State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Chelsea Dawn Estep, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Chelsea D. Estep, convicted of aggravated child endangerment, possession of a narcotic, and possession of drug paraphernalia, appeals her convictions. She claims the district court abused its discretion in denying her mistrial motion and that there was insufficient evidence to support her aggravated child endangerment conviction. We are not so persuaded, and thus we affirm.

During a search of Estep's residence, the police find drugs and children.

In March 2023, the Topeka Police Department executed a search warrant of Estep's home. She lived there with her boyfriend, her two children–aged 9 and 11—and two roommates: Steven, who lived in a converted porch area with access to the backyard, and Amber, who stayed sporadically with Steven.

The search began when about a dozen officers entered the house to conduct a protective sweep of the premises, lifting beds and throwing items in the process. The officers wanted to make sure the scene was safe and secure. After the protective sweep, another officer recorded video footage to document living conditions, including methamphetamine and smoking devices within plain view of the master and porch bedrooms. The recording showed the house in general disarray, with food, clothing, boxes, and household items strewn about and in piles.

A thorough search of Estep's bedroom produced an additional bag of methamphetamine, a glass pipe, two smoking devices, and a mirror with methamphetamine on it. In total, officers seized over 2.25 grams of methamphetamine from Estep's residence. The State charged Estep with one count each of aggravated endangering a child, possession of a narcotic, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

During a recorded interrogation, Estep explained that all the people coming in and out of her house stemmed from her boyfriend's absence, her collection of bicycle parts, and her practice of feeding and housing others. She added that she does not know many of her guests, even though they play with her children and sleep on the couch. She stated she was the only person in the house using methamphetamine and that she stored it in her top dresser drawer. Estep also acknowledged having narcotics in the home with children was problematic.

Estep's brief comment recorded by the police causes a motion for a mistrial.

After her arrest, Estep was questioned by the police. The video recording of the session was four hours long. Even though the entire recording was admitted into evidence by the court, 13 minutes of the recording was played for the jury. The portion the jury heard during the trial included Estep responding, “I don't know why people are saying they bought drugs from me, because they didn't․. And I don't know who or what is saying something about my house like that, but it's not right.”

Estep's counsel moved for a mistrial declaration by the court, arguing that the parties agreed Estep's statement would be redacted. He explained he did not personally edit the video but that the parties had selected specific timestamps to redact, including the one the jury heard. Later, during the jury instructions conference, Estep's counsel reiterated that the parties watched the video together and agreed the statement should be redacted. The State acknowledged Estep's statement “possibly should have been redacted.”

The district court denied Estep's motion for a mistrial, reasoning that counsel (1) failed to redact the footage before trial despite reviewing the video during discovery; (2) had participated in the redaction during the trial; and (3) had failed to object to the admission of the video when it was reintroduced despite having an opportunity to review. As the court observed, a “great big pause in the middle of the video” established the video was partially redacted as requested. The district court acknowledged the State should have redacted the statement and suggested a limiting instruction might correct any error.

We note that the court did not articulate the usual two-step analysis used by courts coping with such issues: is there a fundamental failure of the proceeding, and if so, can it be cured?

In response to the district court's findings, Estep's counsel stated, “I did not object the second [time the video was introduced], based on what I believed was redacted.” The district court concluded, “so we will provide a limiting instruction with regard to [Estep's statement].”

After further reflection, the district court subsequently declined to provide a limiting instruction. It explained Estep's statement constituted mere knowledge or absence of a mistake, and that she was not accused with drug distribution. The district court found that by not giving a limiting instruction, it would avoid confusion. The judge said it would be more prejudicial by “bring[ing] more attention to [the statement] then I think it's value has just as it [is] said.” The judge further stated, “In fact, the statement itself is she's kind of exonerating herself in some ways by saying, ‘I don't know why people would think I was selling.’ ”

The jury convicts Estep.

At trial, Estep admitted to possessing the methamphetamine in her drawer but denied that the mirror and pipe were there before the search. She also stated her children were not exposed to her drug use, claiming they were unaware of her use before the search. Estep explained “there's a reason that my house was the house 11 kids came to” every weekend.

During closing arguments, the State emphasized Estep's knowledge of the methamphetamine in her home and reminded the jury that two bags of methamphetamine were in the porch that the children passed through to get to the backyard. The State suggested that because children do not remain in specific rooms, they could have been exposed to methamphetamine and paraphernalia anytime. It concluded that methamphetamine in the home put the children “in a situation in which their life, body, or health was endangered.”

Estep's counsel responded,

“There was no evidence submitted of neglect. There was no evidence submitted the children were not fed. There was no evidence submitted that they were not taken care of. There was no evidence submitted that they were not getting to school on time. There was no evidence submitted that they were [not] having regular lives.”

The jury convicted Estep on all three counts. The district court sentenced Estep to a suspended 17 months’ imprisonment term, 18 months’ supervised probation, and 12 months’ postrelease supervision.

Estep now appeals the denial of her mistrial motion along with her aggravated child endangerment conviction.

We must follow well-established rules in resolving these two issues.

Under K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c), a district court may determine that a mistrial is necessary if “prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to either the defendant or the prosecution.” Prior cases interpret this statute to establish a two-step test:

“First, the trial court must determine if there was some fundamental failure of the proceeding. If so, the trial court moves to the second step and assesses whether it is possible to continue without an injustice. In other words, the trial court must decide if the prejudicial conduct's damaging effect can be removed or mitigated by an admonition, jury instruction, or other action. If not, the trial court must determine whether the degree of prejudice results in an injustice and, if so, declare a mistrial.” State v. Sean, 306 Kan. 963, 987, 399 P.3d 168 (2017).

In other words, is there a fundamental failure, and, if so, can it be cured? A district court addresses the second step only if it finds that a fundamental failure occurred. Sean, 306 Kan. at 987-88.

For our part, we review a district court's decision denying a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Barlett, 308 Kan. 78, 88, 418 P.3d 1253 (2018). The standard is applied in two parts. First, this court determines whether the district court “ ‘abuse[d] its discretion when deciding if there was a fundamental failure in the proceeding.’ ” Sean, 306 Kan. at 988. Next, we decide whether the district court “ ‘abuse[d] its discretion when deciding whether the conduct resulted in prejudice that could not be cured or mitigated through jury admonition or instruction, resulting in an injustice.’ ” 306 Kan. at 988-89.

In Kansas jurisprudence, it is fundamental that a district court abuses its discretion if its decision is “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable,” based on an error of law, or based on an error of fact. State v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 309 Kan. 113, 126-27, 431 P.3d 850 (2018) (citing State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 57-58, 371 P.3d 862 [2016]). This court “ ‘may examine the entire record’ ” when conducting its review of a district court's ruling on a mistrial motion. Harris, 313 Kan. at 585 (quoting State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 981, 270 P.3d 1142 [2012]). The party asserting the claim bears the burden of showing the abuse of discretion. State v. Thomas, 307 Kan. 733, 739, 415 P.3d 430 (2018).

We see in this record no fundamental failure of these proceedings that would compel a declaration of a mistrial.

The jury viewed the recording where Estep stated, “I don't know why people are saying they bought drugs from me, because they didn't․ I don't know who or what is saying something about my house like that, but it's not right.” The parties agree and the judge found that the statement should have been redacted under K.S.A. 60-455.

But Estep does not clearly explain what prejudice she suffered from the court denying a mistrial declaration. Instead of an explanation, she simply asserts that, “[o]nce the jury heard Chelsea deny law enforcement's accusations that she sold drugs out of her home, there was no way for her to get a fair trial on a charge of child endangerment.” What accusations? Estep was not charged with selling drugs. Does the jury seeing this statement create a fundamental failure of the proceedings?

Regrettably, the district court made no clear analysis on this point. The court did, however, implicitly, through its denial of the motion, hold that the jury hearing her denial statement was not a fundamental error. First, the court denied the mistrial request. The court suggested that the error could be “solve[d]” with a limiting instruction. But, upon reflection, the court subsequently declined to give such an instruction. The judge said that a special jury instruction would be “more prejudicial than just the statement itself” as such an instruction would draw additional attention to Estep's statement.

We note that there was no limiting order issued by the court here, and thus we are not dealing with a violation of an order prohibiting the admission of some evidence. Instead, in our view, the district court was dealing with the inadvertent admission of immaterial evidence to the jury. Estep was not charged with selling drugs, and her statement regarding selling drugs was not material to the charges brought against her. Our conclusion is supported by the district court's finding that Estep's statement was merely a statement of “knowledge, or absence of mistake.” This finding signals to us that it was the district court's view that K.S.A. 60-455 did not apply to her statement. A limiting jury instruction would therefore be unnecessary and prejudicial, as admitting the video was not an error. We see no abuse of discretion here, as the court considered the statement's content, the statement's value, and its impact on the outcome of the proceedings. This is not reversible error.

We turn to Estep's insufficient evidence claim

Estep contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain her conviction for aggravated child endangerment. Relying on the ruling in State v. Cummings, 297 Kan. 716, 305 P.3d 556 (2013), she specifically claims that the State presented little evidence showing the children were at risk of “imminent peril.” According to Estep, the evidence failed to support even the lesser charge of child endangerment. She does not challenge the vagueness of K.S.A. 21-5601, the child endangerment statute. Relying on Cummings, Estep argues that, because proving imminent peril is an essential element of the misdemeanor crime, it must also be an essential element of the felony charge. Estep contends that because there is no evidence that these children were in imminent peril, she was wrongfully convicted.

In dealing with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we decide “ ‘whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, ․ a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Chandler, 307 Kan. 657, 668, 414 P.3d 713 (2018). In making this decision we do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations. See 307 Kan. at 668. This high burden warrants reversal “only when the testimony is so incredible that no reasonable fact-finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Meggerson, 312 Kan. 238, 247, 474 P.3d 761 (2020).

To sustain Estep's aggravated child endangerment conviction under K.S.A. 21-5601(b)(1), the State must prove that she “[r]ecklessly caus[ed] or permitted a child under the age of 18 years to be placed in a situation in which the child's life, body or health is endangered.” The elements listed in the jury instructions accurately reflected the statute and further provided: 8

“A defendant acts recklessly when the defendant consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that certain circumstances exist or a result of the defendant's actions will follow. This act by the defendant disregarding the risk must be a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would use in the same situation.”

The district court instructed the jury that it should consider and weigh all admitted evidence and that it may “use common knowledge and experience.” Juries decide the facts not courts of appeal. And child endangerment prosecutions under K.S.A. 21-5601(b)(1) are extremely fact sensitive. See State v. Sharp, 28 Kan. App. 2d 128, 130, 13 P.3d 29 (2000).

We decline Estep's invitation to extend the ruling in Cummings.

As noted above, Estep relies on State v. Cummings, 297 Kan. at 716, a case that does not deal with aggravated child endangerment, as support. The defendant in Cummings owned a daycare center. Cummings placed a 13-month-old child in a car seat to nap, latching only the top strap. She later heard the child cry for several minutes but did not check on the child for over two hours. She later discovered the child dead from asphyxiation. The State charged Cummings with involuntary manslaughter and endangering a child. Cummings appealed after a jury convicted her on both counts, arguing that her failure to secure the top strap was insufficient to show she endangered a child. She claimed the court's instruction was wrong, and the State was required:

“[T]o prove she knew, at the time she placed the child in the car seat, that a reasonable probability the child's life, body, or health would be injured or endangered was ‘something more than a faint or remote possibility’ and that there was ‘a likelihood that harm to the child [would] result or that the child [would] be placed in imminent peril.’ ” 297 Kan. at 720.

Cummings contended that the court's jury instruction was clearly erroneous as it failed to explain the State's burden.

Ultimately, our Supreme Court held that “the term ‘reasonable probability’ creates an ambiguity for the jury as to the level of risk that constitutes criminal conduct.” 297 Kan. at 729. It explained that the child endangerment statute was not so broad that criminal liability attached to “ ‘every circumstance which would arguably protect children’ ” and that probability and foreseeability were distinct standards. 297 Kan. at 729, 732. The Cummings court reversed the lower courts and remanded for a new trial. 297 Kan. at 733. The opinion makes no mention of felony aggravated child endangerment, the charge made here.

Basically, Estep asks us to extend the ruling in Cummings by finding that an aggravated child endangerment conviction may be sustained only if the State establishes that a child is in “imminent peril.” She suggests that if K.S.A. 21-5601(a)—the child endangerment statute—requires showing a likelihood of imminent peril, then it logically follows that K.S.A. 21-5601(b)(1)—the aggravated child endangerment statute—requires a showing of certain imminent peril. According to Estep, the State failed to prove she placed children in imminent peril. We decline to adopt Estep's position on this point. We will not rewrite the statute. We, instead, look at the record.

Here, given our standard of review, we find that the State presented evidence sufficient to show that Estep's actions were a “gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would use in the same situation” and actually endangered children. First, 11 children were in a house where they were exposed to methamphetamine in plain view in multiple rooms, giving them unfettered access to the drug. As Estep herself admitted, such exposure is problematic. Indeed, there is no reasonable way to expose children to methamphetamine without also putting them at risk of being irreparably harmed by this powerful drug. Methamphetamine is inherently dangerous.

More significantly, the real risk to the children went beyond exposure to methamphetamine. Drugs available for usage draws drug users and abusers. Drug paraphernalia was in plain view in several rooms, suggesting open drug use. A number of people whom Estep herself considered to be strangers were in and out of this residence. All of these facts imply that this was an unpredictable environment where even Estep could not reasonably know who posed a risk to the children. Lastly, the number of children present during the weekends, when coupled with the other facts, suggests that Estep could not and did not maintain consistent supervision of the children despite her knowledge that methamphetamine was in the house. Any reasonable person would have understood that Estep was violating K.S.A. 21-5601(b)(1).

To sum up, the evidence in this record is sufficient to sustain Estep's aggravated child endangerment conviction. By her own admission, Estep exposed nearly a dozen children to an environment where methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were readily accessible, where unknown individuals regularly came and went, and where food and other household items were scattered across the floor. There was no need for a mistrial in this case. And there is sufficient evidence to find Estep guilty as charged.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: