Micah Daniel Collins, Appellant, v. Kansas Department of Revenue, Appellee. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Collins appeals the suspension of his driving privileges by arguing officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.

Factual and Procedural History

This is Micah Daniel Collins’ appeal from a district court's approval of the administrative suspension of his driving license. Collins claims the district court erred when it held the arresting officer had good reason to extend this traffic stop, and investigate for driving under the influence of alcohol. Our review of the record reveals no errors and we affirm.

An early morning encounter with the police ends poorly for Collins.

Early one morning in February 2024, an Ottawa Police Department officer was on patrol when he came across a truck driven by Collins. It was sometime between 1:30 and 2 a.m. After the officer saw Collins fail to signal a left-hand turn, he began following Collins. While following Collins, the officer noted Collins failed to use his signal when making another turn, and then saw Collins fail to use his signal before 100 feet of turning again. He saw no other traffic violations or indications of impairment.

The officer stopped Collins for failing to use his turn signal. The officer later testified that Collins “swerved a little bit to dodge one of the parked vehicles that he almost struck.” The officer approached the driver's side of the truck and asked for Collins’ license and insurance. The officer later testified that within the first couple of minutes interacting with Collins, he smelled alcohol, however, he was not sure who was giving off the odor since there were two other passengers in the truck. Collins told the officer he had just picked up his passengers from a bar.

The officer returned to his patrol car to check for any outstanding warrants and there were none. The officer returned to the truck and had Collins step out of the truck to see if the alcohol smell was coming from Collins. The officer told Collins he wanted to make sure Collins was safe to drive. The officer later testified it was his intent—at that time—to investigate Collins for DUI. The officer agreed that Collins had no trouble getting out of the truck and said he noticed Collins’ eyes were bloodshot. He also testified that Collins admitted he had been drinking after he exited the truck.

The officer then walked Collins to the back of the truck and “explained to him the different tests” he was going to have Collins perform. The officer had Collins complete some sobriety tests, which Collins did not pass. The officer arrested Collins, took him to the station, provided Collins the implied consent advisory, and had Collins perform a breath test. The breath test indicated Collins’ blood alcohol concentration was 0.091.

The officer said the traffic violation played no role in his decision to investigate Collins for DUI. The officer testified that the traffic stop became an investigatory stop when he smelled “the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle.” He also agreed that his observation that Collins almost hit a parked car upon his initiation of the traffic stop along with Collins’ admission that they had come from a bar, played into the totality of the circumstances supporting his decision to investigate for DUI. The officer added that Collins had told him that he had picked the passengers up from a bar, but did not tell him that he was drinking at the bar.

Due to an over-the-limit breath test, the Department of Revenue suspended Collins’ driving privileges. Collins requested an administrative hearing, and a hearing officer later affirmed the license suspension. Collins then sought judicial review, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop.

At his bench trial, the officer testified about his observations and the traffic stop. The State also admitted the officer's body cam and patrol car recordings into evidence. In its memorandum decision, the district court was guided by two cases: Rosendahl v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 310 Kan. 474, 447 P.3d 347 (2019), and Fisher v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 58 Kan. App. 2d 421, 471 P.3d 710 (2020). The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the following facts:

• The smell of alcohol from inside the truck;

• Collins’ admission that he had picked up the passengers from a bar;

• Collins’ bloodshot eyes; and

• Collins’ admission to drinking.

The district court also found the officer's dash cam video “shows [Collins] pull over to the curb after the officer initiated his red lights, and park” and that while “[Collins’] vehicle [came] close to hitting a parked car ․ it did park appropriately.”

In this appeal of his driving license suspension, Collins argues the district court erred in finding the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend this traffic stop from a simple failure to use a turn signal into a DUI investigation.

The rules that guide us are well established.

A review of a driving license suspension is governed by the Kansas Judicial Review Act, K.S.A. 8-1020, and K.S.A. 8-259. See Jarvis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 312 Kan. 156, 162-63, 473 P.3d 869 (2020). Such a review permits this court to consider whether an officer's encounter with the suspended driver was unlawful. 312 Kan. at 167-69. Because Collins seeks judicial review of the agency's decision to suspend his license, he bears “ ‘the burden to show that the decision of the agency should be set aside.’ ” Rosendahl, 310 Kan. at 479; see also K.S.A. 8-1020(k).

In turn, we review a district court's conclusion that an officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop for substantial competent evidence. Jarvis, 312 Kan. at 173. Substantial competent evidence refers to legal and relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as being adequate to support a conclusion. Geer v. Eby, 309 Kan. 182, 190, 432 P.3d 1001 (2019). In our review of the factual findings, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. State v. Younger, 320 Kan. 98, 115, 564 P.3d 744 (2025). When the facts are generally uncontroverted, appellate review becomes a question of law over whether reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop beyond the purpose of the original traffic infraction. Swank v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 294 Kan. 871, 881, 281 P.3d 135 (2012).

We see no error here.

Collins argues the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to conduct a DUI investigation. He does not challenge the initial stop, or the officer's observations that Collins committed at least two traffic infractions of failing to properly signal his turn. Basically, we must decide whether the officer exceeded the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by extending a valid traffic stop into an improper investigative detention. See State v. Jimenez, 308 Kan. 315, 316, 420 P.3d 464 (2018).

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable government searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; State v. McDonald, 318 Kan. 486, 487, 544 P.3d 156 (2024). “Traffic stops are seizures under the Fourth Amendment and are subject to its limitations.” State v. Schooler, 308 Kan. 333, 344, 419 P.3d 1164 (2018). Our Supreme Court has set the scope of a traffic stop that complies with the Fourth Amendment: such “encounters begin when the vehicle is pulled over and end when the officer has no further need to control the scene and tells the occupants they are free to leave.” Jimenez, 308 Kan. at 316. The seizure remains lawful as long as unrelated inquiries do not “measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009).

An officer “may not conduct nonconsensual inquiries unrelated to the mission in a way that prolongs the stop—without the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Jimenez, 308 Kan. at 323-24. Even so, officers do not have to perform their duties with a “blind eye,” nor do they have to disregard information that may lead them to suspect independent criminal activity to justify further detention. 308 Kan. at 324. As the Jimenez court stated, there is a time during a stop that “is temptingly seen as a bountiful opportunity for unrelated criminal investigation, especially drug enforcement.” 308 Kan. at 316. It is during this time when a person's Fourth Amendment rights are typically implicated.

Every traffic stop is unique. But it is generally expected that an officer can make inquiries about a person's driver's license; check for warrants; inspect the registration and proof of insurance; and “may also take ‘negligibly burdensome precautions’ to complete the stop safely.” Jimenez, 308 Kan. at 316-17. Officers can extend a traffic stop if they have reasonable suspicion, i.e., “ ‘a particularized and objective basis” for suspecting the person stopped’ is engaged in criminal activity.” Jimenez, 308 Kan. at 324.

That particularized objective basis is what we look for in this record. To detain Collins beyond the scope of the traffic stop the officer had to have formed a reasonable suspicion that Collins was involved in criminal activity. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-55, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015); Jimenez, 308 Kan. at 316. Reasonable suspicion means less than probable cause but requires more than an unparticularized hunch or suspicion. 308 Kan. at 324.

In our review, seeking evidence that creates a reasonable suspicion, we examine “the totality of the circumstances in the view of a trained law enforcement officer,” which “ ‘allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them.’ ” State v. Lowery, 308 Kan. 359, Syl. ¶ 4, 366, 420 P.3d 456 (2018). “In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the court must judge the officer's actions in light of common sense and ordinary human experience” and must give “ ‘due weight’ to the factual inferences drawn” by law enforcement officers. 308 Kan. 359, Syl. ¶ 4, 366.

This record shows that during the early morning hours when the bars are closing, this officer saw Collins commit two traffic infractions: turns made at two intersections and no turn signal was used either time. The police video recording of their encounter shows Collins’ vehicle pull over to the curb, and park after the officer started his red lights. The officer's vehicle was following closely behind Collins’ vehicle. The video also shows Collins’ vehicle coming close to hitting a parked car, but it did park safely. When the officer approached, he smelled alcohol coming from inside of Collins’ vehicle. Collins admitted he had been to a bar but claimed it was only to pick up his passengers. Collins’ eyes were bloodshot and he admitted to drinking. Given these circumstances, a reasonable officer would conduct field sobriety testing.

We do not resolve any dispute about the facts; that task is up to the district court to perform where the testimony is heard. We will not reweigh the evidence. We hold that the officer here had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop. We affirm the district court's approval of the administrative suspension of Collins’ driving privileges.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: