State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jayreece Tyrell JoneS, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jayreece Tyrell Jones appeals the award of jail credit in three cases and asserts the district court erred when it ordered he was not entitled to duplicative jail credit. While the appeal was pending, K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 became law. The State moved for supplemental briefing and argued K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 applied retrospectively to bar duplicative jail credit. We find that applying K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 retrospectively in this case would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we find the district court erred when it ordered that Jones was not entitled to duplicate credit.

21-CR-951

In November 2021, the State charged Jones with aggravated failure to appear on October 14, 2021, in case number 21-CR-951 (Case 1). On January 21, 2022, the State moved to revoke Jones’ bond for failure to obey all laws alleging that on January 19, 2022, Jones violated a protective order, resisted arrest, criminally damaged property, battered a law enforcement officer, and criminally trespassed.

As part of a global plea agreement, Jones pled no contest to aggravated failure to appear. On May 9, 2022, the district court sentenced Jones to 10 months’ imprisonment, suspended the sentence, and ordered 12 months’ probation.

22-CR-824

In December 2022, while he was on probation in Case 1, the State charged Jones with interference with a law enforcement officer, forgery, battery on a law enforcement officer, and violation of a protective order in case number 22-CR-824 (Case 2).

Jones pled guilty to interference with a law enforcement officer, forgery, battery of a law enforcement officer, and violation of a protective order. The district court placed him on probation for 18 months with an underlying prison term of 24 months followed by a consecutive sentence of 12 months in jail. The district court ordered that in the event the underlying sentence was ever imposed, it would run consecutive to the 10-month prison sentence in 21-CR-951.

23-CR-417

In May 2023, the State charged Jones with interference with law enforcement, speeding, driving while suspended, and failure to wear a seatbelt in 23-CR-417 (Case 3).

Pursuant to a plea agreement consolidating two cases, Jones pled guilty to interference with law enforcement and felony theft. The district court again placed Jones on probation, with an underlying prison sentence of 18 months. If the sentence was ever imposed, Jones was required to serve it consecutively to 21-CR-951 and 22-CR-824. Jones was released from custody onto probation in all three cases on October 30, 2023.

The District Court Revokes Probation

On July 24, 2024, the district court revoked Jones’ probation in all three cases and ordered him to serve the underlying sentences. Jones filed a motion requesting a determination of his jail credit because he believed the amount of time he spent in jail exceeded the number of days he was credited. Specifically, Jones asserted he should receive credit for 1,137 days of confinement. The State responded that Jones was not entitled to the credit he requested because that figure contemplated time already awarded in other cases and he was not entitled to duplicate credit. The State attached a jail credit tracking sheet created by the Saline County Jail but “readily admits the way the jail tracks credit is extremely misleading.”

Jones ultimately withdrew his motion. Shortly thereafter, the district court entered its journal entries on the probation violation hearing for all three cases, awarding the amount of time listed for each case on the jail credit tracking sheet the State submitted.

In Case 1, the district court awarded 339 days of jail credit, 131 days of credit in Case 2, and 174 days in Case 3. The entire amounts awarded in Cases 2 and 3, however, overlapped the credit granted in Case 1. The district court included a notation on each journal entry that Jones was “not entitled to duplicate credit.”

Jones timely appeals.

Amendments to K.S.A. 21-6615

Jones’ appeal requires interpretation of the jail credit provisions set forth in K.S.A. 21-6615, which has been amended multiple times since Jones committed his crimes.

At the time Jones committed his crimes, K.S.A. 21-6615(a) stated:

“In any criminal action in which the defendant is convicted, the judge, if the judge sentences the defendant to confinement, shall direct that for the purpose of computing defendant's sentence and parole eligibility and conditional release dates thereunder, that such sentence is to be computed from a date, to be specifically designated by the court in the sentencing order of the journal entry of judgment. Such date shall be established to reflect and shall be computed as an allowance for the time which the defendant has spent incarcerated pending the disposition of the defendant's case. In recording the commencing date of such sentence the date as specifically set forth by the court shall be used as the date of sentence and all good time allowances as are authorized by the secretary of corrections are to be allowed on such sentence from such date as though the defendant were actually incarcerated in any of the institutions of the state correctional system.”

In State v. Hopkins, 317 Kan. 652, 652, 537 P.3d 845 (2023), the Supreme Court overruled nearly 45 years of precedent and held “that the award of credit under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6615(a) is not limited to time spent ‘solely’ in custody for the charge for which the defendant is being sentenced.” It concluded that “the obvious and plain meaning of the words chosen by the Legislature” indicated that a defendant was entitled to “jail time credit for all time spent in custody pending the disposition of his or her case.” 317 Kan. at 657.

The Legislature quickly amended K.S.A. 21-6615 in response to Hopkins. See L. 2024, ch. 96, §§ 7, 13. Effective May 23, 2024, the amended provision included the following italicized language:

“(a)(1) In any criminal action in which the defendant is convicted, the judge, if the judge sentences the defendant to confinement, shall direct that for the purpose of computing defendant's sentence and parole eligibility and conditional release dates thereunder, that such sentence is to be computed from a date, to be specifically designated by the court in the sentencing order of the journal entry of judgment. Such date shall be established to reflect and shall be computed as an allowance for the time that the defendant has spent incarcerated pending the disposition of the defendant's case. The defendant shall be entitled to have credit applied for each day spent incarcerated. In recording the commencing date of such sentence the date as specifically set forth by the

court shall be used as the date of sentence and all good time allowances as are authorized by the secretary of corrections are to be allowed on such sentence from such date as though the defendant were actually incarcerated in any of the institutions of the state correctional system.

(2) When computing the defendant's sentence, the following shall not be considered time spent incarcerated pending disposition of the defendant's case:

(A) Any time awarded as credit in another case when consecutive sentences are imposed on a defendant; or

(B) any time spent incarcerated in another jurisdiction if no hold has been issued in such jurisdiction for the case being sentenced.“ (Emphases added.) K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615(a).

In practical effect, the 2024 amendment both codified Hopkins and set forth a method for calculating a jail credit award to ensure that defendants received one, and only one, day of credit for each day.

Not long after the provision was amended the Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Ervin, 320 Kan. 287, 311-12, 566 P.3d 481 (2025). It interpreted K.S.A. 21-6615(a)—not K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615(a)—to require “the district judge to award one day of credit for each day that Ervin was incarcerated pending disposition of this case regardless of whether he received an allowance for some or all that time against a sentence in another case.”

The Legislature responded to Ervin with the passage of House Bill 2444 (2026). As a result, effective July 1, 2026, K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 stated, in relevant part:

“(d)(1) When consecutive sentences are imposed on a defendant, days spent in custody that are attributable to more than one case shall be credited only once against the aggregated consecutive term. The sentencing court may allocate such days to one case or apportion such days among cases, but the same days shall not be applied more than once to reduce multiple portions of consecutive terms.

(2) The provisions of this subsection shall apply to:

(A) All sentences, whether pronounced before, on or after July 1, 2026, and to all computations of jail credit by the department of corrections and the courts; and

(B) any case posture, including, but not limited to, direct appeals, probation revocation proceedings, motions to correct illegal sentence, habeas corpus actions and actions under K.S.A. 60-1507, and amendments thereto, pending on or filed after July 1, 2026.

(3) Any judicial interpretations regarding application of jail time credit to consecutive sentences in conflict with or inconsistent with this section and the amendments to this section by this act are superseded to the extent of such conflict or inconsistency.” K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d).

“It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute operates prospectively unless its language clearly indicates that the legislature intended it to operate retroactively.” State v. Ford, 262 Kan. 206, 208, 936 P.2d 255 (1997). There is, however, an exception when the statutory change is “merely procedural or remedial in nature.” 262 Kan. at 208.

The language of K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615(d)(2) clearly indicates an intention that the statute apply retroactively. Even still, a retrospective law may not apply if it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution or violates a party's vested right. See State v. Patton, 315 Kan. 1, 6, 503 P.3d 1022 (2022) (“[T]he Ex Post Facto Clause ․ generally prohibits the ․ retroactive increase in the severity of punishment for an offense.”); White v. State, 308 Kan. 491, 499, 421 P.3d 718 (2018) (changes to procedural rules cannot apply retroactively if effect eradicates vested right).

Because K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 became effective during the pendency of this appeal, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties that addressed whether the statute should apply retroactively.

Standard of Review

“[T]he question of retroactive application of a statute presents an issue of law” subject to unlimited review. See White, 308 Kan. at 498.

Discussion

Application of K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Under the United States Constitution, “No State shall ․ pass any ․ ex post facto Law.” Art. I, § 10. An ex post facto law is that which either establishes a punishment for conduct that was not punishable when it was committed or when it increases the punishment beyond what was allowed when the conduct occurred. State v. Davidson, 314 Kan. 88, 90, 495 P.3d 9 (2021). Since the Kansas Constitution does not contain an Ex Post Facto Clause, “this court is bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution.” 314 Kan. at 91.

In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S. Ct. 960, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981), the Court held that “a law need not impair a ‘vested right’ to violate the ex post facto prohibition.” Rather, “an ex post facto violation occurs when a statute applies to acts committed before the statute went into effect and applying the statute disadvantages the defendant.” Patton, 315 Kan. at 15. Of the three recognized ways a law may disadvantage a defendant, only one is relevant in Jones’ cases: whether the statute “increase[s] the punishment for a crime after its commission.” 315 Kan. at 15. “Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30.

A. The State's Arguments

The State contends there is no ex post facto violation. Rather, K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 simply “ensures that the rule against duplicative credit for consecutive sentences, as established by caselaw in effect at the time [the defendant] committed his crime, remains the law.” The State asserts application of the amendment is particularly beneficial because it “permits one day of credit for each day in jail, instead of potentially barring all credit simply because multiple cases were pending.” According to the State, changes to jail credit only affect when a sentence begins, not the overall length of the punishment imposed by the district court. Therefore, no ex post facto violation exists.

B. Jones’ Arguments

Jones asserts that K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 is designed to “deprive individuals of jail credit that they would otherwise be entitled to.” Thus, operation of the provision extends the amount of time that offenders are incarcerated, constituting an increased punishment that results in an ex post facto violation. As support for that proposition, he directs us to Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 445-46, 117 S. Ct. 891, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1997) (taking away provisional overcrowding credits that a person would otherwise be entitled to violates the Ex Post Facto Clause). In that case, Lynce was sentenced to 22 years in prison. At the time of his conviction, Lynce was entitled to early release credits, including some provisional credits based on overcrowding. After Lynce was released as a result of all of his credits, Florida retroactively applied a statute that canceled the provisional overcrowding credits. As a result, Lynce was rearrested and required to serve additional time.

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court found that the statute was an ex post facto violation because it “did more than simply remove a mechanism that created an opportunity for early release for a class of prisoners whose release was unlikely; rather, it made ineligible for early release a class of prisoners who were previously eligible—including some, like petitioner, who had actually been released.” 519 U.S. at 447.

Similarly, Jones cites Weaver to support his argument that the application of K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 and the corresponding removal of duplicative jail credit is an ex post facto violation. There, the United States Supreme Court held that a “reduction in gain-time accumulation lengthens the period that someone in petitioner's position must spend in prison” and disadvantaged Weaver by reducing the opportunity to shorten his prison term simply through the practice of good conduct. 450 U.S. at 33-34. The Kansas Supreme Court has also found that the reduction of earned good-time credits is an ex post facto violation. Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, 417, 960 P.2d 227 (1998).

In short, it is Jones’ position that applying K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 to deny credit for each day spent in custody pending disposition of his cases, “regardless of whether he received an allowance for some or all that time against a sentence in another case,” increases the time he must serve in prison. See Ervin, 320 Kan. at 312. Accordingly, the statute creates an ex post facto violation.

C. An ex post facto violation would occur if K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 is applied.

The State seeks to apply K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 to acts committed before the statute went into effect. Jones’ case was on appeal at that time which fulfills the first prong of the ex post facto analysis; the statute must apply retrospectively. The only remaining question is whether application of the statute disadvantages Jones in some respect. Stated another way, whether it increases his punishment after the commission of his criminal offense. Patton, 315 Kan. at 15.

Hopkins and Ervin interpreted the version of K.S.A. 21-6615 in effect when Jones committed his crimes. Hopkins held that a jail credit award “is not limited to time spent ‘solely’ in custody.” 317 Kan. at 652. Ervin extended that holding to consecutive sentences, “regardless of whether [a defendant] received an allowance for some or all that time against a sentence in another case.” 320 Kan. at 312. The court reaffirmed that position in State v. Zongker, 322 Kan. 137, 141, 586 P.3d 769 (2026), noting that K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6615, which was enacted before Ervin, “shows that the Legislature understood that Hopkins’ plain-language interpretation could require duplicative credit and acted to bar it. If anything, the amendment is evidence that Ervin read the statute correctly.” Based on our reading of Hopkins and Ervin, the statute in effect when Jones committed his crimes required an award of jail credit in each of his cases regardless of any allowance on his other cases.

Viewed through this lens, Lynce and Weaver are persuasive. In Lynce, the law stripped the defendant of provisional overcrowding credits—and his freedom—he received before the law took effect. Undeniably, this resulted in a disadvantage to Lynce; he was required to return to prison and continue serving his prison term. 519 U.S. at 438-39, 447. Although Weaver was slightly different in that he had not been released, he was eligible for substantial good-time credit. The subsequent legislative reduction extended his original sentence by over two years. The Weaver court's ex post facto analysis was based, in part, on the fact that “a prisoner's eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the defendant's decision to plea bargain and the judge's calculation of the sentence to be imposed.” 450 U.S. at 32. In both cases, the result was “increase[d] punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.” 450 U.S. at 30.

We are unpersuaded by the State's argument that a jail credit award does not affect the sentence or, in other words, the punishment. As in Lynce and Weaver, denying Jones the duplicative jail credit that K.S.A. 21-6615 (Self 2023) required serves to lengthen his incarceration. We find no reasonable distinction whether the sentence is increased on the front end—by altering the start date of the sentence—or on the back end as in Lynce and Weaver. In our view, delaying the start date of a sentence beyond what the statute required by denying Jones all the jail credit for which he was entitled disadvantaged him by “increas[ing] the punishment for a crime after its commission.” See Patton, 315 Kan. at 15. As a result, we find that application of K.S.A. 2026 Supp. 21-6615 to Jones’ case would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Given our conclusion on that issue, it is unnecessary to address the parties’ vested rights analysis. Under Ervin, the district court was required to credit Jones for each day he was incarcerated in each case “regardless of whether he received an allowance for some or all that time against a sentence in another case.” 320 Kan. at 312. The district court erred by finding that Jones was not entitled to duplicative credit. Accordingly, we will follow Ervin’s lead and vacate the district court's determination of jail time credit. Jones’ case is remanded with directions to enter an amended journal entry of judgment that credits him for all the days he was incarcerated pending disposition of his cases, or for a hearing if necessary.

Sentences vacated in part and case remanded with directions.

Per Curiam: