STATE OF LOUISIANA v. WILLIAM FRYE (2025)

Defendant, William K. Frye, appeals the 24th Judicial District Court's judgments dated October 2024 pertaining to his convictions and sentences for carjacking, second degree kidnapping, and two counts of simple robbery. For the following reasons, the judgments of the district court are affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts were adduced at trial.

On November 30, 2022, Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office (“JPSO”) responded to a hold-up alarm at Metairie Bank located on Jefferson Highway. Bank tellers Barbara Cockfield and Joshua Shepley both testified that the robber, a Black male wearing a gray hoodie and gloves, ordered them and a customer, Albert Charles Cook IV, to the floor, and demanded money be put into a pillowcase. They tellers were specifically instructed not to include dye packs or marked bills. Both tellers were able to give Defendant “bait bills.”¹ Detective John Walsdorf testified that $8,165.00 was taken from Mr. Shepley, and $5,495.00 was taken from Ms. Cockfield at Metairie Bank that day. Neither teller got a good look at the robber, and both indicated they could not positively identify the perpetrator during or after the incident. Surveillance footage confirmed the timing and sequence of these events from multiple angles, but did not enhance the witnesses’ ability to identify the suspect.

Within minutes of the robbery, a carjacking occurred at Moon's Towing, a business located a short distance from the bank. Louise Bellazer had left her granddaughter, Laci Washington, in the backseat of a running blue Acura MDX while she and her grandson, Rayvan Tilton-Bellazer, went inside. Ms. Bellazer saw a man approach her vehicle and instructed Rayvan to go see what was happening. Rayvan observed the man interacting with Laci, and attempted to intervene when the man entered the car and started to drive off. Laci testified that the man requested a ride, which she refused; nonetheless, he entered the vehicle and drove off with her inside. Laci opened the door and leapt from the moving car; her body was dragged a distance and the JPSO who responded to that scene found her on the ground, unable to move. Laci sustained injuries, including a fractured pelvis that required emergency surgery followed by a substantial recovery.

None of the primary carjacking witnesses—Ms. Bellazer, Rayvan, or Laci—testified to having a clear opportunity to view the perpetrator's face at the scene. Rayvan, despite witnessing the confrontation and attempting an intervention, did not provide a conclusive identification—selecting an individual other than Frye in a photo lineup administered by police. Laci later recognized Defendant from a photo in a news story that identified him as a suspect, and she was able to identify Defendant entering the blue Acura in the surveillance videos obtained from local businesses.

JPSO found the blue Acura within the hour of the carjacking. An eyewitness at the scene advised that he saw Defendant, a man he knows from the neighborhood, exit the abandoned vehicle. Another team of investigators canvassing the area around the bank found a grey jacket with a red plaid lining, a white pillow case, and a pair of yellow and black gloves in someone's backyard. There was cash inside of the pillowcase. Police learned that Defendant owned a early 90's model burgundy Chrysler New Yorker. JPSO located and established physical surveillance of that vehicle at the Rodeway Inn at the 5700 block of Airline Highway. Hotel staff confirmed that Defendant was renting a room and advised that Defendant commented, “I got to go to the bank. I'll be back,” when he was informed that additional room fees were due. Later, JPSO observed Defendant leave his room and attempt to flee on foot after noticing their presence. JPSO swiftly apprehended Defendant and took him into custody. Police also found a pillow with a missing pillowcase in Defendant's room. A $10 bait bill was found among the $428.00 recovered from Defendant person. JPSO also recovered $376.00 from the nearby backyard and $5,400.00 from Defendant's room at the Rodeway Inn. In addition, Police obtained surveillance videos from two stores that captured purchases Defendant made after the robbery according to the receipts found in the hotel room.

The original and superseding bills of information were filed in March 2023, charging Frye with carjacking, second degree kidnapping, two counts of simple robbery, and one count of resisting an officer. Defendant was tried on four counts: carjacking, second-degree kidnapping, and two counts of simple robbery.²

Immediately prior to trial, Frye was granted permission to proceed pro se following a Faretta 3 hearing, though standby counsel was allowed.⁴ Key suppression motions were also argued and denied. The trial commenced on September 24, 2024. The State's witnesses included the two bank tellers, the bank customer and the carjacking victims, along with JPSO investigators, DNA analysts, and detectives. After a two-day trial, Frye was found guilty by a unanimous jury on all four counts.

Post-trial, the defense filed motions for a new trial, for recusal (based on claims of judicial conflict due to the trial judge's alleged prior involvement in Frye's prosecution), and for reconsideration of sentence. The trial court denied all of the motions. The court imposed an initial aggregate sentence of 25 years (carjacking), 35 years (second-degree kidnapping), and five years on each robbery count, all to run consecutively. Subsequent amendments clarified parole/probation restrictions, and the carjacking sentence was reduced to 20 years, per statutory limits, for a total term of 65 years imprisonment at hard labor.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Counseled Assignment of Error

1. The trial court erred in that it imposed an excessive sentence, considering that no weapons were involved in the offenses, Mr. Frye, 47 years of age, does not have a violent criminal history, other than a misdemeanor battery of a police officer. The consecutive sentences imposed for two immediate incidents creates [sic] a de facto life sentence of 65 years without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.

Pro Se Assignments of Error

1. Under the Louisiana Constitution. Art. 1 §§ 2, 16 and United States Constitution Amendments V and XIV, Frye was denied a fair trial and the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the continuances requested by Frye, as pro se to prepare defense, and requested by Mr. Handy, after he was reinstated as counsel, when he vehemently stated he was not ready to continue to trial.

2. Under the Louisiana Constitution. Art. 1 §§ 2, 16 and United States Constitution Amendments V and XIV, Frye was denied a fair trial and the trial judge abused his discretion by: a) denying Frye's motion for recusal after, prior to trial beginning, the judge was made aware of his involvement, as prosecutor, in Defendant's previous convictions; b) holding a conference with a juror without defense present; and c) intercepting Frye's complaint letter to the Judiciary Commission based on comments trial judge made during pretrial hearings.

3. Under the Louisiana Constitution. Art. 1 §§ 2, 13 and United States Constitution Amendments V, VI, and XIV, the trial judge abused his discretion by denying a mistrial when a State's Witness mentioned the words “anonymous witness,” which was litigated and ruled on by the Court prior to trial, and the trial judge also failed to consider admonishment of the jury, which resulted in prejudicing the jury.

4. Under the Louisiana Constitution. Art. 1 §§ 2, 13 and United States Constitution Amendments VI and XIV, the trial judge abused his discretion by allowing a juror who worked at facility where Defendant was being held and knew Defendant, and also participating in ex parte communication with same juror on issue of Defendant being “a problem” in trial.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

First, we address the timing of Defendant's appeal. Defendant was found guilty as charged on counts one through four in September 2024, and sentenced on October 3, 2024. The following day, Defendant filed a motion for appeal. After Defendant's motion for appeal was granted, the trial court had to correct two issues relative to Defendant's sentences pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure art. 881.5 provides that “[o]n motion of the state or the defendant, or on its own motion, at any time, the court may correct a sentence imposed by that court which exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by law.”

Defendant was originally sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment for his conviction on count one. However, at the time of the offense La. R.S. 14:64.2(B)(1) provided that whoever committed the crime of carjacking “shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than two years nor more than twenty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” On October 9, 2024, the trial court vacated the original sentence and resentenced Defendant to twenty years imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Article 882(A) provides in pertinent part that an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence. Defendant was originally sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment on count two without a restriction of benefits. However, La. R.S. 14:44.1(C) provides in pertinent part that whoever commits the crime of second degree kidnapping shall be sentenced without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for at least two years. Accordingly, on October 9, 2024, the trial court also amended the original sentence on count two and added that it would be served without benefits.

Although the trial court was divested of jurisdiction when it granted Defendant's motion for an appeal on October 4, 2025, this premature appeal need not be dismissed because the final sentences were imposed after his motion for an appeal had been filed and granted. See State v. Simms, 03-1459 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/04), 892 So.2d 111, 114, n.1. This Court has found harmless a trial court's imposition of sentence after having been divested of jurisdiction. Therefore, in this instance, we will not dismiss Defendant's appeal “as this would only result in a delay of [his] right to appellate review.” State v. Lampkin, 12-391, p. 3 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/16/13), 119 So.3d 158, 162, writ denied sub nom. State ex rel. Lampkin v. State, 13-2303 (La. 5/23/14), 140 So.3d 717.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

The trial court erred in that it imposed an excessive sentence, considering that no weapons were involved in the offenses, Mr. Frye, 47 years of age, does not have a violent criminal history, other than a misdemeanor battery of a police officer. The consecutive sentences imposed for two immediate incidents creates [sic] a de facto life sentence of 65 years without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.

Appellate counsel argues the court imposed a near life sentence when it ordered Defendant's sentences to run consecutively, totaling sixty-five years. Counsel avers the carjacking statute provides for enhancement of the sentence in the case of injury to a person, and as such consecutive sentencing for the offense is an abuse of discretion. He contends the injury to Laci was not intentional and argues the record is clear that the “brief crime spree” occurred when Defendant had no money for housing, and he impulsively decided to rob the bank. Counsel further argues Defendant was unarmed and “the kidnapping charge is technically correct” but the facts are closer to an attempted kidnapping in that the facts do not show an actual taking of the victim from the scene He contends the sentencing provision of La. R.S. 14:64.2 already included the elements of taking a motor vehicle belonging to another in the presence of the passenger. Defendant argues the carjacking was the cause of the injury to the passenger, and the kidnapping was a concurrent act.

The State contends there is no merit to Defendant's argument that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion. As an initial matter, the State asserts Defendant's excessive sentence claim is based on the fact they were imposed consecutively as opposed to concurrently. The State avers that, because Defendant did not raise the consecutive nature of his sentences in his motion to reconsider sentence, he is precluded from raising the issue on appeal, and the issue is not included in the review for constitutional excessiveness. The State further argues the nature of the crimes, as well as Defendant's criminal background, provided ample support for the trial court imposing the maximum sentence on count one, as well as the sentences on the remaining three counts.

At the sentencing hearing, in October 2025, the State informed the trial court that it filed a “Memorandum Regarding Defendant's Criminal History” the previous day. Mr. Cook, the customer present at Metairie Bank during the robbery, gave a victim impact statement. He explained this was the second time he had experienced a crime and he wanted to take an active role in this trial. He told Defendant he did not appreciate what he did and that he deserved everything that was coming to him. Mr. Cook thanked the judge and the assistant district attorneys and hoped his participation helped him to heal because being a victim was “not fun.”

Before imposing Defendant's sentence, the trial judge explained he reviewed the factors of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 in considering Defendant's sentences. He stated Defendant committed a crime spree that terrified everyone at the bank and Laci. He expressed that the victims may have to deal with the consequences of Defendant's actions for the rest of their lives. The trial judge felt Defendant showed no regard for other people or their safety. He remarked that Laci was only eighteen years old when the incident occurred and Defendant could have let her out of the car. Instead, Defendant created such fear in her that she was forced to jump out, and sustained a broken pelvis as a result of the fall. The trial judge pondered how the experience and injury would affect Laci's future and her ability to bear children. He further stated that Defendant actions – climbing on the teller's counter and hitting the plexiglass window – were violent and made others present apprehensive. The judge explained Defendant's crimes could have resulted in more harm to more innocent people.

The trial judge remarked Defendant had decades to straighten himself out and his criminal record showed he was a career criminal. The trial judge mentioned previous convictions: two counts of possession of cocaine in 1994 (with revoked probation); resisting an officer, illegal carrying of a weapon, and possession of marijuana, first offense in 1994; possession of cocaine in 1998; two counts of distribution of cocaine in 1998; another possession of cocaine in 1998; and a conviction in the Eastern District of Louisiana in 2006 for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, armed bank robbery with assault and jeopardy to life, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime. The trial judge also noted Defendant robbed the same bank in 2006 that he robbed in the instant case. The judge concluded he did not think Defendant could be rehabilitated. After imposing Defendant's sentences, defense counsel noted his objection for the record.

On October 4, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence. The motion provided that pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1, the sentence was excessive, and requested for reconsideration, stating that a “lower sentence more in keeping with fairness and state and federal constitutional standards be imposed.”

On October 9, 2024, the trial court vacated its earlier sentence as to count one (carjacking) and resentenced Defendant to twenty years without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial court added that the second degree kidnapping sentence would also be without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Additionally, both the sentences of simple robbery would be served at hard labor. The judge stated, “I believe brings [sic] the sentence to sixty-five years. Is that correct? I ran everything consecutive with each other.”

Defense counsel subsequently argued at the hearing on his motion for reconsideration that the sentence imposed was unreasonable because Defendant was “cleansed no bill,” and there was no weapon involved. The trial judge replied that it gave its reasons at sentencing and that the reasons spoke for themselves. He explained that Defendant had a “very bad record,” there were injuries involved, and there was a brazen bank robbery. The judge then denied the motion to reconsider, and defense counsel noted his objection for the record.

We first point out that because Defendant did not raise the issue regarding the consecutive nature of his sentences at the trial court, he is precluded from raising that issue on appeal. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(B) provides that a motion for reconsideration of sentence “shall be oral at the time of sentence or shall be in writing thereafter and shall set forth the specific grounds on which the motion is based.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E) provides that “failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.”

This Court has held that the failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence, or to state the specific grounds upon which the motion is based, limits a defendant to a bare review of the sentence for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Manuel, 20-172 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/2/21), 325 So.3d 513, 568, writ denied, 21-926 (La. 10/12/21), 325 So.3d 1071. When the consecutive nature of sentences is not specifically raised in the trial court, the defendant is precluded from raising the issue on appeal and the issue is not included in the review for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Durant, 24-243 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d 736, 743.

In the instant matter, Defendant does not argue that his individual sentences were excessive but only that the consecutive nature totaling sixty-five years is excessive. Defendant orally objected to his initial sentences imposed. However, in the written motion for reconsideration of sentence filed the next day, he only urged “that the sentence imposed is excessive”. Defense counsel did not specifically raise the issue of the consecutive nature of his sentences at the initial sentencing or at the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence. Because Defendant failed to argue the imposition of consecutive sentences in the trial court or in the motion to reconsider sentence, the issue was not preserved for review on appeal. See State v. Adams, 23-508 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/14/24), 398 So.3d 143, 146 (finding defendant who failed to raise the issue of the consecutive nature of his original sentences at the trial court, and did not file a second motion to reconsider after resentencing was precluded from challenging the sentences’ consecutive nature on appeal); State v. Greene, 06-667 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/30/07), 951 So.2d 1226, 1238, writ denied, 07-546 (La. 10/26/07), 966 So.2d 571 (stating that the defendant's failure to state specific grounds upon which the motion to reconsider was based limited the defendant to a bare review of the sentence for constitutional excessiveness, and recognizing that the excessiveness of a consecutive sentence was not included in a bare constitutional review).

Considering the foregoing, this Court will conduct a limited review for constitutional excessiveness as to the individual counts. See State v. Scie, 13-634, p. 4-5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/15/14), 134 So.3d 9; see also State v. Franklin, 13-723 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/14), 142 So.3d 295, 304, writ denied, 14-1396 (La. 2/13/15), 159 So.3d 462.

As to count one, carjacking in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.2, at the time of the offense, the sentencing range for carjacking was not less than two years nor more than twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant was sentenced to the maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. As to count two, second degree kidnapping in violation of La. R.S. 14:44.1, the sentencing range was not less than five years nor more than forty years imprisonment at hard labor with at least two years of the sentence imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. As to counts three and four, simple robbery in violation of La. R.S. 14:65, at the time of the offense, the sentencing range was a fine of not more than three thousand dollars, imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than seven years, or both. Defendant was sentenced to five years imprisonment at hard labor on each count.

In reviewing a trial court's sentencing discretion, three factors are considered: 1) the nature of the crime; 2) the nature and background of the offender; and 3) the sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and other courts. State v. Woods, 18-413 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/19/18), 262 So.3d 455, 460.

The issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Diaz, 20-381 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/17/21), 331 So.3d 500, 520, writ denied, 21-1967 (La. 4/5/22), 335 So.3d 836. The appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D); State v. Pearson, 07-332 (La. App. 5. Cir. 12/27/07), 975 So.2d 646, 656. Generally, maximum sentences are reserved for cases involving the most serious violations of the offense charged and the worst type of offender. State v. Melgar, 19-540 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/30/20), 296 So.3d 1107, 1115, writ not considered, 20-1199 (La. 3/9/21), 312 So.3d 267.

In the instant matter, the record reflects that Defendant committed the series of crimes on the same day. Testimony reflects that multiple victims were affected by the robberies at the bank. Defendant damaged property at the bank and instilled fear in the tellers and bystanders, while stealing thousands of dollars. Testimony also reflects that Laci was physically injured as a result of the second degree kidnapping and carjacking, and required surgery to repair her broken pelvis. Laci's cousin and grandmother were forced to witness the carjacking and kidnapping. Mr. Bellazer had a physical struggle with Defendant in an attempt to gain control of the car. As pointed out by the trial judge, Defendant's actions could have resulted in more harm to other innocent people. The record reflects that the trial court took into consideration Defendant's criminal history, which includes multiple convictions for possession and distribution of drugs, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, illegal carrying of a weapon, resisting an officer, and a federal conviction for the armed bank robbery of the same bank in 2006. After the trial judge considered the factors of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, he concluded he did not think Defendant could be rehabilitated. The sentences Defendant received for counts one through four were within the sentencing ranges for each offense; courts have upheld similar sentences for the same offenses. See State v. Baker, 49,841 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/15), 166 So.3d 1152, 1170, writ denied, 15-1219 (La. 3/4/16), 185 So.3d 745 (affirming 20-year sentence for carjacking); State v. Gauthier, 04-1608 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 916 So.2d 314, 326, writ denied, 06-465 (La. 9/22/06), 937 So.2d 378; State v. Corkern, 461 So.2d 1238, 1242 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (affirming five-year sentence for simple robbery of victim injured during commission of crime by Defendant with history of criminal behavior since he was a juvenile, including prior felony convictions).

Considering the foregoing, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant, and the individual sentences are not constitutionally excessive. This assignment of error is, therefore, without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Under the Louisiana Constitution. Art. 1 §§ 2, 16 and United States Constitution Amendments V and XIV, Frye was denied a fair trial and the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the continuance requested by Frye, as pro se to prepare defense, and the continuance requested by Mr. Handy, after he was reinstated as counsel, when he vehemently stated he was not ready to continue to trial.

Defendant argues that the trial judge abused his discretion when he referred to the fact that the case had been continued seventeen times as a basis to deny Defendant's request for a continuance on September 23, 2024. Defendant makes various references to the continuances granted by the trial court throughout his proceedings and argues that they “placed undue restraints” on his due process rights and his right of a fair trial. Defendant's main contention is the trial court erred when it denied his pro se motion to continue (when he represented himself) and defense counsel's motion to continue (when defense counsel was reinstated as his counsel).

On September 23, 2024, before the motion to suppress hearing, Defendant informed the trial court that he wished to proceed pro se. During the Faretta hearing, Defendant indicated that he did not have discovery, and the court informed Defendant that he was not going to continue the case. The trial judge explained that there had already been seventeen continuances in the matter and that trial was set for the next day. The judge informed Defendant that defense counsel (Mr. Handy) would be available during the trial for Defendant to ask questions. Defendant expressed he did not want Mr. Handy involved, that there were issues with discovery, and that Mr. Handy never filed discovery information. The trial court asked Mr. Handy if he received discovery, and Mr. Handy stated that Defendant had been given the written discovery, and, up to what was provided to him through the prior week, he had gone through the videos with Defendant. Defendant confirmed that he did not change his mind as to proceeding pro se. The suppression hearing proceeded, and the trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence. The minute entry from September 24, 2024 reveals Defendant re-hired Mr. Handy. The court also denied Defendant's counseled motion for continuance and noted the Defense's objection.

A motion for a continuance must be made in writing, allege the specific grounds upon which it is based, and be filed at least seven days prior to trial. La. C.Cr.P. art. 707. At any time upon written motion and after contradictory hearing, the court may grant a continuance but only upon a showing that the motion is in the interest of justice. Id. The denial of an oral motion for continuance leaves nothing for the appellate court to review. State v. Priest, 18-518 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/6/19), 265 So.3d 993, 1003, writ denied, 19-418 (La. 5/20/19), 271 So.3d 201.

The record does not include a written motion for a continuance; thus, there is nothing for this Court to review. See Priest, 265 So.3d at 1003. Nevertheless, there is a jurisprudential exception to the requirement for a written motion where the circumstances producing the motion occur unexpectedly, and there is no opportunity to prepare the motion. Id. at 1004. A review of the record reveals that that Mr. Handy was appointed to represent Defendant on March 23, 2023. The trial court first set a trial date of April 10, 2023. The court granted a continuance at the Defendant's request in order to give the defense a chance to receive discovery. The following two trial dates were reset at the Defendant's request in order for Defendant to have a chance to review discovery and have motions heard. Four additional trial dates were set and then continued — over the defense's objection. The court granted the State and defense's joint motion to continue the December 11, 2023 trial date. Four additional trial dates were set and reset before the September 23, 2024 date; two of the continuances were made at the request of the defense. Considering the extent of Mr. Handy's representation of Defendant evidenced by the record prior to Defendant opting to represent himself, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying either the pro se or counseled motion to continue.

Code of Criminal Procedure art. 712 states, “A motion for continuance, if timely filed, may be granted, in the discretion of the court, in any case if there is good ground therefor.” Whether to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and a reviewing court will not disturb such a determination absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Labranche, No. 24-K-518, 2024 WL 4692365 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/6/2024). Generally, a conviction will not be reversed even on a showing of an improper denial of a motion for a continuance absent a showing of specific prejudice. State v. Simmons, 13-258 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/14), 136 So.3d 358, 366, writ denied, 14-674 (La. 10/31/14), 152 So.3d 151.

Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying both Defendant's pro se motion to continue and defense counsel's motion to continue. The record reflects that Mr. Handy began his representation of Defendant on April 10, 2023. Defendant requested to represent himself the day before trial on September 23, 2024. During the Faretta hearing, despite Defendant's allegations to the contrary, Mr. Handy informed the court that he had reviewed all discovery, and the majority of it with Defendant. Defendant does not explain how he was prejudiced either by the denial or his own or Mr. Handy's motions to continue. The record reflects defense counsel extensively cross-examined each of the State's witnesses at trial. See State v. Malinda, 95-292 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/31/95), 663 So.2d 882, 886. Defendant has not shown how either he could have presented a better defense, or how Mr. Handy could have done so, had the continuances been granted. See id. Considering the foregoing, we find Defendant failed to show any prejudice resulting from the denial of the motions to continue, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when doing so. Accordingly, we find this pro se assignment of error lacks merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

Under the Louisiana Constitution. Art. 1 §§ 2, 16 and United States Constitution Amendments V and XIV, Frye was denied a fair trial and the trial judge abused his discretion by denying Frye's motion for recusal after, prior to trial beginning, was aware of his involvement, as prosecutor, in Defendant's previous convictions, held conference with a juror without defense present, and intercepted Frye's complaint letter to the Judiciary Commission based on comments trial judge made during pretrial hearings.

Defendant argues that at the suppression hearing, Judge Brindisi alluded to a letter he sent to the Judiciary Commission, which he alleges the judge intercepted and returned to defense counsel. He avers that during the suppression hearing, the judge “went into pantomimic character” before verbalizing that Defendant was guilty. Defendant argues that the judge's action of intercepting the letter showed his inability to give him a fair and impartial trial. Defendant contends that he requested the records of the hearing, but he was denied by this Court because “no substantive hearing was held.”

After the trial was held and the verdicts were rendered on September 25, 2024, on October 2, 2024, defense counsel filed “Defense Motion to Recuse the Trial Court.” A hearing was held the same day, and after hearing arguments, the trial court denied the motion. Defense counsel objected to the trial court's ruling and noted his intent to seek a writ and request a stay. The trial judge denied the stay, and our records do not reflect that a writ was sought with this Court.

A trial judge is presumed to be impartial, and the burden is on the party seeking to recuse a judge to prove otherwise. State v. Sly, 23-60 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/2/23), 376 So.3d 1047, 1096, writ denied, 23-1588 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So.3d 608. In order to obtain a recusal based on bias, prejudice, and personal interest, the party seeking the recusal must establish more than conclusory allegations. State v. Galliano, 05-962 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/29/06), 945 So.2d 701, 727-28, writ denied, 06-2367 (La. 4/27/07), 955 So.2d 682. The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that while trial judges “have a duty to remain impartial and neutral, judges are not merely umpires or moderators.” State v. Baldwin, 388 So.2d 679, 686 (La. 1980), citing United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923 (2nd Cir. 1945). Rather, a judge “is charged to see that the law is properly administered, and it is a duty which he cannot discharge by remaining inert.” Id. at 687-88.

Code of Criminal Procedure art. 671 provides the grounds for recusal of a judge in a criminal case. The pertinent subparts of that article provide:

A. In a criminal cause, a judge of any trial or appellate court shall be recused upon any of the following grounds:

․.

(6) The judge would be unable, for any other reason, to conduct a fair and impartial trial.

B. In a criminal cause, a judge of any trial or appellate court shall also be recused when there exists a substantial and objective basis that would reasonably be expected to prevent the judge from conducting any aspect of the cause in a fair and impartial manner.

The Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct dictates the duties and responsibilities of Louisiana jurists. Canon 3(C), Recusation, states:

A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned and shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which disqualification is required by law or applicable Supreme Court rule. In all other instances, a judge should not recuse himself or herself.

Defense counsel filed a motion recuse on October 2, 2024, and alleged that Judge Brindisi previously prosecuted Defendant in case numbers 97-7147 and 97-7148 in Division “S” of the 24th Judicial District Court. Defense counsel argued that a recusal was warranted in this matter pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 671(A)(6) because of the judge's prior participation as a prosecutor. Defense counsel also argued that the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C) strongly suggested the judge recuse himself because his impartiality could be reasonably questioned.

The trial court heard the recusal motion on the same day it was filed. In addition to arguments first presented in his motion, he added that the judge's involvement in Defendant's prior cases came to his attention “yesterday evening” when the State provided him with the information about the cases in 1994, and 1997-98. The State responded that in preparing the sentencing memorandum of Defendant's criminal history, it observed the judge's name in a minute entry, and could not comment as to what involvement the judge had as a prosecutor in the case. The State mentioned that it believed the rap sheet was provided to defense counsel in pretrial discovery “long ago.” The State explained that, when searching JeffNet, the case numbers were not listed; however, when it searched the case numbers, it discovered Defendant pled guilty to the associated charges on October 22, 1998.

The trial judge stated that he was a prosecutor for three years in New Orleans, a prosecutor at the Attorney General's Office, and then became a prosecutor in Jefferson Parish in 1997 for approximately twelve years and prosecuted thousands of cases, before becoming a judge. The judge stated that he did not recognize Defendant and had no idea who he was. He could not recall if he was even in the courtroom when Defendant entered pleas in his prior case. The judge stated that he was sure that Defendant did not recognize him either because the issue of recusal would have been raised sooner. Accordingly, he denied the motion to recuse.

First, we consider the timing of the motion to recuse. The guilty verdicts in the instant matter were rendered on September 25, 2024. The motion to recuse was filed on October 2, 2024, after Defendant was convicted. La. C.Cr.P. art. 674(A) provides the following:

A party desiring to recuse a trial judge shall file a written motion therefor assigning the ground for recusal under Article 671. The motion shall be filed not later than thirty days after discovery of the facts constituting the ground upon which the motion is based, but in all cases at least thirty days prior to commencement of the trial. In the event that the facts constituting the ground for recusal occur thereafter or the party moving for recusal could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have discovered such facts, the motion to recuse shall be filed immediately after the facts occur or are discovered, but prior to verdict or judgment.

It is unclear from the record if defense counsel had access to only the rap sheet with Defendant's criminal history or the actual minute entries with Judge Brindisi's name as prosecutor. However, Defendant's motion to recuse, filed after the verdict was entered, was untimely. Further, we find that the Defendant could have discovered the judge's possible participation in his earlier cases through the exercise of due diligence.

Defendant also references a “judicial complaint letter” that was ignored by the trial judge; we could not locate this letter in the record. Defendant cites to a discussion in the record about the letter that took place on September 23, 2024. The trial judge stated, “Okay. I received – I did receive the letter from the defendant. Did I give you – I gave you that letter; is that correct?” Defense counsel replied, “You gave me that letter, and I provided it back to Mr. Frye.” No further mention of the letter, or a judicial complaint, is made on the record. To the extent that Defendant argues that the trial judge's actions regarding this letter showed he was biased, he did not raise it at the trial court as a basis for the motion to recuse and the issue has not been preserved for appeal. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 841 (An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.); State v. Clues-Alexander, 24-95 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/16/25), 409 So.3d 532, 540 (noting the judge's personal ties with the victim were not raised in the trial court and, thus, will not be addressed by the appellate court); See La. C.Cr.P. art. 841. Accordingly, we find this pro se assignment of error lacks merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

Under the Louisiana Constitution. Art. 1 §§ 2, 13 and United States Constitution Amendments V, VI, and XIV, the trial judge abused his discretion by denying a mistrial when a State's Witness mentioned the words “anonymous witness,” which was litigated and ruled on by the Court prior to trial, and the trial judge also failed to consider admonishment of the jury, which resulted in prejudicing the jury.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied the motion for a mistrial based upon Detective Walsdorf's mention of the “anonymous witness.” He avers that the trial court should have admonished the jury regarding Detective Walsdorf's statement but instead had a conversation with Detective Walsdorf. Defendant argues that it prejudiced him because he was unable to confront the witness, and the mentioning of the witness “prejudiced” the jury against him, leading them to believe that he was linked to the case.

On September 25, 2024, during the cross-examination of Detective Walsdorf, defense counsel asked the witness where his next stop was after securing the Acura MDX. His response was the following:

MR. HANDY: Okay. Where's your next stop after that?

DETECTIVE WALSDORF: Next stop was on the Causeway Bridge.

MR. HANDY: All right.

DETECTIVE WALSDORF: We met with an anonymous witness.

MR. HANDY: Judge, may we approach?

The transcript indicates that the jury exited the courtroom, and defense counsel moved for a mistrial. He argued prohibition against (Detective Walsdorf's) mentioning the words “anonymous witness” or anything pertaining to the “anonymous witness” was one of the only issues that was litigated prior to trial; it was agreed upon by the State and ruled upon by the court. He asserted that Detective Walsdorf “just outright stated it, without any provocation.” Defense counsel asserted that the jury heard it, there was no way to cure it, and the jury now knew it was an issue. He explained that it was the only way Defendant got “anywhere near the case,” and it was now in the jurors’ minds.

The State responded that defense counsel asked an open-ended question as to what Detective Walsdorf did next. The State asserted that its witnesses were instructed to refer to the development of a suspect based on “investigative resources.” It averred that Detective Hymel testified in this manner. The State explained that it also spoke to Detective Walsdorf about this. The State averred that a motion for mistrial was a drastic remedy only warranted when the error would result in substantial prejudice. It argued that the jury was not alerted to the pause, and no additional attention was drawn to it. The State averred that defense counsel had the right to request a “curing [instruction]” or ask the jury to disregard it, but also cautioned that an instruction could draw more attention to the matter. The State explained that it objected to the granting of a mistrial on the basis that it was a “casual mention” to an open-ended question on cross-examination. The court denied the motion for mistrial, and defense counsel noted his objection and intent to seek a writ.⁵

Mistrial is a drastic remedy, which should be used only upon a clear showing of prejudice by the defendant; a mere possibility of prejudice is not sufficient. State v. Lane, 20-137 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/20), 309 So.3d 886, 907, writ denied, 21-100 (La. 4/27/21), 314 So.3d 836. “Whether a mistrial should be granted is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the denial of a motion for mistrial will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Mejia, 23-161 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/23), 377 So.3d 860, 878, writ denied, 23-1722 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So.3d 705. The standard to judge whether a mistrial should have been granted is whether the defendant “suffers such substantial prejudice that he has been deprived of any reasonable expectation of a fair trial.” Id., citing State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688, 696 (La. 1983).

Code of Criminal Procedure art. 771 provides in pertinent part that:

In the following cases, upon the request of the defendant or the state, the court shall promptly admonish the jury to disregard a remark or comment made during the trial, or in argument within the hearing of the jury, when the remark is irrelevant or immaterial and of such a nature that it might create prejudice against the defendant, or the state, in the mind of the jury:

․.

(2) When the remark or comment is made by a witness or person other than the judge, district attorney, or a court official, regardless of whether the remark or comment is within the scope of Article 770[.]

In such cases, on motion of the defendant, the court may grant a mistrial if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure the defendant a fair trial.

A mistrial should be granted under Article 771 only where the prejudicial remarks of the witness make it impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial. State v. J.M., 14-579 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/11/15), 189 So.3d 1079, 1092, citing State v. Ventris, 10-889 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/11), 79 So.3d 1108, 1123.

On appeal, Defendant takes issue with the detective's mention of the “anonymous witness” on cross-examination, but fails to show that the testimony caused substantial prejudice or deprived him of his right to a fair trial, even if the testimony was admitted in error. See State v. Wall, 14-539 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/14), 209 So.3d 962, 973. Detective Walsdorf stated JPSO met with an anonymous witness. The defense did not elicit testimony from the detective that showed how the anonymous witness was linked to Defendant or the investigation. The argument and ruling on the motion for new trial took place outside the present of the jury. Back on the record, the State clarified that “investigative resources instructed or directed [JPSO] to the defendant”. Defense counsel clarified that nothing was asked about the matter, and the information was volunteered. Further, defense counsel did not request an admonition. See Id. at 973 n.10. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's request for a mistrial, and pro se assignment of error also lacks merit. See State v. Melancon, 14-221 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/24/14), 151 So.3d 100, 114, writ denied, 14-2161 (La. 5/22/15), 170 So.3d 982 (finding the defendant was not entitled to a mistrial when the witness’ answer was made while he attempted to respond to defense counsel's open-ended question and was elicited by defense counsel, and also that the answer was not the result of any pattern of unresponsiveness or improper intent.).

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

Under the Louisiana Constitution. Art. 1 §§ 2, 13 and United States Constitution Amendments VI and XIV, the trial judge abused his discretion by allowing juror who worked at facility where Defendant was held and knew Defendant, and also participating in ex parte communication with same juror on issue of Defendant being “a problem” in trial.

Defendant avers that during voir dire, juror Sean D. Pastor lied when he was asked if he knew Defendant. He avers that Mr. Pastor became familiar with him while working at the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center. Defendant argues that Mr. Pastor evaded questions tailored to qualify him as a biased juror and that he deliberately failed to reveal that he knew Defendant, so he could serve on the case. Defendant argues that this subjected him to possible criminal contempt. He avers that Mr. Pastor's service as a juror affected his Sixth Amendment right to trial by unanimous jury. He argues Mr. Pastor would have been challenged and excused for cause had he disclosed he knew Defendant.

Further, Defendant argues that during the trial, Judge Brindisi held an ex parte meeting with Mr. Pastor. Defendant argues that his “letter of record,” which he submitted to the trial court, holds the weight of an affidavit and asks this Court to address the trial court's role in the ex parte meeting. He contends that Judge Brindisi summoned Mr. Pastor and his letter (which he refers to as State's Exhibit S-2) gives some indication as to what was discussed in the meeting.

The voir dire transcript reflects that during the conversation between defense counsel (Mr. Handy) and Mr. Pastor (“The Potential Juror”), Mr. Pastor advised that he was from Rapides Parish, he worked as a correctional officer at the Jefferson Parish Correction Center for almost a year, and he denied knowing Defendant or anyone involved with the case.

Later, at a bench conference, juror challenges were discussed, and Mr. Pastor was accepted as a juror by both parties.

As to Defendant's contentions regarding his letter and the trial court's ex parte meeting with Mr. Pastor, there is no evidence in the record of an ex parte meeting held with Mr. Pastor. The record shows the letter that Defendant refers to was discussed on October 21, 2024, before the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence. The October 21 minute entry from this date provides, “Letter to the court, postmarked 10/15/2024, has been ordered into the record.” However, the letter does not appear in the record.

No ruling was made as to the letter referred to by Defendant. See Uniform Rules - Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3 which provides:

The scope of review in all cases within the appellate and supervisory jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal shall be as provided by La. Const. Art. 5, § 10(B), or as otherwise provided by law. The Courts of Appeal shall review issues that were submitted to the trial court and that are contained in specifications or assignments of error, unless the interest of justice requires otherwise.

It is unclear when Defendant became aware that Mr. Pastor allegedly lied about knowing Defendant. However, if Defendant and defense counsel knew about his association during voir dire, they should have objected at this time. Moreover, Defendant provides no proof that Mr. Pastor knew him, much less lied about knowing him.

Accordingly, we find this last pro se assignment of error lacks merit.

ERROR PATENT DISCUSSION

The record was reviewed for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990). Our review of the record reveals no errors that require correction.

DECREE

Considering the foregoing, Defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

LINDA M. TRAN FIRST DEPUTY CLERK

MELISSA C. LEDET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF

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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY NOVEMBER 5, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

25-KA-57

E-NOTIFIED

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)

HONORABLE FRANK A. BRINDISI (DISTRICT JUDGE)

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(APPELLEE)

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ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

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FOOTNOTES

1.   JPSO Detective Frank Renaudin explained, “A bait bill is a serialized bill that's recorded by the bank in the event that it's taken, it can be found later. It can be matched from bank records to the evidence that's recovered.”

2.   Defendant was also charged with resisting an officer; that count was severed, and later dismissed.

3.   Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).

4.   Matthew Handy was Defendant's standby counsel.

5.   Defendant did not take a writ on this issue.

MARC E. JOHNSON JUDGE