STATE v. PHILLIPS (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Scott D. Phillips appeals the district court's order imposing $3,200 in Child Advocacy Center (CAC) fees following his guilty pleas to eight counts of sexual exploitation of a child. He contends the district court erred by imposing $400 per conviction instead of a single $400 fee. After a review of the record and applicable caselaw, we affirm the district court.

The State charged Phillips with eight counts of sexual exploitation of a child. As part of a plea agreement, Phillips agreed to plead guilty to eight counts of sexual exploitation of a child. In return, the State agreed to recommend the aggravated number in the applicable sentencing grid box, while noting that the aggravated number would be doubled based on Phillips’ status as a persistent sex offender. The State agreed to recommend that the sentences for each count run concurrent. As part of the plea agreement, Phillips agreed to pay a $400 CAC fee for each offense.

At sentencing, the parties asked the district court to follow the plea agreement, impose the aggravated number in the grid box, and run the sentences concurrent with each other. The State requested a CAC fee of $400 per offense.

The district court found Phillips was a persistent sex offender. The district court sentenced Phillips to 110 months’ imprisonment—double the aggravated grid box number—for count one. For each of the remaining counts, the district court sentenced Phillips to 68 months’ imprisonment. The district court deviated from the plea agreement, however, by running Phillips’ sentences consecutive to one another for a maximum sentence of 220 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed various costs, including a $400 CAC fee “for each offense.”

Phillips appealed.

On appeal, Phillips raises one issue: whether the district court erred in assessing eight CAC fees instead of one fee.

Preservation

Phillips acknowledges he did not raise this issue before the district court. But he suggests we can reach the issue for the first time on appeal because it is “ ‘a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case.’ ” See State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 283, 497 P.3d 566 (2021). The State responds that Phillips agreed to a $400 fee per offense as part of the plea agreement, asked the district court to follow the plea agreement, and “should not be allowed to now complain about something that he requested the court to order.”

A defendant cannot “invite an error and then complain of the error on appeal.” State v. Stoll, 312 Kan. 726, 735, 480 P.3d 158 (2021). The Stoll court also held that a defendant cannot stipulate to a conclusion of law, and the invited-error doctrine does not bar review of an erroneous conclusion of law. 312 Kan. at 735. Therefore, the invited error doctrine does not prevent consideration of this issue.

Whether K.S.A. 20-370(a) applies per conviction or per case is a question of law. State v. Sanders, 65 Kan. App. 2d 236, 260, 563 P.3d 234, rev. denied 320 Kan. 867 (2025). Resolution of this issue would be finally determinative of this case, so we address Phillips’ argument.

Standard of Review

Statutory interpretation presents a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Daniels, 319 Kan. 340, 342, 554 P.3d 629 (2024). The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. As a reviewing court, we

“must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, [we] should not speculate about the legislative intent behind that clear language, and ․ should refrain from reading something into the statute that is not readily found in its words.” State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 698, 510 P.3d 706 (2022).

Discussion

K.S.A. 20-370(a) states, in relevant part: “On and after July 1, 2013, any defendant convicted of a crime under chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, in which a minor is a victim, shall pay an assessment fee in the amount of $400 to the clerk of the district court.”

In Sanders, the panel reviewed the statutory language of K.S.A. 20-370(a) and held that the statute “requires a defendant convicted of a crime against a minor victim to pay an assessment fee for each crime committed against a minor.” Sanders, 65 Kan. App. 2d at 264. In State v. Mason, 66 Kan. App. 2d 209, 221, 579 P.3d 978 (2025), petition for rev. filed October 30, 2025, another panel of this court concluded: “While we are not bound by decisions of prior panels, we choose to adopt the plain language interpretation of K.S.A. 20-370(a) as determined by another panel of this court in [Sanders], because it is well-reasoned and accomplishes the result most closely aligned with the clear legislative intent.”

Since Sanders issued, every panel of this court that has addressed this argument has reached the same result: the CAC fee in K.S.A. 20-370(a) applies per crime of conviction, not per case. See, e.g., State v. Seeman, No. 128,864, 2026 WL 1908266, at *2 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion) (“Although we are not bound by the decisions of other panels, the plain language interpretation of K.S.A. 20-370[a] as determined in Sanders is well-reasoned and accomplishes the result most closely aligned with the clear legislative intent.”), petition for rev. filed August 3, 2026; State v. Peters, No. 127,775, 2026 WL 1361905, at *15 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion) (noting Kansas Supreme Court has granted petitions for review of this issue, but “there is currently no decision that alters this court's analysis and [we find] no basis to deviate from the analysis in Sanders”), petition for rev. filed June 12, 2026; State v. Baker, No. 127,616, 2026 WL 412724, at *3 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion) (“Other panels of this court have held that, under K.S.A. 20-370, the Legislature intended for a single criminal defendant convicted of multiple crimes against minors to pay a fee for each crime committed against minors. We agree with their holdings. [Citations omitted.]”), petition for rev. filed March 13, 2026; State v. Shortt, No. 127,828, 2025 WL 3188309, at *2 (Kan. App. 2025) (unpublished opinion) (“We do not read K.S.A. 20-370[a] as requiring anything other than what this court has repeatedly found—that a fee is required for each qualifying offense.”), rev. granted 321 Kan. 794 (2026).

We agree. The district court did not err when it ordered Phillips to pay $400 for each of his eight convictions for sexual exploitation of a child.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: