STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHRISTOPHER ONEAL HOUSTON JR (2025)

Defendant, Christopher Oneal Houston, Jr., was found guilty by a unanimous jury of second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, and first degree feticide, a violation of La.R.S. 14:32.6, and sentenced accordingly. Defendant appeals, asserting that the proof was insufficient for both convictions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Elonzeya “Zoe” Teal Houston, the victim, and Christopher Oneal Houston, Jr., the Defendant, were married in 2018 until Zoe was murdered on June 3, 2019.

On the date of the murder, Defendant, Zoe, and their young child were living with Defendant's grandmother, Mary Houston. Mary testified that when she arrived home on the evening of Sunday, June 2, 2019, she saw Defendant and Zoe on the couch together “like two peas in a pod.” Defendant was getting ready to go to work when Mary awoke the next morning. Mary did not see Zoe, so she questioned Defendant about Zoe's whereabouts. Defendant said that Zoe had left the night before and went walking. Mary looked around the house for Zoe because she believed Zoe would not have left without the baby. Defendant did not inform Mary that Zoe was dead or needed help.

Mary continued to look around the house for Zoe after Defendant left for work. At some point, Mary called her daughter, Alicia. When Alicia arrived at the house, Mary informed her that the door to Zoe's bedroom was locked, but they were able to enter the room after Alicia pried the door open with a knife. When Mary looked behind the bed she could see Zoe's thighs. Alicia described what she viewed as “a fully wrapped sheet with something wrapped inside of it, like a burrito.” While Alicia and Mary dispute whether Zoe's body was completely wrapped in the sheet, it was clear that Zoe was at least partially wrapped in the sheet. Mary began hitting Zoe and telling her to wake up, but Zoe did not awaken. Alicia then pulled on the sheet and began slapping Zoe. Alicia noticed that Zoe's lips were tinted, and her body was “clammy.”

Alicia testified that she had known Zoe for several years through her nephew, Defendant. Alicia and Zoe were close. Alicia described Zoe as happy, bubbly, and free-spirited. The pair went on a trip to Baton Rouge together the weekend prior to the murder. State's Exhibits 2 and 3 were introduced to show that Zoe was visibly pregnant during the trip. Alicia declared that Zoe was “[m]aybe five feet” and “people thought she was my 12-year-old daughter.”

During the trip with Alicia, Zoe noticed $100 was missing from her wallet while shopping at Goodwill. Alicia overheard an argument on a phone call between Zoe and Defendant and heard Zoe crying. Defendant denied he took Zoe's money, called Zoe back several times, and contacted Zoe through Facebook. Zoe blocked Defendant's number and shut down her Facebook page. Defendant then called Alicia's phone to speak with Zoe. Zoe put the call on speaker, and Defendant was yelling so Alicia did not allow Zoe to use her phone to speak with Defendant for the rest of the trip.

Alicia and Zoe returned to Alicia's mother's house late Sunday evening on June 2. This was the last time Alicia saw Zoe alive. Alicia sat Defendant and Zoe together and told them, “if you guys are going to work on you, then you need to work on you and leave everything else alone or separate.” Alicia clarified that the biggest issue in Defendant and Zoe's relationship was a woman Defendant was seeing on the side. There was some testimony at trial regarding Zoe's infidelity, as well, but Alicia testified that she was unaware of any infidelity on Zoe's part.

Shortly thereafter, the phone rang. Defendant called and asked Mary, “have y'all found her yet?” When questioned by Alicia, Defendant stated, “I mean, has she came back yet?” Alicia cursed at Defendant and hung up the phone to call 911. While waiting for the police to arrive, Alicia continued attempting to revive Zoe and called for someone to pick the kids up from the house.

The furniture in the house was not disheveled or out of place. No clothing or items were more scattered than usual. The only thing Alicia believed to be abnormal was that the back window was unlocked.

Pauline Houston, Mary's niece, also testified at trial. Pauline lived around the corner from Mary. Pauline confirmed that on June 3, 2019, Defendant, Zoe, and their young son lived with Mary. Defendant and Pauline worked together at Pilgrim's Pride.

At around 7:00 on the morning of June 3, 2019, Pauline observed Defendant standing in front of his house in sleeping pants and slippers. Pauline was concerned because she knew Defendant could not miss any more work. Defendant told Pauline that he and Zoe “got into it, she left walking last night, and [he was] waiting on her.” Defendant did not tell Pauline that Zoe was dead inside the house.

Shanetra Metoyer, who was in a relationship with Defendant in 2019, also testified at trial. Shanetra knew Defendant was married at the time but still carried on the relationship for about eight months. Defendant complained to Shanetra that he and Zoe always argued and even mentioned getting divorced. Defendant did not mention to Shanetra that he had gotten into a fight with Zoe. On Monday morning of June 3, 2019, Defendant told Shanetra that he was not coming in to work. Defendant also said that Zoe had taken off walking and had not come back yet.

Although she testified that Defendant was never violent towards her, Shanetra believed Defendant and Zoe were violent toward each other and always argued. The last time Shanetra saw Defendant was that Sunday morning and his demeanor was “the same goofy Christopher.” Shanetra did not notice Defendant upset or cursing anybody out at any point that weekend.

When they last spoke on June 3, Defendant did not tell Shanetra that Zoe was dead on the floor or that he had wrapped her in a sheet. Defendant also did not tell Shanetra that he and Zoe had gotten in a fight and that he choked her until she was unconscious. Shanetra was the first to inform Defendant that his wife had been found.

On further direct examination, Shanetra admitted that Defendant was a lot bigger than Zoe. Shanetra also admitted that Zoe was a “tiny, tiny woman.” Zoe complained to Shanetra about abuse or fighting one time.

The State also called Darrel Winder as a witness, who testified that he was a captain with the Natchitoches Parish Sheriff's Office Criminal Investigations Bureau who was called out to investigate Zoe's homicide. Captain Winder had previously encountered Zoe and Defendant roughly sixty days prior to the homicide. On April 1, 2019, Lieutenant Mike Wilson contacted Captain Winder and requested that he meet with Zoe at the emergency room. Zoe was sitting on a hospital bed holding her infant son when Captain Winder arrived. Zoe had bruises on her neck from an altercation with Defendant, in which he had choked her until she passed out.

Zoe told Captain Winder that the altercation began after she and Defendant had an argument over infidelity and money. Captain Winder stated that the altercation ended when Zoe passed out from being choked. Zoe woke up on the floor, and Defendant put her in the shower.

Defendant met Captain Winder at Captain Winder's office the next day. During the interview, Defendant stated that Zoe looked through his phone and saw a conversation with another female. They argued over infidelity, and Zoe tried to punch Defendant. Defendant said he would leave, but they began shoving each other. Zoe threw and broke Defendant's phone, so he did the same in return.

The altercation became more heated and culminated with Defendant choking Zoe until she passed out. Defendant put Zoe in the shower, cleaned her up, and brought her to bed after she passed out. There was an allegation that Defendant gave Zoe some type of pill, but Defendant denied that. Defendant also left a bite mark on Zoe's neck when he bit her to prevent her from hitting him.

State's Exhibits 10 through 12—photos of Defendant—were introduced. Captain Winder admitted that Defendant was taller and naturally bigger than him. The photos showed what Captain Winder labeled as superficial marks on Defendant's skin.

After the interview concluded, Defendant was released. When asked why no arrest was made, Captain Winder explained, “She didn't want to get him in trouble.” Captain Winder recommended marriage counseling to Defendant.

On June 3, the second time Captain Winder encountered the couple, Captain Winder was the on-call detective in reference to a death. Captain Winder's supervisor, Reginald Turner, brought Captain Winder to the back room of the home where Zoe lay deceased on the floor.

State's Exhibit 13—a photo of the entry to Mary's house—was introduced. Captain Winder stated that the photo showed no sign of a struggle. State's Exhibit 14—a photo of the den where Defendant stated the altercation took place—was introduced. Captain Winder stated that the photo showed no sign of a struggle.

When Captain Winder first saw Zoe, her body was lying between the wall and the bed. Captain Winder described State's Exhibits 16 and 17 as showing Zoe's legs with a sheet at her feet. Captain Winder admitted that Alicia and Mary Houston were the first to discover the body and that Alicia stated Zoe was wrapped before Alicia pulled the sheet back. Captain Winder did not disturb the scene prior to taking the photograph and did not rule out that Alicia's description of the initial scene was accurate.

Defendant arrived on the scene “maybe a little bit after 11:00.” Defendant was immediately detained and transported to the Natchitoches Parish Sheriff's Office. Defendant was presented with and signed a Miranda rights form. Defendant's interview, which Captain Winder described as a confession, was recorded via audio. The audio was transcribed, and the transcript and audio of the interview were published to the jury.

The transcript of Defendant's interview with Captain Winder revealed the following exchange:

Q. Okay. While you and Zoe was [sic] there by ya'll self, had ya'll had some type of argument?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And what was that argument about?

A. Cheating and money.

Q. Cheating and life?

A. Money and cheating.

Q. Oh money and cheating. And at one point did ya'll get into a physical altercation?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And tell me what happened?

A. She ran for the kitchen and I saw she was going for the knife rack and I grabbed her.

Q. Okay.

A. From behind.

Q. Okay. And when you grabbed her from behind where did you grab her at?

A. Around her neck.

Q. Okay. And when you grabbed her around her neck, did she ever lose consciousness?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Okay. And after she lose [sic] consciousness what did you do?

A. I laid her on the couch.

Q. Okay. Did you attempt to call 911 or anything like that?

A. No sir.

․

Q. Okay. What did you do, when Zoe didn't wake up while she was on the couch, did you think she was sleep?

A. I just thought she was unconscious for a minute.

Q. Okay. At what point did you, what did you do after that? When you got ready, how did she get to the bedroom?

A. I carried her to the bedroom and laid her at the foot of the bed.

Q. Was she still unconscious?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Okay. Where was the child?

A. In the bed.

Q. Okay. And did you go to bed?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And what time did you wake up this morning?

A. A little bit after 7:00.

Q. Did you get up any time during the night and check on Zoe?

A. No sir.

Q. You're gonna [sic] have to talk to me now.

A. No sir.

Q. Okay. So what time did you wake up this morning?

A. A little bit after 7:00.

Q. Okay. When you got up what did you do?

A. I touched her and felt her. She was cold.

Q. And what'd you do after that?

A. Panicked and laid her on the floor next to the bed and covered her with a sheet.

Q. Okay. What'd you do after that.

A. Proceeded to get ready for work.

․

Q. Oh okay. During the time that Zoe was, and I may have asked you this, was unconscious, did you seek any kind of medical attention for her?

A. No sir.

Q. Okay. Now was Zoe expecting another child?

A. Yes sir.

Q. She was pregnant?

A. Yes sir.

Q. How many months was she pregnant?

A. Honestly, I really don't know.

Q. She was, when did she tell you she was pregnant?

A. Valentine's Day.

Q. Okay. February?

A. Yes sir.

On direct examination, Captain Winder testified that his interview with Defendant revealed that Mary was mistaken. Mary stated that when she arrived, Defendant and Zoe were sitting on the couch like two peas in a pod. Zoe was actually laying on the couch unconscious. Captain Winder agreed that Defendant had a history of lying about where Zoe was and that Defendant admitted Zoe was unarmed when he attacked her from behind.

On cross-examination, Captain Winder was asked about the lack of an arrest stemming from the April choking incident. Captain Winder was then asked about the requirement to prove Defendant's intent regarding second degree murder in the present case. The following exchange occurred regarding intent:

Q. Detective, what evidence supported you arresting [Defendant] for his intent to cause great bodily harm?

A. His confession.

Q. Okay, what else?

A. Well, basically, the marks.

Q. Okay. Well, what specifically did he testify, well, what specifically did he tell you in his confession about what he did?

A. That he choked her.

Q. Okay. Did he tell you specifically how he choked her?

A. Well, he choked her until she went unconscious.

Q. Okay. Did he tell you what type of choke he used?

A. From the forearm to the elbow.

Q. And he intentionally did that?

A. Yes.

The State also called Dr. James G. Traylor, Jr., a forensic pathologist, as a witness. Dr. Traylor performed Zoe's autopsy on June 3, 2019, at 1:30 p.m. Among multiple findings, Dr. Traylor found that Zoe was “pregnant with a male fetus that had no congenital anomalies that was calculated to be between five-and six-months gestational age.” At the conclusion of the autopsy, Dr. Traylor had no immediate cause of Zoe's death. However, the reasons for the delay in determining a cause were revealed in the following exchange:

Q. Okay. And what does, what does that mean in your sense as far as what a definitive cause of death could not be elucidated in this case?

A. Well like, so at the autopsy table I'm not able to say why this individual is dead.

Q. Okay.

A. So, in my mind there's still more investigation that needs to happen. At every autopsy we draw vitreous humor from the eyeballs, we draw blood, we draw a bile from the gallbladder, urine from the urinary bladder and then so we've got to submit, get that tested for toxicology cause [sic] a lot of times people die from drug overdose and there's no way for me to see that. I need for that to be tested and then get those results back. And then the last thing to do is to cut tissue and look at it underneath the microscope. There are a wealth of different types of ailments that could possibly be, that could be seen underneath the microscope, but all of those needed to be done before I could finalize my report. So, I did draw toxicology, I had the blood tested for drugs. I sent the vitreous humor off for glucose and electrolyte studies to see, make sure she wasn't a new onset diabetic that had a high glucose level that can kill somebody with what we call ketoacidosis, hyperglycemia with ketoacidosis, which she was not diabetic. She did not have high glucose; her electrolytes were normal. There were no drugs detected within her system. So, the next thing is to look at the tissue underneath the microscope, I looked at tissue underneath the microscope. She didn't have a heart attack. She doesn't have myocarditis or any inflammation of the heart. She doesn't have pneumonia in the lungs, and there's not cirrhosis of the liver. She's got basically normal looking organs underneath the microscope. So that's what I'm left with. I still don't have an immediate cause of death that I can definitively say this is why she died and be able to prove it.

Q. Okay. And are there three types of causes of death that do not show clinical findings that you can't determine in an autopsy?

A. Well, I don't want to say three types of death, but there are types of death that you can't, you won't have any findings at the autopsy table.

Q. Okay. Would you, would you tell the jury what some of those are?

A. Well, namely asphyxial type of deaths, either lack of oxygen, not necessarily atmospheric oxygen in a sense. I mean, if you put somebody, say, in an airtight box, and they breathe whatever atmosphere or oxygen was left in the box, then that carbon dioxide is going to build up, and they're going to die because of a lack of oxygen. That's an asphyxial form of death. That's actually suffocation. Another type of asphyxial form of death, what if someone would be placed in what's referred to as a carotid sleeper hold. The same thing police use to subdue unreleased suspects. They put the victim, their arm around the victim's neck protecting the airway. In the old days, they used to do what they called the arm bar, but that caused injury to the larynx and the hyoid bone, and then they could die from that. But if you put the crook of your arm right on the front of somebody's neck and protect their larynx, and then you cause compression on both sides of the neck, you stop blood flow to the brain. The person within eight to ten seconds will pass out, and you can just ease them on down to the ground, and if you're a law enforcement officer, you can put the cuffs on them or whatever, and they'll come around. But if you hold on for fifteen or twenty more seconds, then they're not going to begin breathing on their own. Someone's going to have to administer cardiopulmonary resuscitation for them to start breathing on their own, or else they're going to die. So, those will be the two main ways.

Q. Okay.

A. Neither of which I can prove without scene investigation.

Q. Okay. And at the time that you issued this report, your scene investigation was incomplete, as you say, or you didn't ․

A. Well, I don't go to the scene.

Q. Okay.

A. I did converse with Mr. Clanton, the investigator, the death investigator for the Natchitoches Parish Coroner's office, and he informed me that the individual admitted to the police that he had placed the woman or his wife in a carotid sleeper hold. And I said, well, you know, that's certainly consistent with my findings, which I, you know, I can't prove it, but those are consistent with the findings of my autopsy report, the lack of findings.

Dr. Traylor further explained that autopsies do not just determine a cause of death—they also rule out causes of death. Dr. Traylor then described the potential causes that he ruled out as having caused Zoe's death.

The State called Steven Clanton as a witness. Steven Clanton testified that he is both a reserve sheriff's deputy and the Chief Deputy Coroner for the Natchitoches Parish Coroner's Office. As a fact witness, Mr. Clanton testified that his investigation began in response to a notification of a death in Clarence by the Natchitoches Parish Sheriff's Office. The pregnant female was deceased upon EMS's arrival, and EMS requested Mr. Clanton's presence at the scene.

Mr. Clanton testified that Zoe was on the floor between the wall and the bed with a white sheet at her feet when he arrived. Clanton observed bruising, contusions, and abrasions that resembled fingernail impressions on the right side of Zoe's neck. Mr. Clanton observed markings on the left side of Zoe's neck that he deferred to pathology. Mr. Clanton suspected but could not confirm that the fingernail marks were Zoe's because of the direction.

Mr. Clanton assisted Dr. Collins in preparing Zoe's death certificate. When asked by the State for particulars, Mr. Clanton stated the following:

Well, when we look at any case, we have to look at all factors. Autopsy is only one piece of that puzzle. With us being a coroner's office, we don't have a forensic pathologist of our own, which a lot of smaller offices don't. So, we contract a pathology service. So, they're basically looking strictly at the body to determine the cause of death. But we do give them a report of our initial findings before they do the autopsy so they have a synopsis of what we found on the scene. But it is one piece of that puzzle. During the course of the investigation, I talked to Dr. Traylor by phone who advised me that as far as their findings were, that he was listing the cause of death as undetermined and the manner to be determined by the Natchitoches Parish coroner's office. That is kind of typical of some autopsy reports that we receive because on their autopsy findings and what they physically can see, sometimes they cannot find a reason. So, they basically have, to us, in the report, have ruled out natural causes. They didn't find heart attacks. They didn't find [any] embolisms in the lung. They didn't find pneumonia. They didn't find airway obstructions or anything that they, you know, could attribute to a cause of death. So basically, their investigation is undetermined, but we have to continue it based on our scene investigation, what our findings were on the scene. Additional reports.

When Mr. Clanton was asked about his findings, he responded:

When I initially got there, of course, we have a young female who's pregnant, and we are not told any kind of medical history on her that she has medical history, which is always suspicious in our mind because I need to know why this young female is deceased. So, when looking at the scene and we're finding, you know, I'm seeing what appears to be as [sic] some bruising, fingernail markings of the neck. It leads me to wonder what happened to her neck, what happened in this situation because, you know, we don't that [sic] she's been sick, she didn't, you know, there's no evidence that she just fell out and passed out and they called 911. We just know that I'm seeing markings on her neck and that's abnormal. So, when we get the autopsy report back, we also need to know, I never got to talk to her husband because he was already taken by the Sheriff's office for questioning. I never got to see him, talk to him, find out anything that's been going on. I just had the bystanders that [were] there on the scene who told me she was five months pregnant and no real medical history. So, after the conversation with Dr. Traylor, I had talked to detectives who advised me that during their interrogation that they admitted, [Defendant] had admitted to choking her by coming up behind her with her arm until she passed out. At that point with us, it's consistent with what we're finding as far as the fingernail impressions on her neck, that that was going to be the actual cause of death. Those statements from the detectives that I requested because before we make a decision on homicide, undetermined, natural, whatever cause of death, we want something tangible in our file. We want something that's written from the Sheriff's office saying, we investigated this, we interrogated him. During this interrogation, he advised us that this is what occurred. At that point, we know, based on what I'm seeing, she was in moderate rigor when I got there.

Ultimately, Mr. Clanton and his associates determined that Zoe's cause of death was strangulation by asphyxiation, which was a homicide. Other possibilities such as natural causes, accidental causes, and overdose were ruled out by the autopsy.

The State's final witness was Dr. Timothy Collins. Dr. Collins is a medical doctor and the coroner for Natchitoches Parish, and Steve Clanton is an investigator for Dr. Collins’ office. Dr. Collins’ conclusions as to manner of death are based on Mr. Clanton's investigations. Dr. Collins explained that there are four classifications of death in Louisiana: natural, accidental, suicide, and homicide. In Zoe's case, Dr. Collins determined the type of death was a homicide.

On cross-examination, counsel for Defendant challenged Dr. Collins’ testimony that Defendant “choked [Zoe] until she was unconscious and she was dead shortly thereafter,” noting that “there's no evidence of that in that report.” The following exchange occurred:

A. In this report, no. I mean you have to have a common-sense conclusion that that's what happened. I mean the thing is somebody didn't, you know, I mean there's no report of anybody else coming in the room and assaulting her.

Q. I understand that. But my point ․

A. And the thing is, okay, she was healthy, they got in an argument, he choked her and after he choked her she was dead.

Q. I understand.

A. So, one plus two equals three.

Defendant produced no witnesses at trial. After deliberations, he was convicted of second degree murder pursuant to La.R.S. 14:30.1 and first degree feticide pursuant to La.R.S. 14:32.6 by unanimous jury verdict on June 1, 2022. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the first conviction and fifteen years for the second conviction. He now appeals.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we note one issue.

Defendant's sentence for second degree murder is illegally lenient as it was not imposed at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Although the authority to correct an illegally lenient sentence is discretionary under La.Code Crim.P. art. 882, such was not raised as an error. In accordance with State v. Brown, 19-771 (La. 10/14/20), 302 So.3d 1109, in which the supreme court found the court of appeal erred in vacating an illegally lenient sentence absent any complaint by the State, we do not recognize this as an error patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Defendant's sole assignment of error is that “[t]he proof was insufficient for Second Degree Murder and Feticide.”

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The analysis for claims challenging the sufficiency of evidence is well-settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Second Degree Murder

“Second degree murder is the killing of a human being ․ [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Here, there is no dispute that Zoe was killed or that Defendant killed her. However, Defendant argues that the evidence was only sufficient to show negligent homicide. Regarding the element of intent, Defendant argues in his brief:

The matter of intent was the subject of the testimony of Captain Darrell Winder on cross-examination (R424 et seq), who investigated the case and decided on which charge to arrest [Defendant]. Captain Winder confessed that he made his mind up upon hearing that [Defendant] had not tried to get Zoe medical attention or help her in any way, and had misled people by telling them Zoe had gone walking. Captain Winder said he made his charging decision on the “totality of the circumstances” rather than the intent as described in the statute LRS 14.30.1. (R437).

Our court previously explained “specific intent” in State v. Eckert, 17-848, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/18), 244 So.3d 551, 557, writ denied, 18-908 (La. 1/28/19), 262 So.3d 887:

“Specific intent is the state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” State v. Carroll, 95-859, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/96), 670 So.2d 286, 288. Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the case and the defendant's actions. Id.

Furthermore, specific intent may be formed in an instant. State v. Cousan, 94-2503 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382.

While Defendant did not estimate the length of time he choked Zoe, he choked her until she stopped moving. “The act of choking another person has been repeatedly recognized as indicative of a specific intent to kill.” State v. Guillory, 10-1175, pp. 12–13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/11), 61 So.3d 801, 809.

In State v. Simms, 554 So.2d 757, 763 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989), aff'd, 571 So.2d 145 (La.1990), this court ruled:

In convicting the defendant of second degree murder, the jury necessarily found that the defendant had specific intent to kill Mary Justina Robertson. Defendant contends in his second assignment of error that the State failed to prove the requisite specific intent to kill. We disagree. To begin with, the coroner testified that the cause of death was strangulation. This is corroborated by the defendant's confession in which he acknowledged that he grabbed the victim around the neck, pulled her to his sister's room and starting [sic] choking her. He further stated that after she stopped breathing, he drug her outside and pushed her body in a septic pond. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved the essential elements of second degree murder, including specific intent to kill, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Though Dr. Traylor was unable to testify that the cause of death was strangulation, he explained why he could not and affirmed that death by strangulation was consistent with his findings. As in Simms, Defendant confessed to grabbing the victim around the neck, choking her until she stopped breathing, and subsequently moving her limp body to a different area to conceal his actions. Defendant also had a history of violence against the victim, injuries to the victim's neck were noted by witnesses, and the size difference between the two was adequately examined. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved the essential elements of second degree murder, including specific intent to kill, beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's argument is without merit. First Degree Feticide

“First degree feticide is ․ [t]he killing of an unborn child when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La.R.S. 14:32.6(A)(1). Defendant argues: “This case also involves the death of a child in utero, which requires separate evidence of intent.” Defendant claims that only the intent of the homicide was examined at trial, and the unborn child's death was not treated as a separate crime until sentencing.

First degree feticide requires specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. We find that the State proved intent to kill the fetus based upon the doctrine of transferred intent. As stated in State v. Johnson, 29,629, pp. 9–10 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/20/97), 698 So.2d 1051, 1056 (emphasis added):

The provisions of the Criminal Code cannot be extended by analogy to create crimes not provided for therein; however, the Code's provisions “shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.” La. R.S. 14:3. We therefore approach the applicable statutes by giving them a plain reading.

Specific intent is “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” R.S. 14:10(1). Although the Code does not mention transfer of intent, it defines criminal consequences as “any set of consequences prescribed in the various articles of this Code * * * as necessary to constitute any of the various crimes defined therein.” R.S. 14:9.

Johnson was charged with second degree murder, R.S. 14:30.1. This statute provides, in pertinent part:

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. * * *

The statute requires the State to prove only that the offender had a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; stated otherwise, the State must prove that the defendant intended the criminal consequence of the death or serious injury of a human being. The State must prove a causal link between the defendant's criminal conduct and the criminal consequence, but the statute does not appear to require a connection between the subject (victim) of the defendant's intent and the criminal consequence. To read into the statute the additional element of proving that the defendant intended the death of the person who actually died, would be a strained and unjustified interpretation.

Although further analysis is not really necessary, we would note that the purpose of the statute is apparently to prevent the intentional killing of human beings. See, e.g., Rault, “On Louisiana's New Homicide Statutes: Purpose, Constitutionality and Problems of Interpretation,” 19 Loy. L.Rev. 563, 574 (1973). The statute accomplishes this purpose without requiring the State to prove that the defendant specifically intended the death of the person who was actually killed. We also note that neither at the time of the enactment of the Criminal Code, nor in any of the subsequent amendments, has the legislature included provisions that would overrule the rationale of State v. Thomas, [127 La. 576, 53 So. 868 (1910)].

Transferred intent was further explained in State v. Glover, 47,311, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/10/12), 106 So.3d 129, 135, writ denied, 12-2667 (La. 5/24/13), 116 So.3d 659:

In a given situation, a person may shoot at an intended victim with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and accidentally kill or inflict great bodily harm upon another person. In such instance, if the killing or infliction of great bodily harm would have been unlawful against the intended victim, then it would be unlawful against the person actually shot. This is the doctrine of transferred intent. State v. Shivers, 43,731 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/3/08), 998 So.2d 877, writ denied, 09–0161 (La. 10/30/09), 21 So.3d 274; State v. Strogen, 35,871 (La.App. 2d Cir. 4/3/02), 814 So.2d 725, writ denied, 02–1513 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983; State v. Johnson, 29,629 (La.App. 2d Cir. 8/20/97), 698 So.2d 1051.

In State v. Chatman, 23-187 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/23), 376 So.3d 301, writ denied, 24-30 (La. 9/17/24), 392 So.3d 631, the defendant contended that La.R.S. 14:32.7(A)(2)(a)—second degree feticide—required that the intentional misdemeanor be directed at the unborn child. In Chatman, this court recognized the principles set forth in State v. Smith, 96-61, p. 8 (La. 7/2/96), 676 So.2d 1068, 1071–72:

As an element of manslaughter (La.R.S. 14:31), the legislature explicitly states that a homicide or killing of an individual must take place. As an element of second degree feticide or any other grade, the legislature states that the killing of an unborn child must take place. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the legislature intended that the two instant crimes are separate and distinct, and are not lesser or included offenses of each other.

Applying the principle of “common sense” enunciated in State v. [Smith, 475 So.2d 331 (La.1985]), had the legislature not intended that a perpetrator be penalized separately for killing an unborn child where the mother is also killed, it would not have made feticide a crime. The two statutes were aimed at different evils which proves that the court of appeal erred when the conviction for second degree feticide was set aside based on the “same evidence” test. Killing the mother was an element of manslaughter, not second degree feticide, whereas killing of the unborn child was an element of second degree feticide and not manslaughter. These two crimes involve different elements and require different proof.

In his interview with police, Defendant acknowledged Zoe was pregnant and that he choked her until she was unconscious. When discussing the findings from Zoe's autopsy on direct examination, Dr. Traylor stated, “she was indeed pregnant with a male fetus that had no congenital anomalies that was calculated to be between five-and six-months gestational age.”

Under the doctrine of transferred intent, if Defendant is guilty of killing Zoe with specific intent, he would also be guilty of having the specific intent to kill the fetus. Any attempt to argue otherwise runs afoul of Louisiana's legislative intent to punish acts committed against a fetus and recognition that those offenses can be established by acts committed against the mother. See La.R.S. 14:14:32.6(A)(2); La.R.S. 14:32.7(1); State v. Chatman, 23-187, pp. 22–23 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/23), 376 So.3d 301, 316, writ denied, 24-30 (La. 9/17/24), 392 So.3d 631.

As previously discussed, there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for second degree murder. Accordingly, Defendant's conviction for first degree feticide is affirmed, and Defendant's assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Christopher Oneal Houston, Jr.’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

LEDRICKA J. THIERRY JUDGE