State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Caprice Davis, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Caprice Davis appeals the district court's decision to revoke her probation and impose a controlling 39-month prison sentence after she committed the crime of aggravated escape from custody and violated the terms of her probation in other ways. We granted Davis’ motion for summary disposition under Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 48). After carefully reviewing the record, the arguments in Davis’ motion, and the State's response, we affirm the district court's judgment.

This appeal consolidates review of the district court's decisions in two separate criminal cases and is intertwined with its ruling in a third.

In the first case, Davis pleaded no contest to aggravated assault. The district court conducted a sentencing hearing in May 2024 for that offense; it imposed a 12-month prison term but then suspended that sentence and ordered Davis to serve 12 months of probation. Over the next year, Davis violated the conditions of her probation several times, receiving two- and three-day jail sanctions for those violations. The court extended Davis’ probation for an additional 12 months.

In the second case, Davis pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl. In March 2025—a few weeks after Davis completed her three-day jail sanction in the first case—the district court imposed a 24-month prison sentence for that offense but again suspended that sentence and ordered 12 months of probation. As part of this probation, the court ordered Davis to complete a mandatory residential treatment program run by the Sedgwick County Department of Corrections. Unfortunately, she did not comply with this requirement: In June 2025, Davis attempted to leave the residential treatment program and was incalcitrant with program staff. Corrections staff agreed to allow her a second chance at completing the program, but she forcibly escaped from the program the following month, leading to the third criminal case.

In the third case, Davis pleaded guilty to aggravated escape from custody and admitted that this crime (and the conduct leading to the crime) violated the terms of her probation in her earlier cases.

The district court held a combined sentencing and dispositional hearing for all three cases in November 2025. At the hearing, the State argued that Davis’ probation should be revoked given the difficulties she had experienced over the last year and a half. Davis sought another opportunity for probation. Davis’ defense attorney stated that she had an “extensive history of mental health” issues, including depression, ADHD, and schizophrenia, and that she left the residential facility because “she has trouble controlling her emotions when she's not on her medications.” Her attorney explained that Davis had held two jobs before her most recent arrest, that her mother had recently suffered a diabetic coma, and that Davis was willing to live with her mother and address her mental-health and drug issues.

The district court imposed a 15-month prison sentence for aggravated escape from custody and denied Davis’ request for probation in that case. This ruling is not before us.

After reciting the unsuccessful history of Davis’ probation since May 2024, the district court found no reason to suppose that further probation would be successful in the first and second cases. It thus revoked her probation in those cases, although it modified the duration of Davis’ prison sentence in the second case from 24 to 12 months. Under Special Sentencing Rule 9, which applies when a defendant commits new felonies while on felony probation, the court ordered that Davis serve the prison terms in all three cases consecutively for a controlling 39-month prison sentence. Davis now appeals the revocation of her probation in her first and second cases.

Probation is an act of judicial leniency afforded a defendant as a privilege rather than a right. State v. Gary, 282 Kan. 232, 237, 144 P.3d 634 (2006). Once a probation violation has been established, the decision to modify the terms of probation or to revoke probation altogether is vested in the sound discretion of the district court, guided by K.S.A. 22-3716. See State v. Brown, 51 Kan. App. 2d 876, 879-80, 357 P.3d 296 (2015), rev. denied 304 Kan. 1018 (2016). Appellate courts will only reverse that decision if it constituted an abuse of the court's discretion—that is, when the judgment is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or based on a legal or factual error. State v. Levy, 313 Kan. 232, 237, 485 P.3d 605 (2021). Davis bears the burden of showing that an error occurred here. See State v. Stafford, 296 Kan. 25, 45, 290 P.3d 562 (2012). She has not done so.

On appeal, Davis appears to acknowledge that the district court had a legal and factual basis to revoke her probation, as the district court had already imposed sanctions in both cases for noncompliance with her probation terms and Davis had committed a new crime in July 2025 when she escaped from the residential treatment program. See K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(1)(C), (c)(7)(C). But she argues that this decision was nevertheless unreasonable, as she had turned a corner at the time of the November 2025 hearing and was making improvements—maintaining employment, seeking to support her mother, and staying in contact with her probation officer.

Our review of the transcript from the November 2025 hearing shows that the district court appreciated Davis’ report that she was now able to receive and benefit from further treatment. But the court was also aware that Davis had made similar claims earlier in the cases and yet was repeatedly unsuccessful while previously on probation. This lack of success manifested itself most prominently in her recent aggravated-escape-from-custody conviction, when she escaped the Department of Corrections residential treatment program. In light of these facts, we cannot say the district court acted unreasonably when it revoked Davis’ probation and ordered her to serve the modified sentence.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: