ELISABETH KEPLEY v. MICHAEL KEPLEY (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Without the benefit of legal counsel, Elisabeth Kepley filed a 2024 lawsuit seeking to remove some relatives from their positions as trustees of the trust because of their fraudulent acts she had discovered sometime in December 2019. The district court later ruled that her fraud claims were barred by the two-year fraud statute of limitations found in K.S.A. 60-513 and dismissed her petition with prejudice.

Kepley now appeals that dismissal order. The record reveals that she filed her lawsuit five years after her discovery of actual fraud, and not within two years, as required by law. Based on her admissions about the date of her discovery, we must affirm the court's dismissal ruling. Kepley raises essentially four issues, but two were not preserved for appeal, and thus, we cannot address them. And we find no error in the remaining two issues. We affirm

Because we deal here with a motion to dismiss, we assume the facts alleged in Kepley's petition are true.

This lawsuit and this appeal are brought by Elisabeth Kepley. She sues her brother and sister, Michael Kepley and Barbara Blaschke, along with her children, Peter, David, and Anna Kepley.

According to Elisabeth, in 1960, her biological family established a 200-million-dollar trust fund. Since she was not raised by her biological parents, Elisabeth was unaware of the money. Elisabeth was raised by William and Rosemary Kepley. She believes her money was fraudulently appropriated into the William and Rosemary Kepley Trusts. William and Rosemary have since died. In her petition, Elisabeth sought relief under K.S.A. 58a-706 to remove the current trustees of the trust. Not only did she ask the court to declare all documents procured through fraud or forgery void ab initio, but she also asked the court to restore her access to the trust.

The petition states that in 2006, the Appellees fraudulently created and submitted documents purporting to grant them trustee/grantor authority over the trust. The documents include forged assignments of interests, land sale agreements, deeds, and emails. Elisabeth said she discovered the forged documents in August 2023.

Elisabeth did inherit from the William and Rosemary Kepley Trusts, created in 1991, as did her siblings. In 2006, all her interests in the trusts were transferred to her children, with Peter as trustee. The circumstances of such transfer are unknown as she was ill at the time. At the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings, we assume the well-pleaded facts in the petition are true—i.e., that the transfer was fraudulent.

On December 18, 2024, Elisabeth sued, seeking several types of relief: to remove the trustees for illegal transfer of trust and lack of authority; to declare some fraudulent documents void; to remove illegal block on beneficiary's trust; and for declaratory relief. The Appellees moved to dismiss, contending the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the statute of limitations for fraud barred any claim.

The district court granted the motions to dismiss because the case was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for fraud set out in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3). The court additionally observed the ten-year statute of repose found in K.S.A 60-513(b) was also exceeded. To emphasize the finality of its decision the court dismissed this case with prejudice.

We have boiled the appeal issues down to four.

(1) Is a void trust subject to a statute of limitations defense?

(2) Did Appellees commit fraud on the court by submitting forged documents to the district court?

(3) Did the district court properly apply the standard for a motion to dismiss, i.e., did it consider all the allegations in the petition as true, and not consider materials outside the pleadings?

(4) Did the district court err by ruling that Elisabeth could have discovered the fraud earlier than 2023, which is when the petition says she discovered the fraud?

Issue 1 was not preserved for appeal.

Kepley contends that the district court erred when it refused to determine whether any valid trust ever existed or whether Appellees ever held authority. Along the same line of reasoning, she contends that the district court improperly treated forged documents and concealed deeds as time-barred rather than void.

Kepley contended the trust and other documents were void. But she did not argue voidness in relation to the statute of limitations. Generally, issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised on appeal. See In re N.E., 316 Kan. 391, 407, 516 P.3d 586 (2022). An appellant must explain why an issue that was not raised below should be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Johnson, 309 Kan. 992, 995, 441 P.3d 1036 (2019); Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36). This rule is strictly enforced. See State v. Holley, 315 Kan. 512, 524, 509 P.3d 542 (2022).

In her petition, Kepley tried to frame a cause of action on the ground of fraud. She handwrote in “K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3) Fraud/Concealment in a trust.” The parties’ filings and arguments at the motion to dismiss hearing considered whether the statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3) had been exceeded.

To us, she argues that the district court had to determine the existence and validity of the trust along with the authority of the trustee, before addressing the statute of limitations and dismissing the petition. She argues a void document conveys no rights and its challenge is not subject to a statute of limitations. A void trust can be challenged at any time. Her logic is straightforward: If the foundational trust was invalid, then all derivative documents are invalid.

We are not persuaded by her argument. Kepley cites no Kansas authority supporting her claim that no statute of limitations applies. She relies on Faison v. Lewis, 25 N.Y.3d 220, 32 N.E.3d 400, 10 N.Y.S.3d 185 (2015), claiming it is regularly cited by Kansas courts, though no such cases have been found. Faison held that a forged deed is void ab initio and not subject to a statute of limitation. 25 N.Y.3d at 220. That does not appear to be the rule in Kansas.

But there are specific statutes of limitations in Kansas that govern causes of action, depending on how the cause of action is framed. Two older Kansas cases have addressed this issue. In Keys v. Steele, 143 Kan. 826, 829, 57 P.2d 28 (1936), the court held that when a petition states a cause of action for relief on the grounds of fraud, the statute of limitations makes no exception for fraud perpetrated by means of forged deeds. In contrast, in Cox v. Watkins, 149 Kan. 209, 214, 87 P.2d 243 (1939), the court held that an action by the true owner to quiet title against another claiming under a forged deed is not an action for relief on the ground of fraud and ordinarily no statute of limitations applies.

Kepley's petition stated a cause of action for relief on the ground of fraud, citing K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3). To the district court, the parties only argued about whether the statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3) had been exceeded or Elisabeth's claim was saved by the discovery clause of that statute. The effect of that statute is the only argument that is preserved for our review.

Issue 2 was not preserved for appeal.

Kepley contends that the Appellees committed fraud on the district court by submitting forged documents to the court. She argues the district court misapplied K.S.A. 60-513 to claims involving fraud on the court, when fraud on the court has no statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-260(d) and federal precedent. She points out that the Appellee's conduct—use of forged documents, concealed deeds, altered filings, forged emails, and fabricated trustee authority—constitutes fraud on the court requiring our reversal of the judgment as void.

Kepley did not preserve this argument for appeal. Simply put, Kepley did not argue “fraud on the court” to the district court. As we stated above, issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised on appeal without an explanation of why such issue should be considered for the first time on appeal. See In re N.E., 316 Kan. at 407-08; Rule 6.02(a)(5).

We note that Kepley cites Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S. Ct. 997, 88 L. Ed. 1250 (1944). In Hazel-Atlas, Hartford had submitted a fraudulent article to the district court that the circuit court relied upon in its decision. Hazel later filed a petition in the circuit court asking the court to vacate its judgment based on this fraud. There was undisputed evidence of fraud on the court. In such case, the circuit court had the power to vacate its own judgment. 322 U.S. at 240-41, 247, 249-50.

Here, we have only Elisabeth's bare assertion that the documents Appellees submitted to the district court were fraudulent. We, as a court of appeal, do not have the ability to take evidence or hear testimony.

Also, unlike in Hazel-Atlas, the district court here did not rely on any of the alleged forged documents in making its decision. The district court found the statute of limitations had passed based on statements made by Elisabeth in her petition and at the motion hearing.

This claim is not properly before this court.

Issue 3 was properly preserved and we find no error by the court.

At the motion to dismiss hearing, Appellees submitted records from an action filed in the New York Supreme Court, which purported to show that Elisabeth was aware of the allegedly forged documents by 2019. The court admitted the records into evidence. But the court did not consider the documents when ruling on the motion to dismiss.

The parties take opposing positions on this issue. Kepley argues that the district court erred by refusing to hear her evidence, refusing to accept her allegations as true, requiring her to overcome Appellee's narrative, and considering evidence outside the pleadings by accepting evidence submitted by Appellees.

In opposition, the Appellees contend that the district court explicitly did not rely on the Appellee's exhibits. The district court simply reviewed the pleadings to determine the petition was filed outside the statute of limitations.

A brief review of the law is helpful at this point. Motions to dismiss are unique. A district court faced with a motion to dismiss may only consider the plaintiff's petition and any documents attached to it. Rogers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 64 Kan. App. 2d 290, 303, 551 P.3d 142 (2024). The court must assume the plaintiff's factual allegations and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them are true. 64 Kan. App. 2d at 295. When the defendant alleges in a motion to dismiss that the statute of limitations bars the plaintiff's claim, the court also considers plaintiff's asserted facts in opposition to the motion. See Hemphill v. Shore, 295 Kan. 1110, 1123, 289 P.3d 1173 (2012).

In addition, how an argument is presented to a court is important. A litigant should not assume that the court will ignore admissions either made directly to the court or filed in the case when the court is making a dispositive ruling on that case. Davidson v. Denning, 259 Kan. 659, 668, 914 P.2d 936 (1996).

Finally, if an action is time-barred it goes no further. When an action is time-barred on its face, it must be dismissed unless the statute of limitations is tolled. The plaintiff has the burden of proving the statute is tolled. Underhill v. Thompson, 37 Kan. App. 2d 870, 875, 158 P.3d 987 (2007).

In our view, the district court correctly relied on the petition and Kepley's admissions in response to the motion to dismiss. She was given ample opportunity to explain her position on the statute of limitations issue. The district court only stopped her when she tried to argue the merits of her case, rather than the motion to dismiss. The district court correctly refused to consider the exhibits offered by the Appellees in making its decision. The district court did not err procedurally in ruling on the motion to dismiss.

Issue 4: The court did not err when it ruled the fraud could have been discovered earlier than 2023 when Kepley claimed she discovered the fraud.

In exhibits attached to her petition, Kepley stated that in 2006, without her knowledge, the Appellees fraudulently created documents purporting to grant them trustee/ grantor authority over her trust. In July 2023, she subpoenaed the trust attorney, Kent Pringle, for any documents that pertained to her trust fund. In August 2023, she received 121 pages of forged documents, and it is at that moment when she discovered the fraud.

Elisabeth attached several emails to her petition that she had sent to Pringle. According to her, in April 2019, Elisabeth asked about her trust fund and claimed her children were committing fraud. In April 2021, she asked for the removal of trustees from her trust alleging she had been deceived when she was ill. She said she had become aware of a fully signed document assigning her interest in the trust to Peter, but that she had not signed it. In October 2021, she inquired about the stock that had been transferred to Peter when she was sick.

At the dismissal motion hearing, Kepley again argued that she did not comprehend the full extent of the fraud until August 2023, after 120 documents were subpoenaed from the trust attorney, Pringle. She admitted that the forgery by the Appellees began in October 2006. She also admitted that in 2009, she received a package of unsigned documents from Pringle but did not open the package until August 2019. She was sick in 2009. When she opened those documents, she began to suspect the fraud she now complains about, but she could not comprehend everything that had happened. She had communications with financial institutions that raised her suspicions. In December 2018, she received notices from the fraud department at Goldman Sachs, but she could not comprehend it. In December 2019, several banks told her that her children had access to her trust. In 2019, she made claims in a New York case that Peter was acting inappropriately regarding assets that belonged to her. But she said she did not put the pieces together until August 2023.

The district court granted the motion to dismiss because the case was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for fraud set out in K.S.A. 60-513. The court also held that the 10-year statute of repose was violated because the fraudulent activities by the Appellees began in 2006.

The two-year statute of limitations was violated because fraud was reasonably apparent in December 2018, when Kepley received communications from financial institutions indicating inappropriate activity with funds that belonged to her. She had the ability to investigate then. The court said, “The statute of limitations begins when you can reasonably discover an inappropriate act. It does not begin when you think you have the ability to prove exactly what happened.”

Kepley contends that, although she recognized her forged signature on the document assigning away her interest in the trust in 2019, she lacked access to the concealed deeds, knowledge of the forged emails, an understanding of the concealed trust scheme, and an ability to investigate without discovery.

Appellees contend that the petition is time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations because:

• the alleged fraud was reasonably ascertainable in 2009 when Elisabeth was given a packet of documents she now alleges were fraudulent;

• she was notified of the alleged fraud in 2018 by Goldman Sachs;

• she was informed by three banks that her children had access to her trust in 2019;

• she opened the packet of documents in 2019 and suspected fraud;

• and she was making the same allegations that she makes herein in 2019.

She did not need to be aware of the full extent of the fraud for the statute of limitations to begin to run. We reverse the district court's holding on the 10-year statute of repose because it is inapplicable to fraud claims. Hemphill, 295 Kan. at 1124-25. But we affirm that the two-year statute of limitations was exceeded.

A quick review shows that by Kepley's own admissions, she had several warnings indicating fraud before she understood the full extent of the fraud. In December 2018, she received notices from the fraud department at Goldman Sachs. In April 2019, she claimed her children were committing fraud. In August 2019, she opened a package of what she suspected to be fraudulent documents. In December 2019, three banks told her that her children had access to her trust. In April 2021, she asked for removal of trustees over her trust alleging she had been deceived. In October 2021, she knew her stock had been transferred to Peter. On December 18, 2024, she filed this action.

Kepley repeatedly stated that she “could not comprehend everything” prior to 2023. But discovery in K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3) does not mean that one can comprehend everything. It means that the fraud could be discovered with reasonable diligence. Miller, 246 Kan. at 465.

When we combine all the warnings that Kepley received alerting her to fraud, they were more than sufficient to initiate the two-year statute of limitations. It started to run at least by the end of 2019, which was five years before filing this action. The district court correctly dismissed the case because, on undisputed evidence, it was barred by the statute of limitations.

Affirmed.

Hill, J.: