HARTSFIELD v. COMMONWEALTH (2025)

Tyrone Antoinne Hartsfield challenges the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the Fayette Circuit Court's order which denied the Commonwealth's motion in limine to exclude a select portion of a police officer's body camera video. This portion of the video contained the police officer's recorded opinion about whether the alleged victim, B.B., was telling the truth when she described Hartsfield's attack on her. The trial court denied the motion in limine, and further ruled that the entirety of the body camera video was admissible.

We affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing and remanding. We agree that the trial court abused its discretion in both denying the motion in limine and in ruling that the entire video was admissible.

I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

Hartsfield and B.B. met online during the Covid-19 pandemic. On September 6, 2020, they met up at the Ramada Inn in Lexington and Hartsfield accompanied B.B. to her hotel room. Later that night, B.B. called 911 to report that she was raped and assaulted by Hartsfield.

Officers interviewed both B.B. and Hartsfield at the Ramada Inn and these interviews were recorded on the officers’ body cameras. B.B. reported that Hartsfield sexually assaulted her and agreed to be transported to the hospital for collection of evidence of that assault, including a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) exam and strangulation assessment.

B.B.’s account of what occurred is that Hartsfield became angry when she was on her phone and accused her of speaking to other men. He slapped her face, grabbed her by the neck, and threatened to kill her. He forced her to have oral sex, forced her to have vaginal intercourse, and then strangled her again.

Hartsfield admitted to having sex with B.B. but claimed that it was consensual. B.B. had a mark on her neck and a responding officer questioned whether this was an indication of strangulation or was a “hickey.”¹

On November 10, 2020, Hartsfield was indicted for first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree strangulation, fourth-degree assault, terroristic threatening, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO-1). The Commonwealth provided Hartsfield with all discovery materials, including access to the police officer's body worn camera video. Trial was scheduled to begin on October 31, 2022.

On August 30, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine regarding the footage from the police officer's body worn camera. The Commonwealth requested that the trial court “prevent witness's opinion about the truth of the testimony of another witness, specifically opinions of Lexington Police Officers heard in the Body Worn Camera worn by the officers.”² Hartsfield opposed the motion on the basis that an officer should be able to give a lay opinion based on first-hand observation. Each side argued that the case of Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. 2005), supported their position as to whether this portion of the body camera video footage should be excluded or admitted.

Hearings were held on the motion in limine on October 27, 2022. The Commonwealth argued that the officer's hearsay statements regarding whether or not the officer believed the victim should not properly be admitted as it would constitute improper character evidence on B.B.’s truthfulness.

The defense argued that the officer's statements regarding B.B.’s veracity constituted an appropriate, rational, lay witness opinion pursuant to the Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 701, which would be helpful to determine a fact at issue in the case: whether the crime occurred. The defense stated that, furthermore, the officers’ opinion as to whether the mark on B.B.’s neck was a hickey was properly based on what the mark looked like at that time.

The Commonwealth countered that it was not trying to exclude what the officers observed but only the officer's opinion about the believability of the alleged victim and whether she was telling the truth, explaining the officer had no personal knowledge of whether B.B. was telling either the truth or a lie and opining about her honesty was outside of the officer's expertise.

The trial court orally ruled that the body camera video was the best evidence as to what occurred, and it would not allow any party who offered the video into evidence to redact any portion of the video. The trial court explained that the officer's statements were not being given for the truth of the matter but for “context” and were no different than the real-time recorded statements of bystanders to George Floyd's restraint in which they said he was being killed.³

Ultimately, an order was entered on November 4, 2022, denying the Commonwealth's motion in limine. The trial court acknowledged that it had not viewed the body camera video. This video, although available to both parties, was not shown to the trial court during the hearing. Instead, the parties argued their positions regarding whether this portion of the video could properly be offered into evidence during the trial as a matter of law.

In its ruling, the trial court characterized the portion of the body worn camera footage that the Commonwealth asked to exclude as being where one of the officers can be heard stating, under his breath, that he did not believe the allege victim's account of the night's event. The trial court characterized Lanham as controlling and allowing for the admission of the officer's statements about the victim's veracity, as the officer's opinion was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but for “completion.”

The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal pursuant to the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 22A.020(4). The Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that Lanham was distinguishable:

Our Supreme Court noted that it is generally improper for one witness to characterize the testimony of another witness as being either deceptive or truthful.

The Lanham case involved the particular context of custodial interrogation involving statements by police designed to elicit admissions rather than direct testimony by a police officer in a courtroom. The statements of the interrogating police officer in Lanham were suggestive rather than testimonial. The statements in the case now before us, however, are wholly testimonial in nature.

Commonwealth v. Hartsfield, 2022-CA-1388-MR, 2024 WL 56917, at *3 (Ky. App. Jan. 5, 2024). Analyzing Lanham and two unpublished cases, the Court of Appeals held that the comments made by an officer on the body camera video regarding the victim's credibility were inadmissible and the trial court erred by holding that the entire body camera footage would be admitted. Hartsfield, 2024 WL 56917, at *5.

Hartsfield sought and was granted discretionary review by our Court. Oral argument was held on October 15, 2025.

II. ANALYSIS

Hartsfield argues that the Commonwealth failed to adequately establish it had a right to exclude portions of the body worn camera video because it failed to establish with specificity what it was seeking to exclude. Alternatively, Hartsfield argues that the trial court was correct in its ruling and interpretation of Lanham.

We review the trial court's evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000).

A. We May Properly Review the Trial Court's Ruling

Hartsfield argues that the Commonwealth's argument for excluding portions of the video from the body worn camera was not properly preserved because in the Commonwealth's motion in limine and during the hearing regarding the motion, the Commonwealth failed to identify the specific statements that were objectionable or to play the body camera footage of such statements. Hartsfield argues that the Commonwealth may be trying to exclude the officers’ comments that the mark on B.B.’s neck looked like a hickey, as implying she was being dishonest. Hartsfield argues that because the motion in limine is too broad, it makes the trial court's order denying this motion unreviewable as the Court of Appeals and this Court is being asked to review the actions of the trial court based on a hypothetical record.

The best practice would be to play the specific portion of the video during the evidentiary hearing, or directly quote the statements from the video that are at issue. However, the question before us is a legal one, not a factual one. The question is not whether the officer said something opining on the veracity of B.B., but whether such statements can be admitted into evidence. From having reviewed the hearing below, it is evident that while Hartsfield raised a question as to whether the Commonwealth was trying to prevent any opinion testimony regarding the appearance of the mark on B.B.’s neck, the Commonwealth clarified that its motion was not trying to bar any testimony relating to the appearance of that mark.

We can properly review the legal issue before us—whether it is proper to allow anyone to offer an opinion on the veracity of a witness as to what occurred—without needing to review the recorded statement. Additionally, there is no indication that either party before the trial court was unclear on what the challenged statements were. Vacating for the trial court to review the body camera footage would only result in additional delay.

B. The Officer's Recorded Statements Opining on the Veracity of the Victim are Inadmissible.

Hartsfield argues that the trial court was correct to order the entire body worn camera video to be admitted into evidence. He argues the statements on the body worn camera are not being introduced for the truth of the matter asserted and are not testimonial and instead would be used to tell what was happening at the time “as officers are trying to figure out what happened” and “trying to figure out what was going on to render assistance[.]” Hartsfield argues that “[a]ny skepticism from an officer on the body cam did not establish that B.B. was telling or not telling the truth and was not being offered for that reason” but “[was] only being introduced to show context.” Hartsfield emphasizes that the statements’ use by the jury can be properly limited to that purpose through an admonition.

There appears to be some confusion about when a video and the statements contained therein can properly be admitted into evidence. The Kentucky Rules of Evidence do not contain an exception which allows for the blanket admission of body worn camera recordings. Therefore, if the statements contained therein would not be appropriately admitted if testified to by a sworn witness at trial under our evidentiary rules, they cannot be admissible simply because they were recorded. There are of course, additional hurdles that out of court statements must satisfy. Accordingly, we examine what can properly be admitted under our evidentiary rules.

Before we even reach the issue of whether one witness can opine on the veracity of another, the prohibition against hearsay must be addressed. An oral statement recorded on a body worn camera is an out of court statement which qualifies as hearsay if it is “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” KRE 801(c). Such hearsay evidence is normally excluded. KRE 802. While there are various hearsay exceptions, such as for a present sense impression or an excited utterance, see KRE 803(1)-(2), the statements cannot be admitted under either of these exceptions. Unlike the footage of George Floyd's murder, the opinion statements at issue are not relaying or reacting to what is happening or uttered under the excitement of what just happened. Instead, the officer's opinion was based on an analysis of what the initial investigation of the aftermath of a reported crime revealed.

There is no hearsay exception allowing for the admission of statements “to provide context” any more than there is an “investigatory hearsay” exception. See Ruiz v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.3d 675, 680–81 (Ky. 2015) (explaining there is no such thing as “investigative hearsay”); Colvard v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Ky. 2010) (noting there is no investigatory exception for social workers).

The officer's statements could overcome the general rule excluding hearsay statements under appropriate circumstances. However, if a live witness would not be allowed to provide testimony opinion about another witness's veracity, a recorded statement of that same person giving the same prohibited opinion cannot be admitted into evidence. As we explained in Carson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Ky. 2021):

One area in which neither lay nor expert testimony is appropriate is the veracity of a witness. Just as we prohibit the introduction of mechanical polygraphic evidence, we similarly restrict the ability of a witness to act as a human lie detector on the stand. As such, “neither expert nor lay witness may testify that another witness or a defendant is lying or faking. That determination is within the exclusive province of the jury.”

(Quoting Moss v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Ky. 1997)) (citation footnotes omitted).

In Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 762, 789 (Ky. 2013), we similarly summarized:

“[I]t is generally improper for a witness to characterize the testimony of another witness as ‘lying’ or otherwise.” Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 23 (Ky. 2005); see also Moss v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Ky. 1997) (“A witness should not be required to characterize the testimony of another witness ․ as lying.”). “With few exceptions, it is improper to require a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness. A witness's opinion about the truth of the testimony of another witness is not permitted. Neither expert nor lay witnesses may testify that another witness or a defendant is lying or faking. That determination is within the exclusive province of the jury.” Moss, 949 S.W.2d at 583 (quoting State v. James, 557 A.2d 471, 473 (R.I. 1989)); see also Hall v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W.3d 595, 602 (Ky. 2011).

Brown v. Commonwealth, 718 S.W.3d 776, 791 (Ky. 2025), states: “It is well settled that a witness cannot vouch for the truthfulness of another witness either directly or indirectly.”

Likewise, an opinion as to the defendant's guilt is improper.

Even if [a] statement [containing such an opinion] is technically admissible into evidence, it is obvious that the purpose was incompetent. The issue of guilt or innocence is one for the jury to determine, and an opinion of a witness which intrudes on this function is not admissible, even through a route which is, at best, “back door” in nature.

Nugent v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Ky. 1982) (internal citations omitted).

In Lanham, our Court agreed that it was generally improper to allow one witness to characterize another witness as lying, and considered “[w]hether this rule applies to non-testimonial statements made by a police officer during an interrogation of a criminal suspect as part of the overall interrogation technique[.]” 171 S.W.3d at 23.

As the Court of Appeals noted below, the key to understanding the reach of the Lanham decision is contained in the following language:

By making such comments [during the interrogation, that the defendant is lying], the officer is not trying to convince anyone—not the defendant (who knows whether he or she is telling the truth), other officers, a prosecutor, or the jury—that the defendant was lying. Rather, such comments are part of an interrogation technique aimed at showing the defendant that the officer recognizes the holes and contradictions in the defendant's story, thus urging him or her to tell the truth.

This last point is perhaps most important, at least for the purpose of developing a rule that will address future instances of similar evidence. Almost all of the courts that have considered the issue recognize that this form of questioning is a legitimate, effective interrogation tool. And because such comments are such an integral part of the interrogation, several courts have noted that they provide a necessary context for the defendant's responses. We agree that such recorded statements by the police during an interrogation are a legitimate, even ordinary, interrogation technique, especially when a suspect's story shifts and changes. We also agree that retaining such comments in the version of the interrogation recording played for the jury is necessary to provide a context for the answers given by the suspect.

We also agree, however, that such comments are not admissible for the truth of the matter that they appear to assert, i.e., that the defendant is lying.

Id. at 27. After explaining how an admonition could help the jury to understand why the comments were being admitted, we further clarified that “our holding in this case, and the rule that it establishes, is limited to the types of comments in this case, i.e., accusations by an officer that a defendant is not telling the truth.” Id. at 29.

The interrogation situation in Lanham clearly did not occur here. The officer's statements about B.B.’s veracity did not take place during a police interview of the defendant as part of an interrogation technique. The officer's statements about B.B.’s veracity did not even take place during the officers’ interview with her to challenge or clarify her statements. Instead, the officer's statements opining on B.B.’s veracity apparently took place when the two officers were alone and talking to one another.

The trial court ruled that playing the portion of the video containing this opinion is not being done to establish the truth of the matter asserted, but rather for “completeness.” The danger of the officer's opinion being offered as evidence through admission of the unredacted video is that the jury will not make its own credibility determinations but will instead rely on the officer's opinion that B.B. was not truthful and thereby be influenced to disbelieve B.B.’s account of what occurred. Thus, any such statements as to veracity must be excluded.

The question of whether at trial the police officers may provide lay witness opinion testimony regarding their assessment of the cause of the mark on B.B.’s neck is not before us. Neither is the question of whether such testimony could be impeached if they offered contrary opinions on body camera video. We confine our analysis solely to considering whether the trial court erred in denying the motion in limine regarding the officer's opinion as to B.B.’s veracity and ruling that if any portion of the video were offered into evidence, the entire video would be admitted.

Doubtless, the body worn camera footage contains many other instances of hearsay, some of which may be admissible pursuant to certain exceptions and other instances which may be inadmissible. In general, when there is something pertinent to be viewed from the body worn camera footage, rather than the wholesale admission of such video, an in camera examination should be conducted by the court and counsel, limiting the footage to admissible portions.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the Court of Appeals. It correctly reversed the Fayette Circuit Court's decision to deny the Commonwealth's motion in limine to exclude the officer's recorded opinion as to the alleged victim's veracity and the trial court's ruling that the video would be admitted as a whole, and properly remanded for the trial court to grant the Commonwealth's motion in limine.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As explained on WebMD,A hickey, also known as a love bite, is a dark red or purple mark on your skin caused by intense suction. The neck is a common site for hickeys because of its easy access, but you can get them anywhere. When your partner sucks on and bites your skin, the pressure breaks little blood vessels under the surface. Those broken vessels release tiny spots of blood called petechiae. A collection of these blood spots forms a larger dark spot, which is basically a bruise.Hickeys: What You Need to Know, WebMD, https://webmd.com/skin-problems-and-treatments/hickey-what-you-need-to-know (Oct. 20, 2025) (paragraph breaks omitted). See also Hickey, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hickey (last visited Nov. 3, 2025) (definition 2, 1.a, defining a “hickey” as “a temporary red mark or bruise on the skin (such as one produced by biting and sucking)”).

2.   For consistency with the trial court's order and the Court of Appeals’ opinion, we will treat the arguments as involving only one video and only one officer's opinion.

3.   The trial court was referring to the playing of video evidence during the trial of former police officer Derek Chauvin for the killing of George Floyd during his arrest.Bystander video footage captured ․ Chauvin kneeling on Mr. Floyd's neck for several minutes and pinning him to the pavement, as Mr. Floyd begged for air and cried that he could not breathe. Ultimately, the disturbing video ․ played a crucial role in the trial that sent Chauvin to prison.Michael Brewster Policing the Police: Utilizing the Right to Record and Civilian Oversight Boards to Monitor Police Activity in the United States, 88 Brook. L. Rev. 993, 993 (2023) (footnote citations omitted).

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE THOMPSON

All sitting. Lambert, C.J.; Conley, Goodwine, and Nickell, JJ., concur. Bisig and Keller, JJ., concur in result only.