that reason, we're asking you to find [Defendant] not guilty. I asked Lieutenant Harris- -I asked him something about [Bruce], and he said yes, I would like him prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Okay. Well, that's who should they [sic] be trying. Thank you.

Since defense counsel's elicitations were in line with a defensible trial strategy, namely an attempt to pin the murder on someone else, such elicitation does not render his performance ineffective.

Defendant does cite one statement that was not first elicited by defense counsel. The statement was elicited during Lt. Harris's explanation of what occurred during his investigation. The entire exchange, between the State and Lt. Harris on direct examination, is as follows:

Q. During the course of your investigation, did you receive information that the persons that were involved in the murder of Corey Rosette possibly burned their clothes after the murder in a yard on Claude Street?

A. Yes. So, I was informed that after the homicide was committed on the Friday, they walked several blocks north, which was at a residence on Claude Street, and there was a [sic] older gentlemen out there burning, I guess trash, and they requested to throw a-- they requested to throw their clothes in the burn pile. At that time, I think from what I learned was that they took their clothes off that they were wearing at that time, and they tossed the clothes, along with a bag, we believe is the backpack that belonged to the victim, and threw it into the burn pile, and destroyed the evidence.

Q. Okay. Were you-- you received this information, were you able to track down anyone?

A. Yes. I did speak to the gentleman that spoke to them and allowed them to burn the items. I did speak to him at another residence on Park Street.

Q. Okay. Did he provide you with the description of the two individuals?

A. Yes. He said-- he stated that one was light complected [sic] with dreads, and the other one was brown, skinny, and short.

During defense counsel's cross-examination, it was learned that the statement was imputed to Fred Sibley, who was deceased by the time of trial:

Q. Yesterday, you spoke about a gentleman. You referred to a gentleman who you stated that two individuals approached him as he was burning material, or whatever, and according to your testimony, those individuals asked him to allow them to burn their clothes?

A. That's correct.

․

Q. What is that individual's name?

A. The person who the property belonged to?

Q. Yeah, whoever was burning this stuff?

A. Mr. Fred Sibley.

Defense counsel questioned Lt. Harris as to why he failed to have Sibley perform a photo lineup, to which Lt. Harris admitted that Sibley stated he would be unable to identify or recognize the individuals again if he saw them. Defense counsel later elicited Bruce's hearsay statements from Lt. Harris concerning the presence of Bruce and Defendant at Sibley's burn pile. That testimony corroborated what Lt. Harris was told by Sibley.

A police officer's testimony regarding information provided to him by another individual is not hearsay when it is offered to explain the course of his investigation. State v. Jones, 18-81 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/26/18), 254 So.3d 1221, writ denied, 18-1828 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So.3d 584. Even assuming, arguendo, that this testimony was inadmissible to explain the course of Lt. Harris's investigation, hearsay that is merely cumulative or corroborative of other testimony introduced at trial is harmless. State v. Howard, 04-499 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/17/04), 888 So.2d 375, writ denied, 04-3216 (La. 4/8/05), 899 So.2d 13. Further, since defense counsel's own cross-examination arguably nullified any weight that Sibley's identification may have carried, Defendant cannot prove prejudice from the introduction of Sibley's testimony. Accordingly, we find that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Sibley's statements elicited via Lt. Harris.

Speculation concerning Defendant's tattoo:

Regarding Defendant's speculation claims, he asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony concerning a teardrop tattoo under Defendant's left eye. Defendant asserts on appeal that the State's references to his teardrop tattoo were a deliberate “attempt to create an atmosphere of racism, intolerance, xenophobia, and prejudice” based upon a “specious” contention that ignores numerous alternative explanations for the significance of the tattoo. He asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to “guard against” these remarks.

The complained of testimony was elicited from Lt. Harris and Sergeant Derek Garick, who both testified that a teardrop tattoo “usually” signifies that the bearer committed a murder. Lt. Harris was asked on direct examination:

Q. When you questioned Jaleel Durisseau on the 18th, did you notice any facial tattoos?

․

A. Yes. I did. He had fresh tattoo - - one in which was very unique was a tattoo of a teardrop underneath his eye.

Q. Okay. You've been in law enforcement for a long time?

A. Yes.

Q. Twenty-four years?

A. Twenty-four years.

Q. Twenty-four years. In your experience as a law enforcement officer, what does a teardrop tattoo located near someone's eye indicate or signify?

A. It usually signifies that they have committed a murder.

Lt. Harris then testified that, after viewing a video from February 11 on either Defendant or Bruce's cell phone, he noticed that Defendant did not have that tattoo on that date. On direct, Sgt. Garrick commented that he noticed what he believed was a fresh tattoo on Defendant's face when he detained Defendant while executing a search warrant. However, it was not until cross-examination by defense counsel that Sgt. Garrick opined on the meaning of the tattoo:

Q. Okay. Let's talk about the teardrop. Did you ask him about the teardrop tattoo?

A. I don't recall.

․

Q. Does it have any particular significance?

A. Yes.

Q. To your knowledge, what does that mean?

A. A murder was committed.

Q. Okay. Did you ask Jaleel Durisseau about the meaning of the teardrop on his face?

․

A. I don't remember.

Q. You don't remember? Okay. How long have you been on the force?

A. Fifteen years.

Q. Have you arrested other individuals with teardrop tattoos on them?

A. Yes.

Q. And were they all in connection to a homicide?

A. I don't know.

As the record demonstrates, Sgt. Garrick's opinion regarding the meaning of teardrop tattoos was directly solicited by defense counsel.

At trial, the State presented extracted cellphone data indicating that Defendant had the teardrop tattoo commissioned shortly after the murder. Instagram messages, sent shortly before the murder from an account tied to Defendant, announced his intentions to get the tattoo the next day while discussing a recent fight between Bruce and the victim. In his own defense, the jury heard Defendant testify that he got the tattoo to honor his father, whose birthday was February 11, 2021, and waited until February of 2022, because he turned eighteen that past November. Defense counsel repeated this defense in his closing arguments and asserted that other members of Defendant's family had teardrop tattoos as well.

Although Defendant labels this testimony as “expert” testimony, he does not otherwise reference the rules on expert testimony. Additionally, the defendants in the relevant cases cited by Defendant were accusing the State of using their tattoos to elicit evidence of other crimes. State v. Lagarde, 03-606 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/10/03), 861 So.2d 871, writ denied, 04-340 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 829; Gonzales v. Quarterman, 458 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2006), cert denied, 549 U.S. 1323, 127 S.Ct. 1909 (2007). In other cases in this state, parties made similar objections to such testimony. See State v. Ross, 12-109 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/17/13), 115 So.3d 616, writ denied, 13-1079 (La. 11/22/13), 126 So.3d 476. However, “other crimes” objections were not available to defense counsel as the State expressly sought to tie Defendant's tattoo to the particular murder in this case and produced evidence to that effect. It was not used as evidence of other crimes.

Instead, the State cites, in brief, jurisprudence where tattoos were admissible where they were relevant and their probative value did not outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice. For instance, in State v. Motley, 39,321 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/2/05), 895 So.2d 708, writ denied, 05-826 (La. 4/24/06), 926 So.2d 532, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder. On cross-examination, the State asked the defendant if he had any tattoos and then asked the defendant to display a tattoo on his arm to the jury that said, “killer.” Id. at 712. The trial court found that evidence of defendant's character had been introduced via defendant's employer and his own testimony. The defendant argued on appeal that the tattoo was inflammatory and was not character or personality evidence. On appeal, the second circuit found no reversible error in the trial court's decision to allow the tattoo to be shown to the jury:

Defendant chose to testify [on] his own behalf. Having done so, he was subject to cross-examination on the entire case. Tattoos are admissible when relevant, i.e., when the probative value of their display to the jury is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. State v. Martin, 519 So.2d 87 (La.1988), appeal after remand, 558 So.2d 654 (La.App. 1st Cir.1990), writ denied, 564 So.2d 318 (La.1990). A trial judge is vested with wide discretion in determining relevance. Id.

Although evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or waste of time. La. C.E. Art. 403; State v. Ludwig, 423 So.2d 1073 (La.1982).

In the instant case, the tattoo had little relevance; however, defendant testified that the tattoo was old [allegedly received when he was fifteen] and that he was ashamed of it, so the jury was able to decide what weight, if any, to give to the evidence. If error, it was clearly harmless. We find no showing of reversible error on the trial court's part. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Id.

In this case, Defendant's tattoo holds more relevance, as the State introduced the Instagram messages discussing Defendant receiving a teardrop tattoo following the discussion of a fight between Bruce and the victim the day prior to the victim's murder. Additionally, Defendant was given the opportunity to explain the tattoo. Defendant testified that he received the tattoo on February 12, the day after the victim's murder, but denies it signified committing a murder. Instead, he testified that the tattoo was in honor of his late father whose birthday was February 11, and who also had a teardrop tattoo. Considering the totality of the evidence regarding the tattoo, Lt. Harris's and Sgt. Garrick's opinion as to their years of experience with the meaning of a teardrop tattoo was relevant and not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, especially considering Defendant's testimony and defense counsel's closing statements.

Accordingly, since Defendant has not specified a valid ground upon which his counsel could have objected and the evidence is otherwise highly probative, we find his counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.

Facts not in evidence:

Defendant also asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to facts referenced by the State that were not in evidence. Defendant specifically refers to the State's contentions that the victim had narcotics at his residence and that Defendant stole the drugs after murdering him.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 774 provides, relevantly, that arguments at trial “shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case” without “appeal to prejudice.”

Contrary to Defendant's assertion, evidence in the record did establish both challenged facts. Bruce claimed, in statements that were elicited by defense counsel during the cross-examination of Lt. Harris, that Defendant removed crack cocaine from the victim's pockets shortly after murdering him. Defendant's challenges to Bruce's statements have already been discussed. Even without his testimony, the challenged facts could have been inferred from other evidence: what appeared to be cocaine residue was found at the victim's residence, there were obvious indications that the victim was robbed at the time of the murder, Defendant sold narcotics while he was selling the victim's other possessions (particularly his PlayStation), and Defendant posted an audio clip through his Instagram claiming that he obtained several of these items after shooting someone and taking his belongings. Accordingly, we find no merit to this ineffective assistance claim.

Miscellaneous objections:

Defendant asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to give an opening statement, issuing only one objection, and for not filing “a Motion for New Trial, for Judgment of Acquittal, for Reconsideration of Sentence, or a Notice of appeal.” Defendant only includes these claims in his summary of the argument and does not elaborate on them further in brief. Defendant also asserts that his counsel was ineffective for instructing him to wear clear-lens glasses. Defendant argues that this “ploy” was immediately pointed out by the State and that this instruction was therefore detrimental to him. Defendant does not provide any evidence that his counsel told him to put on glasses, and his counsel's putative reasons for doing so are not elaborated upon. “General statements and conclusory allegations will not suffice to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Celestine, 11-1403, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/30/12), 91 So.3d 573, 579. Furthermore, since defense counsel's reasons for not taking these actions and for allegedly giving the eyeglasses instruction are not on the record, any merit to these claims would be best resolved on collateral review and are, therefore, relegated to post-conviction relief.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2:

For his second assignment of error, Defendant asserts that his rights pursuant to the Confrontation Clause were violated by the admission of Bruce's hearsay testimony. As already discussed above, Defendant cannot complain on appeal about evidence that his counsel chose to elicit, either directly or via opening the door for the State on rebuttal. Further, since his counsel did not make any contemporaneous objections to these statements at trial, these claims were not preserved for appellate review pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 841(A). Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE:

Defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed. However, those claims discussed under “Miscellaneous objections” are relegated to post-conviction relief. The trial court is further instructed to amend the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order to reflect the trial court's imposition of Defendant's sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

AFFIRMED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mr. Doucet spelled his name on the record as “Gevontate” Doucet, but he is referred to as “Jevontate” Doucet in some documents.

2.   This Court notes that there is no co-defendant charged in the indictment.

3.   Both the State and Defendant incorrectly attributed this exchange to Defendant's counsel.

CANDYCE G. PERRET JUDGE