IN RE: the MARRIAGE OF J.G. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After being married for five years, and having two children, J.G. and C.B.-G. divorced. The district court entered a journal entry addressing custody and parenting time, child support, and the division of marital assets and debts.

On appeal, J.G. alleges the district court abused its discretion in making an equitable division of the marital assets by ignoring his testimony that explained his use of funds from a joint marital account. But J.G. fails to support his factual allegations with citations to the record on appeal, and we conclude that the factual findings of the court were supported by substantial competent evidence.

J.G. also alleges that the district court abused its discretion by failing to award him a “right of first refusal” so that he could have parenting time any time C.B.-G. was unavailable. But J.G. again fails to provide factual support for his allegations by citing to the record and has not proven that he made this request to the district court. J.G. has also failed to prove that the district court abused its discretion by failing to include such a provision.

Finally, J.G. alleges that the district court abused its discretion by failing to order a second medical examination for the minor children—both of whom have been diagnosed with autism. But J.G. has not proven any error of law or fact, and a reasonable person could agree with the district court's decision not to include such an order because C.B.-G. voluntarily agreed to a second examination for the children. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

J.G. and C.B.-G. were married in 2018 and have two young children—S.G. and A.G. The parties separated in the summer of 2022, and J.G. filed for divorce in 2023. A final hearing was held in 2025.

Marital Assets and Debts

Both parties provided testimony at the final hearing related to marital assets and debts. J.G. testified that prior to the parties’ separation, he deposited his paycheck into a joint marital account and continued to do so for some time after the parties separated. J.G. understood that his income was used to make household payments and pay expenses for the children.

J.G. stopped depositing his check into the joint marital account in May 2023 and began depositing it in an account that belonged to his father. J.G.’s father would give J.G. money for rent, credit cards, his car payment, and J.G.’s other needs. J.G. testified that his father did not keep any of his money and eventually, J.G. got his own bank account.

J.G. also admitted that in May 2023, he stopped paying the mortgage and utilities for the marital home. J.G. also stopped paying costs related to the children, including health insurance, day care costs, and school fees. He acknowledged he did not help with these expenses even after C.B.-G. brought the issue to his attention.

J.G. admitted that he made a down payment on a car in the amount of $2,400 out of the joint account in August 2022. He acknowledged that he told C.B.-G. he would reimburse the account for the down payment but had failed to do so. J.G. also admitted that he had paid his $500 monthly car payment from the joint account through April 2024.

C.B.-G. also testified about marital assets and debts. She stated that her financial situation was difficult after J.G. stopped providing financial support for her and the children. She relied on food pantries to feed her children and tried to find assistance where she could, including working with a HUD advisor that helped her place her student loans into forbearance. C.B.-G. stated she had paid $3,765.90 in out-of-pocket medical expenses for the family through the time of trial.

While the divorce was pending, C.B.-G.’s vehicle became inoperable. She filed an emergency motion to modify the temporary orders to allow her to purchase a new vehicle which the district court granted. C.B.-G. purchased a vehicle with funds from a retirement account.

While the parties stipulated to the admission of several financial documents for the district court to consider, only Exhibits A and C.B.-G.’s proposed property and debt division worksheet appear to have been included in the record on appeal. The largest marital asset was the family home, and a legal description of the property is contained in Exhibit A. C.B.-G. testified that she was unable to pay the mortgage after December 2024. The parties acknowledged that because the mortgage was not being paid, they entered a forbearance program, and both agreed to list and sell the house. C.B.-G. attached her proposed property and debt division spreadsheet and recapitulation of the financial evidence to her proposed journal entry and decree of divorce.

Parenting Time

At the final hearing, both parties testified in support of their proposed parenting plans. J.G. did not file his proposed parenting plan with the district court; rather, he offered it as an exhibit at trial. J.G.’s proposed parenting plan is not contained in the record on appeal. Exhibit W is C.B.-G.’s proposed parenting plan that was eventually adopted by the court as a final parenting plan after it made some modifications. Exhibit W appears in the record on appeal.

At the final hearing, J.G. asked the district court to award C.B.-G. parenting time every other weekend and award him all remaining parenting time. J.G. requested equal parenting time in the summer. J.G. did not request any “right of first refusal” parenting time during his testimony.

C.B.-G. also testified about her requested parenting time. She requested that J.G. be given parenting time every other weekend and that she be awarded the remaining parenting time.

Medical Needs of the Children

Both children were diagnosed with autism at the University of Kansas Medical Center. J.G. testified that at the time of the evaluation, both children primarily spoke Spanish, and he was concerned the testing did not account for that fact. J.G. testified that he wanted to have the children retested but expressed he would have difficulty with getting off work to take them. J.G. agreed that if the second diagnosis included autism, he would support the children receiving appropriate treatment. J.G. acknowledged that he had not spoken to any of the children's healthcare professionals about his concerns.

C.B.-G. testified that each child has been diagnosed with level 1 autism, which is considered mild. She described that both children “have a recessive expression—recessive expressive language disorder, which is tied in with the autism. And our youngest daughter, [A.G.], she also has a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with anxiety.” C.B.-G. also discussed the testing and treatment the children received. She testified that she did not have a problem with the children receiving a second medical evaluation to address J.G.’s concern.

District Court Decision

At the conclusion of the final hearing, the district court asked that each party file a pleading outlining their proposed division of assets and debts. In response, C.B.-G. filed a proposed journal entry and divorce decree. Her pleading included a proposed parenting plan and also addressed child support, maintenance, and the division of marital property and debt. J.G. did not file any document in response to the district court's request.

The district court filed a journal entry and divorce decree, adopted C.B.-G.’s proposed permanent parenting plan with modifications, and filed a child support worksheet. The district court divided the property and debt of the parties and ordered a “bank account reimbursement” from J.G. to C.B.-G. in the amount of $15,951.61. The district court made an accompanying factual finding: “Beginning in May 2023, Petitioner withdrew funds from the parties’ marital accounts. Respondent is granted a judgment in the amount of $15,951.61 against Petitioner, representing one-half of the funds Petitioner withdrew.” The district court also divided the personal property of the parties and ordered that the marital residence be sold. It ordered that from the net proceeds of the sale, C.B.- G. would first be reimbursed for the mortgage payments she had made, and after that reimbursement, the parties would equally share in the proceeds. But from J.G.’s proceeds, the district court also ordered J.G. to pay C.B.-G. $17,068 for back child support, $2,354 for unpaid temporary child support, and $7,900 for J.G.’s car loan.

Analysis

Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion in the Division of Marital Assets?

J.G.’s first argument on appeal is that the district court abused its discretion in its division of marital assets because its factual findings are not supported by substantial competent evidence.

Standard of Review

Appellate courts review a district court's equitable division of property and debt for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Thrailkill, 57 Kan. App. 2d 244, 261, 452 P.3d 392 (2019). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. The party asserting the district court abused its discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse of discretion. In re A.S., 319 Kan. 396, 400, 555 P.3d 732 (2024).

J.G. has failed to support his factual allegations with citations to the record on appeal.

J.G.’s first argument on appeal is that the district court made an error of fact by ignoring his testimony explaining Exhibit L—C.B.-G.’s recapitulation of the financial evidence. In his brief, J.G. states, “The Petitioner/Appellant in this case takes issue with the Court's division of assets as the decision clearly ignores the testimony of the Petitioner on the handling of the parties’ joint bank account as was set forth in Respondent's trial exhibit L which is part of the transcript in this matter.”

While J.G. provides citations to the record within the “Statement of Facts” section of his brief, the facts J.G. presents in that section are very limited. He only states that the parties were married, and that they have two minor children. He notes the divorce petition he filed and that the district court held a one-day trial before issuing its opinion. He concludes, “The Court granted the parties a divorce and made findings related to the disposition of the parties’ marital assets and as to the Parenting Plan. On March 26, 2025, a Journal Entry and Decree of Divorce, Permanent Parenting Plan and Child Support Worksheet were filed by the Court.” This is the last time J.G. cites to the record in his brief. Though J.G. makes multiple factual allegations throughout his argument, he fails to support them with citations to the record.

This is important, because J.G. is alleging that the district court ignored his testimony and the evidence in the record. In making those allegations, J.G. is required to cite facts in the record to support his argument. “When facts are necessary to an argument, the record must supply those facts and a party relying on those facts must provide an appellate court with a specific citation to the point in the record where the fact can be verified.” Friedman v. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 296 Kan. 636, 644, 294 P.3d 287 (2013). Moreover, the burden is on the party making a claim to designate a record sufficient to present its points to the appellate court and to establish its claims. Bicknell v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 315 Kan. 451, 462-63, 509 P.3d 1211 (2022).

Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36) provides that an appellant's brief must contain

“(4) A concise but complete statement, without argument, of the facts that are material to determining the issues to be decided in the appeal. The facts included in the statement must be keyed to the record on appeal by volume and page number. The court may presume that a factual statement made without a reference to volume and page number has no support in the record on appeal.”

In examining J.G.’s argument that the district court erred in its division of marital assets and debts, we find that he has alleged facts beyond those cited to in the record in his Statement of Facts. J.G. asks us to find that the district court ignored his testimony as to his handling of the joint marital account but fails to provide a citation to such testimony. J.G. specifically argues that “[h]e went through the ledger set forth in this exhibit line by line and testified as to the nature of the transaction as to how the money was not being dissipated from the marital estate.” Yet, J.G. fails to cite to the transcript in order to support this argument. J.G. also asks us to consider the factors found in K.S.A. 23-2802(c) to determine whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's findings. That statute provides a list of factors for the trial court to consider in making an equitable division of property and debt. J.G. has failed again to provide any citation to the record to support his conclusion that the evidence in the record did not satisfy these factors.

The result of J.G.’s failure to cite to the record means that we “may presume that a factual statement made without a reference to volume and page number has no support in the record on appeal.” Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36). And as a panel of our court recently pointed out, we may also deny J.G. relief on his claim for this reason alone. Reed v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections, No. 128,984, 2026 WL 709822, at *3 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital assets.

Notwithstanding J.G.’s failure to support his arguments with citations to the record, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the assets of the parties. K.S.A. 23-2801(a) provides that once divorce proceedings begin, all property of married persons becomes marital property. In re Marriage of Meek, 320 Kan. 313, 317-18, 567 P.3d 252 (2025). The district court is then required to make a just and reasonable division of property. K.S.A. 23-2802(c).

J.G. argues that the district court's division of assets was not supported by substantial competent evidence. “Substantial evidence is such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.” Geer v. Eby, 309 Kan. 182, 190, 432 P.3d 1001 (2019).

J.G. does not specify which of the district court's orders he disputes but argues generally that the court's division of property ignored his testimony. Issues not adequately briefed are deemed waived or abandoned. See In re Marriage of Williams, 307 Kan. 960, 977, 417 P.3d 1033 (2018).

Since much of J.G.’s brief centers on the district court's finding that he dissipated assets, we will consider whether the district court erred in that factual finding. We will also consider the district court's closely related order for J.G. to reimburse C.B.-G. for funds used to purchase his vehicle. The district court found, “Beginning in May 2023, Petitioner withdrew funds from the parties’ marital accounts. Respondent is granted a judgment in the amount of $15,951.61 against Petitioner, representing one-half of the funds Petitioner withdrew.” And the district court also ordered J.G. to pay $7,900 for “reimbursement to Respondent for payment of Petitioner's vehicle loan.”

The record reflects that C.B.-G. requested the division of assets contained in her proposed journal entry and decree of divorce, including repayment of $15,951.61 for half of the “bank transfers that [J.G.] transferred in violation of the temporary orders,” from June 2023, and for payments made from the joint account for J.G.’s vehicle.

J.G. argues that his testimony disputed C.B.-G.’s Exhibit L. But J.G. does not provide any specific citations to his or C.B.-G.’s testimony in the record. Nonetheless, after examining the record on appeal, we conclude that substantial competent evidence supported the factual finding that J.G. dissipated assets and used marital funds to purchase a vehicle.

J.G. testified that he transferred money from the parties’ joint checking account to his father's account to protect the funds from C.B.-G.’s spending. But J.G. admitted that the money was used to pay for his “credit card payments, rent payments, car insurance, car payments, gas, food, in general life bills.” J.G. admitted that he stopped depositing his paycheck into the joint account that was being used to pay the expenses of the parties and stopped paying for the mortgage, utilities, and expenses related to the children. He also testified that he used funds from the marital account to make a down payment and monthly payments on his vehicle.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the district court took the matter under advisement and requested that each party file a pleading with their requests “as to specific divisions of the assets and specific divisions of the debts.” C.B.-G. filed a proposed journal entry and divorce decree that included a property division spreadsheet and recap of monies that J.G. owed to C.B.-G., as well as parenting plan provisions. J.G. did not file any pleading in response to the district court's request.

We find that the record contains substantial competent evidence supporting the district court's finding that J.G. withdrew assets from the marital account for his own use—much of that evidence being J.G.’s own testimony. J.G. has failed to prove that the district court's factual findings were not supported by substantial competent evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion by Failing to Order a “Right of First Refusal” for Parenting Time with the Children?

Standard of Review

A district court's decision concerning child custody and parenting time is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cheney v. Poore, 301 Kan. 120, 128, 339 P.3d 1220 (2014).

Discussion

J.G. asserts that the district court should have included a provision in the parenting plan allowing him the right of first refusal to have parenting time with the children if C.B.-G. was unable to care for them during her parenting time. He alleges

“[t]his request was not unreasonable and would best serve the interests of the children by giving them the maximum amount of access to their natural parents in lieu of employing a third party to watch the children. While the Respondent was not in agreement with this provision, the failure of the trial court to address this request in [its] judgment of decree calls into question whether the Court even considered this request which would be an abuse of its discretion.”

J.G. did not seek a “right of first refusal” provision in his petition, request for temporary orders, or pretrial questionnaire. In his pretrial questionnaire, J.G. stated he “will be filing a proposed parenting plan with the Court setting forth the proposed parenting time for the parties along with other parenting rules and guidelines.” While J.G.’s proposed parenting plan was entered into evidence as Exhibit 1 at the final hearing, that plan is not part of the record on appeal. Our review of the final hearing transcript indicates J.G. did not testify at trial about his request for this provision. J.G. has not indicated where, when, or how he made this request to the district court.

J.G.’s argument suffers from the same flaw as his first argument—his factual allegations are unsupported by citations to the record. It is J.G.’s burden to designate a record that allows him to present his argument and prove his claim. Bicknell, 315 Kan. at 462-63. He has failed to do so. And as in his first argument, J.G.’s failure to cite to the record is a failure to follow Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4). The violation of this rule means that we may presume J.G.’s factual allegations are unsupported in the record on appeal.

To the extent J.G. is arguing the district court erred as a matter of law because it failed to consider an issue raised by J.G., he has failed to cite the record to point out where he previously raised this issue to the district court. And J.G. cannot complain that the district court's factual findings were inadequate, because he failed to object to those findings. “When a party fails to object to the lack of findings before the district court, an appellate court presumes that the district court made the factual findings necessary to support its decision.” State v. Gaither, 283 Kan. 671, 686, 156 P.3d 602 (2007).

At the final hearing, the district court heard testimony from both parties as to the needs of the children. Following the final hearing, the district court entered a parenting plan that controlled the custody and parenting time of the children, and the district court found that this plan was in the best interests of the children. J.G. has failed to demonstrate why a “right of first refusal” provision was necessary to meet the needs of the children. J.G. has failed to prove that the district court made any error of law or fact, or that no reasonable person could agree with the district court's decision. Cheney, 301 Kan. at 128. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to include a “right of first refusal” provision in the parenting plan.

Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion by Failing to Order a Second Medical Examination for the Children?

Standard of Review

We review the district court's orders concerning the needs of the children for an abuse of discretion. Cheney, 301 Kan. at 128. A district court abuses its discretion: “(1) when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court; (2) when a ruling is based on an error of law; or (3) when substantial competent evidence does not support a district court's finding of fact on which the exercise of discretion is based.” 301 Kan. at 128.

Discussion

We begin our analysis of this issue by again noting that J.G. has failed to cite the record in support of his argument that the district court abused its discretion by failing to order a second autism evaluation for the minor children. As a result, we may assume the record does not support his factual allegations and may deny him relief. Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4).

Because the transcript of the final hearing is part of the record on appeal, we are still able to conduct a meaningful review of J.G.’s argument. The minor children were diagnosed with autism at the University of Kansas Medical Center. During his testimony at the final hearing, J.G. requested a second opinion regarding the children's diagnoses. J.G. acknowledged that he had not spoken with the children's medical providers about this idea or looked for a medical professional to provide a second opinion. J.G.’s request for a second opinion was primarily based on his own opinion that because the children spoke Spanish as their first language and the test was given in English, the results may not be accurate. J.G. testified that his sister, a speech therapist and neurologist in Florida, did not believe his older child had autism based on some testing she had performed. J.G. stated that his sister had reviewed some medical records, but he did not provide the court with his sister's credentials or a report of her findings. Notably, C.B.-G. did not object to the children getting a second medical opinion.

On appeal, J.G. asserts that the “Court could have designed in the decree a means by which a second examination could have been handled consistent with the decree issued in the case.” It is unclear whether J.G. is asserting the district court made an error of law or fact, or whether he contends the court acted unreasonably. J.G. states:

“the failure of the trial court to address this issue[ ] in its decree does not address the best interest of the minor children on this issue and represents an abuse of its discretion such to warrant this Court to remand the case back to the trial court with instructions to make findings that address the means by which the Court wants the issue of the Autism diagnosis addressed.”

We note that J.G. did not object to the factual findings of the court. He has also failed to cite to the facts in the record that support his argument. But even ignoring those errors, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion. Because C.B.-G. agreed to the second examination, the district court could have reasonably believed it did not need to address this specific issue with an order. We see no error of law or fact, and a reasonable person could agree with the district court's decision to omit a second medical examination in its order.

Finally, we note Appellee's motion for attorney fees. While we note under Supreme Court Rule 7.07(b)(1) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 52) we would be within our authority to award attorney fees, on the facts of this case we decline to do so. Moreover, we do not find the appeal frivolous under Supreme Court Rule 7.07(c). Accordingly, Appellee's motion for attorney fees is denied.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: