State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Sidney W. Clark, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury sitting in Reno County District Court convicted Defendant Sidney Wayne Clark of failing to comply with the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq. On appeal, Clark raises two issues. First, Clark says the district court failed to obtain a proper waiver of his jury trial rights when he and the State stipulated to the underlying conviction requiring him to register, so the exact crime would not be identified during the trial. Second, the district court failed to bring him to trial within 180 days under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), K.S.A. 22-4301 et seq. Neither point presents reversible error. We affirm Clark's conviction and resulting sentence.

Given the appellate issues, the detailed facts supporting Clark's conviction are irrelevant. We offer an overview for context. In 2005, Clark pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sodomy in Reno County District Court. That's the underlying crime requiring him to register and report under KORA. Clark failed to properly report changes in his residence and employment in late December 2021, prompting the charge in this case. The jury convicted Clark in February 2023, and the district court later ordered him to serve 37 months in prison followed by postrelease supervision for 24 months, reflecting a mitigated guidelines sentence for a severity level 6 person felony, given Clark's criminal history. During the trial, Clark offered no evidence and does not now dispute that the State proved the KORA violation.

To convict Clark, the State had to present evidence to the jury that he had been convicted of a crime requiring him to register and report. Here, that would be the 2005 conviction for aggravated criminal sodomy. As a trial strategy, Clark—through his lawyer—offered to stipulate that he had been convicted of a crime requiring him to comply with KORA without identifying the crime by name. So the jury would not hear that Clark had been convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy, a crime that sounds particularly vile. Consistent with Clark's request, the district court approved and submitted to the jury this stipulation: “By court order because of the conviction in Reno County District Court for a crime requiring registration, Sidney Clark is required to register with the Sheriff in Reno County, Kansas.”

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to have the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged crime. Before a district court may substitute a stipulation for one or more elements of a crime, it must inform a defendant of that right and secure a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right. State v. Bentley, 317 Kan. 222, 230-31, 526 P.3d 1060 (2023). That did not happen here. The district court neither informed Clark of his right to have a jury determine that he had been convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy in 2005 nor secured a waiver from him. The failure amounted to a constitutional error compromising Clark's right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and sections 5 and 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, even though Clark sought the stipulation in the first place. 317 Kan. at 230-31.

The error is subject to review for harmlessness. 317 Kan. at 233-34. As the party benefiting from the district court's mistake, the State bears the burden of proving the error to be harmless under the circumstances. 317 Kan. at 234. Given the nature of the error, the Bentley court identified a focused test requiring the State to show beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant would have entered into the elements stipulation if they had been advised of their right to have a jury determine the stipulated element. 317 Kan. at 236. Relevant factors would include the ease in proving the element without a stipulation, the lack of a defense to the element, and the absence of any suggestion that the defendant intended to contest the element as part of their defense. 317 Kan. at 235.

On appeal, Clark contends the State cannot demonstrate harmlessness. First, Clark says that the State was unprepared to prove the 2005 conviction because it had not tendered a journal entry of conviction or other documents from that case, as the prosecution had done in State v. Guebara, 318 Kan. 458, 471, 544 P.3d 794 (2024). We are unpersuaded. Both this case and the case resulting in the 2005 conviction were adjudicated in Reno County. We see no reason the State could not have easily obtained a certified copy of the journal entry of conviction from the 2005 case and other documents showing the Sidney Wayne Clark in that case to have common identifiers, e.g., birthdate or social security number, with the Sidney Wayne Clark in this case.

On appeal, Clark also suggests his 2005 conviction could be constitutionally vulnerable because some DNA evidence may have been mishandled or lost. In turn, he says the 2005 conviction may be infirm, vitiating his obligation to comply with KORA. All of that comes across as pyramided speculation. Moreover, Clark would not have been able to collaterally attack the 2005 conviction as a defense in this case. His relief, if any, would lie in a request for DNA testing in that case or a habeas corpus proceeding challenging that conviction. We decline to wade into an academic discussion of what effect a successful attack on the 2005 conviction would have in this case. That's a question for another time and place far removed from this appeal.

Under Bentley, the State could have readily proved the 2005 conviction without Clark's requested stipulation. And Clark would have had no defense to the fact of his conviction. Likewise, nothing in the record suggests Clark somehow intended to base a defense on the precise crime of conviction in the 2005 case. His request for a stipulation to substitute an unnamed generic crime demonstrates just the opposite. Indeed, it is hard to fathom a colorable strategic reason Clark would want the jury in this case to know that he had been convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy.

In short, the district court erred in failing to secure an informed jury trial waiver from Clark before presenting the stipulation to the jury in this case. But we are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Clark would not have withdrawn the stipulation had he been properly informed of his right to have the jury consider whether he had been convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy in 2005, as the offense triggering his obligation to register under KORA.

For his remaining point on appeal, Clark contends he was not brought to trial within the timeframe established in the UMDDA. Before trial in this case, Clark was in the custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) for violating the terms of his postrelease supervision in the 2005 case. Reno County filed a detainer, so the KDOC would not release him on that violation. In turn, Clark submitted a request to KDOC officials for disposition of the charge in this case on August 22, 2022. But those officials did not forward the request to the Reno County District Court and the county attorney in conformity with the UMDDA until December 7, 2022. Clark's trial began on February 27, 2023.

At a motions conference three days before trial, Clark sought dismissal of this case because he had not been brought to trial within the 180-day period required by the UMDDA. The State responded that the time began to run on December 7, when the KDOC presented the request, along with other required documents, to the district court, so the trial would be timely. The district court denied Clark's requested dismissal.

Under the UMDDA, after Clark submitted his request for disposition of this case, the KDOC was required to “promptly” certify the time he had served on his present incarceration and a projected release date and to then mail a copy of the certificate along with his request for disposition of the detainer to the district court and the county attorney. K.S.A. 22-4302. Upon receipt from the KDOC, the State had 180 days to bring Clark to trial, subject to some exceptions not implicated here. K.S.A. 22-4303(b). If the State failed to do so, the district court had to dismiss the case against Clark with prejudice. K.S.A. 22-4303(b)(4).

In the district court, Clark failed to challenge the 108-day delay between his presentation of the request to the KDOC and the KDOC's delivery of it and the required certification to the district court and the county attorney. That is, he did not argue that the KDOC failed to act promptly on his request. Accordingly, the record contains no information about why it took 108 days for the KDOC to process the request.

The Kansas Supreme Court has held that the statutory language of the UMDDA “controls absent some claim that prison officials thwarted the inmate's request by misfeasance or malfeasance.” State v. Griffin, 312 Kan. 716, 724, 479 P.3d 937 (2021). If there were some sort of misfeasance or malfeasance, the inmate's substantial compliance with the UMDDA would be sufficient, likely meaning the 180-day window should be measured from an earlier date.

As we have explained, Clark did not make such a claim in the district court, let alone present evidence supporting any dereliction on the part of the KDOC. We are not disposed to say the delay here was categorical or conclusive evidence of dereliction. And the State did comply with the statutory language when it brought Clark to trial less than 180 days after receiving the certification and Clark's request from the KDOC. Based on the record evidence, we see no error in the district court's ruling denying Clark relief under the UMDDA.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: