STEVEN BLACKISTON APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE (2026)

OPINION AFFIRMING

Steven A. Blackiston (Appellant) appeals from a judgment entered in Boyd Circuit Court reflecting his guilty plea on one count of Receiving Stolen Property, $1,000–$10,000, under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 514.110(3)(b). Appellant's appointed counsel, Hon. Aaron Reed Baker, filed an Anders ¹ brief stating his belief that there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal, and requested to withdraw from representation. After careful review of the record and the law, we agree with Mr. Baker that there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal and accordingly affirm the judgment on appeal. We will grant Mr. Baker's motion to withdraw from representation by way of a separate order rendered concurrently with this Opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 5, 2024, Appellant was indicted on one count of Receiving Stolen Property, $10,000 or more, under KRS 514.110(3)(d). The indictment arose from Appellant's possession of a 2012 Ford F-250 truck in Boyd County, Kentucky, which had been reported as stolen in South Carolina. Appellant was arrested on March 6, 2024, at the Boyd County Detention Center.

On December 2, 2024, Appellant, pro se, moved to be extradited to South Carolina where the alleged crime occurred. In the following days, he filed a series of additional pro se motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, requesting new counsel, seeking a bill of particulars, and alleging that in response to his oral request for extradition, Honorable George Davis, Judge, stood up in his chair and yelled “hell no!”

Prior to these motions being ruled upon, the charge was amended by way of an agreed order to one count of Receiving Stolen Property, $1,000– $10,000, KRS 514.110(3)(b). On April 25, 2025, Appellant accepted the Commonwealth's plea offer, under which he entered a guilty plea to the amended charge with a recommended sentence of five years in prison, to be probated for four years. Appellant engaged in the standard plea colloquy during which Appellant acknowledged that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into and that he was waiving certain rights. Thereafter, the Boyd Circuit Court entered a judgment reflecting the guilty plea and sentencing Appellant in accordance with the Commonwealth's recommendation. Appellant was also ordered to pay restitution.

Appellant filed an appeal from the Boyd Circuit Court's judgment. In his handwritten, pro se Notice of Appeal, Appellant sought to appeal “the denial of my due process and constitutional rights” and to be “extricated back to sout carolna [sic].” Appellant cited 28 U.S.C.² § 144 (Bias or Prejudice of Judge) as a statutory basis for the appeal.

Appellant was assigned counsel, Mr. Baker, who filed an Anders brief stating his belief that there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal, and providing Appellant the opportunity to file a pro se brief. Mr. Baker also moved to withdraw from his representation of Appellant. Appellant filed no pro se appellate brief and the appeal is now ripe for adjudication.

II. ANALYSIS

In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held that appointed counsel must “support his client's appeal to the best of his ability.” The Court went on to state that,

[o]f course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court—not counsel—then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel's request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Anders was adopted in Kentucky in Fite v. Commonwealth, 469 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Ky. 1971). See also Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001).³

Further,

[a]ny attorney providing representation under this chapter on an appeal and who, after a conscientious examination of the appeal believes the appeal to be wholly frivolous after careful examinations of the record, may request the court to which the appeal has been taken for permission to withdraw from the case. The attorney shall file with that request a brief which sets forth any arguments which might possibly be raised on appeal. A copy of the request for permission to withdraw and the brief shall be served upon the client in sufficient time so that the client may raise any argument he or she chooses to raise.

KRS 31.219(3).⁴

Appellant was arrested, charged, and received the appointed counsel to which he was entitled. After consultation with counsel, Appellant chose to accept the Commonwealth's guilty plea in order to receive a reduced charge and avoid prison. He then entered into a thorough plea colloquy acknowledging that his plea was made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly. Appellant was not entitled to extradition, as Appellant was charged with being in possession of stolen property in Kentucky, and there were no charges pending in South Carolina. See Crady v. Cranfill, 371 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1963), noting that extradition may occur only in the context of another state seeking to exercise its jurisdiction over the defendant. In addition, the record is wholly devoid of any basis for concluding that Judge Davis acted inappropriately and should have recused.

III. CONCLUSION

Per Anders and its Kentucky progeny, and based on our thorough examination of the record, we conclude that that the instant appeal is wholly frivolous. We find no basis for Appellant's apparent claims ⁵ that he was denied due process nor that his constitutional rights were violated; that he was entitled to be extradited to South Carolina; nor, that Judge Davis acted inappropriately and should have recused himself. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Boyd Circuit Court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).

2.   United States Code.

3.   In A.C. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Services, 362 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. App. 2012), a panel of this Court applied Anders to termination of parental rights cases because indigent parents have a statutory right to appellate counsel.

4.   Amended 2026 Ky. Acts ch.136, sec. 8 (eff. Jul. 15, 2026).

5.   As Appellant has filed no pro se appellate brief, the sole source of his grievances is his pro se Notice of Appeal.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE:

ALL CONCUR.