STATE v. REED (2025)

In 2019, the defendant, Reginald L. Reed, Sr., was charged by amended grand jury indictment with the second degree murder of Selonia Reed, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1.¹ He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was convicted as charged. The defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment, motion for new trial, and motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, all of which were denied. On January 30, 2023, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, alleging the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On August 24, 1987, the defendant filed a missing person's report with the Hammond Police Department (“HPD”), claiming his wife, Selonia Reed, failed to return home after a night out with her friend. Soon after the report was filed, officers discovered Selonia's semi-nude body in the passenger seat of her vehicle parked in a lot near John's Curb Market. An autopsy revealed Selonia died the night of August 23, 1987, from multiple stab wounds to the chest, including the heart and lungs, in addition to her neck.² The defendant was the primary suspect in the 1987 investigation but was not charged with Selonia's murder until 2019.

At trial,³ Detective Vincent Giannoble, the lead investigator with HPD in 1987, testified that he was the lead investigator and responded to the scene. Detective Giannoble testified that Selonia sustained several stab wounds to her chest and neck, trauma to her face, her earrings had been torn from her ears, and an umbrella had been inserted into her vagina. In addition, he stated there was white lotion on Selonia's body and blood present on the passenger side and backseat of her vehicle. Detective Giannoble also learned during his investigation that the defendant had taken out several life insurance policies on Selonia that were in effect at the time of the murder.

Roddy Duvall, the former HPD Chief of Police, interviewed that defendant in 1987. He testified that at the time of the offense, he observed and photographed scratches on the defendant's neck, which the defendant claimed were caused by the family dog. Chief Duvall testified about searching the Reed home in the defendant's presence and stated that it appeared to have been recently cleaned, describing it as “immaculate.” Chief Duvall recalled that when he recovered a broken gold necklace clasp from the carpet, the defendant's demeanor changed and he became upset and nervous. Chief Duvall also recalled the defendant said he, Selonia, and their six-year-old son, Reginald Jr., went to the Hammond Square Mall about six o'clock on the evening that Selonia's body was found. Then, according to the defendant, Selonia went out with a friend while he stayed home with their son. When asked about the insurance policies, the defendant responded he had taken out policies two or three weeks before the murder.

Crystal Dimattia, a fact witness for the State, contacted HPD a day after the murder. Dimattia testified she was getting gas at John's Curb Market on the evening of August 22, 1987, when she noticed a suspicious vehicle nearby. Dimattia said she had a clear view of the individuals in the car and wrote down the vehicle's license plate number. It was later discovered that the vehicle was registered to the defendant's mother but the defendant drove it regularly.⁴ Dimattia later identified the defendant and Jimmy Ray Barnes in a photographic lineup as the individuals she saw the night of August 22, 1987. During his testimony, Detective Giannoble testified the defendant and Jimmy Ray were the only suspects in the 1987 investigation and remained the only suspects.

Gwen Smith, Selonia's sister, testified she had last seen Selonia on August 22, 1987. According to Smith, Selonia picked her up from work between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. to bring her home. Smith said Selonia then asked her if she wanted to go to the mall with her and Reginald Jr. later, but Smith declined. Smith testified the defendant called her about 6:20 a.m. the next morning to ask if she had seen Selonia, to which she responded she had not.

Roy Albritton, a retired officer with the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office, testified he was working security detail at the Hammond Square Mall the night before Selonia's body was discovered. Officer Albritton said he saw Selonia and Reginald Jr. walk through the mall but did not see the defendant with them. The defendant's neighbor, Janice Short, testified she drove to the Hammond Square Mall sometime after work on August 22, 1987. According to Short, Selonia and Reginald Jr. were in the car in front of her and she followed Selonia to the mall.⁵ Short did not see the defendant in the car or at the mall.

Melinda Mike, also a fact witness for the State, testified she worked with Selonia in the medical records department at the Seventh Ward Hospital for several years and remained friends with her. Though Mike had gone out to a bar with Selonia once before, she testified she had not gone out with Selonia on August 22, 1987, as she was in Metairie with her family. Mike said she had not seen Selonia in weeks and did not know Selonia's whereabouts that night. According to Mike, the defendant called her after Selonia's body was found and said, “You know you were with [Selonia] last night,” and when Mike denied she was, the defendant said, “You better say she was with you.” Mike testified she felt scared after receiving the phone call and notified the HPD.

Sergeant Barry Ward with the Louisiana State Police (“LSP”) criminal investigations division testified he began investigating the murder around December of 2011. In addition to the information obtained by the HPD in 1987, Sgt. Ward reinvestigated the life insurance policies and learned the defendant had taken out two policies with State Farm and three policies with Prudential immediately prior to Selonia's death. Three of the policies were obtained less than three weeks before Selonia's murder, and the proceeds for all policies totaled $421,000 with the defendant listed as the beneficiary of each policy. Additionally, Sergeant Ward brought evidence to the LSP Crime Lab for DNA testing, since DNA testing was unavailable in 1987. Billy Ray Barnes, Jimmy Ray's identical twin brother, was identified as a match to DNA found on a cigarette butt from Selonia's car.⁶ Jeremy Dubois, an expert in DNA analysis, testified that identical twins have identical DNA profiles. Sergeant Ward testified he interviewed Jimmy Ray multiple times. According to Sergeant Ward, Jimmy Ray provided more information each time he was questioned.

Wallace Lewis, a State Farm agent in 1987, testified the defendant first purchased a life insurance policy in December 1986 in the amount of $130,000. A second life insurance policy was purchased by the defendant on August 7, 1987, two weeks before the murder. Lewis testified while it was protocol to obtain both parties’ signatures on the life insurance policy, he allowed the defendant to sign for Selonia on both policies. After Selonia was killed, the defendant contacted Lewis to claim he insurance benefits. However, Lewis testified the defendant later sought to withdraw his claim.⁷

Page McClendon, counsel for State Farm in 1987, testified she conducted depositions during her litigation over the policies the defendant had acquired.⁸ During the deposition of the defendant, the defendant stated Selonia always wore a gold necklace. He also explained, during his deposition, that he got the scratches on his neck while playing a game of basketball.

Michael Morris testified he overheard the defendant talk about having Selonia killed a few weeks prior to her murder.⁹ According to Morris, the defendant offered to pay money for the murder.¹⁰

Jimmy Ray testified he met Selonia at the bank where she worked and later met the defendant while working on their house. Jimmy Ray said after knowing the defendant for about six months, the defendant told him one day that he “needed someone knocked off’ and would pay $50,000. Jimmy Ray testified he thought the defendant was joking. According to Jimmy Ray, on August 22, 1987, the defendant told him he was going to leave one of his cars near his mother's house and asked Jimmy Ray to pick him up in another one of his cars. Jimmy Ray stated that when he picked up the defendant that evening, he saw the defendant and Selonia in Selonia's car. Jimmy Ray observed the defendant seemed “jitterish,” and the defendant was wearing dark clothing with driving gloves. According to Jimmy Ray, Selonia was in the passenger seat and had blood and tears on her face. Jimmy Ray did not see Selonia move. Jimmy Ray testified he did not ask the defendant about Selonia's injuries when he and the defendant drove away. Jimmy Ray also recalled being questioned by the HPD in 1987, at which time he denied any involvement in Selonia's murder; however, Jimmy Ray told the HPD about the conversation in which the defendant mentioned “knocking somebody off[.]”¹¹

The defense called Jacob Deveaux, who was in jail with Jimmy Ray at one point. According to Deveaux, Jimmy Ray admitted he and his brother, Billy Ray, were paid to kill Selonia after she was caught having an affair. According to Deveaux, Jimmy Ray used a hammer while Billy Ray used an ice pick, and the Barnes brothers disposed of Selonia's body near downtown Hammond.

Reginald Reed, Jr., defendant's son, testified he vaguely remembered playing video games with his dad the night before his mother's body was discovered. Reginald Jr. thought his mother went out, and he denied ever leaving the house that night.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury convicted the defendant and he was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals.

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, he claims there was no direct evidence of his guilt, and the circumstantial evidence introduced at trial failed to exclude his reasonable hypothesis of innocence. A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1 Cir. 04/08/22), 342 So. 3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So. 3d 460. See also La. C. Cr. P. art. 821(B).

When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense, La. R.S. 15:438 mandates: “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” This is not a separate test for evaluating the evidence; rather, all of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to convince a rational juror the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cabellero, 2022-0441 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/04/22), 356 So. 3d 389, 394, writ denied, 2022-01777 (La. 04/25/23), 359 So. 3d 982. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Bessie, 2021-1117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 04/08/22), 342 So. 3d 17, 22, writ denied, 2022-00846 (La. 09/20/22), 346 So. 3d 802. See also State v. Captville, 448 So. 2d 676, 680 (La. 1984).

At the time of the commission of the offense, second degree murder was defined, in pertinent part, as “the killing of a human being ․ [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La. R.S. 14:30.1(1). “Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the factfinder. State v. Meek, 2023-0362 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/09/23), 379 So. 3d 67, 71, writ denied, 2023-01639 (La. 05/29/24), 385 So. 3d 703.

The State bears the burden of proving the elements of the offense, along with the burden of proving the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. See State v. Coleman, 2017-1045 (La. App. 1 Cir. 04/13/18), 249 So. 3d 872, 877, writ denied, 2018-0830 (La. 02/18/19), 263 So. 3d 1155. When, as in this case, the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. A positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. See State v. Hughes, 2005-0992 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So. 2d 1047, 1051.

While the defendant argues the evidence was mostly circumstantial, the jury found the evidence rebutted the defendant's hypothesis of innocence. Here, the defendant's version of events indicated he, Selonia, and Reginald Jr. went to the Hammond Square Mall on August 22, 1987, and, afterwards, he and Reginald Jr. stayed home playing video games while Selonia went out with Mike. However, several of the State's witnesses contradicted and discredited the defendant's alibi. Smith testified Selonia asked her on August 22, 1987, if she wanted to go to the mall with her and Reginald Jr., but Selonia did not mention the defendant going with them. The Reeds’ neighbor, Short, remembered driving to the mall at the same time as Selonia and further testified the defendant was not in the vehicle with Selonia and Reginald Jr. Officer Albritton testified he did not see the defendant with Selonia and Reginald Jr. at the mall while he was on duty that evening. Mike testified she was friends with Selonia but was not out with her on August 22, 1987. Mike further testified about the threatening call she received from the defendant on August 23, 1987, during which he told her, “You better say she was with you.”

Given this testimony, we believe any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find that evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypotheses of innocence, all of the elements of second degree murder and the defendant was the perpetrator, rejecting the defendant's claim of misidentification.

While the defendant attempts to cast doubt on Jimmy Ray's credibility, the trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Dunn, 2021-0630 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So. 3d 77, 85, writ denied, 2022-00095 (La. 04/05/22), 335 So. 3d 834. Moreover, in Louisiana, an accomplice is qualified to testify against a co-perpetrator even if the State offers him inducements to testify. The inducements would merely affect the witness's credibility. Additionally, a conviction may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a purported accomplice, although the jury should be instructed to treat the testimony with great caution. However, when the accomplice's testimony is materially corroborated by other evidence, such language is not required. An accomplice's testimony is materially corroborated “if there is evidence that confirms material points in an accomplice's tale, and confirms the defendant's identity and some relationship to the situation.” Hughes, 943 So. 2d at 1051.

When there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder's determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 1997-2261 (La. App. 1 Cir. 09/25/98), 721 So. 2d 929, 932. We are constitutionally precluded from acting as a “thirteenth juror” in assessing what weight to give evidence in criminal cases. Dunn, 340 So. 3d at 85.

Jimmy Ray's testimony, regardless of whether it was motivated by an immunity agreement with the State, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. Jimmy Ray testified he drove one of the defendant's cars to pick up the defendant near John's Curb Market on August 22, 1987. He testified that while there, he saw Selonia in the passenger seat of her vehicle with a bloody face. The jury could have reasonably inferred from his testimony that Selonia had already died. Importantly, DNA found on a cigarette butt in Selonia's vehicle matched Jimmy Ray's DNA profile. The State also presented evidence showing the defendant and Jimmy Ray were identified by Dimattia as being near John's Curb Market the night before Selonia's body was discovered. Dimattia testified she was suspicious of the individuals and jotted down the vehicle's license plate number, which matched the license plate number on the vehicle the defendant regularly drove.

Both Jimmy Ray and Morris testified about the defendant's plan to kill Selonia prior to her murder, with Jimmy Ray testifying the defendant offered him $50,000 to carry out the murder. The defendant's specific intent to kill Selonia is further evidenced by his taking out five life insurance policies on her totaling $421,000, three of which were taken out only a few weeks before her death.

Additionally, we find that the jury could have rationally concluded the defendant was the perpetrator of Selonia's murder based on the evidence presented. The HPD searched the Reed house, which Chief Duvall testified had been recently cleaned, and found a broken gold necklace clasp. The jury could have concluded the broken necklace clasp belonged to Selonia based on counsel for State Farm's testimony that the defendant stated during his deposition that Selonia always wore a gold necklace. The jury could have reasonably inferred Selonia's necklace was broken during her murder, which was bolstered by the presence of scratches on the defendant's neck. Further, the defendant provided conflicting explanations for the scratches throughout the investigation. The defendant first claimed the family dog caused the scratches, but later claimed he received the scratches during a game of basketball. After hearing all of the testimony and viewing the evidence presented at trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged.

The defendant re-urges to this Court the same hypothesis of innocence presented to the jury, that Jimmy Ray or someone else killed Selonia. Finding that the jury was reasonable in rejecting this argument, and considering Captville, supra, and the defendant's failure to raise any new hypotheses, his argument fails on appeal. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 01/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 (per curiam). In summary, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the offense and all of the elements of second degree murder. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. C. Cr P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/03/23), 378 So. 3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 05/21/24), 385 So. 3d 242.

On review, we note that the trial court failed to advise the defendant of the time period to file an application for post-conviction relief. La. C. Cr. P. art 930.8(C) directs the trial court to inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief at the time of sentencing. See State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 09/15/06), 943 So. 2d 1134, 1142-43, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 08/15/07), 961 So. 2d 1158. Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to correctly advise the defendant of the prescriptive period has no bearing on the sentences and is not grounds to reverse the sentences or remand for resentencing. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of convictions and sentences have become final under the provisions of La. C. Cr. P. arts. 914 or 922; LeBoeuf, 943 So. 2d at 1143.

Further, the transcript reveals that the trial court failed to state that the defendant's sentence was imposed at hard labor. However, the DOC commitment order signed by the trial court indicates the sentence was indeed imposed at hard labor. Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1, the sentence imposed must be served at hard labor. In the event of a discrepancy between the transcript and the commitment order and/or minutes, the transcript prevails. See State v. Lynch, 441 So. 2d 732, 734 (La. 1983); see also State v. Johnson, 2020-0679 (La. App. 1 Cir. 04/28/21), 2021 WL 1662420, *6 n.4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2021-00802 (La. 10/05/21), 325 So. 3d 381.

A mere inspection of the proceedings without inspection of the evidence and La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2) authorizes consideration of such an error on appeal. La. Code Crim. P. art. 882(A) authorizes the appellate court to correct an illegal sentence on review. Thus, because a correction of the illegally lenient sentence does not involve sentencing discretion, this Court has the authority to simply amend the sentence. See State v. Jefferson, 2018-0037 (La. App. 1 Cir. 06/01/18), 2018 WL 2454474, *4 (unpublished). Again, out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy we hereby amend the sentence by providing it be served at hard labor.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction of second degree murder is affirmed. Life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence is affirmed as amended.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED. SENTENCE AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The original grand jury indictment listed an additional charge of conspiracy to commit second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:26 and 14:30.1, and charged Jimmy Ray Barnes alongside the defendant with both second degree murder (count one) and conspiracy to commit second degree murder (count two). The State dismissed the conspiracy charge against the defendant prior to the commencement of trial, and in exchange for an immunity agreement, Jimmy Ray Barnes pled guilty to accessory after the fact on count one and the State dismissed count two.

2.   Dr. Alfredo Suarez, the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy, testified there was no semen present.

3.   Trial began on November 15, 2022.

4.   According to the testimony at trial by Detective Vincent Giannoble.

5.   On cross-examination, Short acknowledged she told the HPD she was driving in front of Selonia's car.

6.   Sergeant Ward testified he interviewed Billy Ray about the murder. It does not appear from the record that Billy Ray was ever considered a suspect in the case.

7.   Ron Macaluso, the defendant's attorney in 1987, testified he advised the defendant to withdraw his claim for life insurance in exchange for State Farm paying the proceeds to his son under a tutorship. Macaluso testified the defendant's brother, Lafayette Reed, was appointed the tutor while the defendant was the undertutor. Macaluso further testified the law of tutorship permits both the tutor and the undertutor to have access to the funds.

8.   McClendon is currently serving as the Chief Judge on the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal. Accordingly, she is recused from all matters regarding this case. See La. C.C. art. 158(b).

9.   Morris is incarcerated following an attempted murder conviction in an unrelated case.

10.   One of the Barnes brothers was involved in the conversation, though Morris did not know which brother.

11.   In exchange for his testimony, the State reduced Jimmy Ray's second degree murder charge to accessory after the fact and dismissed a charge of conspiracy to commit second degree murder.

BALFOUR, J.