State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Lee Shelton Leon, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lee Shelton Leon appeals the Barton County District Court's decision to revoke his probation and impose the underlying prison term for his conviction of aggravated criminal threat. We granted Leon's unopposed request for summary disposition of the appeal under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 48). Finding no abuse of judicial discretion in the sole argument Leon raises, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2023, the State charged Leon with aggravated criminal threat and criminal threat for conduct involving Leon's bringing a rifle into the sheriff's office and making threats. As part of a negotiated plea agreement, Leon ultimately pleaded no contest to the aggravated criminal threat charge. Leon moved for a dispositional sentencing departure, and the State recommended the departure at sentencing, consistent with the plea negotiations. On February 9, 2024, the court imposed an underlying prison term of 41 months but suspended the sentence in favor of 36 months of probation.

The district court issued a warrant roughly three months after sentencing alleging Leon had violated his probation. The court did not revoke probation but imposed a 30-day jail sanction. About five months later, the district court again issued a warrant claiming that Leon had violated the conditions of his probation. Leon admitted the allegations, and in line with the recommendations by community corrections, the district court continued probation. The court imposed a 60-day sanction, subject to early release if Leon entered an inpatient drug treatment program.

Nearly a year later, the district court again issued a warrant for probation violations, alleging that he had an aggressive confrontation with his probation officer, failed to attend drug treatment, continued to abuse illegal substances, and failed to attend his mental health appointment.

At a hearing on October 10, 2025, Leon admitted to the allegations. The court noted it had imposed previous intermediate sanctions for his earlier violations and concluded that Leon had failed to take steps to address his substance abuse problem. The court revoked Leon's probation and imposed the underlying sentence of 41 months in prison. Leon appeals that revocation.

Analysis

Once a probation violation has been established, the district court's decision to revoke the offender's probation and impose the original sentences is governed by K.S.A. 22-3716, which permits revocation within the discretion of the district court after imposition of an intermediate sanction. See K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(1)(C). A district court may revoke probation without first imposing an intermediate sanction if one or more statutory exceptions apply. See K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(7). An appellate court reviews a district court's decision to revoke probation for an abuse of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion is abused when a decision is based on an error of law or fact or when the decision is otherwise arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable under the circumstances of the case. Leon, as the party contending the court abused its discretion, bears the burden of establishing such abuse. See State v. Tafolla, 315 Kan. 324, 328, 508 P.3d 351 (2022).

Here, the district court previously imposed jail sanctions under K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(9), not K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(1)(B), the provision governing intermediate sanctions. Because Leon's probation was the result of a dispositional departure, however, the district court could properly revoke Leon's probation without imposing a sanction. See K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(7)(B). The district court did not specifically articulate its reliance on K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(7)(B), but the State noted the exception as a reason to excuse an intermediate sanction. The court indicated it intended to inquire about the exception. In explaining its reasons for revoking probation, the district court noted that Leon had been convicted of aggravated criminal threat and that he was given an opportunity for probation. The district court was not required to provide particularized findings to rely on K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(7)(B). See Tafolla, 315 Kan. at 331 (applying the previous dispositionaldeparture exception under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3716[c][9][B]). Tafolla also rejected the notion that the district court's failure to invoke the dispositional departure exception establishes that the district court failed to understand the scope of its discretion. The Tafolla court placed the burden on the criminal defendant to request an intermediate sanction and request more definite findings from the district court. Without an adequate objection, an appellate court presumes the district court found the facts necessary to support its judgment. 315 Kan. at 332. For these reasons, the lack of intermediate sanctions under K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(1)(B) is excused by Leon's prior dispositional departure sentence under K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(7)(B).

Leon does not contend that the district court ignored any statutory constraint on its exercise of discretion and, as a result, does not carry his burden to establish an abuse of discretion on that basis. Leon stipulated to a violation of the conditions of his probation and only contends on appeal that the district court should have reinstated his probation, without providing any reasons for that position. When reviewing a district court's exercise of discretion, an appellate court does not substitute its judgment for that of the district court unless no reasonable person could have reached the same decision. See State v. Rayton, 321 Kan. 677, 689, 583 P.3d 898 (2026) (“[T]he abuse of discretion standard does not permit this court to substitute its judgment for that of the district court.”).

The district court noted that the court had given Leon multiple chances on probation, even though Leon's offense and his criminal history called for a prison disposition. The court observed that drug usage continued to be a problem but that it did not perceive Leon to have taken meaningful steps to address his underlying drug and mental health issues, given that he did not attend his mental health appointments or engage in substance abuse treatment. The court also noted the serious nature of Leon's underlying conviction.

Given Leon's original dispositional departure from a presumptive prison sentence to probation and his admission to violating the conditions of his probation at the October revocation proceedings, along with Leon's aggressive conduct toward his probation officer as part of the factual premise for this revocation, the district court's decision to revoke Leon's probation was reasonable and, therefore, not an abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: