STATE IN THE INTEREST OF v. << (2025)

In this termination case, the father, T.J.F.¹ , appeals the judgment of the trial court terminating his rights to the minor child T.F. and certifying her for adoption. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

ISSUES

On appeal, T.J.F. asserts the following assignments of error:

(1) The court manifestly erred by considering the entire child in need of care proceeding records which were not introduced into evidence at the hearing on the Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of the father, T.J.F.;

(2) The court manifestly erred by finding clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish that T.J.F. had not substantially complied with his case plan and that there was no reasonable expectation of a significant improvement in the near future. Further, the court erred by failing to determine whether [the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)] provided reasonable efforts to assist T.J.F. to complete his case plan; and

(3) The court manifestly erred by finding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of T.J.F.’s parental rights was in T.F.’s best interest.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

T.F. was born on November 9, 2022. T.F. was removed from the custody of her parents on June 7, 2023, after DCFS received reports that the infant was being neglected. On June 20, 2023, T.F. was adjudicated a child in need of care (CINC) and ordered to remain in the custody of the State after a disposition hearing on August 8, 2023. T.F. was placed in a relative placement. Prior to T.F.’s removal, T.J.F was arrested and incarcerated. He was released from incarceration on April 22, 2024. During the time of his incarceration, T.F. continued in the custody of the State.

T.J.F's case plan contained routine requirements which required him to maintain safe housing, submit to mental health assessments, attend domestic violence counseling, submit to random drugs screens, complete an approved parenting class, provide verification of income, maintain contact with DCFS, comply with and complete the terms of his probation/parole, and permit home visits. The case plan also set forth a monthly assessment of ten dollars a month for child support.

DCFS filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and Certification for Adoption on September 23, 2024, asserting grounds for termination under La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5). T.J.F. entered a general denial but the mother stipulated to the termination of parental rights at the answer hearing on November 12, 2024.

A termination hearing was held on December 11, 2024. The court heard the testimony of the DCFS caseworker, Renata Fulton, who testified to the elements of T.J.F.’s case plan and his compliance with same. The court also heard the testimony of T.J.F. and reviewed exhibits introduced by T.J.F. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that T.J.F. had made substantial efforts in completing his case plan. However, the court noted that there were issues with housing and concerns about drug use. The court ordered that the hearing be reconvened after a period of sixty days during which T.J.F. was to submit to weekly drug screens.

A second hearing was held on February 27, 2025, and additional evidence was introduced. At the second hearing, the court noted that T.J.F.’s failure to find stable housing, failure to make parental obligations since October 2024, and missed visits with the child showed that T.J.F. failed to realize he had an obligation to his child and there was no evidence of support from his family. The court terminated the parental rights of T.J.F. and further ordered that T.F. was freed for adoption. T.J.F. now appeals.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A judgment terminating parental rights is reviewed under the manifest error standard of review. State in the Interest of M.J.F., 18-584 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/18), 261 So.3d 879.

A trial court's factual determinations as to whether there has been substantial compliance with a case plan, whether a significant indication of reformation has been shown, and whether the parent is likely to reform will not be set aside unless the record reflects that the trial court is clearly wrong.

State ex rel. G.O., 10-571, pp. 5–6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/8/11), 68 So.3d 636, 640, writ denied, 11-1512 (La. 7/21/11), 67 So.3d 479.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In his first assignment of error, T.J.F. asserts that the trial court manifestly erred by considering the entire CINC record which was not introduced into evidence at the hearing on the petition to terminate his parental rights. Additionally, T.J.F. asserts that the State did not introduce a case plan into evidence.

T.J.F. is correct that the entire CINC record was not formally admitted into evidence by the trial court. At the beginning of the second hearing, introduction of the CINC record and prior testimony from the first hearing was addressed in the following exchange:

BY THE COURT: Are you going to offer, file and introduce by reference the entire record from the previous hearing?

BY MS. FOSSETT [Attorney on behalf of DCFS]: Yes, your Honor I'd like to offer, file and introduce the entire․

BY MR. PIAZZA [Attorney for T.J.F.]: And we object, Your Honor. It calls for instanter proceedings and things of that nature; it calls for hearsay. This is a trial․

BY THE COURT: Who was at the other hearing?

BY MR. PIAZZA: But instanter proceedings Your Honor, there's hearsay evidence admitted into the record and this is the trial at the adjudication and we object to the hearsay and to the entirety of the record coming in.

BY MS. FOSSETT: We're not asking for it to be admitted under 10:36.1 [sic] although I would ask that it be admitted under 10:36.1[sic] if it was not done last time, which is allowed by statute. So, those records.

BY MR. PIAZZA: I would just like a ruling on my objection, Your Honor.

BY THE COURT: We did this for your client, who was given an opportunity to show that he's working toward avoiding some sort of judgment of termination. It was to assist him and give him an opportunity to redeem himself or to prove that he was able to be a father and not have his parental rights terminated, which were imminent, if I remember correctly from the testimony that was presented.

BY MR. PIAZZA: The court was very generous in granting a continuance in a sense for him to be allowed additional time to complete his case plan, to avoid the potential for termination of parental rights and my client is forever grateful of that, Your Honor. We are just simply objecting to any hearsay evidence that she's asking that the entirety of the record be offered. We're objecting to any hearsay, more particularly the instanter and all other subsequent hearings that hearsay evidence, you know, but more particularly the instanter.

BY THE COURT: No, it was just the last hearing she was offering. It has nothing to do with, I don't think it was an instanter hearing. There was a hearing on the merits of the termination.

BY MS. FOSSETT: Right. Of that testimony․

BY THE COURT: There was no instanter hearing at the last hearing, it was just, it was on the merits of determination. We had a hearing, and I granted him an opportunity to show that he was capable of reformation.

BY MR. PIAZZA: Thank you, Judge.

BY THE COURT: I'm going to grant the offer of the original hearing into this hearing as it is a continuation of what was done last time.

Although DCFS stated that they would like the record to be admitted under La.Ch.Code art. 1036.1, as it had not been done at the prior hearing, the trial court only ruled on admitting evidence from the prior hearing into the current hearing.

Louisiana Children's Code Article 1036.1 (emphasis added) provides:

A. Evidence of a prior adjudication or a parent's prior stipulation that a child is in need of care and an instanter order or disposition judgment removing the child from the parent's custody shall be admissible in proceedings brought under this Title. If the prior adjudication judgment was entered by the same court, it may take judicial notice of its own records. If the prior order or judgment was entered by another court, a certified copy of the order or judgment or certified copy of the minute entry shall be admissible in accordance with the Louisiana Code of Evidence.

B. The court record of a prior child in need of care proceeding involving the child who is the subject of the termination proceeding may be introduced into evidence at the hearing on the termination of parental rights

T.J.F. argues that although a court may take judicial notice of judgments rendered by it, this does not allow consideration of the entire CINC record. T.J.F. specifically points to the written judgment in which the trial court stated:

Pursuant to Ch.C Art. 1036.1, the Court took judicial notice of all of the Child In Need of Care proceedings records concerning the minor child. The Child In Need of Care proceedings were also admitted as evidence in the matter.

The Court considered: the pleadings; the entire record, including the Child In Need of Care proceedings records involving the minor child; the evidence presented, including testimony and stipulations or admissions, if applicable; and the law.

Even assuming the trial court erred in considering the entire CINC record, we find that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's ruling. In this case, Judge Spruill was the trial court judge for both the termination hearings and the prior CINC adjudication. Thus, it would not be error for the trial court to take judicial notice of its own records. The judgment of disposition signed by the trial court clearly stated that a case plan dated July 7, 2023, was approved by the court. Additionally, the trial court signed a permanency hearing order which approved a case plan dated April 8, 2024. Thus, the record makes clear that there was an approved case plan in this case. During both termination hearings, the assigned caseworker testified in detail about the requirements of T.J.F.’s case plan and his compliance with said case plan.

When ruling on the termination of parental rights, the trial court stated:

For me, this is a very difficult case because the father has had some success on his case plan, and I take termination of parental rights so seriously. Today's date, we have to be objective about what has happened and what, in truth and fact, is going on in this case. The records will show that this child, [T.F.] was removed from her father and mother's custody June 8, 2023. We're approaching two years that has been afforded the father an opportunity to work a case plan. For one reason or another—and [T.J.F.] always has what he considers a legitimate excuse—he cannot accomplish very simple goal, cause I was concerned about his drug issue last time, and I said, please just do what you need to do on drugs, and I'll give you sixty days, and I'll give you a special opportunity, a special window—let's clear this issue up. When I view the record objectively, I have to conclude that the father was less than cooperative. He was less than sincere about his efforts to reunite with his child when he knew that drugs was the issue. Not once has he taken a hair follicle test. During this sixty-day period, he was caught attempting to manipulate the result, which is again indicative of an attempt to defraud the court that was giving an opportunity to show that he can belly up to the bar and be daddy. There are serious shortcomings in this case.

This travel trailer that he wants to occupy as his home—and the picture, it's really a nice-looking travel trailer, large, could possibly serve as a home—but admittedly, he does not have a title to the home. That is not stability of a home for a child because the registered owner could claim that it belongs to them, and it's unauthorized use by [T.J.F.], who has no written document to prove his possession of that registered vehicle. Admittedly, the location of 139 Mayeux Road, as we sit here today, is not ready as a home for this child. The testament [sic] we been working about is a home for this child since January 8, 20223, [sic] and still today we're not there.

I find that these are two critical issues in this case. There's no stability for a home for this child that has been known, been placed for most of the time since removal in a home that probably in the child's mind is, this is home for me, cause you don't [have] another continuance home.

I have a father that's working at Sonic, but admittedly is earning wages that, if they were sufficient, he hasn't paid parental contributions since October. It shows me that I have a daddy that doesn't realize that he owes an obligation to a child. He was under scrutiny of the Court and everybody here, and we expected him to meet those obligations—those very minimal obligations. Those contributions are not large. I don't know exactly what they are, but they are insignificant—it's just to show, “I can meet those obligations”—and that's a failure. I mean that child has had no money set aside, owed by law since October, zero to live on. It shows me a daddy saying, I ain't got to worry about that. That child is being taken care of; it's not my responsibility. But that's a failure of the test of what we're doing here. It's making a mockery of the sixty days that I gave him to do something and try to get things organized in his life.

․

There were visits that were scheduled for him to keep with his child during this sixty days period, I don't know what the reasons were but if I were daddy and I wanted to reunite I would have made sure, I don't care what the reason was, I would have been there for a scheduled visit. [A]gain, failure. Failure as a dad. The property called “the family home,” wherever it's located—admittedly, it's owned by a number of members of the family—it's nothing that is titled in the father's name. There's no effort made, not even letters of intent by family members saying, “This is the father's home, and he's working on it, and we're helping him, and we're all working together so he can have a home.” That's not family support here that would give this Court faith and confidence to do anything other than terminate parental rights. That would be in the best—would satisfy a best interest test for this child. Best interest requires that the facts of the case justify termination of parental rights, and it's so ordered. I order that the father present in court, the alleged father—well, he's on the birth certificate—[T.J.F.], he's the only male that justifiably claimed paternity to this child, his parental rights are terminated. The child is free for adoption, which is required by law.

Nothing in the trial court's reasoning suggests that the trial court considered any evidence other than the testimony given during the trial. We find that this evidence was sufficient to determine whether T.J.F. was in substantial compliance with a court approved case plan. Thus, we find that T.J.F.’s first assignment of error lacks merit.

In his second assignment of error, T.J.F. asserts that the trial court erred by finding clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish that he had not substantially complied with his case plan and that there was no reasonable expectation of a significant improvement in the near future. He further alleges that the trial court erred by failing to determine whether DCFS provided reasonable efforts to assist him to complete his case plan.

In State in the Interest of J.A., 17-500, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/4/18), 237 So.3d 69, 72, this court explained:

A parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in establishing and maintaining a meaningful relationship with his or her children. State in Interest of A.C., 93-1125 (La. 1/27/94), 643 So.2d 719. This parental interest includes the “care, custody, and management of their child.” State ex rel. J.M., 02-2089, p. 7 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1247, 1252. Consistent with the parental interest, the state has a legitimate interest in limiting or terminating parental rights under certain conditions. Id. Because termination of parental rights is a severe action, the state bears the burden of establishing each element of a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. La.Ch.Code art. 1035; State ex rel. B.H. v. A.H., 42,864 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/24/07), 968 So.2d 881. The statutory grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are found in La.Ch.Code art. 1015, although “only one ground need be established.” State ex rel. B.H., 968 So.2d at 885. Once a ground for termination has been established, the parental rights may be terminated by the trial court if it is in the child's best interest. Id; La.Ch.Code art. 1037.

In its petition, DCFS asserted termination based on La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5) which provides:

Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent's custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child's age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.

In determining a parent's lack of substantial compliance with a case plan, La.Ch.Code art. 1036 provides, in pertinent part:

C. In accordance with Article 1015(5), lack of parental compliance with a case plan may be evidenced by one or more of the following:

(1) The parent's failure to attend court-approved scheduled visitations with the child.

(2) The parent's failure to communicate with the child.

(3) The parent's failure to keep the department apprised of the parent's whereabouts and significant changes affecting the parent's ability to comply with the case plan for services.

(4) The parent's failure to contribute to the costs of the child's foster care, if ordered to do so by the court when approving the case plan.

(5) The parent's repeated failure to comply with the required program of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in the case plan.

(6) The parent's lack of substantial improvement in redressing the problems preventing reunification.

(7) The persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar potentially harmful conditions.

(8)(a) The parent's failure to provide a negative test result for all synthetic or other controlled dangerous substances, except for any drug for which the parent has lawfully received a prescription, at the completion of a reasonable case plan.

(b) For purposes of this Article, “controlled dangerous substance” shall have the meaning ascribed in R.S. 40:961.

D. In accordance with Article 1015(5), lack of any reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's conduct in the near future may be evidenced by one or more of the following:

(1) Any physical or mental illness, mental deficiency, substance abuse, or chemical dependency that renders the parent unable or incapable of exercising parental responsibilities without exposing the child to a substantial risk of serious harm, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.

(2) A pattern of repeated incarceration of the parent that has rendered the parent unable to care for the immediate and continuing physical or emotional needs of the child for extended periods of time.

(3) Any other condition or conduct that reasonably indicates that the parent is unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.

T.F. was removed from her parents’ custody on June 8, 2023, and the final hearing took place in February 2025. There is no question that at least one year has elapsed since T.F. was taken into custody. The DCFS caseworker testified that T.J.F.’s case plan required him to obtain stable housing, keep the agency informed of his whereabouts, attend all court hearings and meetings, comply with the terms of his probation, attend counseling for anger management, pay $10.00 a month in contributions, obtain employment consistently for six months and provide verification to the caseworker, work with Volunteers of America, submit to random drug screens and complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations.

After the first termination hearing in December 2024, the trial court explained to T.J.F. its concerns with his lack of housing and use of drugs. He was plainly instructed that he had to have stable housing in his own name and refrain from any drug use. The trial court continued the matter and gave T.J.F. sixty additional days to work his case plan and submit to weekly drug screens. After the sixty days, the DCFS caseworker again testified to T.J.F.’s compliance with his plan. According to the testimony, T.J.F. was living in a camper. Although the camper may have been suitable for raising a child, this camper, which he claims was given to him, was not titled in his name. T.J.F. testified that he intended to raise the child in a “family home” which was currently uninhabitable, but he was actively working to fix. However, this home was also not in T.J.F.’s name nor did he provide any kind of documentation that he had a legal right to use the home. T.J.F. was specifically told at the prior hearing how important it was to have housing in his name, yet he still failed to meet this very specific goal.

Concerning drug use, the caseworker testified that although T.J.F. did complete several negative urine tests, he refused every hair test requested which resulted in an automatic positive test on multiple occasions. There was also testimony that T.J.F. was caught manipulating a test as well as two tests which he failed to show up for. T.J.F. denied attempting to manipulate any test but he admitted that he refused all hair tests. When asked to explain his actions, he simply stated “I don't like nobody playing in my hair like that.”

In addition to his failure to secure housing and submit to drug screens, T.J.F. also missed visits with the child and ceased to make his monthly contribution payments. The reason for his missed visits was because he failed to confirm the visits in advance. This condition of visitation, however, was one with which T.J.F. was well aware.

In granting the termination, the trial court noted that the father had “some success on his case plan” but there remained an issue with drugs and housing. The trial court found that T.J.F. was less than cooperative and was “less than sincere about his efforts to reunite with his child when he knew that drugs was the issue.” The trial court also pointed out T.J.F.’s missed visits and his failure to make parental contributions which he found was “a failure of the test of what we're doing here. It's making a mockery of the sixty days that I gave him to do something and try to get things organized in his life.”

Considering T.J.F.’s continued failure to secure stable housing and unwillingness to submit to all drug screens despite being fully aware that these conditions were preventing reunification with his child, we find that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in finding that DCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that T.J.F. failed to comply with his case plan. T.J.F. was given an additional two months to work his case plan before the second termination hearing. Instead of increasing compliance with his case plan, his compliance decreased. Given the fact that T.J.F. knew he was under scrutiny, and an impending termination of parental rights did not provoke further compliance, the trial court did not manifestly err in finding that there was no reasonable expectation of compliance in the near future.

In his final assignment of error, T.J.F. asserts that the trial court manifestly erred by finding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of the child. T.F. is currently two years old and has been in an adoptive placement since she came into the State's care at five months old. This adoptive placement is also the home of T.F.’s older sister. The caseworker testified that T.F. is doing well there, she's happy, and she is thriving. This is the only home the child has ever known. Given her young age and the need for permanency, the trial court also did not err in finding that termination was in the best interest of the child.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant, T.J.F.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-1 and 5-2, the initials of the parties will be used to protect and maintain the privacy of the minor child involved in this proceeding.

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON JUDGE