LAFAYETTE CITY PARISH CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT v. TRIPLE ENTERPRISES INC AND NATHAN ALLEN MARTIN (2025)

Plaintiff, Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (LCG), and Defendants, Triple T Enterprises, Inc. (Triple T), Argonaut Insurance Company, and Nathan Allen Martin all appealed the decision of the trial court. For the reasons below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Nathan Allen Martin was driving an 18-wheeler for his employer, Triple T, while intoxicated and using an electronic device. Martin was hauling a fully loaded flat-bed trailer. Meanwhile, a nearby Lafayette Fire Department firetruck was responding to a major automobile crash. The firetruck stopped on an overpass with its emergency lights activated. Martin proceeded to crash head-on into the firetruck. A firefighter was injured from jumping off the overpass to avoid being struck by Martin. His claims were settled. The firetruck was a total loss.

At the scene of the wreck, responding officers witnessed Martin slurring his words and displaying a lack of balance. He smelled of alcohol. The officers discovered an open whiskey bottle on the ground near the 18-wheeler, and an opened beer can with condensation inside the cab of the vehicle. Martin's blood alcohol test showed a level of 0.11 percent, well over the 0.04 percent limit for operators of commercial motor carriers under the Federal Motor Carrier Act.

The firetruck was a 1994 Pierce pumper truck used as a spare pumper truck for the fire department's fleet if other trucks went offline. Employees of the fire department and city testified that although the cost of rental for a similar truck would have been $275 per day, the department was unwilling to accept the risk associated with leasing or buying a used replacement vehicle. The department ordered all its pumper trucks new and custom-built to fit its needs. In addition to being painted with the same unique decals and schemes, the trucks were outfitted with the same equipment in similar fashion so they would be interchangeable to the firemen.

After a bench trial, the trial court awarded $12,500 for the actual cash value of the truck, $131,175 for the loss of use damages, and $50,000 in exemplary damages. Plaintiff and Defendants have appealed.

COMBINED ASSIGMENTS OF ERROR

1) Whether the trial court erred in awarding $12,500 for actual cash value of fire truck.

2) Whether the trial court erred in awarding punitive damages to a claimant who suffered no physical or mental injuries.

3) Whether the award of punitive damages was abusively low or high.

4) Whether the trial court erred in awarding loss of use damages, and if not, was the award excessive.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The manifest error standard applies to the review of a trial court's award of special damages. Kaiser v. Hardin, 06-2092, (La. 4/11/07), 953 So.2d 802; Kaltenbaugh v. Bd. of Supervisors, 18-1085, 18-1086 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/23/19), 282 So.3d 1133. Likewise, entitlement to exemplary damages in motor vehicle crashes caused by an intoxicated driver is reviewed under the manifest error standard. Hanson v. Benelli, 97-1467 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/30/98), 719 So.2d 627, writ denied, 98-2754 (La. 1/8/99), 735 So.2d 632. However, “[q]uestions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute, are reviewed ․ under the de novo standard of review.” Louisiana Mun. Ass'n v. State, 04-227, p. 35 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So. 2d 809, 836.

The appellate court is guided by the principle that “if a trier of fact's findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse even if convinced that if it had been sitting as trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” Mistich v. Volkswagen of Germany, Inc., 95-939, p. 5 (La. 1/29/96), 666 So.2d 1073, 1077. Where multiple permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder's decision between them cannot be manifestly erroneous. Watson v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 967, (La.1985).

LAW AND ARGUMENT

1) The award of $12,500 for the actual cash value of the firetruck

The trial court's market value award for the total loss of the fire truck relied on the credibility determination of the plaintiff's expert witness, Dennis Norman. Norman is an independent appraiser and licensed adjuster hired by the fire department to value the loss. He investigated the market value of comparable trucks and estimated the actual cash value of the truck at $12,500.

Norman was then hired as an expert by the LCG. At trial, Norman testified he found two trucks for sale at prices of $25,000 and $35,000. His opinion was that the market value of the fire truck would have been $40,000 to $50,000. The trial judge asked Norman how he arrived at a market value of $40,000 to $50,000 when his comparable trucks were only $25,000 and $35,000. Norman effectively had no answer to this question.

Norman also testified about added costs to customize a used replacement truck to fit the department's needs. However, these costs are irrelevant in finding the actual cash value. The owner is only entitled to the market value of the vehicle as it was immediately preceding the crash, less any salvage value. Coleman v. Victor, 326 So.2d 344 (La.1976); Holt v. Rapides Par. Police Jury, 574 So.2d 525 (La.App. 3 Cir.1991).

Where testimony conflicts, “reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.” Mistich, 666 So.2d at 1077. Additionally, when considering the testimony of an expert, “the trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in part ․ [his or her opinion] even to the point of substituting its own common sense and judgment for that of an expert witness, where, in the factfinder's opinion, such substitution appears warranted by the evidence as a whole.” Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 07–1335, p. 28 (La. 4/18/08), 980 So.2d 654, 673.

We find a reasonable factual basis for the trial court's award, and we find no error in its rejection of Norman's trial opinion. It was reasonable for the trial court to accept Norman's initial inspection and opinion.

2) The award of punitive damages

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.4 states, in pertinent part:

exemplary damages may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were caused by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a motor vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries.

The defendants claim that “injuries” are limited to physical and mental injuries and are unavailable in a case with only property and loss of use damages. At least two Louisiana appellate courts have permitted the application of Article 2315.4 in property damage and loss of use cases. The first circuit did so in Falgout v. Wilson, 531 So.2d 492 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 532 So.2d 154 (La.1988), and the fourth circuit did so in Bourgeois v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 562 So.2d 1177 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990), writ denied, 567 So.2d 611 (La.1990).

In Bourgeois, an intoxicated driver struck multiple parked cars and the defendant insurer contested the award of exemplary damages. Of relevance to the issue before this court, the fourth circuit stated:

The defendant in the instant case contends that the word “injuries” refers only to bodily injury, especially since the other code articles on tort liability utilize the broad term “damages.” Thus, defendant asserts, the legislature must have intended to narrow the scope of exemplary damages. However, the word “injury” is defined broadly in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) pp. 706–07 as follows: “Any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation, or property. The invasion of any legally protected interest of another.” Other types of injury, such as “accidental injury,” “civil injury,” and “bodily injury,” are defined separately.

Because the purpose of article 2315.4 is to deter drunk driving, and the definition of the word “injuries,” which is used in the article, traditionally includes property damage, the deterrent effect of article 2315.4 is best served by including property damage without accompanying bodily injury within the ambit of its coverage. To allow otherwise would lessen the detrimental impact of the article.

Bourgeois, 562 So. at 1179-80.

We adopt the reasoning of the fourth circuit that the term “injuries” is sufficiently broad to include damages from the destruction or loss of use of property. There was no error in the trial court's finding that La.Civ.Code art. 2315.4 applies to a property and loss of use damage case where the other elements of the article are proven.

3) The amount of punitive damages

The trial court has much discretion in fixing the amount of an exemplary damage award. Selvage v. Robert Levis Chevrolet, Inc., 98-197 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/16/98), 719 So.2d 1088. The relevant factors “in determining the amount of exemplary damages are: (1) the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff; (2) the wealth or financial situation of the defendant; (3) the character of the conduct involved; and (4) the extent to which such conduct offends a sense of justice and propriety.” Angeron v. Martin, 93-2381, pp. 5–6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/94), 649 So.2d 40, 44. We note that the court in Angeron awarded $50,000 in punitive damages in a crash due to intoxication, where the special and general damages totaled $99,799.98. This ratio of punitive to other damages is like our case.

Martin's conduct was particularly egregious in this case. Not only was he operating a vehicle while over the legal blood alcohol limit, but his vehicle was a loaded 18-wheeler. Its size and weight presented a greater threat than most vehicles. Martin was also on an electronic device. Considering all of this, we cannot say that the trial court's award for exemplary damages was abusively high in this case.

It is rare for the amount of exemplary damages to exceed the combined compensatory damages. Lacoste v. Crochet, 99-602 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/5/00), 751 So.2d 998. We find nothing in the record to support overturning the trial court's punitive award as abusively low. We find factual support in the record for the trial court's award of exemplary damages. There was no abuse of discretion.

4) The award of loss of use damages

The award of loss of use damages for loss of a firetruck to a governmental fire department who does not operate for profit appears to be a case of first impression in Louisiana. The jurisprudence on loss of use does not define universal or broad rules regarding loss of use damages but instead can be summarized as follows.

There are multiple vehicle loss of use cases where such damages were awarded despite no rental costs being incurred. These cases stressed the inconvenience or mental anguish caused by the loss of use. See e.g. Alexander v. Qwik Change Car Ctr., Inc., 352 So.2d 188 (La.1977); Neloms v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 37-786 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/16/03), 859 So.2d 225; Williams v. La. Indem. Co., 26,887 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/21/95), 658 So.2d 739. In one case, the plaintiff's home was damaged, but no rental costs were incurred. Enriquez v. Safeway Ins. Co. of La., 52,425 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/16/19), 264 So. 3d 648. Multiple federal district courts in Louisiana have allowed loss of use claims where communications cable cases were severed, and rental costs were not incurred. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC v. Toomer Elec. Co., Inc., 557 F.Supp.2d 745 (E.D. La. 2008). MCI Commc'ns Serv. Inc. v. KC Trucking & Equip. LLC, 403 F.Supp.3d 548 (W.D. La. 2019).

However, another federal district court faced a severed telecommunications cable and believed Louisiana law would not allow for non-pecuniary loss of use damages but would limit them to economic loss. AT & T Corp. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., (W.D. La.2008) (W.D. WL 4585460). One Louisiana appellate court denied the recovery of rental costs when they were not incurred. In Jensen v. Matute, 19-706 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/29/20), 289 So.3d 1136, the plaintiff's cello was damaged in an automobile crash. The plaintiff used his old cello as a substitute while the damaged one was being repaired. The court stated, “absent a showing of actual damages, a plaintiff is not entitled to recover loss of use damages.” Id. at 1143.

In this case, the fire department had a fleet of vehicles, including substitute vehicles, if a truck went offline. The department's employees testified that if there is a shortage of trucks, and a station does not have a truck available, the station would be shut down and unable to respond to emergencies. The two nearest fire stations would have to assume the responsibilities of the closed station until that station's truck became unavailable. The employees testified that the fire department had to close a station because this pumper truck was available. The fire department did not incur rental costs after the firetruck loss in this crash but increased its reliance on its spare vehicles.

The trial court arrived at its loss of use award by multiplying the daily rental rate testified to by the LCG Fleet Superintendent by fifteen months, the amount of time it took to get a new custom ordered pumper truck. Defendants claim it was an error to award loss of use damages at all. Alternatively, they claim the fifteen-month multiplier is excessive.

The facts of this case are unique. They do not fit the usual loss of use of vehicle cases. Firetrucks are not interchangeable commodities like passenger vehicles and replacing one is not as simple as finding an equivalent used one.

According to one of the fire department's fire chiefs, the department could not accept the risk of buying or renting used fire trucks. They needed a degree of interchangeability and dependability to respond to emergencies that a used vehicle would not offer. Consequently, the department typically had replacement trucks custom designed, and their lead time was up to three years between budgetary approval, design, and manufacturing. These facts provide a reasonable basis for the department not renting or buying a used substitute vehicle.

There are loss of use damages in this case, making it distinguishable from Jensen. In Jensen, 289 So.3d 1136, the use of the substitute cello in musical performances did not result in depreciation and wear and tear of the instrument. Here, the increased reliance on the department's spare vehicles resulted in wear and tear. The loss of use was an inconvenience to the department. It faced a risk of shutting down stations.

MCI Communications Services Inc., 403 F.Supp.3d 548 analyzed loss of use cases in Louisiana, attempting to set out a framework from the various cases. The “spare boat” doctrine supplies the rationale for awarding loss of use damages in this case. The MCI court stated:

Furthermore, the policy goals articulated in the analogous “spare boat” cases are served by this distinction in damages ․ Specifically, the United States Supreme Court affirmed an award to a ferryboat owner for loss-of-use damages where the owner maintained a “spare boat” which he used in place of a vessel damaged by another ship while the vessel was repaired. The Cayuga, 5 F.Cas. 329, 331 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1870), aff'd, 81 U.S. 270, 14 Wall. 270, 20 L.Ed. 828 (1871). The ferryboat owner was awarded damages for loss of use because the Court found that the owner had made the decision to purchase and maintain a spare boat and the tortfeasor should not reap “the benefit of this large outlay” simply because the boat owner did not incur the expense of hiring a replacement boat. Id. In a subsequent case, the United States Supreme Court refused to extend the “spare boat” doctrine to a situation where the “spare” was not set aside for emergency use, but rather, was used in the normal course of business. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Term. v. United States, 287 U.S. 170, 177, 53 S.Ct. 103, 77 L.Ed. 240 (1932).

MCI Commc'ns Serv. Inc., 403 F.Supp.3d at 558-559.

The fire department maintains spare vehicles. The defendants should not benefit from the department's prudent management of resources used to respond to emergencies. The fire department is in the business of responding to emergencies and maintaining spare pumper trucks is part of their preparedness. We find that the “spare boat” doctrine applies under these facts.

Also, the court's ruling in Level 3 Communications, LLC, 557 F.Supp.2d 745 provides support for awarding the rental costs that would have been incurred had the fire department not maintained spare vehicles. Where a telecommunications company rerouted traffic to redundant capacity built for emergencies, the Level 3 court held, “under Louisiana law the appropriate measure of damages is the reasonable cost that Plaintiff would have expended renting substitute capacity on another carrier.” Id. at 748.

This issue here is whether the trial court was clearly wrong in making its award. We find that the law in Louisiana permits recovery under these circumstances, and that the trial court's loss of use award was neither excessive nor clearly wrong.

DECREE

The judgment of the trial court awarding property, loss of use, and exemplary damages is affirmed. Each party shall bear their own costs of appeal.

AFFIRMED.

CLAYTON DAVIS JUDGE