STATE v. PIKE (2025)

Defendant, Brandon L. Pike, appeals his sixty-year enhanced sentence, as a second felony offender, for aggravated battery on the basis that the sentence is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment and remand the matter with instructions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is Mr. Pike's fourth appeal. This Court's opinion from Mr. Pike's first appeal provides the following background and procedural history:

[E]ighty-four-year-old Shirley Fazande[ ] testified at trial that defendant, Brandon Pike, broke into her home on December 31, 2016, and confronted her in her hallway. She recalled that defendant broke through the front door of her home and was approximately three to four feet away from her when he demanded her money. When she informed defendant that she did not have any money, he pushed her into her bedroom and started “beating [her] in the head,” rendering her unconscious. Once she regained consciousness, she was able to call her daughter-in-law for help. When her son and daughter-in-law arrived at her home, she told them that defendant, who lived around the corner, attacked her. The victim explained that she knew defendant from the neighborhood commodity store and testified that she would see him three to four times a week when he would pass in front of her house. The victim further testified that the only item missing from her home was her television. ․

Detective Carl Koppeis of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office testified that ․ [b]ased on conversations with the victim, her son (Ronald Fazande), and other individuals at the scene, defendant was developed as a suspect. Detective Koppeis testified that he went to the hospital to speak with the victim, and observed substantial swelling to her face, including her left eye which was swollen shut, and dried blood behind her left ear. He further explained that the victim identified defendant from a photographic lineup. Ms. Fazande also told Detective Koppeis that she knew defendant from the neighborhood commodity store and the neighborhood. A warrant was prepared for defendant's arrest, and upon his arrest, scratches were observed on his hands.

***

On February 17, 2017, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging defendant, Brandon L. Pike, with aggravated burglary of a residence belonging to Shirley Fazande, in violation of La. R.S. 14:60 (count one), and second degree battery of Ms. Fazande, in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1 (count two). Defendant pled not guilty at his arraignment on February 22, 2017․ A one-day trial commenced before a twelve-person jury on February 27, 2018. The jury found defendant guilty as charged.

On March 15, 2018, defendant filed a motion for new trial and for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. The following day, March 16, 2018, the trial court denied defendant's post-verdict motions and, after a waiver of delays, sentenced defendant to thirty years imprisonment at hard labor on count one and eight years imprisonment at hard labor on count two. The trial judge ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence was denied by the trial court following sentencing.

State v. Pike, 18-538 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/8/19), 273 So.3d 488, 491-92, writ denied, 19-927 (La. 2/10/20), 292 So.3d 60 (internal footnotes omitted).¹

Mr. Pike appealed his convictions and sentences (his first appeal), arguing that the consecutive nature of his maximum sentences rendered his sentences constitutionally excessive. This Court found that Mr. Pike was not entitled to review of the consecutive nature of his sentences, but was limited to a bare review for constitutional excessiveness. Mr. Pike's sentences were affirmed. Id. at 503.

On June 22, 2018, prior to this Court affirming Mr. Pike's convictions and sentences on May 8, 2019, the State filed a habitual offender bill of information on the aggravated burglary conviction, alleging that Mr. Pike had pled guilty on August 5, 2011 to violating La. R.S. 14:68.4—unauthorized use of a motor vehicle—and that the district court had sentenced Mr. Pike to thirty months imprisonment at hard labor for that offense.

On October 10, 2018, the district court held a hearing on the habitual offender bill, wherein Mr. Pike was adjudicated a second felony offender. The district court vacated the original aggravated burglary sentence and resentenced Mr. Pike to sixty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.² The district court ordered the enhanced sentence to run consecutively to the eight-year sentence imposed for the second degree battery conviction. State v. Pike, 22-113 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/22), 355 So.3d 691, 693, writ denied, 23-35 (La. 9/26/23), 370 So.3d 470.

Mr. Pike was granted an out-of-time appeal to challenge his habitual offender adjudication and enhanced sentence. In his second appeal, on errors patent review, this Court found the State failed to prove that the applicable cleansing period had not elapsed between the date of discharge from correctional supervision (or the end of imprisonment) for Mr. Pike's predicate offense and the date of the latest offense. Consequently, this Court vacated Mr. Pike's habitual offender adjudication and sentence, and reinstated Mr. Pike's original thirty-year sentence. The matter was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Pike, 355 So.3d at 694-96.

Upon remand, the district court entered a minute entry on January 5, 2023, which reflected the following: “On 12/28/2022, 5th Circuit Remand No. 22-KA-113, Habitual Offender Adjudication and Sentence Vacated. Original Sentence on Count 1 REINSTATED.” The minute entry also reflected that neither Mr. Pike, who was incarcerated, his counsel, nor an Assistant District Attorney were present on January 5, 2023. According to the minute entry, the district court gave a rendition of the history of the case by explaining Mr. Pike's convictions on February 27, 2018 and the sentences imposed on March 16, 2018. A new uniform commitment order dated January 5, 2023 was issued, which reflected that the date of Mr. Pike's sentences was March 16, 2018. See State v. Pike, 23-102 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/31/23), 374 So.3d 983, 984, writ denied, 23-1611 (La. 6/17/25), 411 So.3d 637.

On January 27, 2023, Mr. Pike filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and asked to have the Louisiana Appellate Project institute his appeal. On that same date, Mr. Pike filed a pro se motion for appeal and designation of the record, which was granted on February 1, 2023. Id. On appeal, Mr. Pike argued that the district court erred in failing to assure that he was present and represented by counsel at the time his original sentence was reinstated. On October 31, 2023, this Court dismissed Mr. Pike's third appeal finding that the district court granted the appeal in error. Specifically, we held that because a “new” sentence was not imposed by the district court on January 5, 2023, Mr. Pike did “not have a right to appeal the January 5, 2023 reinstatement of his sentence.” Pike, 374 So.3d at 985.

On November 15, 2023, the State filed a notice of intent to re-open the habitual offender proceedings, which explained that the State sought to again pursue the habitual offender bill filed on June 22, 2018. A habitual offender hearing was held on May 2, 2024. Mr. Pike was adjudicated a second felony offender, and his original sentence on count one was vacated. Mr. Pike was resentenced to sixty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The district court judge ordered the enhanced sentence to run consecutively to the sentence previously imposed on count two, the second degree battery conviction.

On October 31, 2024, Mr. Pike filed a pro se motion for out-of-time appeal, which the district court granted on November 13, 2024.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Pike avers the district court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Specifically, Mr. Pike argues his sixty-eight-year sentence,³ which is essentially a life sentence, is constitutionally excessive. He emphasizes that there were no weapons or narcotics involved, this was not a recidivist crime, and that the victim, Ms. Fazande, survived. For these reasons, Mr. Pike argues that his excessive sentence should be vacated.

In response, the State argues the district court imposed an appropriate sentence for the crime committed by Mr. Pike. It contends that Mr. Pike kicked in a door of the eighty-four-year-old victim's home, beat her until her eye was swollen shut, and left the victim bloodied and unconscious on the floor as he stole her television. The State emphasizes that Ms. Fazande was unable to receive medical attention for her injuries until the following day, and describes the lasting effects the offense has had on the victim and her life. According to the State, the maximum sentence imposed is not excessive. We agree.

DISCUSSION

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1(B) provides that a motion for reconsideration of sentence “shall be oral at the time of sentence or shall be in writing thereafter and shall set forth the specific grounds on which the motion is based.” Further, La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E) provides that “failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.” Thus, when the consecutive nature of sentences imposed is not specifically raised in the district court, a defendant is precluded from raising the issue on appeal and the issue is not included in the court's review for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Durant, 24-243 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d 736, 743.

Here, the record reflects that Mr. Pike did not file a motion to reconsider sentence or object to the enhanced sentence in the district court. While Mr. Pike does not explicitly argue about the consecutive nature of his sentences on appeal, he implicitly does so as he characterizes the sentences as “sixty-eight years imprisonment,” which is not the length of either individual sentence, but rather, is the total length of the combined sentences. However, because the issue was not raised in the district court, we find that Mr. Pike is not entitled to a review of the consecutive nature of his sentences in this appeal and is limited to a review of his sentence for constitutional excessiveness.

On March 16, 2018, at the time Mr. Pike's original sentence was imposed, the district court stated:

Alright. Mr. Pike, I remember this trial; I remember the evidence which was presented, as you can tell by the argument we just had for the Motion for New Trial and Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal. It's the sentence of this Court, after consideration under the sentencing guidelines of 894.1, that I can't fathom anybody that would do that to an elderly lady; I can't. I don't even understand what would possess you to do that. People are taught to respect each other, and they're taught to respect their elders; at least that's the way it was – as you can tell, I have the gray hair, that's the way I was raised. Alright? I was taught to, in any way if I lived in a neighborhood, to help someone who was in need of help, if it be cutting her grass, if it means cleaning her house, if it means taking in her groceries, anything that I could do to help someone in time of need. I can't even understand why someone who lived in a neighborhood could do this; I can't even fathom it.

Therefore, based on the evidence presented to me for what you did to Ms. Fazande, the physical damage and trauma that you caused to her, the fact that she was eighty-four, going on eighty-five years old at that time, that lady shouldn't have to worry about someone that lives in her neighborhood do[ing] this to her. She should be concentrating on every day she has left in her life to live it to the fullest that she wants.

Therefore, I considered the sentencing guidelines under 894.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Article; and I believe that when you've been convicted of a felony, the Court should impose the sentence of imprisonment if any of the following circumstances exists: I believe there's an undue risk, that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation, you would commit another crime, under A 1; A 2, the Defendant is in need of a correctional treatment or custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; and three, any lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the Defendant's crime.

Other than certain other crimes that I consider in this Code, I can't imagine any crime being worse than beating an eighty-four year old person in their home to the point where they're unconscious and their face is swollen, and they wake up on the floor.

On October 10, 2018, at the habitual bill proceeding, the district court stated:

The Court's sentencing range is, in count 1 for aggravated burglary, as I stated when I sentenced you earlier, that I considered all of the sentencing guidelines under the Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1[.] I find that this particular case, I cannot get beyond the fact of the photos and the description of what Ms. Fazande looked like after this incident. When the police officer went to the hospital to speak with her, her eye was swollen shut, she was left to lay on that floor all night, which I believe was New Year's Eve.

You were found guilty of kicking in the door, of taking the t.v., and punching her, and knocking her unconscious on that floor. I cannot for the life of me understand why someone who was familiar to this woman would do that. But I stopped asking questions like that a long time ago; I just can't figure out why.

Based up [sic] that and the fact that she was eighty-something years old, and people are supposed to be safe in their house; they're supposed to be safe. Especially on New Year's Eve, in a neighborhood in which she raised all of her children, to not be subjected to someone kicking in her door and beating her unconscious.

The district court then vacated the original sentence and imposed an enhanced sentence of sixty years at hard labor without benefits, stating:

And based on that, and considering all of the Code of Criminal Procedure Article- - Articles under- - let me go to them: 894.1 A, 1, 2, and 3, the last one that I believe is the most appropriate, other than the fact that I believe that any lesser sentence of the sixty years would deprecate the seriousness of the beating this poor lady took in her life on this evening that was committed by you.

I also order, based on the facts that I've already presented, the fact that she was beaten unconscious, and left on the floor to be found, and then put in the hospital, that count 2 be run consecutive, that the eight years be run consecutive to the sixty.

I want you to understand that, as I stated, that any lesser sentence of those two counts being run consecutively would deprecate the seriousness of this offense, on this particular day, to Ms. Frazande, in her eighties.

Most recently, on May 2, 2024, after Mr. Pike was again adjudicated a second felony offender, the district court judge stated he presided over this case previously and reiterated that he reviewed the La. C.Cr.P art. 894.1 guidelines. He explained that he believed that there was an undue risk that during the period of suspended sentence or probation, Mr. Pike will likely commit another crime, that Mr. Pike is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that could be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution, and any lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of Mr. Pike's crime. The judge went on to say that Mr. Pike's conduct during the commission of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty to Ms. Fazande. Further, in addressing Mr. Pike, the judge explained that he remembered the case. He summarized, “That was a lady - - an old lady, very old, who said she knew you from that store where she used to get her commodities and you helped her load her commodities into the car.” The judge continued, “I will say that the jury found you guilty that you kicked in that door to steal that TV and beat that lady so bad that her eyes were swollen shut. She was able to give a positive ID of you. The jury took that and found you guilty.” The judge then sentenced Mr. Pike to sixty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and reiterating that “any lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of this offense,” ordered the sentence to run consecutively to the eight-year sentence imposed on count two.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Likewise, Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution also prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, but further, explicitly prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. State v. Robertson, 23-525 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/23/24), 398 So.3d 767, 775. A sentence is considered excessive, even when it is within the applicable statutory range, “if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and is nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Id. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Stewart, 24-50 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/24), 398 So.3d 812, 824, writ denied, 24-1445 (La. 2/19/25), 400 So.3d 931.

A trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case and, therefore, is given broad discretion when imposing a sentence. State v. Ford, 24-197 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d 652, 680, writ denied, 25-356 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So.3d 216. On review, an appellate court does not determine whether another sentence might have been more appropriate, but rather, whether the district court abused its discretion. Id. The review of sentences under La. Const. art. 1, § 20 does not provide an appellate court with a vehicle for substituting its judgment for that of a trial judge as to what punishment is most appropriate in a given case. Id. Generally, courts reserve maximum sentences for cases involving the most serious violations of the offense charged and the worst type of offender. State v. Beckendorf, 24-242 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d 729, 734, writ denied, 25-379 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So.3d 222.

The appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D); Beckendorf, 406 So.3d at 734. Appellate courts consider three primary factors in evaluating whether a sentence is excessive: (1) the nature of the crime; (2) the nature and background of the offender; and (3) the sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and other courts. There is no requirement, however, that specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. Id. In reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, the reviewing court shall consider the crime and the punishment in light of the harm to society and gauge whether the penalty is so disproportionate as to shock the court's sense of justice, while recognizing the district court's wide discretion. State v. Hulbert, 24-208 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d 719, 724.

Here, Mr. Pike was given an enhanced sentence of sixty years imprisonment at hard labor. At the time of the offense, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1,⁴ as a second felony offender, Mr. Pike faced a possible sentence of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than fifteen years and not more than sixty years. Thus, Mr. Pike received the maximum sentence.

This Court previously considered whether Mr. Pike's original sentence on this count was excessive. Mr. Pike was originally sentenced to thirty years imprisonment at hard labor for his aggravated burglary conviction, the maximum sentence the district court could have imposed under La. R.S. 14:60, which provides for a sentencing range of one to thirty years imprisonment at hard labor. See La. R.S. 14:60(B). There, this Court found that, considering the nature of the crime, the record reflected—and was also reiterated by the trial judge at sentencing—that Mr. Pike kicked in the front door to a house of an elderly eighty-four-year-old victim, who was home alone at the time and familiar with Mr. Pike from the neighborhood. This Court noted that Mr. Pike beat the victim to the point of unconsciousness, causing her to wake up bloodied on the floor hours later with an eye that was swollen shut, and requiring transportation to the hospital for treatment of her injuries. This Court stated that these injuries caused lasting effects on the daily living activities the victim once enjoyed. See, Pike, 273 So.3d at 499.

In our previous opinion, this Court provided that, considering the nature and background of Mr. Pike, and Mr. Pike's criminal history, the district court was of the belief that Mr. Pike was at risk for recidivism and in need of correctional treatment in a custodial environment given the egregiousness of the crimes he committed. Id. Also, after Mr. Pike was adjudicated a second felony offender the first time, but prior to the imposition of the enhanced sentence, the prosecutor informed the district court of Mr. Pike's prior criminal history. Specifically, the prosecutor advised the court that Mr. Pike was convicted of possession of cocaine in 1996, forgery in 2003, attempted theft in 2010, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in 2011.

Upon review, we find that this Court's prior reasons support the enhanced sentence. In further support, we considered that Ms. Fazande was an eighty-four-year-old diabetic, and that her front door frame was damaged, potentially leaving her vulnerable as she lay alone unconscious on the floor overnight. Her home was ransacked, and Mr. Pike stole her television. Ms. Fazande sustained substantial swelling to her face, including her left eye which was swollen shut, and had blood behind her ear. Additionally, the record established that Mr. Pike and Ms. Fazande knew one another from the neighborhood commodity store and saw one another three to four times per week. In addition to aggravated burglary, Mr. Pike was also convicted of second degree battery.

In looking at similar sentences imposed for similar crimes, we note that in State v. Jenkins, 07-586 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/22/08), 977 So.2d 142, 149, the defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary. He was thereafter adjudicated a second felony offender, and received an enhanced sentence of sixty years imprisonment at hard labor. On appeal, the defendant argued that the sentence was excessive. In affirming the enhanced sentence, this Court observed that the defendant had two prior drug convictions, one for possession of marijuana and one for distribution of cocaine within a school zone. We found that the distribution of cocaine within a school zone occurred only two years prior to the charged offense and that it was a heinous offense endangering children. We stated that, in committing the aggravated burglary, the defendant struck the victim and took her purse as well as the money inside the purse. This Court found that the defendant made no showing of exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify a downward departure from the maximum sentence and held that the sentence was not excessive. Id.

In State v. Bunch, 510 So.2d 1266 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1987), imposition of the maximum sixty-year sentence on a second felony offender was affirmed on appeal in view of the fact that the ninety-three-year-old victim was beaten unprovoked, he suffered loss of hearing as a result of the attack, his life savings were stolen, and the defendant fled the scene. Acknowledging the district court's “great discretion in sentencing within statutory limits,” the appellate court found that the record supported the district court's conclusion “that defendant [was] one of the most egregious offenders.” Id. at 1270.

In State v. Robinson, 01-1458 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/24/02), 818 So.2d 246, writ denied, 02-2064 (La. 6/20/03), 847 So.2d 1222, the appellate court affirmed the nineteen-year-old defendant's habitual offender sentence of fifty years, finding that it was not excessive considering that the defendant and an accomplice forced their way into a seventy-six-year-old widow's home, pushed her into a chair, and forcibly removed her wedding ring.

Pursuant to this review, we find that Mr. Pike's enhanced maximum sentence for aggravated burglary is not so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence “makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.” Robertson, 398 So.3d at 775; Stewart, 398 So.3d at 824. In addition to the aggravated burglary conviction, Mr. Pike was convicted of second degree battery. He also had prior convictions for possession of cocaine, forgery, theft, and the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The record indicates that Mr. Pike violently beat the elderly Ms. Fazande in the head and face until she was unconscious and then left her alone on the floor, where she remained until she regained consciousness the following day. The testimony at trial evidenced how this crime has negatively impacted Ms. Fazande's daily living and how it will likely affect her for the rest of her life. Further, Mr. Pike's sentence is within the statutory limits and a review of similar cases indicates that Mr. Pike's enhanced sentence is not an outlier. Accordingly, we find that Mr. Pike's assertion that his sixty-year sentence as a second felony offender is excessive in light of the circumstances and evidenced presented is without merit.

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

The record was reviewed for errors patent in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920: State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990). Our review revealed an error patent that requires correction.

We find there is an inconsistency in Mr. Pike's sentence as to the restriction of parole. According to the May 2, 2024 sentencing transcript, the trial judge stated that Mr. Pike's sentence for aggravated burglary was to be served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The district court did not restrict parole. La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) requires that all habitual offender sentences are without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, but it does not restrict parole. When a defendant is sentenced as a habitual offender, it is the penalty provision for the underlying offense that imposes a parole restriction. State v. Cotton, 23-492 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/31/24), 392 So.3d 1147, 1158. Here, La. R.S. 14:60, the penalty provision for aggravated battery, does not statutorily provide for the imposition of a restriction on parole. While the transcript shows that the district court properly sentenced Mr. Pike pursuant to La. R.S. 14:60, the habitual offender sentencing minute entry states that the sentence is to be served without the benefit of “parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” The uniform commitment order (“UCO”) similarly reflects that Mr. Pike's sentence is to be served without the benefit of “probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.”

The transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732 (La. 1983). For this reason, we remand the matter to the district court for correction of the sentencing minute entry and the habitual offender UCO to remove the restriction of parole for the enhanced sentence on count one, aggravated burglary. We further order that once the UCO is corrected, the Clerk of Court for the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court is to transmit the corrected habitual offender UCO to the appropriate authorities in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 892(B)(2) and the Department of Corrections’ legal department. See State v. McGinnis, 23-472 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/31/24), 392 So.3d 963, 978.⁵

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Pike's enhanced sentence. We remand the matter to the district court for correction of the sentencing minute entry and the habitual offender UCO as instructed above.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his first appeal, defendant argued that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in sentencing defendant for aggravated battery rather than aggravated burglary; (3) the consecutive sentences imposed are constitutionally excessive; (4) the convictions for both aggravated burglary and second degree battery constitute double jeopardy; (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a double jeopardy claim; and (6) the non-unanimous jury verdict violates the Equal Protection Clause and is unconstitutional. This Court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences on May 8, 2019. Pike, 273 So.3d at 493.

2.   See Errors Patent Review regarding an inconsistency as to the restriction of parole.

3.   While Mr. Pike actually received two separate sentences—one, sixty years for aggravated burglary, and two, eight years for second degree battery—to run consecutively, in this appeal, he consistently refers to his “sixty-eight-year sentence.”

4.   A habitual offender is sentenced according to the law in effect at the time the offense was committed. State v. Parker, 03-924 (La. 4/14/04), 871 So.2d 317, 326-27; State v. Thomas, 20-97 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/4/20), 306 So.3d 568, 577 n.13. The charged offense occurred on December 31, 2016. At that time, La. R.S. 15:529.1 provided:If the second felony offender is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

5.   In McGinnis, this sentencing minute entry and UCO showed a restriction of benefits not contained in the transcript. There, this Court ordered the correction of the sentencing minute entry and the UCO, stating that, once the UCO was corrected, the Clerk of Court for the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court was ordered to transmit the corrected UCO to the appropriate authorities in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 892(B)(2) and the Department of Corrections’ legal department.

CHEHARDY, C.J.