Damon Vontress, Appellant, v. Kansas Department of Corrections and Lansing Correctional Facility, Appellees. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Damon Vontress suffered a relatively significant injury while incarcerated at Lansing Correctional Facility and filed a personal injury claim in accordance with the facility's protocol. The district court ultimately dismissed the case, with prejudice, upon finding that Vontress failed to file his claim within the 10-day time frame mandated by the administrative regulations that govern such issues. Vontress brings this appeal seeking determination of whether the dismissal of his claim was legally sound. We have thoroughly analyzed the specifics of the issue raised in conjunction with the controlling legal authorities and decline to find that any error occurred. The decision of the district court is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

Vontress was performing his assigned job at Lansing Correctional Facility (LCF) when a fellow inmate inadvertently collided with him during that inmate's flight from four correctional officers. The impact left Vontress with a broken femur and two broken wrist bones that necessitated medical attention at a nearby hospital. He ultimately underwent two surgeries but was discharged from the hospital to LCF's infirmary for aftercare seven days later. Vontress requested and received permission to return to the general population approximately one week after arriving at the infirmary.

The following day, Vontress filed a personal injury claim, and the warden received the corresponding paperwork one day later—August 7, 2024. The CMII Property/Personal Injury Claims employee disapproved Vontress’ claim on August 7, 2024, concluding: “Although you were injured in this incident, there is no visible staff negligence or staff misconduct. You were given immediate and proper medical attention. Because of this, your claim is denied.”

Consistent with the procedural protocol, Vontress appealed to the Leavenworth County District Court and named the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) and LCF (Defendants) as defendants. He asserted that the Defendants were negligent in their safety training as evidenced by their pursuit of the fleeing inmate and requested actual damages that exceeded $75,000 plus interest.

The Defendants moved to dismiss on six specific grounds: (1) failure to serve the Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General as required; (2) failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (3) qualified immunity; (4) the Defendants cannot sue or be sued; (5) courts decline to interfere in prison system management; and (6) the Defendants do not have a duty to protect Vontress. As support for their second contention the Defendants argued that Vontress failed to strictly comply with K.A.R. 44-16-104a and exhaust his administrative remedies. Specifically, he neglected to attach the required documentation to establish that he filed a grievance.

Vontress countered that (1) the Defendants’ insufficient process claim was premature; (2) the attachment deficiency was cured by a subsequent filing; (3) the Defendants are not immune under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA); (4) the Defendants failed to cite supporting authority; (5) courts routinely adjudicate decisions made by correctional facilities and their employees; and (6) the Defendants had a duty to Vontress as no reasonable threat to inmate or personnel safety existed at the time of the pursuit of the other inmate.

The Defendants met Vontress’ contentions with the assertion that he failed to submit his complaint form within 10 days of the injury as required under K.A.R. 44-16-104a(a). According to the Defendants, Vontress’ failure to file within the requisite time limit was dispositive.

The district court issued a comprehensive ruling that granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. It made three findings in support of its conclusion, with the following being of particular import:

“Plaintiff makes a policy argument that the court finds reasonable. For example, in a situation where an inmate is in a coma or otherwise held for treatment in a hospital for 10 days after a physical injury. A person in those situations would not be able to comply with K.A.R. 44-[16-]104a(a). However, that does not seem to be the case here. By Plaintiff's own admission, he was returned to the prison within the 10-day period. Plaintiff's examples need not be considered because they are factually distinct. Plaintiff would have had the opportunity to meet the deadline set forth in K.A.R. 44-[16-]104a(a) and did not do so. To decide otherwise in this instance would be to open the door for any number of other inmates who for some reason could have filed a grievance within the deadline and did not. The case law is clear in that regard. The court is not tasked with trying to figure out why K.A.R. 44-[16-]104a(a) was not complied with when there was at least some opportunity for the inmate to comply. This seems to be the essence of the cases which mandate strict compliance. It seems to the court that to do otherwise would create an exception where none currently exists.”

It specifically declined to dismiss based on factors three through six raised by the Defendants as the facts established by Vontress would make dismissal inappropriate on those grounds. Finally, the district court determined that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate given Vontress’ failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under K.A.R. 44-16-104a(a).

Vontress now brings his case before this court seeking an analysis of whether the timeliness of his filing can offer a solid foundation for the district court's ruling given the particular facts and circumstances of his case. Additional facts are included as necessary to resolve the issue raised.

Legal Analysis

Does this court lack jurisdiction to consider Vontress’ claim?

As a preliminary matter, the Defendants assert that we lack jurisdiction to review Vontress’ claim because the KDOC and LCF are the only named defendants and state agencies lack the capacity to sue or be sued. Vontress did not favor us with a response to the Defendants’ contention. Before we undertake an analysis of Vontress’ claim we must first resolve whether we have the jurisdiction to do so.

Whether this court has jurisdiction over an appeal raises a question of law over which we exercise unlimited review. Woods v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County/KCK, 294 Kan. 292, 295, 275 P.3d 46 (2012). To the extent we are required to engage in statutory interpretation to arrive at an answer, we also have unlimited review of those matters. 294 Kan. at 295.

The jurisdictional inquiry the Defendants raise is a rather complicated one given its intersection with the KTCA, statutory authority, and appellate procedure. They rely on Corder v. Kansas Board of Healing Arts, 256 Kan. 638, 889 P.2d 1127 (1994), and Hopkins v. State, 237 Kan. 601, 605-06, 702 P.2d 311 (1985), as well as a series of federal cases, to buttress their claim.

In Corder, the plaintiff sought damages against the Kansas Board of Healing Arts (the Board) under, inter alia, the KTCA. At both the district court level and on appeal, the Board argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award damages as it had not been granted the capacity to be sued.

Corder appealed and raised nine issues, including that the Board was not immune under the KTCA but was actually previously sued several times. 256 Kan. at 641-42, 646. The Kansas Supreme Court examined the Board's enabling statute, the KTCA, and the Kansas Judicial Review Act but did not identify any language that expressly authorized the Board to sue or be sued. Therefore, it concluded that tort damages were not available against the Board or its executive director. Even so, rather than dismiss the case, the court analyzed the merits of Corder's remaining issues. 256 Kan. at 662-67, 670.

In Hopkins, a defendant sued the Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP), along with a multitude of other agencies, under the KTCA. The KHP subsequently moved for dismissal on the grounds that it lacked the capacity to sue or be sued, and its motion was granted. 237 Kan. at 605-06.

Hopkins appealed and asserted that the KHP was properly included as a defendant because it was “an executive agency of the State under the Kansas Tort Claims Act.” 237 Kan. at 605-06. The KHP countered “that a governmental agency has the capacity to sue and be sued only when a statute grants that authority.” 237 Kan. at 605.

In arriving at its own conclusion, the Hopkins court highlighted the following portion of the district court's ruling:

“ ‘The legislature may create a separate governmental entity with the capacity to sue and be sued but such authority must be expressly created. K.S.A. 74-2105 et seq., contains no such authority. The Kansas Tort Claims Act deals only with the subject matter of liability of the State and its entities as they might exist. It does not undertake to change the governmental organization or structure nor the nature or capacity of any of the State's instrumentalities.’ [Citation omitted.]” Hopkins, 237 Kan. at 606.

Accordingly, it examined the KHP's enabling statutes and determined that none of those provisions granted the agency the capacity to sue or be sued. 237 Kan. at 605-06. Notably, this conclusion did not prompt the court to dismiss Hopkins’ case in its entirety. 237 Kan. at 613.

Contrary to the Defendants’ assertion, the decisions in Corder and Hopkins reveal that a party's capacity to sue or be sued is not a jurisdictional question but rather is a statutory function. As the KTCA is an “ ‘open ended’ act,” liability is the rule and immunity the exception. Soto v. City of Bonner Springs, 291 Kan. 73, 78, 238 P.3d 278 (2010). “Statutory immunity constitutes a legal avoidance of or affirmative defense to liability,” with the governmental entity bearing the burden of proof. Estate of Randolph v. City of Wichita, 57 Kan. App. 2d 686, 695-96, 459 P.3d 802 (2020).

Here, the district court did not find that it lacked jurisdiction or that the Defendants were immune from suit. Instead, it dismissed Vontress’ case solely on the grounds that his complaint was filed outside the 10-day statutory limit. Indeed, the district court expressly declined to dismiss based on the Defendants’ claims that they have qualified immunity and are not subject to suit, that the court cannot interfere with facility management, and that the Defendants owed no duty to Vontress. We decline to adopt the Defendants’ position that their capacity to sue or be sued constitutes a jurisdictional bar in this instance.

Did the district court err by dismissing Vontress’ complaint on the grounds that it was untimely?

It is Vontress’ position that the 10-day statutory time limit provided under K.A.R. 44-16-104a(a) should be subject to an exception that is triggered by the totality of the circumstances surrounding an inmate's injury. The Defendants counter that the regulation must be strictly enforced. We are not persuaded that it is appropriate for this court to establish an exception to an administrative regulation where one does not currently exist.

Whether a party is required to or has failed to exhaust their administrative remedies is a question of law over which this court's review is unlimited. In re Habeas Corpus Application of Pierpoint, 271 Kan. 620, 622-23, 24 P.3d 128 (2001). Again, we also exercise unlimited review when called upon to interpret a statutory provision. Woods, 294 Kan. at 295.

Legislative intent guides statutory interpretation when that intent is ascertainable. The initial step requires consideration of the plain language chosen by the Legislature, “giving common words their ordinary meaning while accounting for both the specific context in which the language appears and the broader statutory framework.” Johnson v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, 320 Kan. 325, 333, 567 P.3d 810 (2025). We only turn to other resources such as legislative history and canons of construction for assistance when the provision proves ambiguous. 320 Kan. at 333.

Vontress argues that the regulation at issue should allow for an exception that tolls the 10-day regulatory clock in cases such as this where the incident results in the hospitalization of an inmate. Relying on “State v. Hurst, No. 117,953, 2018 WL 4939094 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2018) (unpublished),” he contends that a totality of the circumstances approach to the regulation carries the added benefit of providing district courts with a pathway that results in greater consistency in its application. Our research failed to uncover the “Hurst” opinion that Vontress relies on but that is of no moment as his argument is not persuasive in light of the basic tenets we are required to adhere to when called upon to interpret a provision. Am. Warrior, Inc. v. Board of Finney County Comm'rs, 319 Kan. 78, 81, 552 P.3d 1219 (2024) (courts apply the same rules to interpreting regulations as they do when interpreting a statute). In that case, the Supreme Court explained that regulatory interpretation and construction are reviewed without limitation, that courts follow the express language when it is plain and unambiguous, give common words their ordinary meanings, and do not add to or subtract from the text. They will resort to textual construction only when the language is ambiguous. 319 Kan. at 81.

From our reading, K.A.R. 44-16-104a(a) does not expressly provide for the exception Vontress advocates for, nor can it be said that its language is ambiguous and conceivably lends itself to that interpretation. Rather, the provision's clear and succinct terms state that “[e]ach inmate claim for personal injury shall be submitted to the facility and secretary of corrections within 10 calendar days of the claimed personal injury.“ (Emphasis added). K.A.R. 44-16-104a(a). The regulation does not provide any exception to its temporal restriction, thereby offering a strong indication that the Secretary intended for strict adherence to its terms as written.

K.A.R. 44-16-104a(a) derives its authority from K.S.A. 75-5251. This latter provision vests the Secretary of Corrections with “free access to the correctional institutions and parole offices at all times.” Notably absent is the mention that the Secretary's authority extends to those hospitals that provide medical services to inmates. K.S.A. 75-5251. Accordingly, when K.A.R. 44-16-104a(a) and K.S.A. 75-5251 are read in conjunction with one another, we are unable to identify any pathway that allows for a hospitalized inmate's 10-day clock to lie dormant until they return to a correctional facility.

We decline to engage in the interpretive machinations required to yield the outcome Vontress seeks. As an additional point, we note that he did not favor us with an explanation for his failure to address the district court's finding that he had the opportunity to file within the 10-day window yet neglected to capitalize upon it, nor did he provide much authority to this court as support for his contention that an exception is warranted. The regulation required that complaints be filed within 10 days of when an injury is sustained, and Vontress failed to follow that directive. Accordingly, we are unable to conclude that the district court erred in dismissing his claim as untimely. The decision of the district court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: