STATE OF LOUISIANA v. BRYSON JOHNLEWIS (2025)

Defendant, Bryson Johnlewis, appeals his convictions and sentences for being a principal to second degree murder, conspiring to commit second degree murder, and possessing a firearm by a convicted felon.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 16, 2019, seventeen-year-old Garon Lewis was shot and killed while sitting in his parked car in New Iberia, Louisiana.

Five months later, Defendant was charged by bill of information with various offenses, including possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1. And four months after that, Defendant was charged by grand jury indictment with being a principal to second degree murder under La.R.S. 14:24 and 14:30.1 and with conspiracy to commit second degree murder under La.R.S. 14:26 and 14:30.1. Defendant pleaded not guilty, and the matter proceeded to jury trial.

Trial was held in September 2023. At the close of evidence, the jury unanimously found Defendant guilty on all three charges. Defendant moved for a new trial, but the motion was denied.

The trial court then sentenced Defendant as follows: for his conviction of principal to second degree murder, Defendant was sentenced to life in prison at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; for conspiracy to commit second degree murder, Defendant was sentenced to thirty years at hard labor without benefits; and for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Defendant was sentenced to twenty years at hard labor without benefits. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Defendant then orally moved for reconsideration of the sentences, but this motion was also denied.

Defendant now appeals his convictions and sentences, asserting three assignments of error:

I. The evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a rational jury to convict [Defendant] of principal to second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit second-degree murder, and illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

II. The trial court erred in denying [Defendant's] motion for new trial despite defense counsel's inability to subpoena [D]etective Coquina Mitchell and Dontrell Charles.

III. The trial court erred in ordering that [Defendant's] sentences for each charge are to run consecutively.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

All criminal appeals are initially reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record under La.Code Crim.P. art. 920. Here, we find no patent errors.

I. First Assignment of Error

Defendant asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of any of the charged offenses. Defendant thus challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is reviewed on appeal under the standard set forth by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319.

“This standard, now legislatively embodied in La.C.Cr.P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact-finder.” State v. Pigford, 05-477, p. 6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517, 521. After all, the appellate court's function is not to assess the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. The appellate court must instead afford great deference to a jury's decision to accept or reject the testimony. State v. Robinson, 02-1869 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 66.

Summary of the Record Evidence

As noted, Garon was fatally shot on August 16, 2019. At the time of the shooting, he was parked on Rene Street, one block west of his girlfriend's house and one block east of the Dodge City apartments.

The State's first witness was Detective Howard Bodin of the St. Martin Parish Sheriff's Office. Detective Bodin formerly worked as a probation officer in New Iberia. He testified that in 2017, Defendant was convicted of second degree battery. The documents reflecting this conviction were admitted into evidence. Detective Bodin supervised Defendant's probation for this felony conviction.

Garon's girlfriend, J'Aijha Marshall, testified next. According to J'Aijha, she and Garon had been dating for a few years. Their relationship was on-again, off-again: it was a toxic relationship that involved physical abuse, which her family knew about. For instance, in December 2018, Garon punched her in the mouth. Then, when her brother, Jhamad Allen, found out, he punched Garon in his mouth. But J'Aijha noted that her brother never had any other issues with Garon.

J'Aijha was then asked about August 16, 2019, which is the date of the shooting. She explained that she and Garon were secretly dating at that time: her family was opposed to the relationship and told her to stop seeing him a few months earlier. She testified that the plan that night was for Garon to pick her up at her house. She thought she would be home alone. But when Garon tried coming over to pick her up, her aunt was still there visiting. Because of this, J'Aijha told Garon that she could not leave with him. In response, Garon said he was going home.

J'Aijha’s house is on the corner of Audrey Street and Sis Street. She testified that when Garon left, he was driving toward the Dodge City apartments. Her cousin Jacquelyn Allen then arrived. J'Aijha and Jacquelyn went outside to talk. And while outside, they heard four or five gunshots. But according to J'Aijha, hearing gunshots was normal “[w]here [she] live[d].” Even still, she and Jacqueline ran inside. J'Aijha then texted Garon several times, but he never responded. So after about thirty minutes, J'Aijha and a few others walked around the corner to see what had happened. This is when she saw Garon's car on the side of the road.

During cross-examination, defense counsel asked J'Aijha about her brother, Jhamad. J'Aijha acknowledged that Jhamad owned lots of guns. But then she was asked if she wanted her brother to be blamed for Garon's death. She responded, “He can't get blamed for something he didn't do so.”

The State then called Chris Wilson, formerly a detective for the New Iberia Police Department. Detective Wilson was the lead investigator in the case. The detective first identified Google Maps printouts of the area commonly referred to as Dodge City, which included the scene of the shooting. He noted that Garon's vehicle was found on Rene Street near the intersection with Audrey Street. Garon had parked one block away from J'Aijha’s house.

Detective Wilson recalled that when he arrived at the scene, he noticed that Garon's vehicle was still running, though the headlights were off and the windows were rolled up. He also noticed that multiple bullets had ripped through the vehicle. For example, the rear window, rear taillight on the driver's side, and the backseat window on the driver's side were all shattered; the rear tire on the driver's side was punctured; and the rear bumper had a hole through it. Detective Wilson then turned his attention to the vehicle's interior, explaining that “on the driver's floorboard where [Garon] was[,] there was a piece of metal which we found came from—when he was shot it broke loose as it went through the window and it's commonly called the jacket of the projectile[.]”

Detective Wilson testified that on the other side of Rene Street, which is where the bullets were fired, there is a wrought-iron fence with small fleurde-lis ornaments on top. He recalled that one of the ornaments was knocked off the fence and was on the ground in front of it. He believed that the shots were fired from behind the fence, specifically in the area between the fence and an abandoned apartment building. The detective further pointed out that two 9-millimeter shell casings were found on the ground between the fence and apartment building; no other bullet casings were discovered. In addition, he noted that a bullet fragment was found lodged in the fence. All of this supported his belief that the shooter was behind the fence when the shots were fired.

According to Detective Wilson, the New Iberia Police Department conducted more than eighty interviews. J'Aijha’s interview was one of the first. He noted that J'Aijha also allowed police to search her cellphone. The information retrieved from her phone, including text messages, corroborated what she had said during her interview. Additionally, police obtained video recordings from cameras on J'Aijha’s home. And this evidence also supported J'Aijha’s statements to police.

Detective Wilson was then asked about J'Aijha’s brother, Jhamad. According to the detective, Jhamad was initially investigated because of his altercation with Garon in late 2018. A search warrant was executed at Jhamad's apartment. And although three guns were found, none of them matched the shell casings or bullet fragments recovered from the scene. Based on this and based on statements from numerous witnesses, Jhamad was eventually excluded as a person of interest.

Detective Wilson next explained that the investigation began to focus on seven individuals: Defendant; Defendant's brother, JaBryson Johnlewis; Trevonce Bernard; Terrence Adkins; Kenray Ledet; Travis Layne; and Terrell Hamilton. They all had nicknames. For instance, Defendant was “Duke,” JaBryson was “Bug,” Travis was “Bird,” and Kenray was “Duff.” And they were all together on the 1100 block of Rene Street around 9:00 p.m. on August 16, 2019.

According to Detective Wilson, these seven individuals were hanging out together in an area called “the Circle,” which is where Harrison Street curves toward Audrey Street. The group of seven believed that Garon's car belonged to an “op” or opposition to their group. The detective explained that the general sentiment expressed by these individuals during police interviews was this: when an op was in the area, you shoot them.

According to Detective Wilson, Travis was the first member of the group to leave to investigate the op. He drove from Harrison Street to Audrey Street and then south on Rene Street. Trevonce and Defendant also decided to investigate the op. But they left the Circle on foot and took the “Cut,” which is a shortcut that goes between buildings and comes out on Rene Street just south of where Garon was parked.

Detective Wilson was then asked specific questions about Trevonce. In response, he explained that Trevonce was not involved in the shooting: Trevonce's former girlfriend, Tayjha Alfred, picked him up before the shooting. She met him at the end of the Cut on Rene Street. She drove Trevonce to the Dollar General store to buy diapers for his baby boy. Detective Wilson pointed to the video recordings obtained from J'Aijha’s residence that show Tayjha's vehicle—a white Ford Fusion with a non-functioning headlight—driving away from Rene Street five minutes before the shooting.

Detective Wilson's testimony then focused on Defendant. For starters, the detective testified about a text-message conversation between Defendant and Trevonce in which Defendant was trying to sell a Glock handgun. This conversation occurred earlier in the day of the shooting. Detective Wilson also noted Defendant had replaced his cellphone between the shooting and when he was interviewed by police.

As to Defendant's interviews with police, Defendant initially claimed to know nothing about a Glock handgun. But his story changed when police confronted him with his text messages to Trevonce. Defendant also initially told police that he was nowhere near Dodge City on the day of the shooting and that he did not know anything about the shooting or the people involved. But here too, his story began to change: “He went from not being there to he was in the Circle, then that was it, and then he went a little further into the Cut and then he was at the fence. He kept putting himself further and further to the crime scene.” Defendant also told police that Travis left the Circle in his car to see if the vehicle on Rene Street was an op, that he and Trevonce then walked down the Cut toward Rene Street, and that Trevonce was with him when the shooting occurred.

On cross-examination, Detective Wilson acknowledged that early in the investigation, a witness named Jamison Beals implicated Jhamad in the shooting. Jamison told police that Jhamad had texted him, saying he killed the op. But when police searched Jamison's cellphone, no such text message was found. In fact, nothing was found to substantiate Jamison's claim.

Detective Wilson then addressed Dontrell Charles's claim that Jhamad had bragged to him about killing Garon. Dontrell was a jailhouse informant. Although he and Jhamad were incarcerated at the same time, there was nothing to substantiate his claim. There was also no evidence placing Jhamad at the crime scene. As Detective Wilson put it: “We pursued Jhamad and we ruled him out.” By contrast, Detective Wilson testified that two people put themselves at the scene of the shooting at the time of the shooting: Defendant and Travis.

Jhamad testified next. He acknowledged that he was incarcerated on drug and gun charges and that he was not promised anything for his testimony. According to Jhamad, he slapped Garon in late 2018 for calling J'Aijha “a bitch.” Jhamad noted that he was aware of his sister's ongoing relationship with Garon. He also noted that he had no problem with Garon, even stating that Garon would sometimes give him a ride.

Jhamad testified that in August 2019, he was living with his then-girlfriend, Iesha Hall, at the St. Edwards apartments. He explained that people from St. Edwards and people from Dodge City do not hang out with each other. Nor do they go near each other. As to the night of the shooting, Jhamad testified that he and Iesha were at their apartment far away from Dodge City. Jhamad then admitted that he was in jail because of the search of his apartment: police found drugs, three guns, and three thousand dollars in cash. The drugs, according to Jhamad, were his; the guns were not. He emphasized that he did not kill Garon.

During cross-examination, Jhamad denied texting Jamison after the shooting. Jhamad also denied telling Dontrell—who was incarcerated with Jhamad on unrelated charges—that “I got that little ‘n word’ that slapped my sister.” Yet Jhamad admitted that Iesha texted him after the shooting about moving the guns out of their apartment and into a storage unit, but the search warrant was executed before she could move them.

Kelly Bernard was the State's next witness. She lived on Harrison Street, which is one street over from where the shooting occurred. On the night of the shooting, Kelly went grocery shopping before coming home. She recalled that when she arrived home, she saw “Trevonce, Duke, Bug, [and] Terrence” standing outside, and then “Bird and Duff pull[ed] up.” Kelly is Trevonce's aunt. She knew Bird was Travis. And although she did not know Duff's real name, she knew he was Travis's brother. Kelly identified Defendant as “Duke”; she did not know his real name. Similarly, she did not know Bug's real name, but she knew he and Defendant were brothers. According to Kelly, she did not know Defendant or his brother very well, but she often saw them because their mother lived nearby.¹

Kelly was then asked about the shooting. Kelly recalled hearing the gunshots not too long after returning from the grocery store. After the shots ended, Kelly heard people outside. She did not see Trevonce, though, so she asked about his whereabouts. She was told that he left before the shooting.

Kelly next admitted telling police that after the shooting, she saw “Travis, Duke and Duff” running from the Cut. But Kelly then testified to the jury that she had “never seen three individuals running from the [C]ut.” She explained that she only gave that statement “[b]ecause I was pretty much forced to say that or they told me I would be charged with principal to commit murder and my six children would be in OCS custody.”

Kelly specifically pointed to Captain Corey Porter as the officer who badgered her into making that statement. Kelly claimed that she was interviewed repeatedly by Captain Porter and that he kept pressuring her to say she saw those boys running from the Cut. Kelly then acknowledged that she did not want to be involved in this case. She also acknowledged that she changed her story after she was arrested on a material witness warrant.

The State then called Captain Porter, who previously worked at the New Iberia Police Department in the criminal investigations division. He testified that when he joined the New Iberia Police Department in 2018, he joined as a captain to help build the criminal investigations division “from scratch.” Captain Porter denied telling Kelly how to testify. He also denied threatening to arrest her or have her children taken away. He explained that every interview with Kelly was recorded and that she was only interviewed twice.

Tayjha testified next. Like Kelly, Tayjha was being held in custody on a material witness warrant. Tayjha worked as a certified nursing assistant. She testified that she had dated Trevonce, but their relationship ended in the summer of 2019. Tayjha explained that she and Trevonce would visit Kelly, his aunt in Dodge City, “[a]lmost every day” when they were dating. She then identified Defendant as one of Trevonce's friends, noting both his real name and nickname. Although Tayjha testified that she knew some of Trevonce's other friends, including Travis, she stated that she hung out with Trevonce's family, not his friends.

Tayjha was then asked about the day of the shooting. She testified that she picked up Trevonce's son that morning. This was not unusual: she would often help care for Trevonce's son, even after their breakup. Later that day, Tayjha called Trevonce because he needed to buy diapers and wipes for his son.

That evening, Tayjha contacted Trevonce. She agreed to meet him in Dodge City and drive him to the Dollar General store. When she met up with Trevonce, she noticed that Defendant was with him. Defendant, however, continued walking down the sidewalk on Rene Street. She also noticed what she thought was an abandoned gray car. This is when Travis drove up. He parked right behind her. At this point, Trevonce spoke briefly with Travis. Trevonce then got into Tayjha's car. As Tayjha began driving away, she noticed that Defendant and Travis were together on the sidewalk directly across from the gray car. It was approximately 9:00 p.m.

Tayjha estimated that it took about five minutes to drive to the Dollar General. Once there, Trevonce went inside, bought the diapers and wipes, came back to the car, and gave them to her. Five minutes later, they returned to Rene Street. This is when Tayjha saw yellow tape, detectives, and emergency responders everywhere.

Terrence was the State's next witness. Terrence testified that he lived in Dodge City with his girlfriend. He knew the area because he grew up there. Terrence identified an op as an opponent. But Terrence's testimony about what occurred on the day of the shooting was inconsistent with his prior statements to police, culminating with responses like this: I “can't just remember something from years ago.”

Nonetheless, Terrence testified that he arrived in Dodge City that night at around seven o'clock. He then hung out with Defendant, JaBryson, Trevonce, Terrell, and Kenray. According to Terrence, they were all loitering near Kelly's house. Travis arrived a short time later. Terrence acknowledged telling Captain Porter that he heard someone say there was an op. He recalled that Travis then left the group “[t]o go see if there was a car on the backstreet.” But his testimony changed from Travis leaving the group on foot to Travis leaving in a car, which is what he had originally told police.

Terrence then testified that Defendant and Trevonce also left the group, but they were on foot. Yet later in his testimony, Terrence told the jury that Travis had accompanied Defendant and Trevonce as they walked through the Cut toward Rene Street. In any event, Terrence testified that he heard gunshots five to ten minutes after Defendant and Travis left the group to investigate the op. Terrence believed that about seven shots were fired. He explained that he and Kenray were standing near Kelly's house when he heard the gunshots. Terrell and JaBryson were also with them at that time. Although Terrence testified that he did not see anyone with a gun “that day,” he stated that all of them had carried a gun before. Terrence then confirmed that Defendant and Travis were together at the time of the shooting.

Terrence was next questioned about his police interview of September 14, 2019. During that interview, he reported that Defendant had admitted shooting the op. But this changed at trial: Terrence testified to the jury that Defendant “never said that out his [sic] mouth.” And although Terrence testified at trial that he did not see Defendant with a gun on the day of the shooting, he previously testified before the grand jury that he did see Defendant with a gun that day. Terrence tried to brush away these inconsistencies, explaining that the only reason he testified before the grand jury was to get his bond lowered so he could get out of jail.

Trevonce testified next. At the outset, he acknowledged that he did not want to testify. He nevertheless explained that he knew all the individuals who were at Dodge City on the night of August 16, 2019. After all, he grew up with them in that area. He described an op as an opponent. He testified that none of the individuals in the area that night would just walk up to the window of a car that they believed was an op. According to Trevonce, that day was just a regular day before the shooting that evening. And although he was no longer residing in Dodge City, his aunt and grandmother lived there.

As to his relationship with Tayjha, Trevonce testified that it was “on again, off again.” He confirmed that she was babysitting his son on the day of the shooting. He also confirmed that Tayjha asked him to buy diapers and wipes, that he met her that night at the end of the Cut on Rene Street, that he spoke with Travis before leaving, and that Travis and Defendant were together just off Rene Street behind the wrought-iron fence as he and Tayjha drove away. He recalled that there was also a car that he did not recognize “parked almost on the corner of Audrey and Rene.” He did not notice anyone inside the vehicle. Nor did he notice that any interior lights were on.

Trevonce explained that after he bought the items from the Dollar General store, Tayjha drove him back to Rene Street. But when they arrived, “[i]t was lit up out there, they had nutin [sic] but police lights and yellow tape.”

Next, Trevonce admitted telling police that Defendant had a Glock pistol earlier that day. And although he did not remember telling police that Defendant usually carried a Glock 19 Gen 5, he did not contest the accuracy or truthfulness of that statement. Throughout much of his trial testimony, he continued this pattern of not remembering details but acknowledging what he previously told police. For example, when he was asked at trial if Defendant admitted shooting the op, Trevonce testified that if he said it happened, it happened; but he no longer remembered any details—he no longer remembered telling police that Defendant got into a car with him and said the shooting was “[his] work.” Trevonce then acknowledged telling the grand jury that Defendant had confessed to the shooting. He also acknowledged telling police that Travis was in a black Honda at the time of the shooting. Police had received witness reports of a black Honda Accord speeding away immediately after the shooting.

On cross-examination, Trevonce testified that he was not in Dodge City when the shooting happened. Yet even still, he was arrested in late-September 2019. Trevonce claimed that the detectives fed him information about the case and then had him testify before the grand jury before he was allowed out of jail.

The State then called Phillip Stout, who is the “firearm section supervisor for the North Louisiana Crime Lab.” Mr. Stout was previously employed at the Acadiana Crime Lab in New Iberia. He was qualified as an expert in the field of firearms identification.

According to Mr. Stout, the type of rifling found on the recovered casings indicates that the bullets were fired from a weapon whose barrel has a type of rifling called “polygonal with rails.” He testified that only newer model Glock weapons use this type of rifling. According to Mr. Stout, it appeared that the bullet fragments recovered from the fence, Garon's tire, his fender, and the floorboard of his car were all fired from the same weapon, which was a newer generation Glock pistol. Mr. Stout confirmed that none of the guns retrieved from Jhamad's apartment fired those bullets.

The State then called Jeremy Dubois, a DNA chemist from the Acadiana Crime Lab. Mr. Dubois was accepted as an expert in DNA analysis. He testified that a DNA profile had been obtained from one of the shell casings, but it was a match for Detective Wilson. This is not surprising. DNA from investigating officers typically ends up on this type of evidence through sweat or lack of gloves. But even so, it is rare to recover any DNA from a spent casing because of the heat that is generated when a bullet is fired. As to the second shell casing, there was only a partial DNA profile, and it was too small for any conclusions to be drawn.

The State then called Dr. Christopher Tape, who was accepted by the court as an expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Tape testified that Garon died from a gunshot wound to the head which entered above and behind his left ear, travelling upward from back left to front right. He noted multiple tears to the left ear, which he opined were likely caused by small fragments of the bullet. Dr. Tape testified the lead core of the bullet caused a bulge in Garon's forehead but did not exit the head. According to Dr. Tape, the fatal gunshot to Garon was inconsistent with a .223 round; the wound and lead core were more consistent with a lower velocity handgun, such as a Glock 9 millimeter. He classified the death as a homicide caused by a gunshot wound to the head.

Principal To Second Degree Murder

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of being a principal to second degree murder. In essence, he argues that the evidence against him is circumstantial and that the State failed to reasonably exclude his hypothesis of innocence.

“Second degree murder” is defined by La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) as the killing of a human being “[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.”

“Specific criminal intent” is then defined by La.R.S. 14:10(1) as “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” As explained in State v. Draughn, 05-1825, pp. 7–8 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 592-93, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537 (2007), “Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant.”

Finally, the term “principals” is defined by La.R.S. 14:24 as “[a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.” The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Neal, 00-674, p. 12 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 659, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1323 (2002) (citation omitted), explained that “the defendant's mere presence at the scene is not enough to ‘concern’ him in the crime. Only those persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime may be said to be ‘concerned’ in its commission, thus making them liable as principals.”

In essence, Defendant here argues that the evidence against him is circumstantial and that the State failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Jhamad committed the shooting. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed circumstantial evidence in a sufficiency review in State v. Toby, 23-722 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So.3d 831. There, the supreme court provided the following statement of law:

Circumstantial evidence is “evidence of one fact, or a set of facts, from which the existence of the fact to be determined may reasonably be inferred.” State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 468 (La. 1983), citing McCormick, Law of Evidence, p. 435 (2d ed. 1972). When circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, the evidence, “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, [the circumstantial evidence] must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” La. R.S. 15:438; State v. Toups, 2001-1875, p. 3 (La. 10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910, 912 (La. R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general rational juror's reasonable doubt formula; rather it serves as a helpful evidentiary guide for jurors).

The Jackson standard “leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial, requiring only that jurors ‘draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’ ” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064, 182 L.Ed.2d 978 (2012). Importantly, the Jackson due process standard does not allow a jury to speculate on the probabilities of guilt where rational jurors would necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La. 1988). The requirement that jurors reasonably reject the hypothesis of innocence advanced by the defendant in a case of circumstantial evidence presupposes that a rational rejection of that hypothesis is based on the evidence presented, not mere speculation. State v. Quinn, 2019-0647, p. 7 (La. 9/9/20), 340 So.3d 829, 834, citing State v. Schwander, 345 So.2d 1173, 1175 (La. 1977).

․

In circumstantial evidence cases, a reviewing court does not determine whether another possible hypothesis could afford an exculpatory explanation of the events. Rather, the court determines whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the possible alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under Jackson v. Virginia. See State v. Davis, 637 So.2d 1012, 1020 (La. 1994). Here, defendant does not identify any reasonable hypothesis remaining after the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The court of appeal departed from the Jackson v. Virginia standard, substituting its judgment for that of the jury, when it found an otherwise unspecified reasonable hypothesis of innocence remained. Simply because there was no direct evidence, such as the precise content of a text message to show an agreement (defendant replaced his phone, thus covered his tracks), jurors were not foreclosed from inferring from the circumstantial evidence presented that defendant conspired with his brother in the plot to kill Broussard.

Id. at 834–35 (alteration in original).

In our case, the trial testimony from both Trevonce and Tayjha placed Defendant and Travis on Rene Street, in the location from which bullet casings were recovered, less than five minutes before Garon was killed. Defendant likewise admitted to police that he was on Rene Street with Travis at the time of the shooting. In addition, Trevonce admitted seeing Defendant with a gun shortly before the shooting, admitted telling police that Defendant said the shooting was “[his] work[,]” and admitted telling the grand jury that Defendant had confessed to the shooting. Also, Mr. Stout, a firearms expert, testified that the murder weapon was a newer generation Glock pistol, which is the same type of pistol that Defendant tried to sell to Trevonce hours before the shooting. And finally, Trevonce confirmed that the suspicious vehicle was Garon's car, which was parked on Rene Street directly across from where the shell casings were found.

Now to Defendant's hypothesis of innocence. Defendant argues that Jhamad shot Garon because Jhamad did not like how Garon treated J'Aijha. Defendant also notes that Jhamad's girlfriend wanted to hide his guns after the shooting. And finally, Defendant contends that Jhamad confessed to the shooting in a text message to Jamison. But the evidence shows otherwise: there is nothing in the record that places Jhamad at the scene of the crime. And even though Iesha wanted to move Jhamad's three guns to a storage unit, the weapons were not moved; they were seized by police and then excluded as the murder weapon. Finally, Detective Wilson testified that Jamison's cellphone was searched by police and that no such text message was found. As Detective Wilson put it, “We pursued Jhamad and we ruled him out.”

In the end, we conclude that a rational trier of fact, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of principal to second degree murder. We also conclude that a rational trier of fact, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have reasonably rejected Defendant's hypothesis of innocence. And the jury here did just that: they reasonably rejected Defendant's hypothesis that Jhamad was the shooter; they chose to believe the evidence and testimony that contradicted Defendant's version of events. No other hypothesis of innocence was advanced by Defendant.

Conspiracy to Commit Second Degree Murder

Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of conspiracy to commit second degree murder.

The elements of the crime of conspiracy are (1) “an agreement or combination of two or more persons for the specific purpose of committing any crime” and (2) “an act done in furtherance of the object of the agreement or combination.” La.R.S. 14:26. An essential element of the crime of conspiracy is specific intent. State v. Guillory, 540 So.2d 1212, 1215 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989).

Here, the record evidence shows that Travis, Defendant, and Trevonce went to Rene Street to investigate what they believed to be an op. Travis left the Circle in his car; Defendant and Trevonce left on foot. The testimony of Trevonce and Tayjha placed Travis and Defendant on Rene Street near the end of the Cut immediately before the shooting. However, neither Trevonce nor Tayjha testified that they heard anything that was said between Defendant and Travis. There were also no eyewitnesses to the shooting, so it is impossible to know what conversation occurred between Travis and Defendant before one of them began shooting at Garon's car less than five minutes after Trevonce and Tayjha drove away.

As noted, conspiracy requires an agreement to commit a crime and an act in furtherance thereof. For all intents and purposes, our disposition here turns on the sufficiency of the evidence as to the first element. After all, the second element—an act in furtherance of an agreement to commit second degree murder—is supported by evidence showing that either Defendant or Travis fired the fatal shot. But what about the first element—an agreement to commit murder? Here, the dispositive issue is whether there is sufficient evidence of an agreement to commit this crime.

The same issue was before the Louisiana Supreme Court in Toby, 395 So.3d 831. In that case, the defendant was convicted on circumstantial evidence of conspiracy to commit second degree murder. On appeal, this court vacated the conviction under the Jackson standard. In reversing this court, the supreme court explained:

The court of appeal found the evidence insufficient to prove defendant conspired in the killing. State v. Toby, 22-481 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/19/23), 363 So.3d 1260. The court of appeal observed that there was no direct evidence of any agreement between defendant and Shavis, such as communications between them in which they discussed killing the victim. Instead, the State's case was circumstantial and relied primarily on cell phone usage and location evidence from the two brothers’ cellphones. While the court of appeal acknowledged that an agreement can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, they found the circumstantial evidence here failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Instead, the court of appeal found the jury could only speculate when it inferred an agreement from the circumstantial evidence presented at trial. We disagree.

Id. at 833 (footnote omitted).

Later in the opinion, the supreme court further explained:

The court of appeal concluded that the jury could only speculate to infer defendant's participation in a conspiracy with his brother Shavis. However, the State presented evidence at trial that both brothers travelled to Lafayette on the day of the murder and engaged in multiple phone calls and texts to each other before the murder. Furthermore, the State presented evidence that Shavis travelled to murder a victim he did not know, other than that defendant was recently in a fight with him. Notably, evidence was also presented that defendant obtained a new phone the day after the murder. The jury could reasonably infer guilty knowledge from the attempt to conceal defendant's electronic communications with Shavis.

Id. at 834.

In our case, the evidence shows that Defendant and Travis reached an agreement that someone would shoot the op, and one of them did just that. Witness testimony placed Defendant and Travis at the shooter's location five minutes before the shooting. They were both there pursuant to a desire to investigate a possible op parked on Rene Street. According to Terrence's statement to police, Defendant said he fired the shots because Travis kept talking about an op. And according to Detective Wilson, the consensus of the seven individuals at the Circle that night was that “[t]he standard procedure is to shoot them[,]” referring to ops. Finally, like the defendant in Toby, Detective Wilson testified that Defendant here replaced his cellphone between the shooting and when he was interviewed by police.

To sum up, we conclude that a rational trier of fact, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of conspiracy to commit second degree murder, including finding an agreement for the specific purpose of committing the crime. And for the reasons given earlier, the jury here reasonably rejected Defendant's hypothesis of innocence.

Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon

Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

To convict a person of being a felon in possession of a firearm under La.R.S. 14:95.1(A)(1), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that Defendant has been convicted of a felony enumerated in this statute; (2) that subsequent to that conviction, Defendant possessed a firearm; (3) that a period of less than ten years has elapsed since Defendant's completion of his sentence, parole, or probation for the prior conviction; and (4) that Defendant had the general intent to commit the offense. State v. Stewart, 18-757 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/1/19), 270 So.3d 741.

“ ‘The general intent to commit the offense [of being a felon in possession of a firearm] may be proved through the actual or constructive possession of the firearm.’ If the State can prove actual possession, it has satisfied the intent element of the offense.” Id. at 746 (quoting State v. Drayton, 46,191, p. 8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/13/11), 63 So.3d 319, 324, writ denied, 11-2343 (La. 6/1/12), 90 So.3d 430).

In this case, Detective Bodin established that Defendant is a convicted felon under La.R.S. 14:95.1(A)(1) and that the ten-year period in the statute has not elapsed. Even still, Defendant argues that there was not sufficient evidence to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a firearm on August 16, 2019.

Thus, for this court to affirm Defendant's conviction, we must determine whether, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was in actual possession of a firearm on August 16, 2019.

In sum, our previous discussion as to the sufficiency of evidence for the conviction of being a principal to second degree murder applies to the “possession” element of this offense. Hence, a rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was in actual possession of a firearm on August 16, 2019.

For all these reasons, Defendant's first assignment of error is without merit.

II. Second Assignment of Error

In his second assignment of error, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial. We review this assignment for abuse of discretion. State v. Randolph, 275 So.2d 174 (La.1973).

Defendant argues that he should have received a new trial under La.Code Crim.P. art. 851(B)(1), which requires a new trial whenever “[t]he verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence,” and under La.Code Crim.P. art. 851(B)(5), which requires a new trial whenever “[t]he court is of the opinion that the ends of justice would be served by the granting of a new trial, although the defendant may not be entitled to a new trial as a matter of strict legal right.”

As to La.Code Crim.P. art. 851(B)(1), our previous discussion of Defendant's first assignment shows that the verdict is not contrary to law. Nor is the verdict contrary to the record evidence.

Now to Defendant's argument under La.Code Crim.P. art. 851(B)(5). Defendant argues that he was prejudiced because Detective Coquina Mitchell and Dontrell Charles were unavailable to testify at trial. Detective Mitchell interviewed Dontrell, who is the inmate to whom Jhamad allegedly confessed. Detective Mitchell also interviewed Jamison Beals. Jamison is the person who claimed that Jhamad had confessed to him by text message.

By contrast, the State notes that it attempted to serve Detective Mitchell on September 1, 2023, but could not because she was on medical leave. Defendant then unsuccessfully attempted to subpoena Detective Mitchell mid-trial on September 29, 2023. And there is no evidence that anyone ever tried to subpoena Dontrell.

Defendant nevertheless argues that Detective Mitchell's testimony was necessary because she interviewed the two witnesses (Dontrell and Jamison) who claimed that Jhamad had confessed to them that he was the shooter. But as the State points out, there is nothing in the record showing that Dontrell or Jamison was subpoenaed by Defendant before trial.

In addition, Detective Wilson testified that Jamison's statement to police had been refuted: Jamison claimed that Jhamad had confessed to him by text message, but no such text message was found by police when they searched Jamison's cellphone. Also, multiple individuals reported to police that Jhamad was at a different apartment complex at the time of the shooting. And finally, Jhamad testified at trial, and he specifically denied telling Dontrell or Jamison that he was the shooter.

In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for new trial. This assignment is without merit.

III. Third Assignment of Error

In his third and final assignment of error, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering his sentences for conspiracy to commit second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon to run consecutively to his mandatory life sentence for second degree murder. This assignment is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-165 (La. 6/30/00).

In short, this assignment is deficient for two reasons. First, it has not been properly preserved under La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E).² Although Defendant orally moved the trial court to reconsider the sentences, no specific ground was given. Hence, Defendant is now precluded from raising this objection for the first time on appeal. Id.

And second, Defendant's sentences for conspiracy and illegal possession of a firearm are consecutive to his mandatory life sentence. Because Defendant is serving a life sentence, there is no practical difference between running Defendant's sentences consecutively or concurrently. State v. Dennard, 482 So.2d 1067 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1986).

In sum, Defendant's third assignment is also without merit.

DISPOSITION

For the above reasons, Defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Detective Wilson testified that Travis and Duff's mother also lived in this area. As noted earlier, Duff is Kenray's nickname.

2.   La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E) states:E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

CHARLES G. FITZGERALD JUDGE