State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Amanda Jean White, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Amanda Jean White directly appeals her conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery after a jury trial. She claims several evidentiary trial errors, and also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, which together denied her right to a fair trial. After a careful review of the record, we affirm White's conviction.

Factual and Procedural History

White was married to B.K. for about 20 years before divorcing. On or about Friday, October 6, 2023, White spent the night at B.K.’s apartment with their teenage daughter. White stayed the weekend.

By Saturday, B.K. and White were fighting about their relationship, which continued into early Sunday morning. On Saturday night, B.K. and White continued to converse until bedtime. While the two were in bed, with their backs to each other, White rolled over, struck B.K. in the back several times with both hands, then rolled back over facing away from B.K.

The next day B.K. called the police. When Officer Casey Mast arrived on scene, B.K. explained what happened that weekend, including the battery. Officer Mast did not notice any injuries on B.K. Afterwards, B.K. showed Officer Mast a video from a camera he had in his bedroom. The video confirmed that White had struck B.K. Officers then questioned White, who denied ever striking B.K.

The State charged White with one count of domestic battery, a class B misdemeanor.

Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine requesting an order prohibiting the defense from discussing White's lack of knowledge about B.K.’s camera in his bedroom, which White believed was an invasion of her privacy. White also filed a motion to suppress the video evidence in its entirety based on this purported privacy violation. The district court granted the State's motion and denied White's motion. The video was ultimately admitted into evidence and played during the trial.

At trial, B.K. testified that he and White had only been in bed together for a brief amount of time and were talking prior to White striking him. After he was struck, B.K. testified that he then got up and walked away. He then began communicating with White via text messaging in an effort to get her to leave. While this was happening, B.K. claimed White began breaking things in his apartment and that their daughter eventually went outside and joined B.K. in order to get away from the situation. B.K. also testified that he had never known White to suffer from a sleep disorder and that he believed she was awake when she struck him.

White testified that she was unaware that she had struck B.K. and suggested that she had a sleep disorder. She pointed out that in the video showing her striking B.K., her eyes were closed and she was not talking. On cross-examination, White admitted that she and B.K. had engaged in sexual activity on the night that she arrived at his apartment. She further admitted that prior to B.K. contacting police about the battery, she threatened to send text messages to his employer alleging that he had engaged in an inappropriate relationship with their daughter.

In addition to her testimony, White wanted to call her former boyfriend, Mark Godsey, as a witness. However, the district court denied White's request to allow Godsey to testify via Zoom. On direct examination, White stated that Godsey allegedly told her that she had been hitting him in her sleep.

A jury convicted White of one count of domestic battery, a class B misdemeanor. In August 2024, the court sentenced White to 90 days in jail, suspended pending completion of 12 months of probation.

White appeals her conviction.

Analysis

On appeal, White challenges her conviction of domestic battery. She does not dispute the act, rather she disputes the culpable mental state required to uphold her conviction. White raises five issues on appeal. Each is addressed in turn.

I. White's claim of error regarding the motion in limine has not been preserved.

The State allegedly filed a motion in limine to prevent the defense from discussing the existence of a camera in B.K.’s bedroom without White's knowledge, as a violation of her privacy. Limited argument was presented on the motion at a pretrial hearing, where the State claimed that this evidence was irrelevant and would constitute improper character evidence under K.S.A. 60-455. White disagreed on both counts, and the district court ultimately granted the State's motion in limine, ruling that the evidence that White was not aware of the camera's presence was not relevant to whether or not White “committed the offense.”

White argues that the district court erred in granting the motion in limine. However, White has failed to preserve this issue on appeal. “[A]ny pretrial objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence must be preserved by contemporaneously objecting at trial.” State v. Showalter, 318 Kan. 338, 345, 543 P.3d 508 (2024). There is nothing contained in the record showing that White objected at trial to the exclusion of her presenting evidence about her lack of knowledge of the camera's existence.

Compounding this problem is that the actual motion in limine is not contained in the record on appeal. Neither is White's written response to the motion in limine, both of which are referenced in her appellate brief. “It is ‘the well-established rule that an appellant has the burden to designate a record sufficient to establish the claimed error. Without an adequate record, an appellant's claim of alleged error fails.’ ” State v. Vonachen, 312 Kan. 451, 460-61, 476 P.3d 774 (2020). Because we do not have access to the actual motion in limine and White's written response, it is difficult for this court to adequately address whether the district court committed error.

White's claim that the district court erred in granting the State's motion in limine fails because the issue was not properly preserved and because she failed to provide us with an adequate record.

II. The district court did not err when it admitted the State's evidence.

White argues that the district court admitted several pieces of testimony that were irrelevant and prejudicial: (1) White's demeanor and actions, specifically breaking things in the apartment after the battery; (2) the location of her daughter after the battery; (3) White's threat to send messages to B.K.’s boss claiming B.K. may have had inappropriate contact with their daughter; and (4) despite the alleged inappropriate contact with their daughter, that White went to B.K.’s house and had sex with B.K. The State disagrees, and claims all four pieces of evidence establish that White was not suffering from a sleep disorder when she battered B.K.

White has preserved only part of this issue. An evidentiary challenge must be preserved by a timely and specific objection at trial. Without a timely and specific objection, this court will not review a claim of error. Showalter, 318 Kan. at 345.

Trial counsel lodged a relevance objection when the State elicited testimony about the situation escalating after White battered B.K. Specifically, the objection was made when testimony was received about White damaging property in B.K.’s apartment, and again when the State questioned White about the messages she threatened to send to B.K.’s employer. Those two categories are preserved, and we address them on the merits. But no contemporaneous objection was made to the testimony about the couple's daughter's location after the battery, or to the questioning about White going to B.K.’s home and continuing a sexual relationship with him after she claims to have had knowledge of B.K. acting inappropriately with their daughter. As such, the admission of these two pieces of evidence are not before us and any claim of error will not be considered.

We now turn to the two preserved evidentiary issues regarding White's conduct in the apartment and the threatened messages. All relevant evidence is generally admissible. K.S.A. 60-407(f). Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.” K.S.A. 60-401(b). “Material evidence is evidence that supports a fact in dispute or in issue in the case, and evidence is probative when it has a logical tendency to prove a material fact.” State v. Dean, 298 Kan. 1023, 1033, 324 P.3d 1023 (2014). Materiality is reviewed de novo and probativeness for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cunningham, 321 Kan. 384, 391, 580 P.3d 672 (2025).

Intent is ordinarily proved by inference from circumstantial evidence, because direct proof of a defendant's state of mind is rarely available. A defendant's conduct surrounding an incident may be circumstantially relevant to state of mind, and circumstantial evidence that would be admissible if offered by the State is equally admissible when it bears on the contested issue. State v. Frantz, 316 Kan. 708, 725, 521 P.3d 1113 (2022). Kansas courts have long recognized that a defendant's hostility toward the victim, including threats and violence around the charged conduct, is relevant as to motive and intent. State v. Bey, 322 Kan. 32, 44-46, 585 P.3d 911 (2026).

White asserts that nothing that occurred after the conduct for which she was charged was relevant to establishing a fact that was at issue and significant under the substantive law of the case. White was charged with one count of domestic battery. Under K.S.A. 21-5414(a)(2), to prove domestic battery the State needed to prove that White knowingly caused physical contact with B.K. in a rude, insulting, or angry manner, and that they were involved in a dating relationship or a family or household member.

Damaging Victim's Property

White argues that evidence of her destroying items in B.K.’s apartment is irrelevant. However, this evidence demonstrated that White remained agitated and damaged B.K.’s property a relatively short time after the battery. This showed sustained anger and physicality, from which the jury could infer that she acted knowingly rather than in her sleep. It allowed the jury to weigh her demeanor immediately after the battery against her claim that she was unaware of her actions. Because the evidence related to White's conduct during the incident and the circumstances that followed, it was relevant and probative rather than merely evidence of bad character.

Text Messages to B.K.’s Employer

White alleges that her threats to send disparaging messages to B.K.’s employer after the battery but right before he contacted law enforcement were likewise irrelevant. The content of the text messages related to accusations of inappropriate behavior by B.K. that allegedly occurred before the battery took place. Their content and context bore on the ongoing conflict between White and B.K. and whether White acted intentionally rather than unintentionally while sleeping. The evidence supplied context for the charged conduct rather than was simply used to attack White's character. In sum, the timing of the threat to send the messages as well as the statements about the contents of the texts were relevant to prove the only disputed material fact—White's intent. There was no error in the admission of this evidence.

III. White has not preserved her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Next White claims trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object on the grounds that the video of the battery was “selectively edited” and also by failing to secure the presence of White's witness. The State responds that trial counsel's performance was not deficient. More importantly, the State argues that this issue was not preserved. We agree with the State.

Appellate courts generally will not consider an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal. The usual course is for appellate counsel to request a remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance claim, commonly called a Van Cleave hearing. See State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117, 120, 716 P.2d 580 (1986). “ ‘Although “there are circumstances when no evidentiary record need be established, when the merit or lack of merit of an ineffectiveness claim about trial counsel is obvious,” and an ineffectiveness claim can therefore be resolved when raised for the first time on appeal, these circumstances are “extremely rare.” ’ ” State v. Zongker, 319 Kan. 411, 431, 555 P.3d 698 (2024). When a defendant does not request a remand, this court need not order one on its own motion. State v. Hilyard, 316 Kan. 326, 338, 515 P.3d 267 (2022).

White did not request a remand for a Van Cleave hearing on her ineffectiveness claim, and the record is not developed enough for this court to rule on her claim. There is no video in the record, and nothing shows whether counsel investigated the existence of additional footage, whether any such footage existed, or who selected the portion shown to the jury. Further, White admits that she did not inform her trial counsel of the existence of a desired witness that she wanted to testify until the week before trial and confirms that her witness refused to appear in person. Because the record is not obvious as to the merit of either of her claims, it cannot be resolved on direct appeal, and we decline to review it as unpreserved.

IV. There was no prosecutorial error.

White argues that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial error both during cross-examination and during closing arguments. The State counters that the statements were proper. Alternatively, the State claims that if errors occurred, White did not suffer any prejudice that would entitle her to relief.

Standard of Review

An appellate court uses a two-step process to evaluate claims of prosecutorial error. The court first determines whether there was error and, if so, then decides whether the error was harmless. State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 737, 559 P.3d 792 (2024).

“ ‘To determine whether prosecutorial error has occurred, the appellate court must decide whether the prosecutorial acts complained of fall outside the wide latitude afforded prosecutors to conduct the State's case and attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner that does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. If error is found, the appellate court must next determine whether the error prejudiced the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial. In evaluating prejudice, we simply adopt the traditional constitutional harmlessness inquiry demanded by Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967)].’ ” 319 Kan. at 737.

A prosecutor's error is harmless if the State shows “there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.” State v. Ninh, 320 Kan. 477, 495, 570 P.3d 1169 (2025).

The wide latitude afforded to prosecutors permits them to comment on the evidence and draw reasonable inferences, but it does not extend to misstating the law, to urging conviction on an improper legal theory, or to “ ‘inflame[ing] the passions or prejudices of the jury.’ ” State v. Thomas, 311 Kan. 905, 910, 468 P.3d 323 (2020). Appellate courts do not “consider any statement in isolation but look to the statement's context to determine whether error occurred.” State v. Brown, 316 Kan. 154, 164, 513 P.3d 1207 (2022).

White makes three specific arguments to support her claim of prosecutorial error. She first claims that the prosecution used irrelevant evidence to attack White's credibility during White's cross-examination. She next claims that the prosecution improperly commented on witness credibility during closing argument. Finally, White suggests the prosecutor introduced facts that were not in evidence during closing argument. Each is addressed in turn.

a. Cross-examination

White's first claim of prosecutorial error is that during cross-examination of White, the prosecutor asked about the text messages she threatened to send to B.K.’s employer as well as her decision to have sexual relations with B.K. the day before the battery. Specifically, White complains about the following questions by the prosecutor: “So on October 6th, you decide to go over to the home of someone who has committed, possibly, pedophilia against your daughter?” The prosecutor then followed that question with, “And you decided to have sex with that person still?” White argues that these questions were irrelevant and meant to inflame the passions of the jury.

The State contends that there was no objection to this line of questioning, and so it is not preserved for appeal. “Preservation is a question of law subject to plenary review.” State v. Campbell, 308 Kan. 763, 770, 423 P.3d 539 (2018).

“Generally appellate courts do not require a contemporaneous objection to preserve issues of prosecutorial error for appellate review. However, in accordance with the plain language of K.S.A. 60-404, evidentiary claims—including questions posed by a prosecutor and responses to those questions during trial—must be preserved by way of a contemporaneous objection for those claims to be reviewed on appeal. But appellate courts will review a prosecutor's comments made during voir dire, opening statement, or closing argument on the basis of prosecutorial error even without a timely objection, although the presence or absence of an objection may figure into the analysis of the alleged error.” State v. Sean, 306 Kan. 963, Syl. ¶ 5, 399 P.3d 168 (2017).

During this line of questioning, the only objection lodged by trial counsel was that White had “just answered that question.” There was no objection as to the relevance of the questioning, which White now argues on appeal. “A defendant cannot evade K.S.A. 60-404’s contemporaneous-objection rule by reframing an unpreserved evidentiary objection as prosecutorial error.” State v. J.L.J., 318 Kan. 720, 733, 547 P.3d 501 (2024). This claim of prosecutorial error is not properly before us.

b. Closing Argument

White's next claim of prosecutorial error are statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments that she alleges were made only to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury.

White raises these claims of prosecutorial error during closing argument for the first time on appeal. Appellate courts will review a prosecutorial error claim based on a prosecutor's comments made during a closing argument even without a timely objection, but the court may consider the presence or absence of an objection in its analysis of the alleged error. Mendez, 319 Kan. at 737. Thus, these claims of error are properly before the court.

During closing arguments, a “ ‘prosecutor must confine his or her remarks to matters in evidence. It is clearly improper for the prosecutor to state facts that are not in evidence. [Citation omitted.]’ ” State v. Stano, 284 Kan. 126, 151, 159 P.3d 931 (2007). A prosecutor, however, is allowed to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and is given latitude in drawing those inferences. 284 Kan. at 151.

White relies on State v. Akins, 298 Kan. 592, 607, 315 P.3d 868 (2014), in which the complained about statements directly commented on witness credibility. ” ’Yes, they are credible,’ ” ” ’Yes, that's credible,’ ” or “ ‘[h]is statements ․ are not credible,’ ” demonstrated the prosecutor directly and improperly expressed her personal opinion on the credibility of her own witnesses and the defendant. 298 Kan. at 607-08.

White argues that during closing arguments, the prosecutor made similar statements as those in Akins when commenting on the credibility of both White and B.K. She specifically complains about the following statements:

“Mr. Kelsey, on the stand to you today, wasn't trying to hide anything to you guys. He said, ‘I have used drugs before in my life.’ Is that someone who's lying on the stand? Is that someone who is being untruthful to you? Someone who's going to do everything he can to hide things from you? If he wanted to spin a story, why would he stop there?”

White's claims fall flat. The prosecutor's statements here were not an expression of personal opinion but instead were an argument that the jury could infer credibility from B.K.’s willingness to admit facts against his own interest. This is permissible comment on credibility drawn from the evidence. See State v. Kelly, 322 Kan. 197, 215, 588 P.3d 54 (2026).

Next, White takes issue with the following statements:

“I submit to you—she claims she didn't have enough evidence. No. What I would submit to you is she's threatening [B.K.]. She's intimidating him, coercing him, saying, ‘I'm going to make up these stories if you call the police. I'm going to make up these stories if you don't do what I want. Let me stay here.’

“And if someone makes up stories in the moment, I want you to take that into consideration about what they would do on the stand.”

According to White, the first part of these statements is not supported by facts that were in evidence. She also argues that the latter statements improperly comment upon her credibility.

As to the first statement, the prosecutor argued that White threatened and attempted to coerce B.K. by saying she would “ ‘make up these stories’ ” if he called the police and asked the jury to weigh what a person who fabricates in the moment would do on the witness stand. The record supports these inferences. White testified to an escalating confrontation, to threats made as B.K. tried to call the police, and to telling B.K. she had sent damaging messages to his employer—messages she later admitted she had not sent. The prosecutor could reasonably argue from that evidence that White sought to control the situation and deter B.K. from involving the police. The argument rested on reasonable inferences from the record, not facts outside it. See Kelly, 322 Kan. at 215. The other statement about “mak[ing] up stories in the moment” demonstrates the prosecutor guiding the jury to draw the inferences and make their own conclusions about White. The prosecutor did not comment upon White's credibility and did not commit error when making these comments.

Next, White claims the prosecutor made false statements regarding White's conversation with the police when making the following remarks: “But when the police show up, she says, ‘He's on drugs. He's on drugs. He's using drugs.’ That's her story to the police at least.”

White claims that the body-camera footage from law enforcement shown at trial demonstrates that she only expressed concern about B.K.’s drug usage history and being alone with her child. She alleges that the actual statements she made to law enforcement are a “far cry” from what the prosecutor alleged White had actually said.

White's claim of error rests upon what is contained in the body-camera footage, and that recording is not in the appellate record. Without it, this court cannot determine whether the State's characterization was inaccurate or a fair inference from the evidence. Since White has not met her burden of providing us with a complete record, she likewise cannot establish error. See State v. McNeal, 320 Kan. 818, 828, 527 P.3d 777 (2025).

White's claims of prosecutorial error fail, because there was no error that occurred. Even if there were error, the State meets its burden showing there is no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the verdict. The jury watched the battery on video and could assess for itself whether White acted while she was asleep. The jury also heard that White did not claim that she was suffering from some sort of sleep-related episode on the day of the incident and only raised that theory later. On this record, if there indeed was any error, it was harmless.

V. Cumulative error did not prevent White from receiving a fair trial.

Finally, White argues that cumulative trial errors deprived her of a fair trial. This contention has no merit. The cumulative-error doctrine may require reversal where the totality of the circumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant. But when the court identifies no errors, as in this case, there can be no cumulative error. See Kelly, 322 Kan. at 221. Because we have found no error to accumulate, the doctrine simply does not apply. Even if there were errors, given the video of the battery and the limited support for White's theory that she was sleeping during the incident, any alleged errors would not have deprived White of a fair trial.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: