LJ v. Secretary of Labor and Kansas Department of Labor, et al., Appellees. (2026)

Kansas employees are protected from suffering unpaid work, including overtime, by several state and federal laws. Here, the Kansas Department of Labor (Agency) determined that eight roofers were owed overtime pay and associated penalties and interest from their employer. The employer and one of its administrators, who the Agency found personally liable, sought judicial review of that decision before the district court, which affirmed the Agency's conclusions. The employer and administrator now seek this court's review, alleging that the district court (1) failed to address their claims on review; (2) erroneously interpreted and applied the law; (3) upheld the Agency's factual findings that lacked sufficient evidentiary support; and (4) acted unreasonably in upholding the Agency's conclusions. The appellants’ claims require this court to address all aspects of the Agency's decision.

This court reviews the Agency's decision as if it were directly appealed to it and notes the interplay of federal and state law to the workers’ claims for overtime pay. As such, this court finds that the Agency erred in its application of state law under the Kansas Wage and Payment Act (KWPA) to enforce liability for overtime pay found due under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Nevertheless, the Agency properly interpreted and applied the KWPA to claims properly within that law's purview. Additionally, there was sufficient evidence to support the Agency's conclusion that under the KWPA, Lawrence J. Beck had charge of the affairs of the employer LJ Beck Roofing and Guttering, Inc. (LJB Roofing). Finally, this court finds no error with the Agency's procedure of combining the workers’ claims into a single hearing.

As explained herein, the Agency's decision is remanded for reconsideration. On remand, if the Agency proceeds on the current record, it must apply the Kansas Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Law (KMWMHL) to determine liability, if any, for unpaid overtime pay. If the Agency determines the claimants are owed overtime pay under the KMWMHL, it may then apply the KWPA. Appellants are not otherwise entitled to relief on any other issues raised on appeal. This matter is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court for remand to the Agency in accordance with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background

Eight roofers filed unpaid wage claims with the Kansas Department of Labor in April 2022, alleging they were not paid for overtime worked. Six of those claimants reported their title as “crew member,” one listed their title as “crew leader,” and one did not list a job title. The record shows that at least one of the claimants contacted the United States Department of Labor regarding allegations of unpaid overtime and, according to the worker, was told to contact the Kansas Department of Labor “because my employer didn't meet certain criteria[ ]” for a claim pursued by the United States Department of Labor.

The eight claimants were employed by LJB Roofing, which was incorporated in 1996 with Lawrence J. Beck identified as the president, secretary, and treasurer. Beck testified that LJB Roofing paid for insurance and claimants’ compensation expenses. On “Employer's Answer to Claim for Wages,” LJB Roofing listed “Lawrence J. Beck” as “Pres./Sec.” On the same form, the box marked “No” is checked regarding whether the employer “claim[s] to have the legal right to withhold the wages claimed.”

The Agency determined the appropriate period for claims under the statute of limitations was April 19, 2019, through April 19, 2022. LJB Roofing submitted payroll records beginning in February 2020, despite the Agency requesting earlier records.

In February 2023, the Agency notified LJB Roofing and Beck that they owed approximately $49,000 in overtime pay from February 2020 through June 2021 and approximately $40,000 for the earlier period when LJB Roofing failed to provide records. The Agency also identified the specific amounts it believed were due to each claimant. The letter said the estimates were “based on the records provided,” that LJB Roofing had the “responsibility to keep accurate time and payroll records,” and provided LJB Roofing an opportunity to dispute the findings. The Agency letter also recommended LJB Roofing settle the claims:

“It would be our recommendation that you try to settle these cases along with the many employees that did not file claims. Further I would hope that since you have been made aware of the Kansas overtime requirements that you are now keeping time and payroll records and paying overtime as earned.”

In April 2023, LJB Roofing offered claimants a $20,000 settlement—less than a quarter of the amount the Agency determined was owed—to be divided among the claimants and to be made in four monthly payments. One claimant signed the settlement agreement, but there is no evidence LJB Roofing executed the settlement agreement or paid that claimant.

Administrative Hearing

With no settlement, the parties proceeded to a consolidated hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings. At the hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) admitted the Agency's exhibits over objections and identified four issues to be addressed at the hearing: (1) whether the employer was liable for paying the unpaid overtime; (2) whether the employer was liable for paying interest; (3) whether the employer was liable for a penalty; and (4) whether any agent or other person was individually liable for any of the payments.

Beck testified that he calculated the claimants’ pay by multiplying the hours worked with their rate of pay and deducting 30 minutes for lunch. The payroll spreadsheets completed by Beck for each claimant were introduced as evidence. Beck testified that he paid the claimants their regular wage for all time worked, even if that time included overtime hours, because he did not know that an overtime rate was required. He did not deny that claimants worked overtime as part of their employment.

The claimants also testified at the hearing regarding their hours worked, pay, and attempts to recover money they believed was owed. Counsel for LJB Roofing and Beck argued that, as supervisors, two of the claimants would not be entitled to overtime pay or interest. Counsel also argued that LJB Roofing should not be subject to a penalty because no claimant complained about unpaid overtime and Beck was unaware that overtime pay was required. Counsel maintained that Beck should not be individually liable for any of the unpaid wages, interest, or penalties.

The Administrative Law Judge's Findings

The same ALJ issued all eight initial orders in January 2024, where it noted that “[o]vertime requirements are addressed in both Federal law and Kansas law.” The ALJ made specific factual findings regarding LJB Roofing's business activities and concluded that “LJB Roofing is subject to the FLSA and required to pay overtime wages to employees for any work performed in excess of 40 hours in a work week.” Then, applying the KWPA to enforce the FLSA overtime violations, the ALJ concluded that LJB Roofing and Beck were jointly and severally liable to each claimant for unpaid overtime pay for hours worked more than 40 in a workweek, penalties, and interest. This included a finding that under the KWPA, Beck was personally liable as a controlling agent of LJB Roofing. The ALJ also concluded that the claimants identified as supervisors were not exempt from overtime pay under the executive exemption of the FLSA.

LJB Roofing and Beck sought review of the ALJ's initial orders from the Kansas Secretary of Labor. The Secretary's designee issued a final order denying review in each case, and LJB Roofing and Beck sought judicial review under the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA).

Judicial Review from the District Court

In their joint petition for judicial review, LJB Roofing and Beck raised the following issues:

• It was unreasonable, irrelevant, and prejudicial for the ALJ to consider the evidence presented at the hearing in total when deciding issues related to individual claimants.

• Several of the ALJ's findings were not supported by substantial evidence.

• There is no evidence that Beck is the owner of LJB Roofing.

• The ALJ misapplied K.S.A. 44-323 by erroneously concluding that an award of interest was mandatory, rather than discretionary, and by incorrectly calculating the award amount.

• The ALJ's award for interest was not supported by substantial evidence because it was based solely on the existence of a violation of overtime law.

• There was no evidence suggesting LJB Roofing's failure to pay overtime was willful or intentional, so no penalties should have been assessed.

• The determination that Beck should be personally liable was not supported by substantial evidence and was otherwise unreasonable.

• The ALJ's initial orders erroneously determined that the supervisors were owed overtime pay.

The district court consolidated the eight cases. In its journal entry filed in March 2025, the district court summarized the issues as: “1. Whether respondent's determinations were supported by sufficient evidence? 2. Whether respondent's determinations were unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious?” The district court considered the two summarized issues and denied LJB Roofing and Beck any relief, concluding:

“Considering petitioner and respondent's burdens, a reasonable person might accept as sufficient respondent's determinations that workers paid hourly were subject to the protections and rights under KWPA and [Kansas Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Law], as well as its determinations that penalties of 100% of the employees overdue wages were appropriate due to petitioner failing to rectify the error once he was made aware of the oversight.

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“This court has already held that respondent's determinations and findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. For this reason, the court also finds they are not ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.’ ”

LJB Roofing and Beck now appeal.

Discussion

Appellants challenge the district court's decision, alleging that the court failed to consider all issues raised and that it erred in several manners when it upheld the Agency's determination. Appellants contend that the district court erred in its interpretation and application of the law related to the supervisors’ entitlement to overtime pay; finding the appellants liable for overtime pay, interest, and penalties; because its decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record; and by considering evidence from all claimants from a single Agency hearing. Essentially, appellants argue that the Agency erred by misapplying the law and making factual findings that were not supported by the record, and thus the district court erred by upholding the Agency's erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Appeal of Administrative Agency Decisions

Awards from Kansas administrative agencies—such as the Kansas Department of Labor here—are subject to judicial review by the district court and the appellate court under the KJRA. K.S.A. 77-603; K.S.A. 77-609; K.S.A. 77-623. This court exercises the same statutorily limited judicial review of the Agency's action as did the district court and reviews the appeal as though it were a direct appeal. Coma Corporation v. Kansas Dept. of Labor, 283 Kan. 625, 628, 154 P.3d 1080 (2007). This means that appellate relief from the Agency's decision can only be granted for the grounds enumerated under the KJRA. See K.S.A. 77-621(c) (outlining grounds for judicial relief); 283 Kan. at 628 (discussing review under the KJRA). It also means that because the district court upheld the Agency's decision, this court's review will directly address the appellants’ claims of error related to the Agency's decision rather than the district court's review.

Appellants seek review of the Agency's decision based on errors of law; the lack of evidence to support factual findings; and an allegation that the Agency's decision was unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary, based on the following KJRA statutory subsections:

“(4) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;

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“(7) the agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported to the appropriate standard of proof by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole, which includes the agency record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional evidence received by the court under this act; or

“(8) the agency action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” K.S.A. 77-621(c).

This court reviews these alleged errors under the KJRA under different standards.

When reviewing the Agency's factual findings under K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7), this court must “assess the evidence both supporting and contradicting the agency's findings, examine the agency's credibility determinations, and review the agency's explanation as to why the evidence sustains its findings.” Hanson v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 313 Kan. 752, 763, 490 P.3d 1216 (2021). When determining whether substantial evidence supports an Agency's factual findings, the KJRA requires that the evidence “is substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole.” K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7); see also K.S.A. 77-621(d) (defining the meaning of “ ‘in light of the record as a whole’ ”). Substantial evidence is that “ ‘which possesses both relevance and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved.’ ” Board of Cherokee County Comm'rs v. Kansas Racing & Gaming Comm'n, 306 Kan. 298, 326, 393 P.3d 601 (2017).

In determining whether the Agency erroneously interpreted or applied the law under K.S.A. 77-621(c)(4), this court reviews the Agency's interpretation and application of the law de novo, without deference to the Agency's determinations. In re River Rock Energy Company, 313 Kan. 936, 944, 492 P.3d 1157 (2021). Finally, in reviewing whether the Agency's decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious under K.S.A. 77-621(c)(8), this court “ ‘determines the reasonableness of the agency's exercise of discretion in reaching its decision based upon the agency's factual findings and the applicable law.’ ” Via Christi Hospitals Wichita v. Kan-Pak, 310 Kan. 883, 891, 451 P.3d 459 (2019).

Appellants carry the burden of showing the Agency action is subject to reversal under each of these standards. K.S.A. 77-621(a)(1).

I. The District Court Failed to Consider Appellants’ Issues

Before addressing the substantive claims on appeal, this court must address the appellants’ claim that the district court failed to consider all the issues raised in their petition for judicial review. The district court's order is succinct and does not address the issues raised one by one—instead the order addresses two overarching issues, which the district court delineated as whether the Agency's decisions were based on substantial evidence and whether the Agency's decisions were unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Even assuming the district court considered all fact-related claims when it combined them together, the district court failed to address LJB Roofing and Beck's arguments that the Agency misapplied the law in several instances or that the ALJ's decision to “combine” the evidence was error.

However, this does not require remand to the district court because this court reviews the appellants’ claims as if they were appealed directly from the Agency to this court. See Board of Cherokee County Comm'rs, 306 Kan. at 318 (appellate court exercises judicial review of an agency's action as if the appeal was made directly to the appellate court); Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 28 Kan. App. 2d 229, 232, 13 P.3d 358 (2000) (finding, under similar circumstances, that “a reviewing court has the same opportunity to examine and consider the evidence as did the court below and it can make its own de novo determination”). Further, the party seeking review in this court must appeal all issues, regardless of whether they were addressed by the district court, and thus all the substantive claims must have been brought before this court. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl G., 311 Kan. 798, 803, 466 P.3d 1207 (2020) (an issue not briefed is deemed waived or abandoned). It appears appellants brought all claims to this court.

Therefore, because this court reviews the Agency decision as if directly appealed to this court, the district court's failure to review all issues presented in the petition for judicial review does not prevent appellate review. Thus, this court moves on to address the substantive claims.

II. The Legal Conclusions

Appellants contend that the Agency, and thus the district court, misapplied the applicable law in several ways, including by determining that the supervisor claimants were owed overtime pay under the FLSA; that LJB Roofing and Beck owed penalties under the KWPA for willful refusal to pay overtime due under the FLSA; and that LJB Roofing and Beck owed interest on unpaid overtime under the KWPA.

The appellants’ challenges amount to an argument that the Agency, and thus the district court, erred in concluding they violated the FLSA and that those violations carry the penalties and interest assessed under the KWPA. Upon review of these allegations of error, the record on appeal, and the various laws at issue, this court concludes that the KWPA enforcement and penalty provisions cannot be used to enforce claims for unpaid overtime under the FLSA. Additionally, the Agency erred in concluding that the FLSA applied to the overtime claims here. Because the FLSA does not apply to the overtime claims here, the case must be remanded for the Agency to determine whether the KMWMHL applies to confer liability for unpaid overtime. If the Agency finds the appellants liable for unpaid overtime under the KMWMHL it can then apply the KWPA as explained herein. Therefore, the court remands the case to the district court to remand to the Agency for consideration under the appropriate legal standards consistent with this opinion.

A. The KWPA Does Not Apply to Claims for Overtime Pay Under the FLSA

After finding that LJB Roofing violated the FLSA, albeit erroneously as explained below, the Agency applied the KWPA to impose interest and penalties related to those FLSA violations. The appellants challenge the KWPA interest and penalties as explained below. The FLSA is a federal law that, relevant here, requires employers to pay employees a minimum wage for all hours worked and nonexempt employees overtime pay for hours worked more than 40 per workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). While the FLSA is not intended to prevent states from implementing more favorable minimum wage or maximum hour laws, the state laws must yield to the federal law when the state law “ ‘interferes with or is contrary to federal law.’ ” Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 101 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1988); see U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. In fact, the FLSA contains its own robust penalty provisions intended to be used to enforce FLSA violations. See Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 194 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “Congress prescribed exclusive remedies in the FLSA for violations of its mandates.”).

Kansas has also enacted laws specifically addressing minimum wage and maximum hours and related pay requirements. When the FLSA applies to overtime claims, the KMWMHL does not apply. See K.S.A. 44-1202(d); K.S.A. 44-1203(c); K.S.A. 44-1204(c)(1); Blair v. TransAm Trucking, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 3d 977, 984 (D. Kan. 2018) (stating that employers covered by the FLSA are not subject to the KMWMHL); McGowan v. Genesis Health Clubs Management, Inc., No. 17-2419-DDCKGS, 2018 WL 572052, at *3 (D. Kan. 2018) (unpublished opinion) (same).

The issue here is whether the KWPA—which does not contain provisions related to minimum hourly wage or overtime pay—can be used to enforce overtime claims under the FLSA. See Craig v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 300 Kan. 788, 793, 335 P.3d 66 (2014) (“[T]he KWPA does not contain any express provision relating to the payment of overtime, which is typically pursued under a FLSA claim.”). While the Kansas Supreme Court has not decided this issue, it did note that “[t]he KWPA controls several aspects of wages and benefits for the Kansas worker that are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) et seq.” 300 Kan. at 792.

Since the court's decision in Craig, federal district courts in Kansas have consistently concluded that when the FLSA applies to confer liability for an unpaid overtime claim, the KWPA does not apply to penalize or enforce that FLSA liability. See Blair, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 995 (finding the FLSA preempts duplicative KWPA claims); Linde v. Envision Healthcare Corp., No. 2:20-cv-02661-HLT-TJJ, 2021 WL 3089214, at *4 (D. Kan. 2021) (unpublished opinion) (dismissing overtime claims brought under the KWPA); Drowatzky v. ADT LLC, No. 620-cv-01065-HLT-KGG, 2020 WL 3639742, at *1 (D. Kan. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (plaintiff conceded FLSA preemption); Charbonneau v. Mortgage Lenders of America, L.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-2062-HLT-ADM, 2020 WL 3545624, at *8, 10 (D. Kan. 2020) (unpublished opinion) (explaining that overtime is covered by FLSA or the KMWMHL and that the KWPA does not concern overtime); McGowan, 2018 WL 572052, at *5 (”․ Kansas law precludes state statutory claims to recover overtime wages against FLSA-covered employers ․”); Larson v. FGX Intern., Inc., No. 14-2277-JTM, 2015 WL 1034334, at *3 (D. Kan. 2015) (unpublished opinion) (finding overtime claims covered by the FLSA preempt attempts to recover the same under the KWPA). Although these courts have found the KWPA inapplicable to FLSA violations for different reasons, the conclusions are consistent.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether the FLSA preempted similar state law under conflict or obstacle preemption. See Anderson, 508 F.3d at 183. After discussing the extensive FLSA coverage for minimum wage and overtime claims and the relevant penalties, the court examined whether the state law claims stood “ ‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of’ the FLSA.” 508 F.3d at 193. After concluding that Congress intended the FLSA to provide exclusive relief for FLSA violations, the court ruled that the state law claims for violations of the FLSA were precluded because they merely duplicated the FLSA claims. 508 F.3d at 194-95. However, courts have found that the doctrines of express and field preemption do not apply to the FLSA. See Baker v. Coxcom, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1379 (D. Kan. 2015) (field preemption); Barrus v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 243, 255-56 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (express preemption).

The KWPA does not provide employees with additional or different substantive rights than the FLSA for claims of unpaid overtime, and thus the KWPA cannot be used to enforce FLSA overtime violations. However, it is unnecessary to prolong that discussion because the Agency also erred in finding that the overtime claims here implicated the FLSA.

B. Insufficient Facts to Establish FLSA Coverage

The appellants also contend that the Agency erred in concluding that the FLSA executive exemption did not apply to the two “supervisors” making them exempt from the FLSA overtime requirements. Under the FLSA executive exemption, a supervisory employee is exempt from receiving overtime pay when the employee meets the following four criteria:

“(1) Compensated on a salary basis ․ at a rate of not less than [the level set forth in § 541.600];

“(2) Whose primary duty is management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof;

“(3) Who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees; and

“(4) Who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(1)-(4).

In evaluating this claim, the court finds that the FLSA is not implicated in the claims for overtime pay here and it is therefore unnecessary to determine whether the Agency correctly interpreted and applied the FLSA executive exemption. The FLSA protects employees from suffering unpaid overtime work when either: (1) the employer qualifies for the FLSA under the enterprise coverage criteria or (2) the employee pursuing a claim qualifies for the FLSA under the individual coverage criteria. Reagor v. Okmulgee County Family Resource Center, 501 Fed. Appx. 805, 808-09 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished opinion); see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 776.0; 29 C.F.R. § 776.22a. The Agency concluded that “LJB Roofing has engaged in interstate commerce by conducting construction projects outside of the State of Kansas and utilizing goods and materials which travel through interstate commerce.” The Agency then applied the FLSA to the claims.

When an employer meets the criteria for enterprise coverage, then every employee—unless otherwise exempted—is protected under the FLSA. Prince v. Kansas City Tree Care, LLC, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1096 (D. Kan. 2023). There are three ways to establish enterprise coverage under the FLSA, but only one is relevant here. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A). For LJB Roofing to be subject to enterprise coverage under the FLSA, it must have an annual gross sales volume of at least $500,000 and be “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” which means it has employees engaged in commerce or handling, selling, or working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i), (ii).

Looking at LJB Roofing's gross receipts, which were under $300,000, the Agency determined that LJB Roofing did not meet the minimum gross sales volume for enterprise coverage. That finding is not in dispute. Therefore, because no evidence in the record shows that LJB Roofing meets the annual sales minimum for enterprise coverage, this court finds insufficient evidence in the record to conclude that LJB Roofing is subject to enterprise coverage under the FLSA for the overtime claims here. See Collar v. Abalux, Inc., No. 16-20872-CIV, 2018 WL 7364573, at *5 (S.D. Fla.) (unpublished opinion) (finding gross sales of $499,717 failed to meet the $500,000 threshold to qualify an employer for enterprise coverage under the FLSA), aff'd 895 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2018). Having found that LJB Roofing does not meet the criteria for enterprise coverage here, this court must determine whether the claimants qualify for individual coverage under the FLSA.

As the Agency explained, individual coverage under the FLSA stems from the actual conduct of the individual employee seeking protection—not from the overall activities of the business. Reagor, 501 Fed. Appx. at 809. Individual coverage exists when the employee “in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). To be engaged in commerce is more than just performing activities affecting commerce, it requires that the employee's activities be “actually in or so closely related to the movement of the commerce as to be a part of it.” McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 497, 63 S. Ct. 1248, 87 L. Ed. 1538 (1943). Engaging in commerce means the employee must directly participate in moving persons or things in interstate commerce by either performing work for an instrumentality of interstate commerce, such as work for a transportation or communication entity, or by regularly using instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as interstate communication or travel in the course of their work. Reagor, 501 Fed. Appx. at 809; Thorne v. All Restoration Services, Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1266-67 (11th Cir. 2006).

The FLSA has promulgated regulations specific to the construction industry, which plausibly apply here and outline the criteria for determining when an individual is performing work covered by the FLSA. 29 C.F.R. § 776.23(a), (b), (c), and (d); 29 C.F.R. § 776.24. FLSA covered construction projects are those where the employees perform “construction work which is closely or intimately related to the functioning of existing instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce or facilities for the production of goods for such commerce are within the scope of the [FLSA].” 29 C.F.R. § 776.23(c). Noncovered construction projects are those that are “purely local,” and in those circumstances, individual employees may still be covered “by reason of their interstate activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 776.23(d)(1). If the employee is engaged in covered and noncovered work throughout a week, the employee “is entitled to the benefits of the [FLSA] for the entire week regardless of the amount of covered activities which are involved.” 29 C.F.R. § 776.23(b).

First, there is no evidence that the claimants conducted regular interstate activities to make them individually covered by the FLSA. See St. Elien v. All County Environmental Services, 991 F.3d 1197, 1199 (11th Cir. 2021) (employee conducted regular interstate calls to customers and vendors which left question of individual FLSA coverage for jury). While the evidence suggests that some of LJB Roofing's projects were outside of Kansas, the Agency explained there was no information provided “to establish which week or weeks LJB Roofing performed work outside the State of Kansas,” or even which claimants performed work outside the state. See Wirtz v. Ferguson, 317 F.2d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 1963) (distinguishing activities of a “local roofer” with an employee who had “a regular and continuing basis or nexus with commerce or the production of goods for commerce”). Additionally, there was no evidence that claimants were engaged in interstate activities even though the Agency noted that there was also no evidence that all the materials and equipment used by LJB Roofing were “exclusively manufactured and sold in the State of Kansas.” Having occasional trips across state lines does not establish that an employee is engaged in interstate commerce. See Martinez Matute v. CNN Const. Inc., 415 F. Supp. 3d 226, 233 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding an employee who irregularly or in an isolated manner “ ‘happens to cross a State line in the course of his employment’ ” is not covered by the FLSA for that sole reason). Here, there is simply no evidence that during the relevant timeframe the claimants regularly ordered, procured, or moved goods in interstate commerce, worked with goods obtained through interstate commerce, or worked outside of Kansas.

Second, there is no evidence that the claimants performed work within Kansas on instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as airports, railroad facilities, highway facilities, or telecommunication infrastructure that are regularly used for interstate commerce. See Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 212, 79 S. Ct. 260, 3 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1959) (finding individual FLSA coverage because the workers “all worked intimately with the plans and specifications ․ for the repair and construction of various interstate instrumentalities and facilities including air bases, roads, turnpikes, bus terminals, and radio and television installations”); Moss v. Gillioz Const. Co., 206 F.2d 819, 821 (10th Cir. 1953) (explaining work would be sufficient to entitle night watchman of bridge construction to individual coverage if it related to an “existing interstate facility, such as ․ to an existing interstate railroad bridge” ).

During the relevant timeframe, there was not substantial evidence upon which to conclude the claimants were engaged in interstate commerce to invoke individual coverage under the FLSA. See Razey v. Unified School District, 205 Kan. 551, 556, 470 P.2d 809 (1970) (finding insufficient evidence to establish FLSA individual coverage for school custodians); Rucker v. First Nat. Bank. Of Miami, Okl., 138 F.2d 699, 702 (10th Cir. 1943) (the party asserting FLSA individual coverage carries the burden to establish such coverage). Therefore, when the record is viewed as a whole, substantial evidence does not support the Agency's conclusion that the FLSA applied to the claims for unpaid overtime, and thus the Agency misapplied the law.

If the FLSA does not apply to the claims for unpaid overtime, then the Agency must determine whether the KMWMHL, the state law counterpart to the FLSA, applies. “The KMWMHL provides protections for many workers in the state by ensuring that they cannot be compelled to work overtime without fair compensation.” Dollison v. Osborne County, 241 Kan. 374, 380, 737 P.2d 43 (1987). The KMWMHL often fills gaps by protecting claimants who are not covered by the FLSA. See 241 Kan. at 382 (“If an employment relationship is excluded from the FLSA, it would not be excluded from the KMWMHL,” absent an “independent basis for excluding the relationship from the state law.”).

Although the KMWMHL also protects employees from unpaid overtime, it has different requirements and protections than the FLSA. Notably, the KMWMHL requires covered employers to pay covered employees time and a half for any time worked more than 46—rather than 40—hours per week. Compare K.S.A. 44-1204(a) with 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). A covered employer found to have not properly paid overtime under the KMWMHL is liable “for the full amount of such wages and overtime compensation, less any amount actually paid to such employee by the employer, and for costs and such reasonable attorney fees as may be allowed by the court in an action for the recovery of such wages and overtime compensation.” K.S.A. 44-1211(a). In addition to the wages owed, costs, and reasonable attorney fees, the covered employer is subject to fines of not less than $250 and not more than $1,000. K.S.A. 44-1210(a); K.S.A. 44-1211. The Secretary of the Kansas Department of Labor may take assignment of an employee's KMWMHL claims and pursue legal action to collect the amounts owed. K.S.A. 44-1211(b).

The record does not support a finding that the FLSA applies to the overtime claims under either enterprise or individual coverage. Additionally, the Agency erred in applying the KWPA to enforce what it erroneously determined to be FLSA overtime violations. Therefore, the Agency's final order finding violations of the FLSA, including associated legal conclusions related to the overtime pay owed claimants under the FLSA, is reversed and remanded for reconsideration under the KMWMHL.

C. The KWPA May Be Applied to Violations of the KMWMHL for Unpaid Overtime

On remand, if the Agency determines the claimants are owed for overtime pay under the KMWMHL, as explained herein, it may then apply the KWPA. The KWPA was enacted in 1973 to address the plight of employees who were not properly paid for services rendered, particularly those employees not covered by the FLSA or the National Labor Relations Board. K.S.A. 44-313 et seq.; see also Craig, 300 Kan. at 792-93 (discussing the KWPA). The Kansas Supreme Court described the KWPA as an “ ‘expansive and comprehensive legislative scheme that is broad in its scope and the rights created for Kansas workers to secure unpaid wages earned from their labors.’ ” 300 Kan. at 792.

Although the Kansas Supreme Court has not addressed whether the KWPA can apply to claims for overtime pay due under the KMWMHL, before the court's decision in Craig at least one Kansas federal district court found that an employer could be liable for statutory penalties under the KWPA for willful overtime pay violations of the KMWMHL. See Clements v. Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148-49 (D. Kan. 1999). Whether the KWPA provides a recourse for claims of unpaid overtime pay under the KMWMHL is of particular importance because the KWPA carries more severe repercussions than the KMWMHL, including penalties, interest, and personal liability. See K.S.A. 44-315(b) (allowing penalties for willful violations); K.S.A. 44-323(a) (allowing interest for wages owed); K.S.A. 44-323(b) (permitting personal liability for wages owed).

While the KWPA does not include an overtime enforcement provision, its requirements apply to “all wages” an “employer” owes an “employee.” See K.S.A. 44-314(a). At the KWPA's core, it requires that employers pay all wages due. See Coma Corporation, 283 Kan. at 630 (emphasizing that the KWPA requires the payment of all wages). For example, the KWPA does not provide for a minimum wage or employment contract enforcement, but it penalizes an employer's willful failure to pay all the minimum wages owed. See 283 Kan. at 635-36, 647-48 (finding the KWPA applied to an undocumented worker's claim for wages owed).

This court exercises unlimited review of statutory interpretation. Nicholson v. Mercer, 319 Kan. 712, 714, 559 P.3d 350 (2024). Statutory interpretation begins with the precept that the intent of the Legislature governs. H.B. v. M.J., 315 Kan. 310, 320, 508 P.3d 368 (2022). In this review, common words receive their ordinary meanings, and this court presumes the Legislature did not enact meaningless legislation. See In re Wrongful Conviction of Sims, 318 Kan. 153, 161, 542 P.3d 1 (2024). Finally, this court must read statutes together and bring them into harmony, if possible. Johnson v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 320 Kan. 325, 339, 567 P.3d 810 (2025); Roe v. Phillips County Hospital, 317 Kan. 1, 5-6, 522 P.3d 277 (2023). The statutory scheme and legislative intent demonstrate that the KWPA's broad penalty provisions can be applied to unpaid overtime claims under the KMWMHL.

First, the KMWMHL specifically excludes those covered by the FLSA from its purview, showing an intent to yield to the FLSA when applicable. See K.S.A. 44-1202(d) (excluding employers who are covered under FLSA); K.S.A. 44-1203(c) (excluding employers and employees who are covered under FLSA); K.S.A. 44-1204(c)(1) (excluding employees who are covered under FLSA). Yet, the KMWMHL does not include a similar exclusion related to the KWPA. The KWPA was enacted about four years before the KMWMHL, and the Legislature's failure to exclude a KMWMHL claimant from pursuing KWPA claims is notable.

Second, the KMWMHL includes a provision that states it was not intended to limit an employee's ability to pursue more favorable remedies under other state laws already in effect:

“On and after January 1, 1978, any standards relating to minimum wages, maximum hours, overtime compensation or other working conditions in effect under any other law of this state on the effective date of this act which are more favorable to employees than those applicable hereunder shall not be deemed to be amended, rescinded or otherwise affected by K.S.A. 44-1201 to 44-1213, inclusive, but shall continue in full force and effect until they are specifically superseded by standards more favorable to such employees by operation of or in accordance with K.S.A. 44-1201 to 44-1213, inclusive, or rules and regulations adopted hereunder.” K.S.A. 44-1212.

Given this provision and the timing of the enactment of both the KMWMHL and KWPA, it appears that the Legislature intended these statutes to work together.

Third, while both the KWPA and the KMWMHL require employers to pay all wages legally due an employee, the statutes do not conflict with each other. “Where there is a conflict between a statute dealing generally with a subject, and another dealing specifically with a certain phase of it, the specific legislation controls in a proper case.” Chelsea Plaza Homes, Inc. v. Moore, 226 Kan. 430, Syl. ¶ 1, 601 P.2d 1100 (1979). The KMWMHL specifically applies to minimum wage and overtime pay but does not address willful violations. Unlike the KMWMHL, the KWPA provides broad enforcement for all unpaid wages (without mention of overtime) and specifically addresses willful violations. The KWPA's enforcement provisions are clearly more general than the KMWMHL, but the KWPA's provisions do not conflict with the KMWMHL. See Williamson v. Amrani, 283 Kan. 227, 243, 152 P.3d 60 (2007) (discussing statutory conflict and remedies). In Williamson, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that a plaintiff could seek a remedy under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA) against a medical provider for medical malpractice, even when other remedies already existed under the law. Although the Legislature later amended the KCPA following that decision, Williamson illustrates the legal principle that statutory schemes not in conflict can work together to provide complete enforcement and remedies. 283 Kan. at 242-44.

For example, because the KMWMHL provides fewer remedies for overtime violations than the FLSA, applying the KWPA to KMWMHL violations is not duplicative but provides additional remedies. In fact, the FLSA remedies are similar to those in the KWPA, including liquidated damages up to double the wages owed. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (covering unpaid wages, costs, attorney fees, and liquidated damages), with K.S.A. 44-315(b) (permitting the recovery of wages owed and up to 100 percent of wages in interest). The FLSA also provides for additional penalties and fines for willful conduct like the KWPA. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (providing for a penalty not to exceed a $10,000 fine and possible imprisonment for willful violations) and § 216(e)(2) (providing for additional civil monetary penalties for willful violations), with K.S.A. 44-315(b) (providing penalties for willful nonpayment under the KWPA). Like the KWPA, the FLSA also provides a mechanism to hold individuals personally liable. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (defining employer broadly as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee”), with K.S.A. 44-323(b) (permitting a person in “charge of the affairs of an employer, and who knowingly permits the employer” to be personally liable under the KWPA).

On remand, if the Agency finds that appellants violated the KMWMHL, it may apply the KWPA to those findings.

D. The Agency Accurately Interpreted and Applied the KWPA Interest and Penalty Provisions

Several of the appellants’ arguments relate to the Agency's imposition of interest and penalties under the KWPA, including allegations of erroneous interpretation or application of the law and a lack of substantial evidence supporting the decisions. Because the Agency may apply the KWPA on remand, it is necessary to address these allegations.

The KWPA enforcement provision broadly requires that “[e]very employer shall pay all wages due to the employees of the employer at least once during each calendar month, on regular paydays designated in advance by the employer.” K.S.A. 44-314(a). The KWPA defines an employer to mean “any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, corporation, limited liability company or other organization ․ employing any person.” K.S.A. 44-313(a). In a similar vein, it defines an employee as “any person allowed or permitted to work by an employer.” K.S.A. 44-313(b). Finally, wages are “compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis less authorized withholding and deductions.” K.S.A. 44-313(c).

Under the KWPA, an employer that “willfully fails to pay an employee wages as required by” the KWPA under K.S.A. 44-314 or K.S.A. 44-315(a) “shall be liable to the employee for the wages due and also shall be liable to the employee for a penalty in the fixed amount of 1% of the unpaid wages for each day.” K.S.A. 44-315(b). In addition to those penalties, the KWPA authorizes an ALJ to assess interest as provided in K.S.A. 16-201 “on wage claims found to be due and owing from the date the wages were due as defined in K.S.A. 44-314.” K.S.A. 44-323(a).

The appellants challenge the Agency's interest award on two grounds: First that the Agency misunderstood its legal authority regarding the interest award; and second, that the facts did not support an award of interest. In its first argument, the appellants contend that the Agency erroneously believed an interest award was mandatory. To the extent this court is required to interpret the law, it exercises unlimited review. Bruce v. Kelly, 316 Kan. 218, 224, 514 P.3d 1007 (2022).

The initial orders, citing K.S.A. 44-323 and K.S.A. 16-201, state that “the presiding officer may order payment of unpaid wages, plus interest at the rate of 10% per year, accruing after the end of each month until wages are paid in full.” (Emphasis added.) The initial orders also state, “As wages owed were not paid by that date, interest must be assessed․ Interest shall continue to accrue on unpaid wages each month until all unpaid wages are paid in full.” (Emphasis added.) The latter statement follows a recitation of the facts showing LJB Roofing failed to pay claimants their due wages. Contrary to the appellants’ argument, the ALJ's use of the word “must” does not demonstrate a misunderstanding of the law but appears to relate to its decision about interest based on the factual circumstances. The appellants have failed to establish that the Agency misunderstood the discretionary authority granted by K.S.A. 44-323, and thus this court finds no error of law in the Agency's knowledge of its discretionary authority to award interest under the KWPA.

The appellants also attack the Agency's application of the law, contending that the Agency lacked substantial facts to support an interest award because it based the interest decision on the employer's failure to pay overtime, which was “not a compelling basis for the award of interest.” Under K.S.A. 44-323(a), the KWPA authorizes the assessment of interest on “wage claims found to be due and owing” without any additional findings. That is, there is no heightened requirement that the Agency must find a “compelling basis” to support an interest award.

Finally, the appellants argue that the Agency's calculation of interest was in error because interest cannot be calculated on a wage claim that has not been resolved by the Agency or the courts. As the Agency correctly highlights, there is no language in the KWPA qualifying the calculation of interest based on the resolution of a wage claim. This court finds no error with the Agency's interpretation of its authority to award interest under claims properly within the KWPA's purview or its application of the KWPA interest provision in K.S.A. 44-323(a) to wages properly found due under the KWPA.

The appellants also attack the Agency's factual findings, application of the law, and calculations in its penalty award after finding a willful violation under the KWPA. The KWPA permits the imposition of penalties for willful failure to pay wages as required. K.S.A. 44-315(b); see Beckman v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 30 Kan. App. 2d 606, 613, 43 P.3d 891 (2002) (discussing the KWPA penalty provisions). An employer's act is willful if it “indicat[es] a design, purpose, or intent on the part of a person to do wrong or to cause an injury to another.” Weinzirl v. The Wells Group, Inc., 234 Kan. 1016, Syl. ¶ 4, 677 P.2d 1004 (1984). In Beckman, another panel of this court clarified that finding that an employer acted unlawfully is an insufficient basis to award a penalty under K.S.A. 44-315(b). However, because the employer in Beckman knew of the obligation to pay and willfully refused to pay it, the court upheld the imposition of the penalty. 30 Kan. App. 2d at 614.

At the Agency hearing, the appellants maintained they were unaware of the requirement to pay overtime and that claimants did not complain about not being paid overtime. However, the appellants also admitted there was no legal reason not to pay the overtime. Moreover, the ALJ found the testimony about lack of awareness of the overtime law incredible because LJB Roofing had been in operation since 1996 and used a professional accounting service. Importantly, the ALJ also found that LJB Roofing and Beck learned of the failure to pay overtime owed through the claims and the Agency letter in 2022 and still failed to “attempt[ ] to correct any misunderstanding regarding wages owed.” The awareness of overtime owed is also noted by the offer of settlement of the claims. So, the Agency concluded that the appellants failed to pay overtime after knowing such was due through the claims and the Agency's notification.

While this court finds no legal error in the Agency's interpretation or application of the KWPA to claims properly considered under the KWPA, as explained the Agency erred in applying the KWPA to what it determined were FLSA overtime violations. Therefore, the Agency's penalty and interest determinations under the KWPA must be reconsidered on remand if the Agency finds violations of the KMWMHL as explained herein.

III. Substantial Evidence

Appellants argue “many” of the district court's findings “are not supported by substantial evidence,” but they only address the court's finding that Beck owned LJB Roofing and could thus be held personally liable under the KWPA. Appellants argue there is a lack of substantial evidence showing Beck is the owner of LJB Roofing. The district court accepted the Agency's determination that Beck owns LJB Roofing without identifying evidence from the record to support the conclusion. Therefore, the question before this court is whether the Agency's findings regarding Beck's connection to LJB Roofing are supported by substantial evidence pursuant to K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7) and (d).

Under the KWPA, relied on by the ALJ, “[a]ny officer, manager, major shareholder or other person who has charge of the affairs of an employer, and who knowingly permits the employer to engage in violations of K.S.A. 44-314 or 44-315, ․ may be deemed the employer for purposes of this act.” K.S.A. 44-323(b). The ALJ found Beck was the “president/owner” of LJB Roofing and that any arguments to the contrary lacked credibility. It appears the Agency relied, in part, on Beck signing the claimants’ paychecks as well as the “Employer's Answer to Claim for Wages” form sent to the Agency. Of course, the company is also named after Beck, and he is identified as the president on formation documents.

Personal liability under the KWPA is not limited to owners, but it can extend to officers, managers, major shareholders, and any “other person who has charge of the affairs” of a liable employer. K.S.A. 44-323(b). There was substantial evidence in the record as a whole supporting the Agency's finding that Beck was, at minimum, an officer, manager, or other person who had charge of the affairs of the employer because he signed paychecks; signed the “Employer's Answer to Claim for Wages”; and testified extensively about the company, the claimants’ work, and how he paid the claimants. See K.S.A. 77-621(c), (d) (identifying substantial evidence supporting an agency finding).

The Agency's determination that Beck met the definition of a person who could be held personally liable under the KWPA pursuant to K.S.A. 44-323(b) is based on facts in the record that are “substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole.” K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7).

IV. The Agency’s Procedures

Finally, the appellants argue the district court improperly considered the testimony from all claimants in addressing a single individual's claim. While the appellants do not cite to K.S.A. 77-621(c)(5)—“the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or has failed to follow prescribed procedure”—that is the KJRA subsection relevant to this review.

Appellate review of issues raised under K.S.A. 77-621(c)(5) is “unlimited because those questions necessarily involve interpretation of relevant statutory or regulatory procedures.” In re River Rock Energy Company, 313 Kan. at 945. Therefore, the question on review is whether the Agency engaged in an unlawful procedure by considering the evidence from all claimants when addressing a single individual's claim. To the extent this court must interpret the law, this court exercises unlimited review. Bruce, 316 Kan. at 224.

The Kansas Administrative Procedure Act (KAPA) gives the presiding officer—here the ALJ—authority to regulate the course of the proceedings and does not confine them to “technical rules of evidence.” K.S.A. 77-524(a); K.S.A. 77-514; Doe v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 277 Kan. 795, 811, 90 P.3d 940 (2004). For example, while the presiding officer must “give effect to the rules of privilege,” they need not exclude evidence “solely because it is hearsay.” K.S.A. 77-524(a). Rather, the presiding officer must “give the parties reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, and ․ act reasonably without partiality.” K.S.A. 77-524(a).

The appellants agree that the ALJ informed the parties it would conduct a combined hearing because all cases involved the same employer, and the ALJ clarified that each case was separate. At the hearing, counsel for the appellants inquired whether they needed to elicit redundant testimony for their exhibits concerning each claimant. In response, the ALJ said, in pertinent part: “[W]hen we have several claims with the same employer, that's part of the reason for doing these as combined hearings. Because it will save time [and] there's a lot of that repeat information that we don't need to go through again.” The appellants never challenged this procedure and, in fact, benefited from the procedure by specifically asking the ALJ to “use the same background information related to the company, Larry Beck Roofing, the type of work it does, and just the background information that was used during [a previous claimant's portion of the hearing] to also be used here instead [to avoid] the repetition.”

The appellants state, in conclusory fashion and without explanation, that the Agency's “compilation of evidence exhibited partiality” and was “irrelevant, unreasonable, and prejudicial.” The appellants fail to point to specific facts that they feel support a finding of partiality or prejudice. Issues not adequately briefed—or raised only incidentally—are deemed waived or abandoned. See In re Marriage of Williams, 307 Kan. 960, 977, 417 P.3d 1033 (2018) (discussing inadequate briefing); Russell v. May, 306 Kan. 1058, 1089, 400 P.3d 647 (2017) (discussing issues incidentally raised).

The appellants carry the burden to demonstrate error and have failed to do so. No evidence suggests facts specific to one claimant were improperly included in the Agency's factual findings for another claimant or that general facts relevant to all claimants prejudiced the appellants. The appellants fail to show that the Agency engaged in an unlawful procedure or acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in combining claims into a single hearing.

Conclusion

The Agency misapplied the law when it determined that claimants were entitled to wages from unpaid overtime pursuant to the FLSA and associated penalties and interest under the KWPA. However, this court finds no error in the Agency's procedure of combining the eight claims for one hearing or its factual finding that Beck is potentially liable under K.S.A. 44-315(b) as an “officer, manager, major shareholder or other person who has charge of the affairs” of LJB Roofing. This matter is reversed and remanded to the district court to remand to the Agency for reconsideration.

On remand, if the Agency proceeds on the present record, it must determine whether the appellants are liable to the claimants for unpaid overtime under the KMWMHL. If the Agency finds liability for unpaid overtime under the KMWMHL, it must recalculate all amounts owed, if any, consistent with the KMWMHL. Furthermore, following a finding of liability for unpaid overtime under the KMWMHL, the Agency may then apply the KWPA as discussed herein. Appellants are not entitled to relief on any other claim of error.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Hurst, J.: