State of Kansas, Appellant, v. Brian Piland (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The State brings this interlocutory appeal of the district court's order sustaining Brian Piland's motion to suppress evidence in this driving under the influence (DUI) case. It is undisputed that the encounter between Piland and a Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper began as a public welfare or safety check. On appeal, the State contends that the district court erred in suppressing the evidence because the trooper's questioning of Piland did not exceed the permissible scope of the encounter. Based on our review of the record—including the dash cam video of the encounter—we do not find that the district court erred in suppressing the evidence. Thus, we affirm.

Facts

On December 3, 2025, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Piland's motion to suppress, where Lieutenant David Golden testified that he was patrolling on K-14 Highway in Reno County shortly after midnight on July 21, 2024. As Lieutenant Golden—who was in a marked patrol vehicle—turned from K-14 onto Parallel Road, he noticed a person on a motorcycle straddling the “fog line” near the edge of the roadway. It is undisputed that Piland is the person who was sitting on the motorcycle.

Lieutenant Golden testified that he initially passed the motorcycle and then performed a U-turn to pull behind it. Around the same time, he activated his rear emergency lights and his dash cam. As a result, the entire encounter between Lieutenant Golden and Piland was recorded. Moreover, the dash cam video—which was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing—was reviewed by the district court as well as this court.

Lieutenant Golden testified that both the motorcycle's headlight and brake light were on. He also testified that Piland was balanced on the motorcycle like he was ready to pull onto the roadway. Lieutenant Golden exited his vehicle, Piland turned the headlight off, put the kickstand down, and got off the motorcycle. At the suppression hearing, the trooper testified that Piland got off the motorcycle awkwardly.

While Lieutenant Golden was approaching—but still several feet away—he asked Piland if he was doing okay. Piland responded, “Yeah, I just pulled over to adjust my hat.” He said this while gesturing to his head. As the trooper continued to approach Piland, he noticed a wet spot behind the motorcycle and told Piland it looked like Piland had relieved himself. Piland responded, “Yeah, that too.”

Lieutenant Golden testified that after he got close to Piland, he could smell alcohol on his breath. At that point, the trooper continued to ask questions of Piland, had him perform field sobriety tests, and requested that he consent to a preliminary breath test. After Piland refused to consent to the test, Lieutenant Golden placed him under arrest.

The time between Lieutenant Golden exiting his vehicle and Piland responding that he was doing okay was around 10 seconds. At the suppression hearing, Lieutenant Golden further testified that when Piland responded “yeah, that too” after being asked if he had relieved himself, his speech was slurred. In addition, Lieutenant Golden testified that as he got closer to Piland, he noticed his eyes were bloodshot and watery.

Lieutenant Golden testified that his encounter with Piland began as a public welfare or safety check. According to Lieutenant Golden, he believed that Piland would have felt free to leave at the beginning of the encounter. However, he testified that the encounter changed from a welfare check to an investigatory detention and that Piland was no longer free to leave. Lieutenant Golden testified that he would find it rude not to continue the conversation with Piland after he asked him if he was alright.

After taking the matter under advisement, the district court entered an order sustaining Piland's motion to suppress on December 11, 2025. Based on review of the dash cam video of the encounter and the testimony of Lieutenant Golden, the district court found that at the time the encounter escalated into a seizure, Piland had not yet exhibited any outward signs of impairment and there were no facts to establish “a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was about to be committed.” Consequently, the district court concluded that “[t]he State has not met the burden of showing the lawfulness of the search and seizure and [Piland's] motion to suppress is sustained.”

Thereafter, the State filed a timely notice seeking an interlocutory appeal.

Analysis

The sole issue presented by the State in this interlocutory appeal is whether the district court erred in granting Piland's motion to suppress evidence. In particular, the State argues that the district court erred in finding that the encounter between Lieutenant Golden and Piland exceeded the scope of a valid public welfare or safety check. In response, Piland contends that the district court appropriately found that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the seizure was lawful.

The Fourth Amendment and section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Ellis, 311 Kan. 925, 929, 469 P.3d 65 (2020). When the State opposes a motion to suppress evidence, it bears the burden of proof that the search and any ultimate seizure were lawful. State v. Goodro, 315 Kan. 235, 238, 506 P.3d 918 (2022). On appeal, we conduct a two-part review of a district court's decision on a motion to suppress. State v. Garrett, 319 Kan. 465, 469, 555 P.3d 1116 (2024), cert. denied 145 S. Ct. 1449 (2025).

First, we review the district court's factual findings to ensure they are supported by substantial competent evidence. 319 Kan. at 469. To meet this threshold, the evidence must be relevant and of the kind that a reasonable person would find sufficient to support a conclusion. State v. Smith, 312 Kan. 876, 887, 482 P.3d 586 (2021). We are required to conduct this review without reweighing evidence, assessing the credibility of witnesses, or resolving conflicts in the evidence. Garrett, 319 Kan. at 469.

Then, if we find substantial competent evidence in the record on appeal to support the district court's factual findings, we turn to the question of whether the district court's ultimate legal conclusion derived from those facts is appropriate. In doing so, we apply a de novo standard of review. State v. Cash, 313 Kan. 121, 125-26, 483 P.3d 1047 (2021).

Kansas courts have recognized four types of law enforcement-citizen encounters. The first type is a voluntary encounter, which is not considered a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Lee, 283 Kan. 771, 774, 156 P.3d 1284 (2007). The second type is an investigatory detention or Terry stop, in which an officer may detain any person in a public place if the officer reasonably suspects that the person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); see also K.S.A. 22-2402(1). The third type of encounter is a public welfare or safety encounter, in which an officer may approach a person to check on his or her welfare when the officer can articulate specific facts showing a concern for the public's safety. See State v. Vistuba, 251 Kan. 821, 824, 840 P.2d 511 (1992). The fourth type of encounter between an officer and a citizen is an arrest. See K.S.A. 22-2401.

Here, the parties agree that the encounter between Lieutenant Golden and Piland began as a public welfare or safety check. The Kansas Supreme Court first recognized the concept of a public welfare or safety encounter in Vistuba, 251 Kan. at 821. In that case, our Supreme Court held that “[s]afety reasons alone may justify the [encounter], if the safety reasons are based upon specific and articulable facts.” 251 Kan. at 824. Later, in State v. Gonzales, 36 Kan. App. 2d 446, 141 P.3d 501 (2006), this court found that the legality of a public safety encounter can be evaluated in three steps. First, whether there are objective, specific, and articulable facts from which a law enforcement officer would suspect that a citizen needs help or is in peril. Second, whether the officer takes appropriate action to render assistance. Third, whether the officer takes actions that constitute a seizure after being assured that the citizen is no longer in need of assistance. 36 Kan. App. 2d at 456. Subsequently, in Ellis, our Supreme Court adopted the three-part test from Gonzales for establishing the parameters of a public welfare or safety encounter. 311 Kan. at 929-30.

Moreover, the facts surrounding an alleged public welfare or safety rationale are to be carefully scrutinized “so the protections of the Fourth Amendment are not emasculated.” Gonzales, 36 Kan. App. 2d at 455. A public welfare or safety encounter is not to be used for investigative purposes. 36 Kan. App. 2d at 457. Rather, a public welfare or safety encounter “must be divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” State v. Messner, 55 Kan. App. 2d 630, Syl. ¶ 2, 419 P.3d 642 (2018). Furthermore, a public welfare or safety encounter is not limited to vehicle stops. See Ellis, 311 Kan. at 930 (where specific and articulable facts justified officers checking on patron in rest stop bathroom); see also State v. McDonald, 318 Kan. 486, 488-89, 544 P.3d 156 (2024) (“public safety stop” and “public welfare check” used interchangeably).

To extend a public welfare check for further investigation, “the officer must have ‘ “reasonable suspicion the seized individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime or traffic infraction.” ’ [Citations omitted.]” Ellis, 311 Kan. at 931. For the purposes of the suppression motion, the parties do not dispute that Lieutenant Golden detected the smell of alcohol on Piland's breath once he was close to him. Certainly, there are times in which the smell of alcohol may justify further investigation following a public welfare or safety encounter. See, e.g., Nickelson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 33 Kan. App. 2d 359, 367, 102 P.3d 490 (2004). But in the present case, the initial question is whether Lieutenant Golden had justification to extend the public welfare or safety encounter prior to getting close enough to Piland to smell alcohol on his breath.

The parties agree that an experienced law enforcement officer like Lieutenant Golden could reasonably believe that Piland was stranded or in need of assistance as he sat on his motorcycle on the side of the road late at night. See Nickelson, 33 Kan. App. 2d at 360-61. Hence, there is no question that there were specific objective and articulable facts supporting the public welfare or safety check. See Messner, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 636 (“[W]hen a valid safety stop is made, the officer can take appropriate action to render assistance if the individual is in need of aid.”).

In this case, Piland responded that he did not need assistance when asked by Lieutenant Golden. Likewise, there is nothing on the dash cam video to suggest that Piland was in distress. Further, the parties do not dispute the district court's finding that Piland demonstrated no outward signs of impairment when initially asked about his well-being. As this court found in Gonzales, “once the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance, any actions beyond that constitute a seizure, implicating the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment.” Ellis, 311 Kan. at 930.

Generally, we do not consider a law enforcement officer's subjective intent relevant to our inquiry unless the officer made his intent known to the person who has been stopped or otherwise encountered. See State v. McGinnis, 290 Kan. 547, 555, 233 P.3d 246 (2010). Accordingly, although we have no reason to question Lieutenant Golden's subjective belief that Piland may still have needed further assistance after he said he was okay, we must review the record on appeal—including the dash cam video—from an objective standard.

Based on our review of the record on appeal and after viewing the dash cam video of the encounter between Lieutenant Golden and Piland, we find that the district court's findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence. Similarly, we find nothing on the video to depict outward evidence that Piland's welfare was endangered or that he was intoxicated before or at the time he indicated that he did not need assistance. Moreover, even though we recognize that it is a close call, we do not find that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to continue approaching Piland simply to confirm what Piland had already asserted.

Even if a reasonable person would have asked a follow-up question, Lieutenant Golden did not ask Piland again if he needed any assistance. Instead, the trooper told Piland that it looked like he had relieved himself. Only then did he ask Piland a second time if he needed help. But as Lieutenant Golden testified at the suppression hearing, he had already smelled alcohol on Piland's breath at that point and had begun his investigation of Piland for suspicion of DUI. As such, rather than continuing to approach Piland to see if he needed help, Lieutenant Golden made a statement unrelated to his initial concern for Piland's safety. It was after that point that he detected the odor of alcohol on Piland's breath and prolonged the encounter.

Because the district court's findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence and the district court's ultimate conclusion derived from those facts was appropriate, we affirm its decision to suppress the evidence under the circumstances presented.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam