State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jeremy Tod Shrout, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Convicted of three counts of rape and one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a five-year-old girl, Jeremy Tod Shrout appeals his convictions. He argues that the trial court erred when it barred him from presenting evidence of that five-year-old girl's reputation as a liar. In his view, this trial court error impaired his defense and thus denied him a fair trial. Shrout seeks a new trial. Our review reveals no reversible trial error and we affirm his convictions. (We use the pseudonym Doris in referring to the child.)

At the jury trial the State presented the testimony from several witnesses, including the testimony of Doris—who by then was eight years old. Before Shrout's presentation of evidence in his defense, the State for the second time moved to limit any reputation and opinion testimony about Doris's truthfulness. Based on certain cases, the State asked the trial court to exclude any inadmissible reputation and opinion testimony. The motion was taken up outside the jury's presence. The trial court reviewed the motion and decided not to preemptively limit such testimony but allow Shrout the opportunity to lay an evidentiary foundation that could support the admission of such evidence. The court stated that if “there's an issue we'll take it as it comes and the State's going to have to object as it comes. But the State is correct that those foundations have to be laid. Otherwise, it's just truth or veracity.”

Shrout seeks to impeach Doris’ reputation for truthfulness.

In making his defense, Shrout wanted to present four witnesses to impeach Doris due to her reputation for truthfulness. First, Shrout introduced the testimony of Doris’ grandmother. Grandmother testified that Doris would make things up and tell stories and was generally known to be untruthful. Grandmother testified that she was familiar with Doris’ reputation for truthfulness:

“Q. And so, you would be familiar with the reputation for [Doris] in terms of whether or not she's truthful or untruthful—

“A. Yes.

“Q. —in that community of people?

“A. Yes.

“Q. And is she considered to be—to have a reputation of somebody, you know, who is always telling the truth or is somebody, you know, that is lying or—

“A. Making things up, telling stories.

“Q. Okay. And so that would be often untruthful? She would make up false stories?

“A. Yes.

“Q. Okay. And in terms of that you also share that personal opinion?

“A. Yes.”

Next Shrout tried to present the testimony of Doris’ Grandfather. Grandfather testified that Doris and her family lived with him and Grandmother, but once the family moved out and relocated, Grandfather only saw them once or twice a month. Grandfather was only able to name a few members of Doris’ extended family. When asked how old Doris was, Grandfather testified that he “honestly couldn't tell you,” then guessed she was six years old.

Shrout then asked Grandfather to testify about whether he believed Doris to be a truthful person, but the State objected to a lack of foundation and the trial court sustained the objection. In a bench conference, the court stated that Grandfather lacked the foundation to testify about Doris’ reputation, finding “they haven't been in her life for years. They're not part of her community.” The court found that Grandfather “offered no testimony that he had any sort of recent contact with [Doris]. The testimony would indicate that he hadn't had contact with her for years. He doesn't meet that definition of being part of her community according to this case law.”

Next, Shrout tried to impeach Doris through the testimony of his sister, Doris’ aunt. But because Aunt had not had any contact with Doris in the previous two years and had lived in Wisconsin for Doris’ entire life, the trial court found that Aunt lacked sufficient knowledge to opine on Doris’ truthfulness.

Finally, Shrout tried to introduce the reputation evidence through Joe Walker, his close friend and former neighbor. Shrout asked Walker if he knew Doris, and he responded that “she was quite the child” and that “she would play with the kids and then take the toys and lie about it and then have to take and correct it.” The State objected and, in a bench conference, argued that Walker testified to a specific instance of conduct which is inadmissible. The parties then addressed whether Walker could testify about Doris’ reputation or his opinion on her truthfulness.

The court found that Walker could not establish a sufficient foundation to testify about Doris’ truthfulness:

“[B]eing a friend of the family is not sufficient. He's not a member of her community. They don't even live in the same—It says right here that they have to be a member of the same community and has been a resident for a substantial period of time. It's not just that they knew each other. That's the second type.

“[Shrout's attorney]: But the community or a group. Community is definitely family. Family is a community.

“THE COURT: Not for that.”

The trial court found Shrout did not show a sufficient foundation for Walker to testify about Doris’ truthfulness.

Shrout continued with this tactic and sought to present more evidence and testimony to impeach Doris’ truthfulness. The court heard his proffer, on what the witnesses would testify to and whether they met the foundation requirement for reputation and opinion testimony. With the exception of Grandmother, the trial court found neither witness met the threshold set by case law. The court then stated:

“So, the problem is that you keep asking the same question of successive witnesses where I have already told you multiple times and in the pretrial order that it's inadmissible under Kansas law. I've ordered that. I've sustained the objections. You continue to ask the same questions of each witness. It's confusing to the jury. It's—And that's why I asked for your proffer of the testimony of your remaining witnesses to determine if they are going to offer testimony or evidence that is admissible. You're telling me—You've told me nothing other than they wouldn't meet the standards in Penn for the foundation for reputation or opinion and that they were just going to testify about character—give character evidence for Mr. Shrout. That was ruled inadmissible at the pretrial. This is why we have pretrials. If you wanted—You could have sought a pretrial ruling on the evidence that you thought should be admitted or excluded. I do not like taking up the jury's time. You've not told me anything that [the two witnesses] will testify about that's outside of the things I've already ruled on that are inadmissible.”

Shrout testified in his defense. Shrout denied the charges and testified that he “would never do that to my child or anyone's child.” Shrout said Doris could have been coached by her mother to make these allegations, but the State objected to that speculation, and the trial court sustained the objection. After that, the State presented rebuttal evidence through Doris’ second grade teacher. The evidence was presented to rebut Shrout's evidence that Doris had imaginary friends—thus implying Doris was prone to making things up. Her teacher had seen nothing like that with Doris.

In his closing argument to the jury, Shrout contended that Doris made up the allegations for her own gain.

In his closing argument, Shrout painted Doris as a liar and a girl that made up stories for her own gain. He argued that her stories were confusing, and that her story and “everything's always twisted in her favor. If she says it, it must be intentional abuse.” Shrout contended:

“All these things never happened. She talks about these things in confusing ways and contradictory ways. She telling how old she was. She's six, then she's two, then she's four. It's all over the place. They go round and round in different ways. If you're confused you've been paying attention.”

Shrout then stated, “Why would something be so confusing? Because lies—When you're lying—When you're lying about something it didn't really happen. Things that didn't really happen.” Shrout argued that Doris’ story lacked corroborating evidence and that they were “confusing stories, contradicting stories, illogical stories, incomplete stories.”

Then Shrout characterized Doris as a child that seeks attention and that she learned to make up stories for her own gain:

“She gets a lot of attention from others from this. She likes attention. She gets a lot of attention from this. Hate to see an innocent little girl. In reality this is a girl that sees other people. This is a girl who has imaginary friends. A great deal going on. She can't stay on topic at all. They say, oh, she's such a young girl. This is just a child so you can't expect a lie, can't expect a lie. Can't expect a lie. So just a child.”

Shrout also argued that Doris’ trouble remembering certain details and facts was contrary to normal children at her age, implying that she was not credible:

“Boys and girls, they're playing sports at that age. They have seasons. They can remember. Oh, yeah, we won this game and then we won that game and we won that game. You know, I scored two points for that. They can read and write at that age. And they act like you should just let them, oh boo boo baby boo bot. A person of that age can call with complete sentences, complete thoughts. Has memories. It's a bunch of nonsense that [Doris] can't. But it doesn't fit with their story and they got to help her out.”

Shrout then told the jurors that they were “here to think for yourself. You all aren't stupid. Think for yourself. Don't let them think for you. That's what they want. Just sign off on this. It's this man's life.”

And finally, Shrout argued that just because Doris’ statements were consistent throughout her disclosures, interviews, and testimony, that does not mean her allegations were true. He argued that

“[I]f you say the same story again and again and you tell this person and you tell that person, tell that person, that person, that person, that person, that person, that stranger it's a fact. It's not. That's not the way it works. That doesn't make it fact. If someone keeps saying something, the sky is red, the sky is red, the sky is red. It doesn't mean the sky is red. No corroborating facts. Nothing ever to support any of her instances which are confusing.”

The jury found Shrout guilty of the three counts of rape and one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child.

Before sentencing, Shrout moved for a new trial based in part on his contention that the trial court erred by excluding character evidence of opinion and reputation about Doris’ truth and veracity. He argued that this evidence was part of his defense theory and because the case consisted solely of Doris’ allegations, the evidence's exclusion was prejudicial to Shrout's defense. Shrout also moved for a downward durational departure, arguing his lack of criminal history, his community ties, and his family support all showed substantial and compelling reasons to depart. The court did not depart.

Shrout was sentenced to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years.

Shrout raises one issue in this appeal.

Shrout contends that by ruling several witnesses could not testify, the trial court illegally limited his ability to present a defense. In his view the court improperly restricted his ability to present evidence that the complaining witness, Doris, had a reputation in the community for being a liar. The State argues that the trial court properly excluded the defense's witnesses from giving reputation testimony on the complaining witness’ truthfulness.

Some fundamental evidence rules guide us.

When we talk about trials, the law requires the party seeking the admission of evidence to show or “lay” a factual foundation to gain the admission of that evidence. Admissibility of a witness’ testimony begins with answering this question: How is it that this witness knows this fact? What are the circumstances of how this knowledge was obtained? This foundation evidence thus provides a court ruling on the admission of that evidence with a factual context that establishes the basis of that evidence.

Going further on this point, to be admissible, evidence must meet certain foundational requirements. One case has defined foundation to mean “ ‘preliminary questions designed to establish that evidence is admissible.’ ” State v. Contreras, 313 Kan. 996, 1000, 492 P.3d 1180 (2021). “ ‘Providing an adequate foundation prevents the finder of fact from being exposed to inadmissible evidence.’ ” Contreras, 313 Kan. at 1000. The proponent of the evidence is required to lay a foundation before it may be admitted into evidence. 313 Kan. at 1000. These rules are always considered when dealing with reputation evidence.

Here, we deal with opinion and reputation evidence offered to show that another witness is deemed untruthful. The law recognizes that such evidence is important but limits its use. Two statutes come into play. First, for the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, K.S.A. 60-420 broadly allows any party to introduce extrinsic evidence of any conduct by that witness and any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility. The credibility of a witness is important. Then, K.S.A. 60-422 limits the admissibility of such evidence. Specifically: “(c) [E]vidence of traits of his or her character other than honesty or veracity” are inadmissible, and “(d) evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his or her character, shall be inadmissible.” K.S.A. 60-422(c)-(d).

Case law teaches us that to introduce such testimony with the primary purpose of impeaching another witness’ reputation for truthfulness, the following must be established:

1. The impeaching witness is a member of the same community of the witness to be impeached and has been a resident thereof for a substantial period of time;

2. They are aware of the general reputation of the witness for the specific character trait; and

3. They know that the witness has a reputation for dishonesty in the community. State v. Penn, 41 Kan. App. 2d 251, 268, 201 P.3d 752 (2009).

Then, for a witness to testify about their opinion on another witness’ veracity or truthfulness, the following foundation must be established:

1. The impeaching witness is acquainted with the witness and has known him or her for a period of time;

2. They know the witness well enough to have formed an opinion of the specific character trait of the witness for veracity;

3. They have an opinion on this trait; and

4. They are of the opinion that the witness lacks veracity—that they would not believe the witness even under oath.” Penn, 41 Kan. App. 2d at 268.

Answering these foundation questions thus shows how a witness knows this information. A court can use these answers to determine the admissibility of the evidence.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Shrout's witnesses from testifying about Doris’ truthfulness.

Shrout wanted to depict Doris as a liar by using the testimony of his parents, his sister, and a close friend to portray her as having a reputation for dishonesty. But to introduce this type of evidence, the impeaching witnesses must be sufficiently familiar with Doris’ reputation in the community. To have sufficient contact with a witness’ community, the person must be a member of the community for a substantial period. Because Shrout failed to establish proof of this connection and familiarity, the trial court properly excluded their testimony for a lack of foundation.

The three witnesses that Shrout wanted to testify that Doris had a reputation for dishonesty lacked the foundation to be admissible. Grandfather, Aunt, and Walker were not habitually associating with Doris herself, nor with her community. Grandfather only saw Doris and her family once or twice a month, until Doris went into foster care, and he could not recall how old she was. Shrout did not show that Grandfather maintained regular contact with Doris or her community and therefore, Grandfather could not testify about Doris’ reputation in the community.

Similarly, her Aunt could not establish that she belonged to Doris’ community since she lived in Wisconsin and only visited Doris five or six times a year. Aunt failed to name anyone outside the extended family who interacted with Doris. Aunt thus did not establish that she was a member of Doris’ community.

Lastly, Shrout's friend and former neighbor, Joe Walker, testified that he had known Shrout for ten to fifteen years and they had lived in the same apartment complex for a short time. While he may have established membership in Shrout's community, Walker did not establish membership in Doris’ community. Once Shrout and his family moved, Walker only maintained contact with Shrout, not Doris. Therefore, Walker could not testify about Doris’ reputation in the community.

Shrout failed to establish adequate evidentiary foundations for Grandfather, Aunt, and Walker to testify about Doris’ reputation in the community for dishonesty. None of the three witnesses were members of Doris’ community and thus could not testify about a reputation in a community in which they did not belong. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony. Excluding their testimony was not erroneous.

Upon further reflection, we doubt whether this loss of opinion evidence was significant. After all, the record reveals that Shrout did present evidence of Doris’ reputation for dishonesty to the jury through Grandmother's testimony. Her testimony showed that she had a closer relationship with Doris than the other three witnesses that Shrout tried to use to impeach Doris. Grandmother told the jury that Doris has a reputation for making up stories and is, in Grandmother's opinion, untruthful.

From the guilty verdicts, we conclude that the jury was not convinced by Grandmother's opinion. This means that we are not persuaded that the admission of reputation evidence from Grandfather, Aunt, and Shrout's friend—all people with far less contact with Doris than Grandmother—would have changed the jury's verdicts.

Affirmed.

Hill, J.: