State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Stuart A. Smith, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Stuart Smith appeals the district court's denial of his motion for a dispositional or durational departure and its calculation of his jail credit. We granted Smith's motion for summary disposition under Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 48). After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments, we dismiss Smith's challenge to his presumptive sentence for lack of jurisdiction and affirm the district court's jail-credit ruling.

The district court denies Smith's departure and jail-credit requests.

In November 2025, Smith pleaded guilty to stalking—a severity-level-9 person felony—for conduct that took place on April 10, 2025. Smith's presentence investigation report calculated his criminal-history score as A, which he did not dispute. Under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines, Smith's conviction carried a presumptive sentence of 15 to 17 months in prison. See K.S.A. 21-6804. Smith's plea agreement stated that the State intended to recommend a 15-month prison sentence, though Smith was free to request another lawful disposition.

Before sentencing, Smith requested a dispositional departure to probation or a durational departure from the range set by the Guidelines. Smith argued that he should be granted a departure sentence because he accepted responsibility, the harm from his crime was less than typical because there was no physical contact, community-based programs could address his needs, his conduct stemmed from alcohol problems, and he could be a productive member of society if allowed to remain in the community. At sentencing, Smith again asked the district court for a departure. In support of this request, Smith's defense attorney noted that Smith had accumulated almost 2,000 hours of trustee work while in jail and argued that treatment, work release, or community corrections would allow Smith to address his alcohol problems and support his children.

The district court was unconvinced by these arguments. The court observed that Smith had an extensive criminal history, including multiple DUI convictions and four previous stalking convictions. The court ultimately found no substantial and compelling reasons for either a dispositional or durational departure. Instead, the court imposed a sentence of 15 months in prison followed by 12 months of postrelease supervision, to run consecutive to the sentence in any other case.

The district court then addressed the credit Smith would receive against his sentence for the time spent in jail pending the disposition of his case. The State reported that Smith had spent 281 days in custody but also had been committed on two Wichita Municipal Court cases from May 15 through October 8, 2025, and had already received credit for that time toward his sentences in those cases. Based on this overlap, the State calculated that Smith was entitled to 134 days of credit in this case. Smith asked for all 281 days based on State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287, 566 P.3d 481 (2025). The district court denied Smith's request and determined that he would receive 134 days of jail credit.

The journal entry reflects the same calculation. Smith received 34 days of credit for April 11 through May 14, 2025, and 100 days for October 9, 2025, through January 16, 2026. The court did not award 147 days for May 15 through October 8 because that time was already credited toward the sentences in two Wichita Municipal Court cases. The journal entry added that Smith's sentence runs consecutive to any other cases.

Smith appeals, challenging both the denial of his request for a sentencing departure and the district court's jail-credit ruling.

Because Smith received a presumptive sentence under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines, we lack jurisdiction to review his departure request.

Smith first argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a dispositional or durational departure. But we lack jurisdiction to consider that argument. Under K.S.A. 21-6820(c)(1), an appellate court “shall not review” any sentence that falls within the presumptive sentencing range for the crime under the Guidelines. Kansas appellate courts thus have no authority to review a district court's denial of a departure motion when the defendant ultimately receives a presumptive sentence. State v. Farmer, 312 Kan. 761, 764, 480 P.3d 155 (2021).

With a criminal-history score of A, Smith faced a presumptive range of 15 to 17 months in prison for his severity-level-9 person felony. See K.S.A. 21-6804. The sentence imposed by the district court—15 months in prison—fell within this presumptive range. K.S.A. 21-6820(c)(1) thus prohibits us from reviewing Smith's challenge to the district court's denial of his request for a departure sentence. Because we lack appellate jurisdiction to consider Smith's sentencing challenge, we dismiss this portion of his appeal.

The statute in effect when Smith committed his offense on April 10, 2025, states that he is not entitled to duplicative credit for time already credited toward other cases.

Smith also challenges the district court's decision to award him 134 rather than 281 days of jail credit toward his sentence. But a person convicted of a crime is sentenced based on the statutes in effect when the crime was committed. State v. Overton, 279 Kan. 547, 561, 112 P.3d 244 (2005). Smith committed his offense on April 10, 2025. His jail-credit calculation is therefore governed by K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615. Indeed, Smith acknowledges in his motion for summary disposition that this version of the statute controls his claim.

K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615(a)(1) generally requires a sentencing court to give a defendant credit for time spent incarcerated pending disposition of the case. But subsection (a)(2)(A) provides that “[a]ny time awarded as credit in another case when consecutive sentences are imposed on a defendant” is not considered time spent incarcerated pending disposition of the defendant's case. K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615(a)(2)(A).

That provision controls here. Smith spent 147 days—from May 15 through October 8, 2025—in custody when he was also being detained for two Wichita Municipal Court cases. Those days were credited toward Smith's sentences in his municipal cases, and the district court ordered Smith's sentence in this case to run consecutive to his other sentences. Thus, under K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615(a)(2)(A), those 147 days could not also be awarded as jail credit in this case.

Smith's reliance on Ervin does not alter this conclusion. In Ervin, our Supreme Court interpreted the version of K.S.A. 21-6615 that preceded the 2024 amendment and held that the statute required an award of jail credit for time spent incarcerated pending disposition even when that time had also been credited in another case. 320 Kan. at 311-12. But the legislature amended K.S.A. 21-6615 effective May 23, 2024, expressly excluding jail credit awarded in another case when consecutive sentences are imposed. L. 2024, ch. 96, § 7. Because Smith committed his offense nearly 11 months after that amendment took effect, Ervin’s interpretation of the earlier statute does not govern his jail-credit calculation.

The district court correctly excluded the 147 days for which Smith received credit in his municipal cases. Smith was entitled to the remaining 34 days from April 11 through May 14, 2025, and 100 days from October 9, 2025, through January 16, 2026, for a total of 134 days. The district court committed no error in calculating Smith's jail credit.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

Per Curiam: