MATTHEWS v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY (2025)

In this motor vehicle-pedestrian accident, Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant driver and his insurer. The trial court found that the defendant driver owed no legal duty to Plaintiffs. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the granting of the summary judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the night of February 13, 2020, Plaintiffs, Crystal Matthews and Anna Sereal, were pedestrians walking with the flow of traffic in the northbound lane on Louisiana Highway 724 in Lafayette Parish. While walking on the highway towards their intended destination of a grocery store, Ms. Matthews was struck by a Ford F-150 truck driven by Kerry Emanis and insured by State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). The force of the impact allegedly caused Ms. Matthews to slam into Ms. Sereal. Both Plaintiffs sustained injuries. Plaintiffs filed a petition for damages against Defendants, Mr. Emanis and State Farm, alleging that Defendants acted negligently and caused injuries and damages to them.

There are several undisputed facts. The roadway where the accident occurred was flat and unobstructed. At the time of the accident, Ms. Matthews was walking on the wrong side of the road, while Ms. Sereal was standing on the shoulder or in the grass. Ms. Sereal warned Ms. Matthews to get out of the road prior to impact. Ms. Matthews also admitted to taking methamphetamines on the morning of February 13, 2020, but denied consuming alcohol on that date or any drugs after 9:30 a.m.

Mr. Emanis described the accident as having “no idea what happened.” He did not see Plaintiffs prior to the crash, despite testifying that his headlights were on. He explained that he “thought we hit a cow or an animal” and “was wondering if we hit a tire that flew off of a truck or a pallet[.]” He testified that he was traveling under the speed limit.

However, some facts are disputed, including the visibility of Plaintiffs. According to Mr. Emanis, it was “pitch black” outside at the time of the accident. Mr. Emanis testified that his headlights were on and that he could see as far as his headlights shone, but that he never saw Plaintiffs. On the contrary, Ms. Matthews testified that it was “getting dark” at the time of the crash. She said, “When we first started walking, it was still kind of, you know, like right when the night falls?” Furthermore, Ms. Matthews testified that she was shining a phone with a flashlight on, pointed behind her, at the time of the accident.

Q. Did you have a flashlight at the time of the accident?

A. I had a phone with the flashlight on. I was holding it as I was walking.

Q. Okay. And where were you pointing the flashlight?

A. Like towards my back (demonstrating).

Q. So the light would have been facing behind you?

A. Right. To where the driver could have seen the light previously before.

After some discovery was conducted, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that they owed no legal duty to Ms. Matthews. Since proving the existence of a duty is a necessary element of negligence, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs would be unable to bear their burden of proof at trial. Judge Laurie A. Hulin granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment following a hearing on April 3, 2023, and dismissed the lawsuit filed by Plaintiffs. Judge Hulin stated in part:

I agree with the mover here. I think there is no genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Kerry Emanis had any legal duty to guard against this unexpected and obviously unavoidable accident that happened in the dark of night, with a pedestrian who was in the middle of the road or at least in his lane of travel.

Plaintiffs, Crystal Matthews and Anna Sereal, now appeal the granting of the motion for summary judgment, alleging three assignments of error.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court erred in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing all claims of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

2. The trial court committed legal error in finding that Kerry Emanis owed no legal duty to Plaintiffs and in granting Defendant[s]-Appellees’ motion for summary judgment where genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether defendant driver Emanis acted reasonably under the circumstances he encountered at the time of the crash, which precludes summary judgment as a matter of law.

3. The trial court erred, and summary judgment must be reversed because the trial court impermissibly weighed evidence and considered credibility in granting the motion for summary judgment.

ANALYSIS

The standard of review of a judgment denying or granting a summary judgment is de novo. Perry v. Rhodes, 20-109 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/30/20), 304 So.3d 1036. Accordingly, we use the same criteria as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate. Id.

“The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action[.]” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2). After an opportunity for adequate discovery has occurred, summary judgment must be granted if the motion and supporting documents “show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3). The burden rests on the mover. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). If, however, the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial, then the mover is not required to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim. Id. Rather, the mover need only “point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense.” Id. The adverse party, in order to defeat the granting of summary judgment, must either prove the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, or prove that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

“In determining whether an issue is genuine, a court should not consider the merits, make credibility determinations, evaluate testimony, or weigh evidence ․ Any doubt as to a dispute regarding a material issue of fact must be resolved against granting the motion and in favor of trial on the merits.” Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 04-1459, p. 12 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 48.

In this case, Plaintiffs set forth a cause of action based upon negligence. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315 provides the basis of negligence claims in Louisiana, stating, in part, that “[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” The plaintiff in a negligence suit is required to prove several elements, namely that: “(1) the defendant's conduct was cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries; (2) the defendant had a duty to conform conduct to a specific standard; (3) the defendant breached that duty; (4) the defendant's conduct was the legal cause of plaintiff's injuries; and (5) plaintiff sustained actual damages.” Fruge v. ONOB, Inc., 09-1028, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/10/10), 32 So.3d 1115, 1118.

In their motion for summary judgment and accompanying memorandum, Defendants point out the absence of support for the duty element of negligence. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Defendants’ counsel reiterated that the motion was limited to duty, saying: “The question of duty is a question of law for the judge to decide. We are not here, arguing breach. We are arguing that Mr. Emanis had no duty under the case law to avoid an unexpected and unforeseen incident in the roadway.” Therefore, the issue before our court is narrow, as “[a] summary judgment may be rendered or affirmed only as to those issues set forth in the motion under consideration by the court at that time.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(F).

The question of whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff is one of law. Pinsonneault v. Merchants & Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 01-2217 (La. 4/3/02), 816 So.2d 270; see also Mitchell v. Terry, 20-527 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/21), 319 So.3d 451. “The inquiry is whether the plaintiff has any law (statutory, jurisprudential, or arising from general principles of fault) to support the claim that the defendant owed him a duty.” Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 22-849, p. 6 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 467, 473.

In this case, the applicable duty arises from La.Civ.Code art. 2315 under general negligence principles and from La.R.S. 32:214. Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:214 states that “every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon any roadway and shall give warning by sounding the horn when necessary and shall exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any confused or incapacitated person upon a highway.”

The jurisprudence has further explained the duty owed under La.R.S. 32:214. Drivers of vehicles are under “a never ceasing duty to maintain a proper lookout and to see what should be seen.” Davis v. Smith, 35,117, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/2/01), 796 So.2d 765, 769, writ denied, 01-2887 (La. 1/25/02), 807 So.2d 250. A motorist's duty includes maintaining “a careful lookout” and exercising care “to avoid any obstructions.” Nick v. King Cab Co., Inc., 02-295, p.6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/02), 829 So.2d 568, 572. “The driver of a vehicle bears a greater responsibility to avoid pedestrian/motorist accidents because the consequences of his fault present the potential for causing the greater havoc.” Uriegas v. Gainsco, 94-1400, p. 16 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/13/95), 663 So.2d 162, 172, writ denied, 95-2485 (La. 12/15/95), 664 So.2d 458. However, a motorist owes no special duty to anticipate a pedestrian in a roadway with no crosswalk. Id. “Moreover, a motorist is not held to the highest standard of care in guarding against unexpected or unusual obstructions in the road.” Id. Nonetheless, a motorist may not blindly rely on the assumption that a pedestrian will remain in a position of safety when he sees, or should have seen, a pedestrian cross the path of his vehicle. Id.

Likewise, pedestrians on the roadway also have a duty. “Where sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall, when practicable, walk only on the left side of the highway or its shoulder, facing traffic which may approach from the opposite direction.” La.R.S. 32:216(B). Therefore, both drivers and pedestrians owe each other duties, which “ensure that both pedestrians and motorists may safely coexist on roadways traversed by both.” Uriegas, 663 So.2d at 172.

Plaintiffs claim that Louisiana's statutory law mandates a duty between a motorist and a pedestrian, which alone requires denial of the motion for summary judgment. Alternatively, Plaintiffs point out several disputed material facts, which they allege defeats summary judgment.

Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Mr. Emanis had no legal duty to avoid striking Ms. Matthews, given that she was walking on the wrong side of the road, was wearing dark clothing, and was resisting the attempts of Ms. Sereal to leave the roadway. They further argue that Ms. Matthews is the one who breached her duty by walking on the wrong side of the road, thereby violating La.R.S. 32:216(B).

In support, Defendants cite several cases. We find that the cited cases confirm that a motorist, does, in fact, owe a duty to a pedestrian. In Johnson v. Safeway Ins. Co., 98-920 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/6/99), 741 So.2d 32, the court, though ultimately finding that the pedestrian failed to prove negligence on the part of the driver, reiterated that motorists owe a duty to pedestrians and vice versa. Defendants similarly cite Hulan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 93-1084 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/94), 635 So.2d 640, 642–43, but we explicitly stated in that case that “under La.R.S. 32:214, any driver owes a duty of due care to pedestrians.” Although the court in Hulan found that the driver did not breach her duty to the pedestrian, we clearly stated that the duty element of negligence was met.

Defendants also rely on Pottinger v. Price, 19-183 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/23/19), 289 So.3d 1047, in which the first circuit affirmed the trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment in a pedestrian-vehicle accident. Pottinger is distinguishable from the present case because the first circuit addressed “the duty and breach elements of the plaintiffs’ claim” together rather than duty alone, as is the case here. Id. at 1057. As discussed above, the question of duty is a purely legal question. Conversely, “[w]hether there was a breach of the duty owed is a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact.” Farrell, 359 So.3d at 474. The Pottinger court considered the facts of the case and combined the analysis of duty and breach into one. Because the only issue before us is duty, we do not find Pottinger to be dispositive. Furthermore, the material facts in Pottinger were not disputed, whereas the material facts are disputed here, further precluding summary judgment.

Our review of the record reveals that there is no dispute regarding the relevant facts for our duty analysis; namely, that Mr. Emanis, a driver of a vehicle, struck Ms. Matthews, a pedestrian. We find that Louisiana's statutory law and jurisprudence plainly mandate a duty owed from a motorist to a pedestrian. Accordingly, Mr. Emanis, as the motor vehicle driver, owed a duty to Ms. Matthews, a pedestrian. While a pedestrian also has a duty to exercise care when entering a roadway, such a duty does not obviate the motorist's duty. Regardless of whether Ms. Matthews violated her duty to exercise care, Mr. Emanis still owed a duty of due care to Ms. Matthews. The question of whether Mr. Emanis breached that duty, or how comparative fault should be assessed, is a question of fact not before us.

We further find that the trial court improperly weighed the evidence in ruling that the accident was “unexpected and obviously unavoidable” and occurred “in the dark of night.” These factual findings are not only in dispute, but also extend beyond the limited question of duty set forth in Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We therefore reverse the trial court's granting of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. All costs of this appeal are assessed against Appellees, Kerry Emanis and State Farm Automobile Insurance Company.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

THIERRY, Judge.

KYZAR, J., dissents with reasons.