IN RE: Michael Joseph BEATTIE (2026)

OPINION AND ORDER

Pursuant to Kentucky Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 3.480(2), Michael Joseph Beattie ¹ moves this Court to enter a negotiated sanction to resolve a disciplinary proceeding against him. Beattie proposes a sanction of suspension from the practice of law for a period of 60 days, to be probated for two years with conditions. The Office of Bar Counsel (OBC) has no objection.

Previously in this same disciplinary action, Beattie proposed a negotiated sanction of a public reprimand, with the approval of OBC. We rejected that negotiated sanction as inadequate and remanded for further consideration. See In re Beattie, 713 S.W.3d 174 (Ky. 2025). After review, we conclude that the presently proposed sanction of suspension from the practice of law for a period of 60 days, to be probated for two years with conditions, is adequate.

BACKGROUND

This disciplinary matter relates to Public Defender Beattie's representation of Zachary Turner in connection with criminal charges. On April 4, 2024, Turner was charged with first-degree wanton endangerment and possession of drug paraphernalia in Fayette County. The charges arose from Turner's alleged pointing of a loaded firearm at his girlfriend Kyra Pennington.

A few days later Beattie met with Turner in jail to discuss the charges. During that conversation Beattie asked Turner if he had a girlfriend and whether she was pregnant. Turner indicated he did have a girlfriend, Pennington, but that she was not pregnant. Beattie then advised Turner that if Pennington was pregnant, it might result in a more favorable bond reduction decision by the court. Turner responded “maybe she is pregnant.” Beattie acknowledges however that he did not reasonably believe Pennington was actually pregnant.

On April 11, 2024 the Fayette District Court held a preliminary hearing regarding Turner's case. At the hearing, Beattie advised the court that Pennington was pregnant and argued a bond reduction was therefore appropriate to allow Turner to assist Pennington with medical appointments and other pregnancy-related matters. The District Court therefore reduced Turner's bond from $5,000 full cash, which Turner had been unable to post, to a $5,000 10-percent bond with conditions.

Turner was able to post the reduced bond. However, he was arrested again on June 17, 2024 and charged with strangulation and assault for further violence against Pennington. After this new arrest, the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office discovered in recorded phone calls that—contrary to Beattie's representations to the District Court—Pennington had not actually been pregnant at the time of Turner's bond reduction. The Commonwealth's Attorney's Office therefore sought and obtained a revocation of Turner's bond on the basis of both Turner's new charges and Beattie's false representations that were the basis for Turner's original bond reduction. The Commonwealth's motion included an affidavit from Pennington confirming that she was not and had never been pregnant with Turner's child.

At a preliminary hearing on June 27, 2024, Beattie admitted to the District Court that his former assertion that Pennington was pregnant had been false. The District Court held Beattie in contempt and imposed a $500 fine, which Beattie later paid.

Beattie also self-reported his misconduct to the Kentucky Bar Association (KBA).² In this resulting disciplinary proceeding, Beattie now faces a charge of violating SCR 3.130(3.3)(a)(1), which provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly “make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.” He is also charged with a violation of SCR 3.130(8.4)(c), which forbids attorneys from engaging “in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Beattie admits that his conduct violated both of these Rules. He therefore moves this Court to impose a sanction of suspension from the practice of law for 60 days, probated with conditions for two years. The OBC has no objection.

ANALYSIS

Under our negotiated sanction rule, “[t]he Court may consider negotiated sanctions of disciplinary investigations, complaints or charges” if the parties agree. SCR 3.480(2). On receipt of a motion under this Rule, “[t]he Court may approve the sanction agreed to by the parties, or may remand the case for hearing or other proceedings specified in the order of remand.” Id. The decision to accept or reject a proposed negotiated sanction ultimately lies within this Court's discretion. Ousley v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 677 S.W.3d 380, 381 (Ky. 2023).

Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Rye, 336 S.W.3d 462 (Ky. 2011) provides useful guidance in considering a sanction for Beattie's misconduct in making false representations to the District Court. In Rye, an attorney advised a client involved in a custody dispute that she could move with the child to Iowa without any negative repercussions in the custody action. 336 S.W.3d at 463. When the court soon after became aware of the move to Iowa, the attorney falsely told the court he was unaware of the move. Id. at 464. For this misrepresentation, the attorney was found guilty of violating the prohibition against the making of false statements to a tribunal and a negotiated sanction of a public reprimand was imposed. Id.

As we previously noted in our Opinion rejecting Beattie's prior proposed sanction of a public reprimand, however, the present facts are significantly more serious than those presented in Rye. See Beattie, 713 S.W.3d at 176-77. First, the misrepresentation in Rye simply went to the attorney's prior awareness of a fact that by then had become known to the court. 336 S.W.3d at 464. Here, in contrast, Beattie did not simply mislead the District Court about his prior awareness of a particular fact, but in fact misled the District Court as to what the facts relevant to the bond reduction motion before the court actually were. In other words, Beattie's deception differs from that in Rye because Beattie deprived the District Court not merely of knowledge as to what he previously knew about the facts of the case, but rather of highly significant knowledge about the actual facts relating to the situation of the defendant and his girlfriend. Thus—and unlike Rye—Beattie's misleading of the District Court as to the actual situation of Turner and his girlfriend deprived that court of the actual facts required to make an informed and appropriate decision.

Second, Beattie's deceiving of the District Court also presented a far more serious risk of harm, both to the victim and the public more generally, than that presented in Rye. As we previously explained,

Turner's case was a criminal matter in which he was charged with pointing a loaded firearm at his girlfriend. Turner's bail was originally set at $5,000 cash. Beattie helped his allegedly violent client develop a lie about the victim and used that lie to orchestrate Turner's release․ Beattie's conduct not only undermined the integrity of the judicial proceedings but also unnecessarily placed a domestic violence victim at serious risk of further abuse․ Beattie's blatant lie to the trial court was used to secure the release of an allegedly dangerous individual, which posed a serious risk to the public.

Beattie, 713 S.W.3d at 176-77. And of course, Turner is now alleged to have committed further domestic violence against Pennington after his release orchestrated by Beattie's misrepresentation to the District Court.³ In sum, because Beattie's misconduct was significantly more serious than that in Rye, it warrants a more serious sanction than the public reprimand imposed in that case.

We also consider aggravating and mitigating factors when considering a sanction for lawyer discipline.⁴ Relevant aggravating factors present in this case include the fact that Beattie's conduct displayed a dishonest motive, involved the use of deceptive practices and violation of multiple Rules, and involved the making of false statements to the court. Moreover, that conduct led to alleged further domestic abuse of a victim.

On the other hand, we also acknowledge that this case presents a number of mitigating factors to consider. First, Beattie acknowledged his misconduct to the District Court, self-reported to the KBA, and has at all times since taken responsibility for his actions. Second, Beattie fully cooperated in all respects during the course of this disciplinary proceeding. Third, Beattie has not been the subject of any prior discipline.⁵ Thus, in weighing these aggravating and mitigating factors, we accept Beattie and OBC's proposed sanction of a 60-day suspension, probated for two years with conditions.

CONCLUSION

After consideration of the disciplinary record, the proposed sanction of a suspension from the practice of law for 60 days, probated for two years with conditions, is accepted.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Michael Joseph Beattie, KBA Member Number 100200, is adjudged guilty of violating SCR 3.130(3.3)(a)(1) and (8.4)(c);

2. Beattie is hereby suspended from the practice of law for 60 days, probated for two years subject to the conditions of probation enumerated herein;

3. Beattie shall receive no further disciplinary charges during the probationary period;

4. During the two-year probationary period, Beattie shall participate in a mentorship with a Mentor having a practice concentration in criminal defense representation. Any such Mentor shall be approved by OBC and be subject to oversight by OBC. The Mentor shall report to OBC any professional misconduct by Beattie pursuant to SCR 3.130(8.3). The Mentor shall meet with Beattie at regular intervals to discuss practice management issues, interactions with clients and courts, the need to maintain proper objectivity in the representation of clients, including criminal defendants, and other criminal defense practice issues as may come up and be developed by the Mentor. Any such Mentor should be an attorney located outside Fayette County. The Mentor shall submit to OBC and Beattie quarterly reports regarding Beattie and his compliance with the mentoring program;

5. Beattie shall execute and maintain in effect during the probationary period a release authorizing OBC to obtain from the Mentor additional information concerning Beattie as determined by OBC;

6. Beattie shall remain compliant with his continuing legal education and KBA dues obligations;

7. Beattie shall pay costs associated with the investigation and prosecution of this proceeding in the amount of $187.62 pursuant to SCR 3.450 within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of this Order, for which execution may issue from this Court upon finality of this Opinion and Order;

8. If Beattie violates any of the terms of probation stated in this Order or receives a Charge of professional misconduct within two years, OBC may file a motion with the Court requesting the issuance of a show cause order directing Beattie to show cause, if any, why the 60-day suspension should not be imposed; and

9. If, at the expiration of the probationary period of two years, Beattie has fully complied with the above terms, his suspension and all conditions of his probation shall be terminated.

/s/ Debra Hembree Lambert

 CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT

FOOTNOTES

1.   Beattie, KBA Member Number 100200, was admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth on May 1, 2023. His bar roster address is 336 American Avenue, Lexington, Kentucky 40503.

2.   The presiding District Court Judge also filed a Bar Complaint against Beattie, though after Beattie himself had self-reported his misconduct.

3.   Beattie argues that Rye is similar in seriousness to the misconduct at issue here because Rye involved “the wrongful removal of a minor child from Kentucky” on the basis of the attorney's advice. However—and as we made clear in Rye—while we later overruled the case supporting the attorney's advice, that advice was legally sound at the time it was given. 336 S.W.3d at 464. Thus, contrary to Beattie's arguments, the fact that the attorney advised his client she could move the child to Iowa was not serious misconduct. To the contrary, it was in fact consistent with the state of the law at time it was given. Id. Indeed, we even refused to accept the attorney's stipulation that his advice constituted misconduct. Id.

4.   American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2d ed. 2019).

5.   Beattie also offers in mitigation that at the time of this offense he had only been admitted to the bar less than a year, he was employed in an office that had experienced significant staff reductions and a lack of appropriate leadership, and he had only two weeks prior been assigned to handle felony matters for the first time. We cannot find such circumstances to excuse or mitigate in any way a knowing deception of a tribunal by an attorney. The prohibitions against such conduct are so fundamental and well-known that we may reasonably expect any admitted attorney to easily comply with them under any circumstances.We also pause to note our concern regarding Beattie's continued argument in his present Motion that the facts presented here are analogous to those in Rye, and thus that a public reprimand is appropriate here as it was in Rye. First, as noted above and in our prior Opinion rejecting a public reprimand, the gravity of the offense presented here is significantly more serious than that at issue in Rye. Second, a continued failure by Beattie to perceive that distinction would cause us grave concern that he still does not appreciate the seriousness of his misconduct. However, given the contrite tenor of the remainder of Beattie's Motion, we believe Beattie has an appropriate understanding of the seriousness of this offense.

All sitting. All concur.