ANICA YELTON APPELLANT v. WILLIAM YELTON APPELLEE (2026)

OPINION & ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING

Appellant, Anica M. Yelton (“Wife”), seeks review of a final, property-disposition order issued by the Campbell Family Court. After careful review and consideration, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Wife married Appellee, William R. Yelton (“Husband”), in late October of 2021. No children were born of the marriage. The couple separated in February of 2023, and Husband filed a petition to dissolve their marriage in April of 2023. The Family Court issued an interlocutory dissolution decree in November of 2024, which dissolved the parties’ marriage but reserved resolution of financial issues.

The Family Court conducted a trial over the course of three non-consecutive days in late 2024 and early 2025. At trial, the parties agreed that their incomes were roughly equal and exceeded $300,000 per year combined.

Wife does not contest that Husband bought Grant's Lick Café (which is sometimes referred to as Grant's Lick Café and Bar, which we shall refer to simply as “the Bar”) prior to their marriage. However, Wife asserts that she was entitled to a marital interest in the alleged increase in the Bar's value during the marriage. Wife testified that she frequently worked at the Bar during the marriage, performing tasks such as helping with trivia contests, cleaning, and bartending. Husband did not dispute that Wife was present at the Bar often during the marriage but insisted that her help was minimal.

The parties also disputed the manner by which to allocate the sales proceeds from selling their marital residence, which they refer to as a “barndominium.” During the marriage, they jointly purchased land upon which they intended to build a luxurious, marital residence. First, they built a combination barn and dwelling—the barndominium—in which they resided. It is uncontested that they paid for the barndominium, in part, with both spouses’ contributions of nonmarital funds.

The parties disputed whether Wife must pay a portion of the tax liability caused by Husband's withdrawal of funds from his thrift savings plan (“TSP”). They also argued over the proper allocation and division of sundry, personal property.

In lieu of making closing arguments, the parties agreed to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Family Court's May of 2025 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were largely reflective of, but not identical to, those submitted by Husband. Wife then filed this appeal.

We shall provide additional facts as necessary in our analysis of the issues before us.

II. Analysis

A. Issues Presented

Wife raises the following issues. First, she contends that the Family Court erred by finding that the Bar is entirely Husband's nonmarital property. Second, she claims that the Family Court did not properly calculate each party's nonmarital interest in the barndominium. Third, she argues that the Family Court erroneously determined that she had no nonmarital interest in a checking account. Fourth, she asserts that the Family Court did not properly consider the nonmarital funds that she had spent to help satisfy Husband's nonmarital tax obligation. Fifth, she contends that the Family Court erred by requiring her to be responsible for half of the taxes owed on Husband's TSP withdrawal. Sixth, she maintains that the Family Court improperly divided miscellaneous personal property. Next, she believes the Family Court erred by failing to grant her request for $3,000 in attorney's fees that she had incurred by filing an emergency motion related to Husband's alleged misconduct in discovery. Finally, she contends that the Family Court erred by adopting rotely Husband's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

B. Wife's Deficient Preservation Statement

Before we address those issues on the merits, we must discuss Wife's noncompliant preservation statement. Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 32(A)(4) requires the argument section of an appellant's opening brief to include “at the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.”

Wife's preservation statement in its entirety states succinctly: “Pursuant to RAP 32(A)(4), the following issues were preserved in Wife's listing of issues in her pretrial memorandum as well as in her testimony in the hearing.” Wife's Opening Brief, p. 2. That statement is deficient because Wife neither provided a separate preservation statement for each issue, nor did she offer a pinpoint cite to the location in the record to allow this Court to determine where, when, and how she presented each issue to the Family Court. W.I.S. v. K.M.B., 722 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Ky. App. 2025). Those failures are not mere technical defects as it is not our responsibility to search the record to determine whether or in what manner an issue was preserved.

Nonetheless, our independent review of the record showed that, with exceptions that we will later mention, most issues in Wife's brief were presented to the Family Court. Husband does not argue to the contrary. Moreover, we did not find that we, or our Supreme Court, have held that Wife's counsel had failed to comply with mandatory briefing rules in previous appeals. We have thus elected to refrain from imposing sanctions at this time, but we strongly caution counsel to comply strictly with the RAPs in the future.

C. Standards of Review

We also must set forth the standards governing our review before resolving the issues before us. As we have explained:

In a dissolution proceeding involving contested property distribution issues, a trial court's first step must be to categorize each piece of contested property as either marital or nonmarital. Next, the court must assign each party's nonmarital property to that party. Finally, the court must equitably divide the parties’ marital property in just proportions.

Smith v. Smith, 235 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. App. 2006) (footnotes omitted).

Because a Trial Court has “wide discretion in dividing marital property,” we review the division of marital property under the deferential standard of abuse of discretion. Id. However, a Trial Court “has no discretion to divide nonmarital property” but instead must simply “restore the property” to its owner. Fehr v. Fehr, 284 S.W.3d 149, 158 (Ky. App. 2008). Hence, the question whether the property is marital or nonmarital is significant not only to the parties and their asset distribution, but also to this Court to determine the appropriate standard of review:

The question of whether an item is marital or nonmarital is reviewed under a two-tiered scrutiny in which the factual findings made by the court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard and the ultimate legal conclusion denominating the item as marital or nonmarital is reviewed de novo.

Smith, 235 S.W.3d at 6.¹

D. The Bar

Wife argues that the Bar increased in value during the marriage, and that increase is a marital asset as it was created by the parties’ joint efforts, including work that she performed for the Bar. Thus, she contends that the Family Court should have found that the Bar had both nonmarital and marital components and should have awarded her a portion of the marital component.

When there is a mixed asset that is partly marital and partly nonmarital, extra care in division is required:

a trial court must determine the parties’ separate nonmarital and marital shares or interests in the property on the basis of the evidence before the court. Kentucky courts have typically applied the source of funds rule to characterize property or to determine parties’ nonmarital and marital interests in such property. The source of funds rule simply means that the character of the property, i.e., whether it is marital, nonmarital, or both, is determined by the source of the funds used to acquire property. If such a piece of mixed-status property increases in value during the course of the marriage ․ trial courts must determine from the evidence why the increase in value occurred because where the value of [nonmarital] property increases after marriage due to general economic conditions, such increase is not marital property, but the opposite is true when the increase in value is a result of the joint efforts of the parties. [Kentucky Revised Statutes] KRS [403].190(3), however, creates a presumption that any such increase in value is marital property, and, therefore, a party asserting that he or she should receive appreciation upon a nonmarital contribution as his or her nonmarital property carries the burden of proving the portion of the increase in value attributable to the nonmarital contribution. By virtue of the KRS 403.190(3) presumption, the failure to do so will result in the increase being characterized as marital property.

Smith, 235 S.W.3d at 5-6 (emphasis and brackets in Smith) (indentation, internal quotation marks, and footnotes omitted).

In this case, however, we do not need to examine whether the increase in the Bar's value during the marriage was due to the parties’ joint efforts or general economic conditions. Indeed, the record supports the Family Court's conclusion that the Bar's value actually decreased during the marriage.

Wife presented the testimony of Missy DeArk, an accountant, who provided the only testimony as to the Bar's value. DeArk testified that she did not have information to provide a value of the Bar on the marriage date in October of 2021 or the separation date in February of 2023. Instead, she testified that the value of the Bar at the end of 2020 was approximately $60,000; the value at the end of 2021 was approximately $150,000; and the value at the end of 2022 was approximately $143,000. DeArk also testified that the Bar's debts had been reduced by roughly $15,000 in 2022, and the Bar's value at the end of 2022 would have been about $15,000 lower if that debt reduction had not occurred.

However, DeArk also testified that the Bar made a profit of about $37,000 in 2022, but the value of the ownership equity was nonetheless lower at the end of 2022 than 2021 because Husband had taken a distribution in 2022. For reasons that we cannot discern from the record, neither Wife nor Husband asked DeArk follow-up questions about that distribution.

Wife ascribes a value of $60,000 to the Bar at marriage. However, that figure represents the Bar's value on December 31, 2020 – nearly ten months before the parties’ October 2021 marriage. DeArk's December 2021 valuation ($150,000) was based on a date falling only about two months after the marriage. Because the December 2021 valuation was much temporally closer to the parties’ marriage date than was the December of 2020 valuation, we cannot discern error in the Family Court's using the December 2021 valuation to find that the Bar's value when the parties were married was $150,000.

Similarly, though the December of 2022 valuation fell roughly two months before the parties’ separation, that valuation was the one closest to the date the parties separated. As such, we cannot discern error in the Family Court's using of that valuation to find that the Bar's value was $143,000 when the parties separated.

Thus, the Family Court's holding that the Bar decreased by roughly $7,000 during the marriage ($150,000 value on the wedding date - $143,000 value on the separation date = $7,000 decrease during the marriage) is supported by substantial evidence.² Consequently, we affirm the Family Court's resolution of this issue as Wife has not shown error in the Family Court's conclusion that the Bar did not increase in value during the marriage.

Briefly, we also reject Wife's fleeting argument that she gained an ownership interest in the Bar because Husband had referred to it during the marriage as “our bar.”³ A spouse may gift ownership of his or her nonmarital asset to the other spouse. See, e.g., Barber v. Bradley, 505 S.W.3d 749, 759 (Ky. 2016).

But Wife has not shown such a gift occurred here. Our Supreme Court held in Barber that a husband gifted a nonmarital interest in a home to a wife by “repeatedly promising” the wife “that the house was ‘half hers’ and executing a deed that reflected that agreement[.]” Id. Here, Husband did not make Wife a record title owner of the Bar, did not allow Wife to hire or fire employees of the Bar, and did not explicitly, repeatedly promise Wife that the Bar was “half hers.” Unlike Barber, Wife has not pointed to evidence showing an unmistakable, specific, donative intent by Husband.

Finally, Wife presents two curt arguments that are insufficient to merit appellate relief. First, she presents a vague, one-sentence allegation that “[t]he trial court failed to consider that the contributions of Husband also working at the business [the Bar] during the marriage was marital as was any income generated during this period.” Wife's Opening Brief, p. 4. Wife has not identified a location wherein she raised this argument to the Family Court. She also did not file a post-judgment motion for more specific findings on the issue. As we have held, this sort of “terse, conclusory assertion wholly unaccompanied by meaningfully developed argument or citation to authority is insufficient to merit appellate relief.” Schell v. Young, 640 S.W.3d 24, 32 (Ky. App. 2021).⁴

Similarly, Wife hazily notes in passing that “Husband also testified that a loan repayment pertaining to the bar was paid from his paycheck after the parties were married, thus mingling marital funds.”⁵ Wife's Opening Brief, p. 2. The type of relief that Wife is seeking here is unclear. She does not even specify the amount of the alleged repayment with marital funds. She also has not pointed to a location where she raised this issue in her proposed findings (or otherwise asked for relief from the Family Court); she did not ask for post-judgment findings on the issue; and she does not cite authority supporting her position. She has simply not provided sufficient analysis to obtain appellate relief. Schell, 640 S.W.3d at 32.

E. The Barndominium

Wife argues that the Family Court failed to recognize the proper amount of nonmarital funds that she contributed towards purchasing the land and developing the marital barndominium on its situs. In Wife's view, she is entitled to a greater percentage of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home than is Husband because her nonmarital contributions significantly exceeded his.

The Family Court recognized that tracing principles generally apply to determinations of nonmarital interests in property. Essentially, tracing requires a party to track her nonmarital property into a specific marital asset. If the party does so properly, a Family Court must assign the specific property, or an interest therein based on the nonmarital contribution, to the tracing party as his or her nonmarital property. See, e.g., Maclean v. Middleton, 419 S.W.3d 755, 766–67 (Ky. App. 2014). Of course, “[a] party claiming that property, or an interest therein, acquired during the marriage is nonmarital bears the burden of proof.” Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 266 (Ky. 2004).

Here, the Family Court found that strict tracing was inapplicable because, “as Wife testified, ‘it is impossible to trace the funds.’ ” R. at 164. Thus, the Family Court held that “[i]nstead of starting with a strict application of the tracing requirement to divide the property accumulated during the marriage in just proportions, the case must be viewed as ․ two people with significant assets and earnings who were combining funds for a joint venture with the goal of building a luxurious home on prime real estate.” Record (“R.”) at 165.

The Family Court tellingly did not cite authority allowing it to refuse to require the parties to trace their nonmarital contributions to currently-held, marital assets. Our Supreme Court has held that “tracing to a mathematical certainty is not always possible,” but has refused to “do away with the tracing requirements altogether.” Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 64 S.W.3d 816, 820-21 (Ky. 2002). We hold that the Family Court erred by failing to use tracing principles.

Furthermore, tracing is not used to divide marital assets in “just proportions,” as the Family Court stated. Rather, tracing is used to assign what would otherwise be presumptively-marital assets (property acquired during the marriage) to the tracing party as his or her nonmarital property. Maclean, 419 S.W.3d at 767 (holding that if a party satisfies the tracing requirement “then the trial court assigns the specific property, or an interest in the specific property, to the claimant as his or her non-marital property”). If a party shows that she contributed nonmarital funds but cannot trace that contribution to a currently-held asset, a Family Court “will not assign the property to the claimant as non-marital property, but it may consider non-marital contribution as a factor when it makes a just division of the parties’ marital property.” Id.

Though it declined to follow tracing principles, the Family Court ultimately held that Wife had a nonmarital line of credit of $147,000 on her nonmarital home, “of which $135,240.22 was spent on items clearly related to the purchase/development of the [marital] property.” R. at 165. Conversely, we do not find that this amount was “clearly” supported by the record at all. Husband admitted that Wife took out a line of credit of $147,000, but he did not specifically concede that Wife used all those funds on the barndominium. Moreover, Husband's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law asserted that Wife only spent $75,240 of the line of credit towards the barndominium. “When a nonmarital contribution is undisputed, the party claiming that property as nonmarital is relieved of any obligation to prove otherwise.” Fehr, 284 S.W.3d at 158. Here, the amount is contested. We thus reject Wife's fleeting argument that Husband made an unambiguous admission which relieved her of tracing the $147,000 line of credit.

Curiously, the Family Court later used a different sum for Wife's nonmarital contribution while simultaneously holding that she had not traced her nonmarital contribution(s) adequately:

Wife had an equity line of $147,000.00 taken on the [nonmarital] property. The funds from the equity line paid $75,240.00 to contractors to build the barndominium and $60,000.00 was placed in the parties[’] joint account and months later the parties purchased the [marital] property by paying $55,589.44 down. Even though a strict application of tracing sources will not support it, Wife should receive credit for a $130,829.44 investment.

R. at 166. We cannot reconcile the Family Court's inconsistently finding first that Wife had spent $135,240.22 “on items clearly related to the purchase/development of the [marital] property” but finding later that she “should receive credit for a $130,829.44 investment.”

The Family Court also held that Wife had not traced the $39,061.12 profit received from selling her nonmarital home, holding it was “impossible to determine for what these funds were used ․” R. at 166. Instead, the Family Court decided to award Wife an unspecified “portion of this amount as part of her ‘just proportion.’ ” Id. It is not improper for a Court to consider nonmarital contributions that are not adequately traced when dividing marital property in just proportions. Maclean, 419 S.W.3d at 767. However, it is unclear if, or how, the Family Court factored that untraced, nonmarital contribution by Wife when trying to divide the marital property justly.

As to Husband's nonmarital contribution to purchasing and developing the marital residence, the Family Court held that “Husband invested $125,100.00 from his TSP retirement account.” R. at 165. Wife admits that Husband contributed $60,000 of that TSP withdrawal towards building the marital residence. But Wife disputes that Husband traced the remainder of the TSP withdrawal. In fact, Wife cites evidence indicating that some of the funds from the TSP withdrawal were used to pay Husband's nonmarital debts, such as a prior nonmarital TSP loan.

The Family Court did not explicitly determine how much of Husband's TSP withdrawal was adequately traced towards acquisition and development of the marital home. Instead, the Family Court held that “numerous creditors were paid” with some of those TSP funds to improve the parties’ debt-to-equity ratio to enable them to obtain a mortgage to buy the marital property and to build a marital residence. R. at 166. The Family Court held that “immediately after the [TSP] withdrawal and deposit into the joint [checking] account ․ J&J Contracting was paid $22,700.00[,] and creditors were paid $92,595.85. Husband should receive credit for his $125,100.00 investment of individual funds to the parties’ joint venture.” R. at 166. In short, the Family Court held that Husband should receive credit against the sales proceeds of the marital home for the entire $125,100 TSP withdrawal even though a substantial portion of those funds were used to pay Husband's nonmarital debts instead of being directly funneled into purchasing land or developing the barndominium. Ultimately, the Family Court held that “[t]he award to Husband from the sale of the [marital] home should be $139,000.00 plus one-half of the remaining equity. The award for Wife should be $139,000.00 plus one-half of the remaining equity.” R. at 167.

There are numerous issues with the Family Court's treatment of the barndominium sales proceeds. The Family Court had no authority to ignore the binding tracing principles required by our Supreme Court. The Family Court seemingly restored to each party $139,000.00 in nonmarital contributions but the source of those sums is not clear. In fact, those $139,000 sums do not match the figures discussed elsewhere by the Family Court. For example, the Family Court held that Husband had contributed $125,100.00 but credited him with $139,000.00. Presumably, the Family Court held that Husband had somehow contributed the entirety of the TSP withdrawal even though both parties agreed that Husband received only $125,100 because he had to pay a ten percent withdrawal penalty. The Family Court did not explain its reasoning for holding that Husband should receive credit for contributing amounts that he did not actually receive and thus could not have used towards buying and building the marital property. The Family Court also gave different sums for Wife's nonmarital contributions, but none of them were $139,000.00.

The Family Court also did not discuss Wife's seemingly undisputed contribution of $10,000 from her nonmarital, money-market account. Citing evidence from her financial records and trial testimony, Wife alleges that she adequately traced a contribution of $10,000 from this account towards purchasing and developing the marital home. Husband does not address the $10,000 money-market issue in his responsive brief.

Finally, the Family Court stated that Wife had not traced $39,061.12 gained from selling her nonmarital home. The reasons that the Family Court purported to disregard the binding tracing principle for other sums but insisted upon tracing for that amount are unclear. Regardless, the Family Court held that Wife should receive credit for that $39,061.12 amount as part of her “just” share of the marital assets. However, the Family Court did not elucidate whether, or how, it considered that sum in determining the just amount each party should receive of the marital portion of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home.

We are a Court of review, not an initial factfinder or decisionmaker. Klein v. Flanery, 439 S.W.3d 107, 122 (Ky. 2014); Calhoun v. CSX Transp., Inc., 331 S.W.3d 236, 245 (Ky. 2011). Therefore, we cannot sift through or weigh the evidence to determine what nonmarital contributions were properly traced by either party. We also cannot be the Court to determine initially then what amount of the remaining marital portion of the proceeds should be awarded to each party in just proportions.

Instead, we must vacate the Family Court's decision regarding the funds received from selling the marital home. That issue is remanded with instructions for the Family Court first to use tracing principles to determine the nonmarital contribution, if any, each party made towards buying and building the marital home. The Family Court must award any properly-traced, nonmarital contribution to the contributor as his or her nonmarital property. The Family Court must carefully address each party's claimed nonmarital contributions, including Wife's money-market contribution.

Once the nonmarital contributions are deducted, the remaining sales proceeds are marital property. The Family Court must divide that marital property in just proportions. The Family Court “may consider non-marital contribution as a factor when it makes a just division of the parties’ marital property.” Maclean, 419 S.W.3d at 767.

F. The Joint Checking Account

Wife asserts that she had about $7,300 in a Fifth Third Bank checking account at the time of the marriage. After the marriage, Wife added Husband to that account, and they used it as a joint account into which their paychecks were deposited and from which they paid bills and made purchases. The Family Court implicitly concluded that the balance on the date of separation was marital property, which it ordered be divided equally. Wife contends the Family Court should have awarded her the balance in the account on the date of the marriage as her nonmarital property.

The parties do not contest that during the time that the parties separated, Wife withdrew $8,000 from that joint account, which she deposited into her sole account. The Family Court noted this withdrawal in its findings of fact. Then, in the conclusions of law section, the Family Court resolved the issue regarding the Fifth Third account as follows:

The evidence is uncontroverted that at the time the parties separated, Wife transferred $8,000.00 from the joint Fifth Third checking account to her individual account. A division of just proportions would be to divide the $8,000.00 equally between the parties.

R. at 168. By using language referring to “just proportions,” the Family Court implicitly concluded the $8,000 was marital property. See, e.g., Willis v. Willis, 362 S.W.3d 372, 377-78 (Ky. App. 2012) (holding that a court must initially assign each party's nonmarital property and then “[o]nce that has been accomplished, the family court must divide the marital property in just proportions”).

Wife asserts that her “taking $8,000 from the joint marital account upon separation is not unjust as this was nearly the balance upon marriage. Such tracing proves her non-marital interest.” Wife's Opening Brief, p. 8. In her reply brief, Wife slightly amends her argument by claiming that only the approximate $700 difference between the roughly $7,300 in the account at marriage and the $8,000 she took at separation was marital property.

Wife's argument closely resembles one that we deemed persuasive in Allen v. Allen, 584 S.W.2d 599 (Ky. App. 1979). In Allen, the husband had a retirement account with a balance of $5,248.23 at the time of marriage, which grew to a value of $22,000 during the marriage. Id. at 600. Husband retired, withdrew the $22,000, and deposited $8,000 of it into a savings account. Id. The issue became whether Husband had adequately traced the initial $5,248.23 as his nonmarital property. The Trial Court held that Husband had not. We disagreed and held as follows:

We think the requirement of tracing should be fulfilled, at least as far as money is concerned, when it is shown that nonmarital funds were deposited and commingled with marital funds and that the balance of the account was never reduced below the amount of the nonmarital funds deposited. Such was the situation here. It was not a literal tracing in the strict sense of the word, but our conclusion does no violence to the purpose of the statute, which is to equitably divide that which was accumulated by “team effort.” There can be no accumulation unless the parties have more at the end of the marriage than they had in the beginning. The appellant is entitled to restoration of the $5,248.23 as nonmarital property.

Id.

However, in Chenault v. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d 575, 578-79 (Ky. 1990), our Supreme Court explicitly declined to adopt our approach in Allen:  ⁶

The view expressed in Allen is consistent with the concurring opinion of Vance, J., in Turley v. Turley, supra [562 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. App. 1978)]. In that concurring opinion, it was persuasively argued that all nonmarital property should be restored upon dissolution of the marriage providing the parties have, throughout the marriage, maintained at least as much in assets as the combined value of their nonmarital property. By logical inference, if this view were adopted, any decrease during the marriage in the parties’ total nonmarital asset value would be charged pro rata against their percentage share of total nonmarital property to be assigned.

As appealing as the foregoing view may be, particularly when the simplicity of its application and its inherent equity is considered, we believe the concept of tracing is too firmly established in the law to be abandoned at this time.

The Court in Chenault used a relaxed tracing methodology to conclude ultimately that the wife had shown assets were her nonmarital funds. However, the Court stressed that “during the marriage she had worked little and then only in a low-income position,” and thus “the conclusion is unavoidable that the money [wife] claims as nonmarital is included in her current asset portfolio and that such should be assigned to her.” Id. at 579.

The argument Wife raises here is functionally identical to the one we accepted in Allen that the Supreme Court in Chenault explicitly refused to adopt. We are “bound by and shall follow applicable precedents established in the opinions of the [Kentucky] Supreme Court and its predecessor court.” Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court (“SCR”) 1.030(8)(a). Therefore, regardless of whatever equitable appeal Wife's argument may have, we cannot accept her argument that she is inherently entitled, without application of tracing principles, to receive the balance in the checking account on the date of marriage as her nonmarital property.

Although the Fifth Third account began as Wife's sole account, it became a commingled joint account after the marriage into which both parties deposited funds and made transactions. Wife was consequently required to trace the nonmarital funds to be entitled to them as her nonmarital property. And Wife here, unlike the wife in Chenault, earned a substantial income and made numerous deposits and withdrawals from the account during the marriage. So did Husband.

Regardless of whether Allen has any remaining precedential value, application of its holding would not entitle Wife to relief because the record contradicts her insistence that the balance in the account during the marriage never went below the amount on deposit on the parties’ wedding date. Husband's exhibit P-6 is a summary of the Fifth Third account during the marriage. Wife stipulated at trial to the accuracy of that summary. Page two of that summary shows that the balance in the account on November 6, 2021, was $6,645.23. Page four of the summary shows that the balance in the account on May 6, 2022, was $3,014.80, and the balance on June 4, 2022, was $5,791.94. Finally, page eight of the summary shows the balance in the account on February 4, 2023, was $5,591.39. All those amounts are less than the roughly $7,300 that Wife claims was the balance on the wedding day, and many are less than the roughly $6,600 Husband claims was on deposit on the wedding day.

In sum, Wife did not adequately trace the $7,300 in the account at the time of the marriage. We discern no error in either of the Family Court's conclusions, albeit sometimes implicit, that the $8,000 that Wife withdrew from the joint checking account after the parties separated was marital money; and it was just to award Husband half of that marital asset. Though our analysis here and on other issues does not strictly follow the rationale employed by the Family Court or the approach recommended by the parties, our Supreme Court has forcefully commanded that “[i]f an appellate court is aware of a reason to affirm the lower court's decision, it must do so, even if on different grounds.” Mark D. Dean, P.S.C. v. Commonwealth Bank & Tr. Co., 434 S.W.3d 489, 496 (Ky. 2014).

G. Wife's Usage of Nonmarital Funds to Pay Husband's Premarital Tax Debt

Wife testified at trial that she expended $7,665 in nonmarital funds from her home equity line of credit (“HELOC”) to help Husband pay his premarital, nonmarital tax debts. Wife asserts that the Family Court erred by failing to address that issue and order her to be reimbursed. Husband does not meaningfully address this issue in his responsive brief. Wife's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law required Husband to reimburse that amount to her. Nonetheless, the Family Court did not address the reimbursement request in its final decision.

We again stress that we are a Court of review, not an initial decisionmaker or factfinder. Klein, 439 S.W.3d at 122; Calhoun, 331 S.W.3d at 245. Thus, we decline to be the first Court to resolve this issue, and we take no position on its proper resolution. Instead, we vacate the Family Court's property disposition in part and remand with instructions for that Trial Court to resolve on the merits Wife's request for reimbursement.

H. Tax Liability for Husband's TSP Withdrawal

Wife asserts that she should only be responsible for paying less than half of the tax liability caused by Husband's TSP withdrawal because Husband used a significant portion of those TSP funds to pay his premarital, nonmarital debts. Husband's response only generically asks us to refrain from disturbing the Family Court's decision.

The Family Court found that “withdrawal from Husband's TSP was part of the parties[’] plan to improve the parties[’] debt to equity ratio and obtain approval for the largest possible loan” to construct their marital home. R. at 167. The combined federal and state taxes owed on Husband's TSP withdrawal exceeded $51,000, plus interest. The Family Court did not find credible Wife's assertion that she “did not know or cooperate in the execution of documents to complete the transaction ․” Id. Thus, the Court held that “[t]o designate the obligation in just proportions, the tax obligation with interest should be the equal responsibility of both parties.” Id. By using “just proportions,” the Family Court implicitly found the tax obligation to be a marital debt. Willis, 362 S.W.3d at 378.

As we have held:

It is vital to understand that unlike marital property there is no presumption that a debt incurred during a marriage is marital or nonmarital in nature. Rather, debts are generally assigned on the basis of such factors as receipt of benefits and extent of participation. Finally, there is no presumption that debts must be divided equally or in the same proportion as the marital property.

Smith, 235 S.W.3d at 15 (internal quotation marks, footnotes, brackets, and citations omitted). See also, e.g., Rice, 336 S.W.3d at 69 (noting the four factors “that give a clear basis for determining the nature of a debt as either marital or nonmarital: (1) Was the debt incurred for the purchase of marital property? (2) Was the debt necessary to maintain and support the family? (3) What was the extent and participation of each party in incurring or benefitting from the debt? and (4) What are the economic circumstances of the parties after divorce to allow for payment of the debt?”).

The parties agree that Husband used a portion of the TSP funds to pay his nonmarital debts. The parties also assent that they wanted to reduce their debts to improve their debt-to-equity ratio to obtain a favorable mortgage to build their dream home. Thus, as the Family Court found, the tax debt from the TSP withdrawal was incurred for the mutual benefit of Husband and Wife to further the construction of their marital residence. Second, the Family Court properly ruled that the debt was necessary to maintain the family to the extent that the debt was incurred for the goal of building a marital residence. Third, the Family Court was permitted to disbelieve Wife's testimony that she was unaware of the large TSP withdrawal. Smith, 235 S.W.3d at 6 (noting that a Trial Court “is unquestionably in the best position to judge the weight and credibility of the evidence”). Thus, the Family Court's conclusion that the TSP withdrawal was a joint decision that benefitted both parties is supported by the evidence in Husband's testimony. Finally, Wife earns a substantial income and has not shown—indeed, does not even argue—that her economic circumstances prevent her from paying half of the tax debt.

It would have been better practice for the Family Court to have explicitly examined the factors for determining whether a debt is marital or nonmarital. However, the record plainly supports the Family Court's conclusion that the tax debt was jointly incurred to further the parties’ joint interest in building a marital residence and thus was a marital debt. We discern no abuse of discretion in the Family Court's decision to assign half of that marital debt to Wife.

I. Miscellaneous Property Division

The Family Court concluded that money from the joint Fifth Third checking account was “used for payment of personal property that benefitted both parties.” R. at 168. The Family Court then stated that “[e]xamples” of those payments were slightly over $19,000 towards Wife's Mercedes and slightly over $20,000 to pay the mortgage for Wife's premarital, nonmarital home. Id. The Family Court also stated that funds from the joint checking account paid debts associated with Husband's premarital property, such as slightly over $28,000 towards a truck and slightly over $3,600 towards a motorcycle. The Family Court also found that the parties paid over $129,000 towards the American Express card “which was the Wife's credit card, which had a significant balance on the date that the parties were married, and continued to have a ․ balance throughout the time the parties were together.” Id. Consequently, the Family Court divided the miscellaneous marital property at issue as follows:

At a minimum, Wife received a benefit of $39,400.09 of payments toward her property, and Husband received a benefit of $31,773.72 toward his. A division of just proportions would be to award the property to the party who holds the title.

R. at 169.

Wife raises several challenges to those findings. Husband simply asserts that the personal property was divided in just proportions without directly addressing Wife's specific arguments.

The only portion of the personal property section of her opening brief for which Wife cites any authority is her argument regarding the dollar-for-dollar credit regarding payments to her nonmarital home. Wife insists that the credit should be applied only to the amount that the payments reduced the principal balance. Wife cites no authority at all in the one paragraph she devotes to personal property in her reply brief.

As we have previously explained, parties shall cite to legal authority for their arguments, and they must sufficiently develop their claims at the Trial Court level to allow us to conduct meaningful appellate review and grant any relief. Schell, 640 S.W.3d at 32. As that did not occur here, we shall thus examine only Wife's argument regarding her nonmarital home as that is the only argument for which she provides precedent. The remainder of Wife's personal property arguments are “threadbare recitals of the elements of a legal theory, supported by mere conclusory statements” which “form an insufficient basis upon which this Court can grant relief.” Jones v. Livesay, 551 S.W.3d 47, 52 (Ky. App. 2018). Accord Schell, 640 S.W.3d at 32.

According to Wife, Gibson v. Gibson, 597 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. App. 1980), and Drake v. Drake, 809 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. App. 1991), make “clear that one is not entitled to reduction dollar for dollar, but rather only to a ‘credit’ equal to the sum that the mortgage payments reduced the principal mortgage indebtedness.” Wife's Opening Brief, p. 12. We discern no such universal rule in those cases.⁷

In Gibson, the husband was required to pay the mortgage on the marital home for the ten, post-divorce years remaining until the parties’ child reached the age of majority. 597 S.W.2d at 623. We recognized that “the equity in the home will be increased by debt reduction ․ during the ten-year period[,] and [the wife] will have made no contribution to this increase.” Id. Thus, we held that when the marital home is sold, the husband must “be reimbursed for any amount that the mortgage payments made by him since the entry of the decree have reduced the principal balance of the indebtedness ․” Id. We perceived Drake to have “nearly identical” facts to Gibson. Drake, 809 S.W.2d at 712.

But Gibson and Drake each involved materially distinguishable facts from those present in the case at hand. Obviously, the mortgage payments made by the husbands in Gibson and Drake were nonmarital because they were made after the parties had divorced. On the contrary here, neither Wife nor Husband was required to make post-dissolution payments towards Wife's premarital home.

The Family Court was not required to divide the marital assets equally; instead, the Family Court was only required to divide those assets in just proportions. Smith, 235 S.W.3d at 6. Wife has not shown that the Family Court abused its “wide discretion in dividing marital property” regarding the miscellaneous property mentioned in Wife's briefs. Id.

J. Attorney's Fees

In April 2024, Wife filed what she styled as an emergency motion, pertaining to Husband's alleged failure to meet his discovery obligations. Wife requested $3,000 in attorney's fees purportedly incurred in filing the motion. The source of that figure is unclear as there is no affidavit from her counsel detailing the time spent on the motion or the hourly rate. At trial, Wife testified that she believed that she was entitled to fees due to dilatory or insufficient discovery responses by Husband. Wife's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law required Husband to reimburse Wife for the fees allegedly incurred. However, the Family Court's final decision did not address that request.

We must agree with Wife that the Family Court erred by not explicitly resolving this dispute. Once again, we are not finders of fact or initial decisionmakers, and we thus decline to be the first Court to resolve this fee request. Klein, 439 S.W.3d at 122; Calhoun, 331 S.W.3d at 245. Considering that the requested attorney's fees are based on alleged discovery violations by Husband requiring the filing of an emergency motion, we believe that the Family Court—which supervised and managed pretrial discovery—must be the first court to address the fee request. Consequently, we must vacate the final judgment and remand with instructions to resolve Wife's request for $3,000 in attorney fees.

K. Propriety of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Wife alleges that the Family Court merely adopted the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by Husband. We disagree.

As we recently explained, “[w]hile it is true that courts should engage in independent fact-finding, the mere adoption of one party's proposed findings does not constitute reversible error, unless it is shown that the court failed to exercise independent judgment.” Basham v. Basham, 710 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. App. 2025). To determine whether a Family Court has exercised independent judgment, we may undertake “[a] side-by-side comparison” of the party's proposed decision and the decision issued by the Trial Court. Id.

Here, the Family Court's decision is quite similar to Husband's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, a comparison of the two shows that the Family Court exercised its own independent judgment by making several changes to Husband's tendered decision.

In just the first few pages, the Family Court made at least three significant changes to Husband's proposed findings and conclusions. The Family Court added both an introductory paragraph and finding of fact six, which states that no children were born of the parties’ marriage. The Family Court also substantially reworded the language in Husband's proposed judgment listing the issues that needed to be addressed. We need not scrutinize the proposed judgment and the issued judgment further ⁸ or list additional examples of changes made by the Family Court because it is plain that the Family Court did not merely reflexively adopt Husband's proposed judgment.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the final judgment of the Campbell Family Court is affirmed as to:

1. Awarding the Bar to Husband as his nonmarital property; and

2. Equally dividing as marital property the $8,000 in the joint checking account that Wife withdrew soon after the parties separated; and

3. Equally dividing the tax liability for Husband's TSP withdrawal; and

4. Dividing in just proportions the miscellaneous personal property discussed in Wife's briefs; and

5. Modeling, but not unthinkingly adopting, the final judgment on Husband's proposed judgment.

The Campbell Family Court's final judgment is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings as to:

1. The allocation and division of the proceeds from selling the marital property and residence. On remand, the Family Court must use tracing principles to determine the nonmarital interest that each party has in the sales proceeds of the barndominium, if any. Then, the Family Court must divide the remainder, if any, in just proportions as a marital asset; and

2. Wife's claim that she expended $7,665 in nonmarital funds from her home equity line of credit to help Husband pay his premarital, nonmarital tax debt. On remand, the Court must determine if Wife presented sufficient evidence to show that she should be reimbursed for expending her nonmarital funds to help alleviate Husband's nonmarital tax debt; and

3. Wife's claim for attorney's fees allegedly incurred in bringing an emergency discovery motion. On remand, the Court must determine if Wife is entitled to fees and, if so, the proper amount thereof.

The Family Court retains the discretion on remand to choose whether to allow the parties to introduce additional evidence or make additional written arguments.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Kentucky Appellate Courts have occasionally stated that determining whether an item is marital or nonmarital is “left to the sound discretion of the trial court ․” Rice v. Rice, 336 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Ky. 2011). However, the predominant view is that an appellate court should utilize the two-tiered inquiry in Smith. See, e.g., Normandin v. Normandin, 634 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Ky. 2020), as modified on denial of rehearing (Apr. 29, 2021).

2.   We perceive that Wife is not directly arguing that either the distribution or the Bar's profit in 2022 was marital property or that marital funds were used to reduce the Bar's debt in 2022. Husband testified that the Bar's expenses and mortgage were paid from the Bar's checking account to which Wife did not have access.

3.   Wife included in her proposed findings of fact Husband's statement about the Bar being “our bar.” However, the Family Court did not address this claim in its final decision. Wife did not ask the Family Court to make additional findings. “It is the duty of one who moves the trial court for relief to insist upon a ruling, and a failure to do so is regarded as a waiver.” Dillard v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 366, 371 (Ky. 1999). Even if we leniently address the issue on the merits, Wife has not shown an entitlement to relief because the facts here are plainly, materially distinguishable from Barber.

4.   Wife's brief is only 16 substantive pages long. Under RAP 31(G)(2), a computer-generated brief “shall not exceed 8,750 words or 20 pages ․” Even accounting for the word limit, Wife had approximately four additional pages that she could have used to flesh out her allegations.

5.   Husband testified that he had borrowed $20,000 from his mother to help buy the Bar but he repaid her twice that amount. Husband clarified that the loan itself had been paid off prior to the marriage.

6.   We have noted that in Chenault our Supreme Court questioned the holding in Allen but did not explicitly overrule Allen. See Mattingly v. Fidanza, 411 S.W.3d 250, 256-57 (Ky. App. 2013). Other times, we recognized that the “validity” of Allen’s holding is “in doubt” after Chenault. Kleet v. Kleet, 264 S.W.3d 610, 616 (Ky. App. 2007). We need not determine whether Allen retained any precedential effect after Chenault because, as we shall show, the balance in the account at issue sometimes fell below what it was when the parties married.

7.   Because the matter may be adequately resolved by published precedent, we decline to address the unpublished opinions cited by the parties.

8.   “We have considered the parties’ extensive arguments and citations to authority but will discuss only the arguments and cited authorities we deem most pertinent, the remainder being without merit, irrelevant, or redundant.” Schell, 640 S.W.3d at 29 n.1.

ECKERLE, JUDGE:

ALL CONCUR.