ROGER CRAWLEY APPELLANT v. APPELLEE (2013)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINIONAFFIRMING

Roger Crawley appeals pro se from the November 17, 2011, order of the Christian Circuit Court denying his motion to correct his sentence pursuant to CR  Double 60.02 without holding an evidentiary hearing.   For the following reasons, we affirm.

In 1982, Crawley was convicted by a Christian County jury of first-degree robbery and first-degree persistent felony offender (“PFO”), and received a life sentence.   On September 26, 2011, over twenty-nine years later, Crawley filed the underlying CR 60.02 motion requesting that his PFO conviction be vacated.   The trial court denied his CR 60.02 motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing, on the basis that the CR 60.02 motion was not made within a “reasonable time,” as required by the Rule. This appeal followed.

A motion to vacate under CR 60.02(e) and (f) must be made within a “reasonable time.”  CR 60.02.   Determining “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable time ․ under CR 60.02 is a matter that addresses itself to the discretion of the trial court.”  Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky.1983).   A trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing if it appears on the face of the record that the CR 60.02 motion was not filed within a “reasonable time.”  Id.

Crawley filed the underlying CR 60.02 motion over twenty-nine years after the judgment was entered.   Under the circumstances, the trial court's finding that Crawley failed to move for CR 60.02 relief within a “reasonable time” was not an abuse of its discretion.   See Baze v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Ky.2008) (holding that defendant's CR 60.02 motion filed approximately fourteen years after trial was unreasonable);  Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the passage of five years between the final judgment and the CR 60.02 motion exceeded a reasonable time);  Ray v. Commonwealth, 633 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Ky.App.1982) (holding that a CR 60.02 motion filed twelve years after defendant's conviction exceeded a reasonable time).   We find nothing in the record to support a finding that Crawley's motion was filed within a reasonable time under the circumstances.

Accordingly, the November 17, 2011, order of the Christian Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

VANMETER, JUDGE:   Double