NEW PRIME INC AND LACRESHA DANIELS APPELLANTS v. BRYANT SHEDRICK INTEGRATED TRANSPORTATION INC GOFAST LLC KEITH ZELINSKI KIMBERLY DAWN TAYLOR INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF NORMAN TAYLOR MARTIN ENTERPRISE INC AND REYNALDO TORREZ REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST APPELLEES (2026)

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CONLEY AFFIRMING

New Prime, Inc. and Lacresha Daniels seek a writ compelling the Clark Circuit Court to disqualify attorneys R. Tracy Starnes and Bradly Moore, and their current firm, Moore, Davis, Starnes & Bliss, PLLC (“MDSB”), from representing G&D Integrated Transportation, Inc. (“G&D”) and Bryant Shedrick in the underlying civil action.

The asserted conflict arose while Starnes and Moore practiced at Kopka Pinkus Dolin PC (“KPD”). During that period, KPD represented New Prime in one case and G&D in this case, even though G&D's position here was adverse to New Prime. KPD did not obtain a waiver. New Prime argues that this concurrent conflict required disqualification and that the Court of Appeals erred by treating the problem as only a former-client matter.

New Prime is partly correct. The courts below too quickly treated SCR 3.130(1.7), the current-client conflict rule, as irrelevant. A concurrent conflict is not erased from history merely because the lawyers later leave the firm. But the existence of KPD's past conflict does not by itself establish New Prime's entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of a writ compelling disqualification of G&D's present counsel.

We hold that New Prime failed to show an actual conflict requiring present disqualification, failed to show that Starnes or Moore acquired protected information material to this case, and failed to show the great and irreparable injury required for writ relief. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals, though for a narrower reason.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The underlying case arises from a January 6, 2022 multi-vehicle collision on Interstate 64 in Clark County. The decedent, Norman Taylor, was killed. A tractor-trailer operated by Daniels on behalf of New Prime was among the vehicles involved.

Taylor's estate sued New Prime, Daniels, and others. New Prime then filed third-party claims against several additional parties, including G&D and its driver, Shedrick. New Prime seeks indemnity and apportionment from those third-party defendants.

In March 2023, a separate case, Wilson v. Prime, Inc., Carrol Cir. Ct. No. 23-CI-0043, was filed in Carroll Circuit Court. That case also involved a motor-vehicle collision and claims against New Prime concerning, among other things, negligent training, hiring, supervision, safety practices, and regulatory compliance. KPD appeared for New Prime in Wilson.

Several months later, KPD received a referral to represent G&D in this case. KPD's conflict process identified New Prime as a current client. A KPD lawyer handling Wilson stated that KPD could not be directly adverse to New Prime. Nevertheless, KPD accepted G&D's defense. Starnes and Moore, then with KPD's Lexington office, represented G&D in this case.

For approximately sixteen months, then, KPD represented New Prime in Wilson while KPD lawyers represented G&D adverse to New Prime here. KPD did not obtain informed written consent from New Prime or G&D. Nor did it implement a screen.

In January 2025, Starnes and Moore left KPD and formed Moore, Davis, Starnes & Bliss, PLLC. G&D kept the defense with them. In April 2025, New Prime discovered the prior overlap and moved to disqualify Starnes, Moore, and their new firm.

The circuit court denied the motion. It reasoned that SCR 3.130(1.7), governing current-client conflicts, did not apply because Starnes and Moore were no longer with KPD and had never personally represented New Prime. The court instead applied SCR 3.130(1.9), governing former-client conflicts, and found that New Prime had not shown that Wilson and this case were substantially related or that Starnes or Moore acquired confidential information from New Prime.

New Prime then filed an original action in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. This appeal followed.

II. Standard for Writ Relief

Attorney-disqualification rulings may, in proper cases, be reviewed through writ proceedings. Marcum v. Scorsone, 457 S.W.3d 710, 716 (Ky. 2015). Writ relief remains extraordinary. Furthermore, “disqualification is a drastic measure which courts should be hesitant to impose except when absolutely necessary.” Schulkers v. Lape, 730 S.W.3d 903, 915 (Ky. 2026). Before counsel is disqualified, the complaining party must show an actual conflict established by facts, not a vague appearance of impropriety. Marcum, 457 S.W.3d at 718.

Kentucky recognizes two classifications of writs of prohibition or mandamus. Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004). New Prime seeks the second class of writ; that is to say, it alleges “the trial court acted erroneously but within its jurisdiction.” Marcum, 457 S.W.3d at 715. Appellants are required to establish two prerequisites in this circumstance. First, that New Prime “lacks an adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise”; and second, “that great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the writ is denied.” Id. “Until this threshold is met, questions of trial court error do not arise.” Schulkers, 730 S.W.3d at 914.

On this threshold question, we assume, as did the Court of Appeals, that New Prime lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. The question is whether New Prime has shown error and irreparable injury sufficient to justify the writ.

It has not.

III. Analysis

A. KPD's concurrent conflict matters, but it does not decide the remedy.

New Prime's premise is sound. While Starnes and Moore were at KPD, KPD represented New Prime in Wilson and G&D in this case. G&D was adverse to New Prime. No waiver was obtained.

That is a current-client conflict problem. SCR 3.130(1.7)(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest, unless the requirements for consent are met. A concurrent conflict exists when the representation of one client is directly adverse to another client. And under SCR 3.130(1.10), conflicts ordinarily are imputed to lawyers associated in the same firm.

The lower courts were therefore wrong to suggest that Rule 1.7 simply drops out of the analysis because Starnes and Moore later left KPD. A conflict is assessed when it arises. Later events may affect the remedy, but they do not rewrite what occurred.

But New Prime's conclusion does not follow. This appeal is not a disciplinary proceeding against KPD. Nor is KPD still representing G&D. The question is whether Starnes, Moore, and MDSB must now be disqualified from continuing to represent G&D.

Disqualification is remedial, not punitive. It protects the fairness of the proceeding, the confidentiality of client information, and the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. It is not imposed automatically whenever a prior firm conflict occurred.

Thus, the past Rule 1.7 conflict is relevant. But New Prime still had to show why that past conflict creates a present basis to disqualify G&D's current counsel.

B. New Prime did not prove a present disqualifying conflict.

Once Starnes and Moore left KPD, the present question was governed principally by SCR 3.130(1.9). That rule addresses duties arising from a lawyer's own former representation and from a former firm's representation of a client.

Under SCR 3.130(1.9)(b), a lawyer may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which the lawyer's former firm previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to the current client if the lawyer acquired protected information material to the matter, unless the former client gives informed consent confirmed in writing.

New Prime's argument fails on this record for two related reasons.

First, New Prime did not establish that Wilson and this case are substantially related in the required sense. The cases share surface features. Both involve motor-vehicle collisions. Both involve New Prime. Both include allegations concerning corporate training, supervision, safety practices, and regulatory compliance.

Those similarities matter. We do not hold that two cases involving the same trucking company and the same corporate-safety theories can never be substantially related. They can be. But the showing must be concrete. Here, the two cases arose from different collisions, different dates, different locations, different drivers, different plaintiffs, and different factual circumstances. The general fact that both cases involve trucking litigation and corporate-negligence theories against New Prime is not enough.

Second, New Prime did not establish that Starnes or Moore acquired protected information material to this case. Starnes testified that he did not know of the Wilson matter while at KPD, did not access the Wilson file, and did not speak with anyone at KPD about New Prime's confidential information. Moore submitted an affidavit denying that he acquired confidential information concerning Wilson or New Prime. The circuit court accepted that proof.

New Prime points to Moore's inclusion on a conflict email chain and to KPD's failure to screen. Those facts are troubling. They support New Prime's contention that KPD mishandled the conflict. But they do not compel the further conclusion that Moore or Starnes acquired protected information material to this litigation.

We do not require proof that confidential information was actually used. In some cases, access and overlap may be enough. But this is a writ case, and New Prime bore the burden of showing an actual conflict with facts. The record does not require disqualification.

C. This case does not require adoption of the hot-potato rule.

New Prime also asks us to adopt the so-called “hot-potato” rule that is present in some other jurisdictions. That rule generally prevents a lawyer or firm from curing a concurrent conflict by dropping one client and then treating that client as a former client. The problem such a rule seeks to address is not illusory. A lawyer should not be able to create a concurrent conflict and then abandon one client as a maneuver to allow it to claim the conflict has disappeared.

But this case does not squarely present that situation. There is no finding that KPD dropped New Prime to keep G&D. There is no finding that Starnes or Moore left KPD to avoid the conflict. And there is no finding that the firm change was a maneuver designed to transform a current-client conflict into a former-client conflict.

We therefore need not decide whether, or in what form, Kentucky should adopt the hot-potato rule. It is enough to say this: a later firm change does not erase a past concurrent conflict, but neither does every past concurrent conflict require automatic disqualification after the lawyers have moved firms. Again, disqualification is a “drastic remedy.” Schulkers, 730 S.W.3d at 918. The question remains whether the continued representation creates a present conflict, a risk to protected information, or prejudice sufficient to justify disqualification. New Prime did not make such a showing here.

D. New Prime has not shown entitlement to a writ.

Even if the circuit court's reasoning was incomplete, New Prime must still satisfy the writ standard. New Prime identifies the injury as the risk that G&D's counsel may possess or use confidential information from Wilson. But the circuit court found no proof that Starnes or Moore acquired such information. The record supports that finding. New Prime's concern is understandable; at the same time, writ relief requires more than concern.

Nor is this a special case requiring intervention for orderly judicial administration. Ignoring current-client conflicts would harm the administration of justice. But so would automatic disqualification after such a conflict no longer exists without the factual showing our cases require. Disqualification disrupts litigation, burdens the opposing party's choice of counsel, and can be used as a strategic weapon in its own right. For that reason, Kentucky law requires an actual conflict shown by facts.

KPD's conflict process failed. But the question here is not whether KPD should have accepted G&D's defense while representing New Prime in Wilson. It should not have done so without informed consent. The question is whether Starnes, Moore, and MDSB must now be disqualified from representing G&D. On this record, no.

IV. Conclusion

The Court of Appeals reached the correct result. We affirm, but clarify the reason.

A prior concurrent conflict is not rendered irrelevant because the lawyers later leave the conflicted firm. The courts below should have recognized that Rule 1.7 remained relevant to understanding what occurred. However, it is also the case that the drastic remedy of disqualification required New Prime to show a present actual conflict, a substantial relationship coupled with protected information, or irreparable prejudice sufficient to justify writ relief.

Since New Prime did not do so, the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the writ is affirmed.

All sitting. Lambert, C.J.; Bisig, Goodwine, Nickell, and Thompson, JJ., concur. Keller, J., concurs in result only.