State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Larry Ingram, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Larry Ingram appeals his convictions of reckless second-degree murder and violating a protective order following a jury trial. Ingram claims: (1) The district court erred in denying a motion for mistrial; (2) the district court erred in denying a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986); (3) the district court committed instructional error; and (4) he was denied a fair trial based on cumulative error. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments, we find no reversible error and affirm the district court's judgment.

Factual and procedural background

In the early morning hours of December 21, 2023, Ingram called 911 to report that his “wife,” who he identified as D.I., had been shot in their apartment, though he declined to identify the shooter. Police officers and emergency medical services responded to find Ingram performing CPR on D.I. in the hallway of their apartment. Ingram pointed out a handgun laying in the open. Ingram told officers that he awoke to a loud noise in his apartment. He stated that he called out to D.I., who did not respond, and then D.I. walked around the corner and scared him, so he mistakenly shot her. Ingram and D.I. had a child, who was also in the apartment at the time of the shooting.

Later that morning, Ingram interviewed with Steven Jerrell, a sergeant with the Wichita Police Department. Ingram explained that he and D.I. were not formally married, but asserted, “She's my wife.” Ingram explained in more detail a similar version of events that he awoke to a noise, called for D.I., received no response, saw a figure around the corner, shot the figure with a handgun, and then realized he had shot D.I.

On December 27, 2023, the State charged Ingram with reckless second-degree murder and violation of a protective order. The first count was charged as a domestic violence offense. The second count alleged that Ingram's contact with D.I. violated a no-contact order issued as a condition of Ingram's pretrial release in another case.

The case proceeded to trial on January 21, 2025. During jury selection, Ingram lodged a Batson challenge on the grounds that the State struck “the only three identifiable people of color on the jury out of 31.” The State responded that one prospective juror was stricken for sleeping during jury selection and rating the criminal justice system low. The State stuck another for having children and grandchildren in prison for murder, and the prosecutor indicated that another white juror was stricken for the same reason. The State struck a third juror because he was the sole provider for his family, so serving on a jury would present a financial hardship, and the State again indicated that it struck a different white juror for the same reason. The district court asked for Ingram's response, which was, “While I appreciate the analogies to the strikes of people who are not people of color, I think that my reasons stand.” The district court found no discriminatory intent in the State's reasons for striking the jurors. The district court asked if either side wanted to make any further record on the Batson issue. The parties responded that they did not have additional argument, and the district court allowed the State's peremptory strikes to stand.

The trial proceeded to opening statements where the prosecutor, while discussing D.I.’s relation to Ingram, mentioned, “She was also [Ingram's] stepdaughter.” Ingram objected and, after an off-the-record discussion, the district court overruled it. During a later break and outside the jury's presence, the district court addressed the objection on the record. The district court explained that it had overruled the objection because the reference did not violate any order in limine and because a stepparent relationship was one way to prove an element for a domestic violence offense.

Among the State's witnesses was Lauren Aldendifer, a crime scene investigator for the Wichita Police Department. She testified in part that upon arriving at the crime scene, “I was told that the—it was a common-law marriage and the female was also a stepdaughter.” Defense counsel raised a hearsay objection which the district court sustained. Aldendifer's testimony quickly shifted into other topics. Later, during Jerrell's testimony, the prosecutor asked, “Okay. Well, I mean, at some point did you confirm that [D.I.] was also [Ingram's] stepdaughter?” Jerrell responded, “Had been, yes.” There was no objection to this testimony. Jerrell's testimony diverted to other subjects.

The next morning before the jury was called in, Ingram moved for a mistrial on the grounds that Ingram and D.I.’s mother had divorced in 2020, so Ingram argued the divorce terminated the stepparent relationship that Ingram had with D.I. Because the domestic violence offense statute did not list former stepparents or stepchildren, Ingram argued that his status as a former stepparent was irrelevant to the trial. Ingram made no direct argument as to how the reference to his status as a stepparent or former stepparent resulted in injustice or prejudice. The State responded by questioning whether divorce terminated a stepparent relationship. The district court considered various interpretations of how stepparents are treated in “the family law code” and found that because former stepparents have been interpreted to be stepparents in at least one other statute, former stepparents should apply as stepparents to the domestic violence offense statute. The district court also found that there were other ways for the State to prove the domestic violence offense, that the mention of the relationship was not voluminous, that the relationship would not distract the jurors from whether the shooting was mistaken self-defense or reckless murder, and that the risk of prejudice did not rise to the level of a mistrial. Thus, the district court denied Ingram's motion for mistrial.

Ingram did not contest that he shot D.I., and the trial turned on whether Ingram had done so in self-defense or recklessly to support reckless second-degree murder. The State presented evidence of an order of protection and the parties stipulated that D.I. was an endorsed witness by the State in another of Ingram's criminal cases. Ingram called a single witness solely to introduce body cam footage primarily of him speaking while emotional to police officers outside his apartment, which he argued in closing showed trauma and his “raw” and “real” mental state. Ingram also offered into evidence a snippet of a recorded interview showing him emotional when told that D.I. died from her injury.

Ingram objected to the verdict form listing guilty as the first option above not guilty. The district court denied the objection. The jury found Ingram guilty of both counts and found that the reckless second-degree murder count was an act of domestic violence. The district court sentenced Ingram to a controlling term of 493 months’ imprisonment with 36 months postrelease supervision to run consecutive to his sentence in another case. Ingram timely appealed the district court's judgment.

Did the district court err in denying Ingram's motion for mistrial?

Ingram first claims the district court erred in denying his motion for mistrial under K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c) because evidence or statements of his relationship as a stepfather had no probative value and were overly prejudicial. The State contends the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ingram's motion for mistrial because the evidence of Ingram's relationship to D.I. as a stepfather was relevant and not unduly prejudicial.

In State v. Brown, 322 Kan. ___, 595 P.3d 144 (2026), our Supreme Court changed how this court should review the district court's decision to deny a motion for mistrial. The court disapproved of the “ ‘fundamental failure in the proceedings’ ” language from prior opinions and instead focused on the language of K.S.A. 22-3423(1) where the term “fundamental failure” does not appear. 595 P.3d at 154. Based on the statutory language, the court articulated the new standard of appellate review:

“When considering a challenge to a district court's ruling on a motion for mistrial pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c), an appellate court considers the record as a whole and reviews the district court's determinations of (1) whether prejudicial conduct occurred, and (2) whether curative measures mitigated the prejudice—i.e., rendered it harmless—for abuse of discretion.” Brown, 322 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 1.

The burden is on the defendant to show the first factor, and the State carries the burden on the second factor. 595 P.3d at 156-57. This court reviews the district court's decision on both factors for an abuse of discretion. 595 P.3d at 157. A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State v. Younger, 320 Kan. 98, 137-38, 564 P.3d 744 (2025).

K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c) provides that the trial court may terminate a trial and order a mistrial when it finds that termination is necessary because “prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to either the defendant or the prosecution.” The parties disputed below whether Ingram was D.I.’s stepparent or a former stepparent after his divorce from D.I.’s mother and whether a former stepparent was included in the statutory definition of a family or household member for purposes of a domestic violence finding. Under K.S.A. 21-5111(i)(2), a “family or household member” includes persons 18 years of age or older who are “parents or stepparents and children or stepchildren.” The district court found that even a former stepparent should be encompassed in the statute based on how former stepparents are encompassed in a visitation statute in the family law code.

Ingram no longer argues on appeal that the stepparent/stepchild portion of K.S.A. 21-5111(i)(2) does not apply simply because he divorced D.I.’s mother before the shooting. That argument has been waived and abandoned. State v. Davis, 313 Kan. 244, 248, 485 P.3d 174 (2021). More important to the mistrial analysis is that the district court also found that references to the stepparent relationship were not voluminous, the jurors would not be confused as they considered the issue of Ingram's mental state, and, while there was potential for prejudice, it did not rise to the level of warranting a mistrial. In other words, the district court found that, consistent with K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c), no prejudicial conduct occurred that made it impossible to proceed without injustice.

Ingram cites two cases to support his claim that reference to his status as a stepparent was so prejudicial that it warranted a mistrial. In State v. Maybin, 27 Kan. App. 2d 189, 197-200, 2 P.3d 179 (2000), this court found that the prosecutor calling Maybin a “predator” during closing argument was prosecutorial error, but not reversible. In State v. Trotter, No. 120,158, 2022 WL 2112212, at *11-13 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion), this court found prosecutorial error in closing argument with statements that Trotter was not a hero and was not “blessed” by the laws of Kansas to take a life in self-defense because those statements elevated the standard for self-defense into requiring a heroic or righteous person. Ingram claims that reference to his status as a stepparent or former stepparent is akin to these cases. But both cases are distinguishable. First, neither case considered the statements in the context of a motion for mistrial, so they are legally distinguishable. Maybin, 27 Kan. App. 2d at 197-200; Trotter, 2022 WL 2112212, at *10-14. And in neither case did this court find that the inappropriate statements alone were reversible error. Maybin, 27 Kan. App. 2d at 197-200; Trotter, 2022 WL 2112212, at *14-15. The statements in Trotter are also distinguishable in that they were problematic for improperly raising the bar on the burden of proof for self-defense. Ingram's status as a stepparent has no similar effect.

The main fact issue for the jury to resolve at Ingram's trial was whether he killed D.I. unintentionally but recklessly under circumstances that showed extreme indifference to the value of human life or whether the shooting was justified as self-defense or defense of another. The references to Ingram as D.I.’s stepparent or former stepparent were not so prejudicial that it prevented the jury from fairly and impartially deciding the facts. As the district court found, the references to that relationship were not voluminous. The jury heard no statement or evidence about any details of the relationship beyond its possible existence. Ingram fails to show that the references amounted to prejudicial conduct making it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to either party. Thus, he fails to show the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

Did the district court err in denying Ingram's Batson challenge?

Next, Ingram claims the district court erred in denying his Batson challenge as the State used three of its peremptory challenges to strike the only three jurors of color from the panel. The State responds that Ingram's arguments on the district court's Batson ruling are not properly before this court, and, in any event, fail on the merits.

A challenge to the State's use of peremptory strikes under Batson is a three-step process. State v. Peters, 319 Kan. 492, 507, 555 P.3d 1134 (2024). First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecution's preemptory strike was based on race. This court has unlimited review over this step. At the second step, the State must produce a facially valid, neutral, and nondiscriminatory explanation for the challenged preemptory strike. This court gives great deference to the district court's factual findings at this step but reviews de novo whether the State's explanation is race neutral. The burden shifts again at the third step, and the defendant must show that the State's explanation is pretextual. The district court assesses this step in light of all the evidence, and this court reviews that decision for an abuse of discretion. 319 Kan. at 507.

Ingram does not challenge the district court's findings on the first two steps in the Batson analysis. Any such arguments have been waived and abandoned. Davis, 313 Kan. at 248. Ingram focuses on the third step of the analysis and presents a side-by-side comparison of voir-dire responses from various jurors to try to show that the State's race neutral explanations of its preemptory strikes were pretextual. Ingram tries to show that the district court abused its discretion in assessing the third step of the Batson analysis.

The State points out that Ingram is making his argument under the third step of the Batson analysis for the first time on appeal. The State claims this precludes review of those new arguments on appeal. Ingram presented no meaningful argument on the third step to the district court. When asked for his response to the State's proffer of race-neutral explanations, Ingram's counsel responded, “While I appreciate the analogies to the strikes of people who are not people of color, I think that my reasons stand.” The district court offered a second time if either party wanted to make any additional record on the Batson issue. Ingram affirmatively responded that he did not have additional argument.

This case is similar to Peters. Peters appealed the district court's denial of a Batson challenge. In arguing pretext at the third step in district court, Peters offered a brief and generalized claim that the strikes were pretextual without any statistical analysis or side-by-side comparisons of juror responses in voir dire. On appeal, Peters offered for the first time a statistical analysis on the third Batson step which included a side-by-side analysis of voir dire responses. Our Supreme Court declined to review Peters’ new arguments made for the first time on appeal based on its longstanding precedent that the failure to raise arguments on the third Batson step precludes review on appeal. 319 Kan. at 511-12. The rationale behind that rule is that the defendant bears the burden in district court to show pretext at the third step; thus, Peters could not show an abuse of discretion on appeal through a statistical analysis he never asked the district court to undertake when it was his burden to do so. 319 Kan. at 511-12. As a result, the Peters court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Batson challenge. 319 Kan. at 512.

Ingram's case parallels Peters in that he essentially made no argument on pretext below and tries for the first time on appeal to offer a side-by-side comparison of voir dire responses. Under the rule in Peters and earlier Kansas cases, Ingram's failure to bring his facts or analysis to the district court's attention precludes review. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 314 Kan. 292, 304, 498 P.3d 167 (2021) (citing with approval the decision in State v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 309 Kan. 113, 128, 431 P.3d 850 [2018] that “the defendant's failure to raise [arguments on the third Batson step] in the district court precluded the appellate court from considering them for the first time on appeal”).

Ingram replies that the rule in Peters and its progeny are wrongly decided and contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. Ingram relies heavily on Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 n.2, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 162 L. Ed. 196 (2005). In a habeas corpus proceeding, the majority considered a Batson challenge and whether it should review side-by-side comparisons of voir dire responses when those arguments were not made before the state courts in Texas. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241 n.2. The majority decided it should review the comparisons because, while normally the court would assess state court fact findings only in the light of evidence actually presented, state court fact-findings in habeas corpus proceedings were to be reviewed in light of the entire record. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241 n.2. Miller-El does not help Ingram because of the critical importance of the habeas corpus posture in the Court's decision to review side-by-side Batson comparisons that had not been raised in the state court proceedings.

Ingram also relies on Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 170 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2008). The Snyder Court also conducted a side-by-side comparison of juror responses in voir dire not made in the Louisiana lower courts but did so in part because “The Louisiana Supreme Court did not hold that petitioner had procedurally defaulted reliance on a comparison of the African-American jurors whom the prosecution struck with white jurors whom the prosecution accepted.” 552 U.S. at 483 n.2. That implies that had the Louisiana courts applied such a procedural bar as does Kansas through cases like Peters, the result would have been different. Snyder is distinguishable from Peters.

Finally, we acknowledge the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Pitchford v. Cain, 608 U.S. 391, 146 S. Ct. 1345, 225 L. Ed. 2d 11 (2026). The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that Pitchford had waived the third step of his Batson objection by not arguing below that the State's race-neutral reasons for striking jurors were pretextual. 608 U.S. at 397-98. The Pitchford Court disagreed, but it did so because the record showed that Pitchford had tried to make arguments on the third step that the trial court repeatedly shut down, effectively precluding Pitchford's ability to preserve that portion of his claim. 608 U.S. at 397-401. Ingram was twice offered the opportunity to make an argument or record on the third step of his Batson challenge. The first time, he stood on his previous general argument that the State's strikes were racially motivated because the State struck all three jurors of color. The second time, Ingram affirmatively declined the district court's offer. Pitchford is distinguishable from Ingram's case.

Kansas law remains clear that when a defendant fails to argue the third step of the Batson analysis in district court, when given the chance to do so, the defendant waives argument on the third step and cannot make the argument for the first time on appeal. Peters, 319 Kan. at 511-12; Brown, 314 Kan. at 304; Gonzalez-Sandoval, 309 Kan. at 128. This court must follow binding precedent from the Kansas Supreme Court absent an indication that the court intends to depart from its precedent. State v. Patton, 315 Kan. 1, 16, 503 P.3d 1022 (2022). We have no such indication here. The cases from the United States Supreme Court addressing this issue are distinguishable from Ingram's case. Thus, we conclude Ingram has waived his argument under the third step of the Batson analysis which he is making for the first time on appeal. We cannot review whether the district court abused its discretion in finding the State's race-neutral reasons for striking jurors was not pretextual when Ingram offered no argument on the point at trial.

Finally, Ingram seems to make a separate argument that “[s]triking 100% of the jurors of color violates Batson“ and that we should make this determination without engaging in the three-step analysis required by Batson. While that showing might satisfy the first step of the Batson analysis, Ingram provides no case supporting the proposition that such a showing alone negates the need to proceed through the second and third steps. Ingram shows no error in the district court's Batson analysis. Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ingram's Batson challenge.

Did the district court commit instructional error?

Next, Ingram claims the district court erred by listing the option for a guilty finding on the verdict form before the option for a not guilty finding, violating his right to the presumption of innocence. The State contends we must follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent and reject Ingram's challenge to the verdict form.

“When analyzing jury instructions, appellate courts follow a three-step process: (1) determine whether the appellate court can or should review the issue, in other words, whether there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue for appeal; (2) consider the merits of the claim to determine whether error occurred below; and (3) assess whether the error requires reversal—in other words, whether the error can be deemed harmless.” State v. Hollins, 320 Kan. 240, 242, 564 P.3d 778 (2025).

Our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected similar arguments on the order of the options in verdict forms. See, e.g., State v. Dotson, 319 Kan. 32, 52, 551 P.3d 1272 (2024) (finding verdict form that lists “guilty” first is not legally erroneous). The Dotson court noted the defendant made no showing that the order in which the verdict form presents the options has any bearing on the likelihood of a jury reaching one verdict or the other. 319 Kan. at 52. Ingram cites research studies that purport to show that test subjects, when given two options to choose from, tend to disproportionately choose the first option. But Ingram acknowledges that this court has already considered and rejected much of his cited research in State v. Grant, No. 122,307, 2021 WL 1228123, at *2 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion). Indeed, in Grant this court found that unlike blind test subjects, “jurors are not required to immediately choose between two alternatives they have not confronted before․ [J]urors are acutely aware that ultimately, after hearing all the evidence, arguments, and instructions on the law, they will be called upon to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence.” 2021 WL 1228123, at *2. Thus, we conclude the district court committed no error in Ingram's verdict form.

Did cumulative errors deprive Ingram of a fair trial?

Finally, Ingram claims he was denied a fair trial based on cumulative error. This court reviews de novo whether Ingram was denied a fair trial due to cumulative error. State v. Rhoiney, 314 Kan. 497, 505, 501 P.3d 368 (2021). The cumulative error doctrine does not apply if there are no errors or only a single error. State v. Johnson, 321 Kan. 357, 371, 580 P.3d 20 (2025). Because Ingram fails to show the district court committed any error, the cumulative error doctrine cannot apply. 321 Kan. at 371.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: