ELIZABETH PILOTT APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE (2026)

OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING

Elizabeth Pilott appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court's restitution order entered on July 31, 2025, following the entry of Pilott's guilty plea to charges of facilitation of burglary and theft by unlawful taking. After reviewing the facts and the law, we vacate the specific dollar amount of the restitution award, which was the result of an apparent typographical error, and we remand for correction of the restitution amount to conform to the evidence. The remaining portions of the order are affirmed.

I. Background

On February 5, 2023, two individuals were observed on a Ring camera entering the home of Adam Kauffman. While inside the residence, they kicked in a locked basement door and stole a number of valuables, including firearms, designer clothing, and a Rolex watch. The two individuals were later identified as Michael Cannon and the appellant, Elizabeth Pilott. Police subsequently arrested Cannon and Pilott in Harrodsburg, Kentucky, and one of Kauffman's stolen guns was in their possession. (Record (R.) at 35.) A few months later, in May 2023, both Cannon and Pilott were indicted by the Jefferson County grand jury on one count of first-degree burglary, five counts of theft by unlawful taking (firearms), and one count of theft by unlawful taking (over $1,000). In the first pretrial hearing following arraignment, the Commonwealth informed the trial court that Cannon had unexpectedly died. The trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the case against Cannon, leaving Pilott as the sole remaining defendant.

Nearly one year after being indicted, Pilott moved the trial court to accept a guilty plea she had negotiated with the Commonwealth. In exchange for her guilty plea, the Commonwealth offered to amend the charges to one count of facilitation to third-degree burglary,¹ five counts of facilitation to theft by unlawful taking (firearms),² and one count of facilitation to theft by unlawful taking (over $1,000).³ In addition, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend a concurrent sentence of 365 days on all charges, conditionally discharged for a period of two years. Pilott also agreed to pay restitution, either in an amount to be later agreed upon or to be determined by a hearing. (R. at 36.) On April 3, 2024, the trial court informed Pilott of her rights in a plea colloquy before accepting the terms of the negotiated plea. Pilott was once again informed that restitution was part of her plea agreement, and that the amount would be either agreed upon or subject to a hearing.

When the parties could not reach an agreement on the restitution amount, the trial court conducted a hearing on September 10, 2024. The only person who testified at the hearing was the victim, Adam Kauffman. Kauffman first testified about replacing his destroyed basement door. He produced receipts showing that the new door cost $452.88, with an installation cost of $233.88. Next, Kauffman testified about his stolen belongings, beginning with the firearms. He produced a receipt for his stolen Glock 19 pistol, showing that he paid $424.00 for it. For the remainder of his stolen belongings, however, Kauffman could not produce receipts and testified from memory about the price he paid for each item. Kauffman recalled in some detail about his purchases, testifying that his grandfather taught him to look for bargains as a collector would. He testified about a grey CZ-75 pistol, which he purchased for $800.00, and a black CZ-75 pistol, which he bought for $1,000.00. Kauffman also testified that a World War II era Star pistol was stolen, and that he had paid $400.00 for it. He recalled that it was “a crazy good deal” because that gun was somewhat difficult to find. The fifth and last gun which was stolen was a Taurus revolver. Kauffman testified that he was not seeking restitution for this item because the police had eventually recovered it.

After describing his stolen guns, Kauffman testified about the other personal items stolen from his basement. First, he testified about his stolen Rolex, a Day-Date model, which he had purchased on his eighteenth birthday for $17,000.00. He noted that Rolexes appreciate in value, and this particular one was now worth approximately $50,000.00. Next, he testified about a stolen 14-karat gold tennis bracelet, with gemstones, for which he paid $5,000.00. He testified that the thieves had stolen gold and silver bullion, for which he had paid about $6,000.00. Kauffman also testified that the thieves had stolen two skateboards, worth approximately $120.00 each, and at least five videogames, worth about $50.00 each. For two of the stolen items, his Brooks Brothers coat and a gold Zippo lighter, Kauffman could not definitively ascertain the price because those items were gifts from his grandparents.⁴

In sum, Kauffman testified to definitive losses totaling $31,800.76. However, Pilott urged the trial court to order restitution only for the amount supported by the receipts for the door and the Glock 19: $1,110.76. The trial court disagreed and determined that Kauffman was a credible witness, pointing out that he did not appear to exaggerate or overvalue the items he described. The trial court's only question at the conclusion of the hearing was whether Kauffman was required to file an insurance claim for the stolen items,⁵ and it asked the parties to file memoranda with the court on that issue.

On July 31, 2025, the trial court entered an order granting restitution to Kauffman. The order recited factual findings consistent with the testimony it received during the restitution hearing before finding that the Commonwealth sustained its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Kauffman was owed $31,800.76. The trial court found that the Commonwealth did not sustain its burden of proof regarding either the Brooks Brothers coat or the Zippo lighter. The trial court also noted that neither party had located any authority suggesting that a victim was required to make an insurance claim to be eligible for restitution. For reasons we are unable to determine from the record, the order concludes by ordering Pilott to pay restitution to Kauffman in the amount of $31,830.76, thirty dollars more than the amount the trial court calculated in the preceding paragraphs of its order. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

Pilott argues two related issues on appeal. First, she contends the Commonwealth failed to establish the validity of the restitution claim and the amount of restitution by a preponderance of the evidence. Second, Pilott contends the trial court's restitution order was not supported by substantial evidence. We consider each issue in turn below.

Under the Kentucky Penal Code, “ ‘Restitution’ means any form of compensation paid by a convicted person to a victim for counseling, medical expenses, lost wages due to injury, or property damage and other expenses suffered by a victim because of a criminal act[.]” KRS 532.350(1)(a). Kentucky law requires restitution to a named victim pursuant to KRS 532.032(1). Peterson v. Commonwealth, 708 S.W.3d 435, 442-43 (Ky. App. 2025). As an appellate court, we review the decisions of a trial court regarding restitution for abuse of discretion. Bentley v. Commonwealth, 497 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Ky. App. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Morseman, 379 S.W.3d 144, 148 (Ky. 2012)). “The test for abuse of discretion is ‘whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.’ ” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).

In her first argument, Pilott asserts that the Commonwealth failed to establish the validity of the restitution claim and the amount of restitution by a preponderance of the evidence. She contends the trial court erred when it relied upon Kauffman's testimony at the restitution hearing, stating this had no “minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Ky. 2011). We disagree. The Kentucky Supreme Court has recently held that “the testimony of the owner of stolen property is competent evidence as to the value of the property.” Commonwealth v. McMichael, 671 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Ky. 2023). The sole caveat is that such testimony must be supported by “facts and circumstances” which provide a minimal level of reliability. Id.

Pilott argues that these “facts and circumstances” must take the form of external documenting evidence, such as an insurance claim or receipt. However, the Supreme Court has indicated that such documentation is unnecessary. In McMichael, the victim seeking restitution “ ‘threw out a number’ because he did not know the actual scrap value of the siding[ ]” which was stolen from his diner. Id. at 31. The Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that, on remand, the victim was qualified to testify about the value of the stolen siding, if he could provide some “reliable evidence” regarding the diner's worth at the time of the theft compared to its worth afterward, or possibly the value of the recovered stainless-steel siding. Id. at 35-36. In affirming this Court, the McMichael Court quoted with approval our holding in that case:

While it may have been preferable for the Commonwealth to produce documentation, it was not required․ If [the defendants’ argument] was taken to its logical conclusion, restitution could never be imposed for an item of jewelry that had not been photographed, appraised, measured, weighed and insured․ Although they have pointed to some weaknesses in the Commonwealth's evidence, [the victim] had sufficient reliable information, based on her memory and the photographs, to find comparable items on the Internet.

Id. at 35 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Turning to the present case, the question before us is whether Kauffman impermissibly “threw out a number” in assessing the value of his stolen property, which was the case in McMichael, or whether there was some reliable information to support his valuation. Our review of Kauffman's testimony during the restitution hearing supports the trial court's ruling. Kauffman did not guess at the value of his items, which would be the sort of “mere allegation” noted with disapproval in Jones. Instead, Kauffman testified about the specific amounts he paid for the stolen items. When Kauffman was not sure of values, as in the case of his coat and his lighter, he candidly admitted these facts to the trial court. As shown in McMichael, a victim may provide “sufficient reliable information” with information grounded in his or her memory. 671 S.W.3d at 35. “While it may have been preferable for the Commonwealth to produce documentation, it was not required.” Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 538 S.W.3d 326, 329 (Ky. App. 2017). Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the Commonwealth failed to establish the value of the awarded restitution by a preponderance of the evidence.

In her second argument on appeal, Pilott contends that the trial court's restitution order was not supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence is evidence which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.” Donovan v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Ky. App. 2012) (citing Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998)).

Pilott's second assertion of error treads similar grounds as the first. She contends that the trial court should not have accepted Kauffman's testimony because he could have “exaggerated or overvalued” the costs. (Appellant's Brief at 15.) She also argues “there were no facts or circumstances to support Mr. Kauffman's testimony ․ other than Mr. Kauffman's mere allegations.” (Appellant's Brief at 16.) However, it was the prerogative of the trial court, as the fact finder, to judge Kauffman's credibility. CR ⁶ 52.01. “[M]ere doubt as to the correctness of [a] finding [will] not justify [its] reversal[.]” Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted). Furthermore, we have already determined that Kauffman's recollection of the price he paid for his stolen valuables was sufficient to inform his testimony beyond the realm of mere allegation. See McMichael, 671 S.W.3d at 35.

However, as we previously explained, there is a discrepancy between the trial court's findings and the amount of restitution ultimately ordered. The trial court expressly found that the Commonwealth proved Kauffman's losses in the amount of $31,800.76 by a preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, it ordered Pilott to pay restitution of $31,830.76, an amount thirty dollars greater than the amount supported by its findings. Nothing in the record explains or supports this additional thirty dollars. Accordingly, while we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination of the losses properly subject to restitution, the restitution award must be vacated to the extent it does not conform to the trial court's own findings. On remand, the trial court shall correct the restitution amount to $31,800.76.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment only as to the restitution amount of $31,830.76. We remand with instructions to the trial court to reduce the total to the amount supported by the trial court's findings earlier in the order, $31,800.76. We affirm the remaining portions of the judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Third-degree burglary is a Class D felony under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 511.040. Pursuant to the criminal facilitation statute, KRS 506.080, facilitation of a Class D felony is a Class A misdemeanor.

2.   Theft by unlawful taking of a firearm, KRS 514.030(2)(a), is a Class D felony. Facilitation of this crime is a Class A misdemeanor under KRS 506.080.

3.   Theft by unlawful taking of property valued over $1,000 but less than $10,000 is a Class D felony under KRS 514.030(2)(e). Facilitation of this crime is a Class A misdemeanor under KRS 506.080.

4.   Kauffman testified that he believed that the purchase price of the Brooks Brothers coat was about $500.00. However, when questioned by the trial court, he admitted that his grandfather purchased the coat in 2017, and it was not likely to be worth $500.00 at present. He did not place a value on the gold Zippo lighter given to him by his grandmother.

5.   Kauffman testified that he had not filed a claim with his insurance because he did not wish to suffer an increase in his insurance premiums, but he also stated that he intended to file a claim if he could not get restitution.

6.   Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.

JONES, A., JUDGE:

ALL CONCUR.