State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Gareth D. Wiebe, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gareth D. Wiebe appeals his convictions for aggravated assault and criminal threat following a jury trial in Sedgwick County District Court. Finding no errors requiring reversal, we affirm Wiebe's convictions.

Factual and Procedural History

Charges in this case arose out of confrontations between Wiebe, his family members, his landlord, and the landlord's wife that occurred on March 27, 2023, at the rental property where Wiebe had been residing in Wichita. Wiebe's landlord, Paul Zimmerman, had brought eviction proceedings against Wiebe in Sedgwick County District Court earlier in March. On March 22, 2023, following a hearing, Zimmerman received an order from the court granting him possession of the residence and evicting Wiebe. Wiebe was present in the district court when the order of eviction was entered against him and registered no objection to the proceedings. Court records show that the writ of execution on the rental property was executed by a sheriff's deputy, the premises were vacated, and possession of the property was restored to Zimmerman on March 27, 2023.

At Wiebe's jury trial, Zimmerman testified that on March 27, 2023, he met a sheriff's deputy at the residence to complete the eviction. Zimmerman was accompanied by his wife, Wiebe's father Dwight Wiebe (Dwight), Wiebe's stepmother Sally Jo, and Wiebe's brother Matt Percell. The deputy entered the residence and found no one present. The deputy left after Zimmerman confirmed there was no need for the deputy to stay. Zimmerman then began changing the locks to the residence.

Shortly thereafter, Zimmerman heard Percell cry out, “Oh, God, here he comes.” Zimmerman heard Wiebe enter the residence and begin yelling at his father. Zimmerman and those he came with went outside to the front of the residence. Shortly thereafter, Wiebe came running out the front door with a knife and yelling. Zimmerman was by his truck when Wiebe came toward him with the knife saying, “I'm going to kill you, [Zimmerman].” Wiebe came up to a chain link fence which was about 4 feet away from where Zimmerman stood. At trial, Zimmerman testified that he was scared by Wiebe's threat.

Wiebe then went back inside the residence and when he came back outside, he was no longer carrying a knife. Wiebe continued to yell, saying things like, “get the fuck out of here,” “[g]et out of my fucking house,” and “I don't care. I'm not going to leave.” Wiebe spit and blew snot on the vehicles. Zimmerman testified that Wiebe then left.

The testimony of Wiebe's brother, Matt Percell, closely mirrored that of Zimmerman. Specifically, he confirmed that when Wiebe arrived back at the rental unit and came outside, he yelled, “[G]et out of my house. I'll kill you.” Percell was unsure where Wiebe's father, Dwight, had been but did observe Dwight follow Wiebe inside the home and attempt to calm him down. Percell told Zimmerman and Zimmerman's wife to get in their truck. He then grabbed Dwight and backed out of the home. Percell testified he was trying to get space between Wiebe and the others. Percell saw Wiebe exit the house with a knife saying that he will kill them all. He also verified that Wiebe went back inside the home and came out without the knife. Wiebe continued to yell and cuss and then spit and blew snot on both cars.

According to Percell, Dwight and Sally Jo were inside their car, and Zimmerman was inside his truck, but Zimmerman's wife was frozen and still outside the Zimmerman vehicle. Percell went to help Zimmerman's wife as Wiebe ran toward Zimmerman's truck. Percell stated he stepped between Wiebe and Zimmerman's wife. As Percell and Wiebe were face to face, Wiebe continued to yell. Percell stated that once he heard sirens, Wiebe hit Percell in the shoulder and ran away. Percell testified that he felt scared when Wiebe was threatening them: “I was scared of getting stabbed.”

The testimony of Wiebe's father, Dwight, closely matched the versions of the State's other trial witnesses. He accompanied Zimmerman to Wiebe's residence on March 27. Wiebe was not there and Dwight went outside to his truck. When Wiebe arrived back and brandished the knife, Dwight testified that “I was fearful that I might be stabbed.” Dwight testified that “[Wiebe] just kept repeating in an agitated nature, get out, get out. This is my house. Leave, leave.”

Wichita Police Officer Jose Navarro was dispatched to the scene as a disturbance with a weapon. After arriving, he spoke with Zimmerman, who explained the situation. Officer Navarro found two knives in the house, including one matching Zimmerman's description of the weapon Wiebe had brandished.

Another Wichita Police Officer, Megan Mellard, testified that she was in the area and observed a person matching Wiebe's description running from the scene. She ordered Wiebe to stop, but he ran away from her. Wiebe finally stopped but did not comply with Officer Mellard's orders when she apprehended him. Officer Mellard tased Wiebe three times before another officer was able to handcuff him.

When interviewed by police, Wiebe denied ever threatening anyone with a knife. He also denied intentionally making it more difficult for officers to carry out their duties. Wiebe stated he has been diagnosed with paranoia schizophrenia disorder.

At trial Wiebe testified in his own defense. He told the jury that on March 27, he walked home. When he arrived home, his cat was gone. He stated Paul Zimmerman, Ron Zimmerman, Percell, and Dwight arrived and Wiebe let them into the home. Ron and Paul Zimmerman then began changing the locks. Dwight began talking to him, but Wiebe yelled at him to get out of the house. Wiebe testified that police were called, he heard sirens, and he then left to get out of the situation.

Additionally, Wiebe testified that Zimmerman was not technically his landlord. Wiebe admitted he attended the eviction hearing and knew the eviction was coming. However, Wiebe testified that it was an illegal eviction.

After the parties rested and the jury left the courtroom, the district court began reviewing the jury instructions with the parties. Jury instruction No. 6 gave the elements for Count 3, criminal threat. Neither party objected to the instruction. Jury instruction No. 6, as given to the jury, stated:

“The defendant is charged in Count 3 with criminal threat. The defendant pleads not guilty. To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:

“One, the defendant threatened to commit violence and communicated the threat with the intent to place another in fear.

“Two, this act occurred on or about the 27th day of March 2023, in Sedgwick County, Kansas. The term threat includes any statement made by the defendant that he has already committed that act.

․

“The State must prove that the defendant committed the crime of criminal threat intentionally. A defendant acts intentionally when it is the defendant's conscious objective or desire to do the act complained about by the State.”

Jury instruction No. 9 was for intent knowingly. Neither party objected to the instruction. Jury instruction No. 9, as given to the jury, stated: “If the State has proved that the defendant acted intentionally, then the State has proved as well that the defendant acted knowingly. If the State has proved that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly, then the State has proved as well that the defendant acted recklessly.”

During deliberations, the jury submitted two questions to the court. The jury requested a read back of Wiebe's testimony, which the court reporter prepared. The jury also submitted the question: “[P]lease define defendant's conscious objective or desire, Instruction Number 6, last paragraph.” The parties agreed to respond advising the jury to refer to instructions 6 and 9, but without further definition of the terms “conscious objective or desire.”

The jury found Wiebe guilty of aggravated assault against Dwight and criminal threat, but not guilty of aggravated assault against Percell and interference with law enforcement.

After the jury rendered its verdicts, the district court judge asked the parties if aggravated assault, use of a deadly weapon as a domestic violence offense, is a registrable offense. Wiebe argued against registering due to his mental condition and that it would not help the public. The State argued that the order to register is mandatory upon conviction, citing to K.S.A. 22-4902 and K.S.A. 22-4904. The district court then stated, “Mr. Wiebe, you have been convicted or adjudicated of an offense requiring registration as provided by the Kansas Offender Registration Act.”

At Wiebe's sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a total controlling sentence of 24 months’ prison followed by 12 months of postrelease supervision. The court then granted Wiebe 24 months of probation. It also ordered Wiebe to continue complying with the violent offender registration requirement. The district court's journal entry of sentencing included a finding that Wiebe had to register as a violent offender because Wiebe was convicted of committing a person felony with a deadly weapon. Wiebe has timely appealed from his convictions and sentences.

Analysis

The district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on a defense of a dwelling.

Wiebe first argues that the district court erred when it did not instruct the jury on the defense of a dwelling. But he admits no proffer or objection to its absence was made in district court regarding a defense of dwelling jury instruction.

“When analyzing jury instructions, appellate courts follow a three-step process: (1) determine whether the appellate court can or should review the issue, in other words, whether there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue for appeal; (2) consider the merits of the claim to determine whether error occurred below; and (3) assess whether the error requires reversal—in other words, whether the error can be deemed harmless.” State v. Hollins, 320 Kan. 240, 242, 564 P.3d 778 (2025).

See K.S.A. 22-3414(3) (“No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction ․ unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict ․ unless the instruction or the failure to give an instruction is clearly erroneous.”). Because Wiebe did not speak to a defense of a dwelling before the district court, we apply the “clearly erroneous” standard in this case.

“At the second step, appellate courts consider whether the instruction was legally and factually appropriate, using an unlimited standard of review of the entire record.” Hollins, 320 Kan. at 242. In determining whether an instruction was factually appropriate, courts must determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction. See State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 727, 559 P.3d 792 (2024).

The statute embodying the defense of defense of a dwelling is K.S.A. 21-5223(a). It states:

“A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that it appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such use of force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon such person's dwelling, place of work or occupied vehicle.” K.S.A. 21-5223(a).

A person is presumed to have a reasonable belief that deadly force is necessary if he or she has reason to believe the person against whom force is used is unlawfully entering or present within the dwelling. K.S.A. 21-5224(a). This presumption, however, does not apply if the person against whom force is used is lawfully present in the dwelling. K.S.A. 21-5224(b)(1).

Our assessment as to whether a defense of dwelling instruction was legally appropriate requires use of a different and more complex analysis than determining the factual appropriateness of such an instruction in this case. For a legal analysis, the test is whether the charged crimes included an element of force that could be legally justified. The bottom-line inquiry is whether any of the elements of the crimes in this case could have been negated by a defense of dwelling instruction.

In Wiebe's case, the charged crimes for which he was convicted were aggravated assault and criminal threat. The State's theory of aggravated assault required proof that Wiebe placed his father, Dwight, in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm by using a deadly weapon. As our Supreme Court noted in State v. Milo, 315 Kan. 434, 444, 510 P.3d 1 (2022), “some crimes contain an element—the use of force—which may be negated by a proper claim of self-defense.” And “nothing in the crime of aggravated assault ․ is inherently inconsistent with use of lawful force.” State v. Waldschmidt, 318 Kan. 633, 647, 546 P.3d 716 (2024) (citing to State v. Holley, 315 Kan. 512, 519, 509 P.3d 542 [2022]). Thus, a defense of dwelling instruction would have been legally appropriate for the crime of aggravated assault.

Likewise, we believe a defense of dwelling instruction would have been legally appropriate for the charge of criminal threat against Wiebe. Kansas’ criminal threat statute, K.S.A. 21-5415(a)(1) requires a threat to “[c]ommit violence communicated with intent to place another in fear.” Under K.S.A. 21-5221(a)(1)(A), “ ‘[u]se of force’ ” includes “[w]ords or actions that reasonably convey the threat of force, including threats to cause death or great bodily harm to a person.” A reasonable conclusion from the language of these two statutes is that the spoken words and physical actions of Wiebe at the apartment could constitute the “threat of force” which is the gravamen of the criminal threat statute. So Wiebe's words that he would “kill them all” who were in or entering his apartment if they did not leave would be a legally appropriate defense to the criminal threat charge.

But the factual appropriateness of a defense of dwelling instruction in this case is an entirely different matter. Several appellate cases in Kansas are helpful in illuminating the contours of a factual appropriateness inquiry.

In State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 286 P.3d 195 (2012), the Kansas Supreme Court considered whether a defense of dwelling instruction was factually appropriate. Kelly and her boyfriend had been staying at Williams’ residence for three days. Williams then told the couple to leave her residence. This led to a physical altercation between Williams and Kelly. The scuffle ended after Williams used a knife within her home to stab Kelly in the head. A jury found Williams guilty of aggravated battery.

On appeal, Williams argued the district court should have instructed the jury on defense of a dwelling, despite his making no request for the instruction. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the defense of a dwelling jury instruction was not factually appropriate. The court found that neither Williams nor the dwelling was under attack. The fact that Kelly had permission to be in the dwelling, and was being asked to leave, did not automatically make Kelly a trespasser. Thus, our Supreme Court held that the district court's failure to give a defense of dwelling jury instruction was not clearly erroneous. 295 Kan. at 519-20.

Other panels of our court have also found that when a victim has a lawful right to be in the dwelling, the defense of a dwelling instruction is not factually appropriate. In State v. Henderson, No. 100,932, 2010 WL 1873311, at *4-5 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion), the panel declined to reverse the district court's denial of a jury instruction on defense of a dwelling since the victim was lawfully on the property. The panel stated this denial still allowed Henderson to pursue other available defense theories such as self-defense. 2010 WL 1873311, at *4-5.

In State v. Ulmer, No. 114,315, 2016 WL 7428362 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion), the victim was allowed inside the home by Ulmer's roommate and did not attack the dwelling or any person before Ulmer initiated physical contact. The panel held a defense of a dwelling jury instruction was not sufficiently supported by the evidence. 2016 WL 7428362, at *5-7.

In Wiebe's case, we find that the defense of dwelling instruction was not factually appropriate for two reasons. First, Dwight and Percell, the victims alleged in the aggravated assault and criminal threat charges, were lawfully in the dwelling. The district court ordered possession of the property to be restored to Zimmerman four days earlier at the eviction hearing. According to the testimony of Zimmerman, Percell, and Dwight, on March 27, Zimmerman had permitted the others to accompany him to the residence. Even in Wiebe's conflicting testimony, he stated he let the group, including Percell and Dwight, into his home. When Wiebe yelled at them to get out, it did not automatically make anyone a trespasser on the property.

Second, Wiebe was no longer an owner or tenant of the dwelling. Wiebe contends that he did not believe the eviction was legal and that this affected his subjective belief as to whether force was necessary to protect the dwelling. Wiebe's subjective belief that it remained his dwelling does not change the fact that the district court had previously ordered that Wiebe be evicted and possession of the property be restored to Zimmerman. And as we have noted, Wiebe did not contest the eviction at the district court hearing.

As explained, Dwight and Percell were lawfully in the dwelling. They did not become trespassers after Wiebe told them to “get out.” The dwelling was also not under attack. There was no testimony given that Dwight or Percell attacked or threatened Wiebe or the home at any point that day.

We conclude that a defense of dwelling instruction was neither legally nor factually appropriate in this case. Thus, the district court's failure to give a defense of dwelling jury instruction was not clearly erroneous.

The district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the requisite culpable mental state of criminal threat.

As his second issue on appeal, Wiebe contends that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the proper culpable mental state required for the crime of criminal threat.

Once again, Wiebe admits no proffer or objection was made in district court regarding the criminal threat jury instruction.

As noted above, in ruling on this issue raised by Wiebe for the first time on appeal, we employ the three-prong test set out in Hollins, which we set out in ruling on his first issue, and will not repeat here.

First, since this issue was not raised before the district court, the test is whether the omission was “clearly erroneous.” See K.S.A. 22-3414(3) (“No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction ․ unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict ․ unless the instruction or the failure to give an instruction is clearly erroneous.”).

In the second step, we must decide whether the instruction was “legally and factually appropriate, using an unlimited standard of review of the entire record.” Hollins, 320 Kan. at 242. In determining whether an instruction was factually appropriate, we determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction. See Mendez, 319 Kan. at 727.

A criminal threat is any threat to commit violence that is communicated with intent to place another in fear. K.S.A. 21-5415(a)(1). A person acts “ ‘with intent’ ” when the person's conscious objective or desire is to engage in such conduct or cause the result. K.S.A. 21-5202(h).

The Pattern Instructions for Kansas provides language to instruct a jury on the elements of criminal threat. The Notes on Use accompanying PIK Crim. 4th 54.370 (2025 Supp.) states: “If a culpable mental state is required, see PIK 4th 52.300, Definition of Crime Does Not Prescribe Culpable Mental State. However, if the charging document alleges that the crime was committed ‘intentionally’ or ‘knowingly,’ PIK 4th 52.300 should not be used. The required culpable mental state is the one stated in the charging document.”

The Kansas Supreme Court recommends the use of pattern instructions for accuracy, clarity, and uniformity when instructing jurors. The court has stated, “[I]f a court follows the PIK instructions, more than likely the instruction will be legally correct, not because of any independent legal significance of the pattern instruction, but because the committee usually writes an instruction that accurately reflects the law.” State v. Wimbley, 313 Kan. 1029, 1031, 493 P.3d 951 (2021).

Other panels of our court have recently considered similar challenges to the PIK criminal threat language. In State v. Travelbee, No. 128,114, 2026 WL 1622907 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev. filed July 6, 2026, a jury convicted Travelbee of aggravated criminal threat. On appeal, Travelbee argued the jury instruction, based on K.S.A. 21-5202(h), erroneously recited the culpable mental state. Specifically, Travelbee argued the instruction only required intent to commit the act of communicating the threat or intent to cause the result. Instead, Travelbee contended that the criminal threat statute required a finding that he intended to commit the act of communicating the threat and intended to cause the specific result. The panel rejected this interpretation and found the instruction was legally appropriate and not clearly erroneous. 2026 WL 1622907, at *4-5.

In State v. Hulse, No. 128,955, 2026 WL 2210006, at *1 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev. filed August 27, 2026, a jury found Hulse guilty of criminal threat. On appeal, Hulse argued the jury instruction defining intent was not legally appropriate. The challenged jury instruction was based on K.S.A. 21-5202(h). Hulse argued the criminal threat statute required intent to commit the act and intent to cause a specific result. Hulse thus argued that the jury instruction was legally inappropriate since it only required the jury to find Hulse intended either to commit the act or cause a result. The panel found there was no clear error because the criminal threat jury instruction followed the plain language of K.S.A. 21-5202(h) and was based on PIK Crim. 4th 52.010. 2026 WL 2210006, at *2-3.

Before us, Wiebe argues that the inclusion of the word “ ‘act’ ” in the portion of instruction No. 6 which told the jury to determine whether “this act occurred on or about the 27th of March, 2023,” lowered the State's burden of proof. Wiebe argues the instruction required the State to prove only that Wiebe intended to communicate a threat but not that Wiebe intended the result of placing another in fear. He contends that the State should be required to prove both under the statute.

Two other decisions of our court have not looked favorably on the contention, like Wiebe's, that the term “act” in a criminal elements jury instruction lowers the State's burden of proof where the charged crime requires a specific intent. Although our court in State v. Bordelon, No. 126,867, 2025 WL 2553693 (Kan. App. 2025) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 321 Kan. 790 (2026), was considering a defendant's convictions for aggravated sexual battery, not criminal threat, it essentially conducted the same statutory analysis we must perform. The jury was instructed under the aggravated sexual battery statute, K.S.A. 21-5505(b)(1), which required that there be “ ‘touch[ing] ․ with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the defendant or another.’ ” 2025 WL 2553693, at *3. The jury instruction also included the usual and customary requirement to determine if “ ‘this act’ ” occurred in a particular time frame and in the proper geographic jurisdiction. 2025 WL 2553693, at *3.

On appeal, Bordelon argued that the phrase “this act” in the explanatory sentence necessarily prompted the jury to conclude that it could, and should, convict if it found Bordelon touched the alleged victim, and disregard the requisite intent. In other words, touching alone would have been enough for the jury to return guilty verdicts under the instructions. But the panel of our court found that Bordelon's argument artificially and falsely separated “touching” from the ” intent to arouse or satisfy” in the jury instructions, through a “linguistic magic trick.” 2025 WL 2553693, at *3. The plain meaning of the instruction required the jury to regard “the act” as the nonconsensual touching for the particular purpose of sexual gratification. Bordelon's argument was rejected by the panel.

In a recent case, State v. Sinclair, No. 127,554, 2026 WL 1700955 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev. filed July 10, 2026, the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy and three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Sinclair complained that the district court erred in instructions as to the defendant's culpable mental state. The jury was instructed that “the State had to prove that [defendant] lewdly fondled or touched [the victim] ‘with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires’ of either of them” on each of the three charges. 2026 WL 1700955, at *4. Like in Bordelon and Wiebe's case, Sinclair contended that jurors would have construed the phrase “ ‘the act’ ” as referring to the physical action alone, in isolation from the specific intent required for the completed crime. 2026 WL 1700955, at *4. On appeal, Sinclair argued that the physical contact and the requisite intent were separate elements, and the jury should have been instructed to find both the alleged physical actions and the intent for sexual gratification to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Sinclair panel was not persuaded by the defendant's contentions. It adopted the reasoning of the Bordelon opinion by reference, finding that the linkage of “touching” with “ ‘the intent to arouse or satisfy ․ sexual desires’ ” did not create disparate elements, each requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 2026 WL 1700955, at *5. Our court found the instructions given on aggravated indecent liberties with a child to be legally sufficient. 2026 WL 1700955, at *5.

Wiebe's argument fails for the same reasons enumerated in Travelbee, Hulse, Bordelon, and Sinclair. The jury instruction stated the correct culpable mental state under K.S.A. 21-5202(h). The jury instruction given was legally appropriate and properly instructed the jury on the requisite culpable mental state. Thus, the district court's jury instruction was not clearly erroneous.

Given that we find no error in the district court's instruction to the jury on criminal threat, it is unnecessary to proceed to the third step under Hollins, i.e., determining whether or not an error was harmless.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Wiebe to register as a violent offender.

As his final issue on appeal, Wiebe argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to register as a violent offender under the Kansas Offender Registration Act. Once again, Wiebe admits there was no formal objection made in the district court to the order for him to register as a violent offender. Wiebe argues we should consider the issue on appeal because (1) it is a question of law raised on nondisputed facts and (2) it is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of Wiebe's fundamental rights. We agree that we should address the merits of Wiebe's argument in his appeal of this issue.

Wiebe argues that he did not need to register as a violent offender upon conviction and thus the district court abused its discretion by requiring him to do so. A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State v. Younger, 320 Kan. 98, 137-38, 564 P.3d 744 (2025).

The Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) requires a person convicted of certain crimes to register with the State. K.S.A. 22-4904(a). Violent offenders are required to register under KORA. “ ‘Violent offender’ includes any person who ․ on or after July 1, 2006, is convicted of any person felony and the court makes a finding on the record that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of such person felony.” K.S.A. 22-4902(e)(2).

In State v. Thomas, 307 Kan. 733, 748-49, 415 P.3d 430 (2018), the Kansas Supreme Court held there are three circumstances under KORA that require an offender to register:

“(1) [T]he mere fact of a conviction classifies the defendant as an ‘offender’; (2) the fact of a conviction plus some statutorily permitted judicial fact-finding classifies the defendant as an ‘offender’; or (3) a judicial order determines, through the exercise of judicial discretion, that the defendant should be considered an ‘offender’ ․”

Thomas was convicted of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. The State argued that Thomas was required to register under the second circumstance due to this conviction. The court noted that the jury found there was a deadly weapon, but the district court never made such a finding on the record. The court found it was an error of law to require registration absent this finding of fact. 307 Kan. at 733, 750.

The Kansas Supreme Court reassessed this holding in State v. Carter, 311 Kan. 206, 459 P.3d 186 (2020). Carter was convicted of aggravated robbery. After the jury convicted Carter, the district court made an oral finding that a dangerous weapon was used in Carter's crime. The district court's journal entry of sentencing included a checked box stating a deadly weapon was used in the commission of Carter's crime. The Supreme Court found that the journal entry satisfied the requisite finding of fact under K.S.A. 22-4902(e). 311 Kan. at 210. The court thus held that Carter was required to register as a violent offender under KORA. 311 Kan. at 217.

Here, after the jury rendered its verdicts, the district court gave the defendant the admonition “Mr. Wiebe, you have been convicted or adjudicated of an offense requiring registration as provided by the Kansas Offender Registration Act.” But even if we would conclude that this bench pronouncement was insufficiently detailed to invoke KORA for Wiebe, the outcome here is controlled under the holding in Carter. The district court's journal entry of sentencing includes multiple checked boxes finding that Wiebe used a deadly weapon in commission of his crime.

Thus, Wiebe's argument is unpersuasive. Wiebe frames this issue as an abuse of discretion. Wiebe's argument focuses on the district court's oral order after the trial that registration was required. Wiebe makes no mention or argument as to the effects of the journal entry of sentencing. Wiebe's duty to register was not automatic upon the jury verdict, but the duty to register became mandatory upon the district court's finding of fact. The district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Wiebe to register as a violent offender.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: