Teill S. Reynolds, Appellant, v. State of Kansas, Appellee. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Teill S. Reynolds was convicted of the sexual assault of a child under 14 and one count of battery in 2011, resulting in a hard 25 sentence and 6 months in the county jail. He has filed numerous motions while incarcerated, and eventually the district court imposed on him specific filing restrictions that require any new filing to include an affidavit making certain assertions and certifications. After the denial of his 2021 K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and his motion to correct an illegal sentence, Reynolds appealed out of time. We remanded the case for a finding of whether an Albright exception permitted Reynolds’ untimely appeal. See Albright v. State, 292 Kan. 193, 251 P.3d 52 (2011). The district court found no applicable exceptions to his untimely notice of appeal. Reynolds then filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider this ruling, which the court denied. Reynolds then specifically appealed the denial of his motion to reconsider. On review, because Reynolds now argues only the merits of the timeliness of his appeal, and not the ruling on his motion to reconsider, we find we lack jurisdiction over the issue Reynolds briefs and must dismiss his appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

The parties are well acquainted with the underlying facts of Reynolds’ convictions. He was found guilty of two counts of rape of a child under the age of 14 and one count of battery after a three-day jury trial in November 2011. Reynolds was sentenced to a hard 25 prison sentence and 6 months in county jail, which this court later affirmed. See State v. Reynolds, No. 123,592, 2021 WL 3823457 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion).

In March 2021, after finding Reynolds to be a nuisance filer, the Wyandotte County District Court sua sponte promulgated an order restricting his further filings. That order required Reynolds to include, with all future filings, an affidavit certifying that his present claims have not been previously asserted and are made in good faith. The order also requires Reynolds to include with all filings “an accompanying list detailing prior motions filed of the same type and its final resolution.”

On October 13, 2021, Reynolds filed the instant K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, which the court summarily denied on February 4, 2022, for failure to comply with the filing restrictions. Reynolds had neither included the required affidavit certifying that his claims had not been previously asserted, nor had he included the required list of similar previously filed motions. In January 2023—nearly a year after the district court's ruling— Reynolds appealed the denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

Our court remanded the case and ordered the district court to examine whether Reynolds’ late appeal was excused under Albright, 292 Kan. 193. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing during which Reynolds primarily argued that he had not received the district court's ruling on his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion until “much later,” justifying his late appeal. During that hearing, the parties entered a joint stipulation agreeing that a mail log from Lansing State Prison be entered into evidence, which showed Reynolds received a piece of mail from a sender identified as “Roberts” on February 10, 2022.

After taking the matter under advisement, the district court issued a written decision several months later. The district court found the mail on the admitted log to be the order denying Reynolds’ K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. The district court reasoned the mail log showed Reynolds received a piece of mail from “Roberts,”—that is, Wyandotte County District Court Judge Aaron T. Roberts, who was the judge assigned to Reynolds’ case. The case file in district court also included a note dated February 14, 2022, from Judge Roberts acknowledging that Chief Judge Robert Burns entered the journal entry denying Reynolds’ 60-1507 motion for failure to comply with his filing restrictions. Putting together the circumstantial evidence provided by the dates of the journal entry (February 4, 2022), the “Roberts” entry from the prison mail log (February 10, 2022), and Judge Roberts’ notation of the journal entry (February 14, 2022), the district court found that the journal entry denying Reynolds’ 60-1507 motion had been mailed and received by the prison. The district court further found that Reynolds had not requested counsel and had missed his appeal deadline, and that no Albright exceptions permitted the appeal.

From this ruling, Reynolds timely filed a motion to “Object to the Judge's Journal Entry,” which Reynolds later identified as a motion to reconsider. Several months later, Reynolds also filed a motion to consolidate several of his pending cases. On May 9, 2025, the district court denied Reynolds’ motions, finding he had failed to follow the rules imposed by his filing restrictions. The court found Reynolds was a known nuisance filer, had not included the required notarized affidavit certifying that his present claims had not previously been ruled upon and were made in good faith, and had not attached the required list of similar motions he previously filed.

Following this order, Reynolds filed the present notice of appeal on May 28, 2025, which reads, in pertinent part: “This party Teill Reynolds appeals from this judgement of order on motion to reconsider, to the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals of the [S]tate of [K]ansas.” (Emphasis added.)

We Lack Jurisdiction to Review the District Court’s Ruling Challenged in Reynolds’ Brief but Not Included in His Notice of Appeal

Reynolds maintains that the district court erred in finding that no Albright or other caselaw exceptions applied to excuse his untimely notice of appeal. His arguments largely center on his substantive claim that he did not receive the district court's ruling on his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in a timely manner, which caused his late appeal. The State responds that this court lacks jurisdiction entirely to consider this appeal, pointing to Reynolds’ notice of appeal solely from the district court's denial of his motion to reconsider. Reynolds did not reply to the State's argument.

Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law, subject to unlimited appellate review. City of Wichita v. Trotter, 316 Kan. 310, 312, 514 P.3d 1050 (2022).

A fundamental proposition in Kansas appellate procedure is that an appellate court obtains jurisdiction over only the rulings identified in the notice of appeal. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corporation, 293 Kan. 633, 637, 270 P.3d 1074 (2011); In re Adoption of E.D., 57 Kan. App. 2d 500, 505, 453 P.3d 1202 (2019). Put another way, review by an appellate court is limited to those rulings specified in the notice of appeal. City of Mission v. VanHorn, 321 Kan. 378, 383, 579 P.3d 966 (2025).

The notice of appeal, then, is critical to obtaining appellate jurisdiction. Mundy v. State, 307 Kan. 280, 290, 408 P.3d 965 (2018). Jurisdiction in an action on appeal depends on strict compliance with the appellate procedure statute, K.S.A. 60-2103. 307 Kan. at 290. The appellate procedure statute requires that the notice of appeal “designate the judgment or part thereof appealed from.” K.S.A. 60-2103(b).

To confer jurisdiction to appellate courts, a party must adhere to K.S.A. 60-2103, but when there is debate over whether the statute has been complied with, the statute is construed liberally to ensure justice. 307 Kan. at 290-91. An appellate court should not dismiss an appellant's case for lack of jurisdiction due to mere technical violations of the notice of appeal filing requirements if timely filing the notice of appeal has not prejudiced the appellee. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 293 Kan. at 638-39; Hernandez v. Pistotnik, 60 Kan. App. 2d 393, 411-12, 494 P.3d 203 (2021).

Kansas courts have routinely addressed jurisdictional problems arising from the notice of appeal. Although issues briefed need not be identical to the ruling designated in the notice of appeal, the subject of the appeal must be apparent from the notice. State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 806-07, 926 P.2d 218 (1996). For example, in Walker, the appellant was convicted of multiple violent felonies and the district court granted the State's motion to revoke his probation and denied Walker's motion to modify the probation revocation. Assessing jurisdiction, the Kansas Supreme Court examined Walker's notice of appeal, which stated, “ ‘appealing the Order of District Court Judge David Kennedy overruling defendant's motion to modify the order of revocation of defendant's probation.’ ” 260 Kan. at 805. Walker's statement of the issue briefed on appeal stated that the district court judge violated his due process rights and abused his discretion. The court reasoned that it was “quite apparent” from Walker's notice of appeal that the subject of his appeal was revocation of his probation. 260 Kan. at 807. And, whether Walker designated his assertion of error as denial of his motion to modify or directly appealed the district court's probation revocation decision, the result was the same: He asserted error in the district court's revocation of his probation and sought its reversal. As a result, the court found Walker's notice of appeal was sufficient to include the revocation of his probation and appellate jurisdiction was proper. 260 Kan. at 808.

Three other cases from our Kansas appellate courts address whether an appeal of a denial of a motion to reconsider includes the underlying ruling that was sought to be reconsidered. In Key v. Hein, Ebert & Weir, Chtd., 265 Kan. 124, 960 P.2d 746 (1998), the Kansas Supreme Court found a pro se litigant's notice of appeal included an earlier order not specified in the notice of appeal because both orders contained the same issues. 265 Kan. at 130. Key's notice of appeal incorrectly appealed a December 1996 order denying his motion for a new trial, which he mistakenly believed to be the summary judgment ruling that was entered in December 1995. Our Supreme Court reasoned that the notice of appeal was not drafted by counsel, included catch-all language, and both orders covered the same issues. So, the court found the notice of appeal included the underlying ruling. 265 Kan. at 130.

But in Gates v. Goodyear, 37 Kan. App. 2d 623, 629, 155 P.3d 1196 (2007), this court found it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal of an order not specified in the notice of appeal, because the order that was identified in the notice did not contain the same issues. Gates’ notice of appeal cited a judgment that did not address the issues he raised on appeal, as those issues had been decided in previous proceedings. The court reasoned that the notice of appeal did not include the challenged judgments, did not use catch-all language, and it was not reasonable that Gates could have believed the appealed judgment included the earlier findings. 37 Kan. App. 2d at 629.

Later, in Bowens v. Greenwood County Hospital, No. 122,532, 2021 WL 3042249, at *6 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion), our court found a notice of appeal specifying only the ruling on a motion to reconsider summary judgment sufficient to grant jurisdiction. Bowens appealed the district court's denial of his motion to reconsider the order granting the defendants’ summary judgment motion. The court acknowledged that Bowens’ notice contained no catch-all language and seemingly appealed only his motion to reconsider. However, both orders—the denial of reconsideration and the summary judgment ruling—contained the same issues, were inseparably interlinked, and review of the motion to reconsider necessarily required review of the original summary judgment ruling, making jurisdiction proper. Bowens, 2021 WL 3042249, at *6.

As recited above, Reynolds’ notice of appeal succinctly stated: “This party Teill Reynolds appeals from this judgement of order on motion to reconsider.” (Emphasis added.)

Here, the district court's ruling on the timeliness of Reynolds’ appeal of the denial of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was distinct from its later ruling on the motion to reconsider. While the earlier decision rejected the appeal as untimely, making factual findings on when Reynolds received the court's order, its later decision denied both the motion to reconsider the court's decision on the timeliness of his appeal and his motion to consolidate for failure to follow the court's filing restrictions. Yet on appeal, Reynolds solely argues the district court erred in determining no caselaw exceptions applied to permit his untimely appeal. Although Walker instructs that the issues briefed need not be identical to the ruling designated in the notice of appeal, by the clear language of his notice, Reynolds appealed only the district court's denial of his motion to reconsider, not the district court's earlier journal entry. The subject of Reynolds’ appeal simply was not apparent from his notice.

In this respect, Reynolds’ case is more akin to Gates and is distinguishable from both Key and Bowens. In Gates, this court found jurisdiction improper where the judgment specified in the notice of appeal did not contain the same issues argued on appeal. 37 Kan. App. 2d at 629. Like Gates, Reynolds’ brief raises issues not included in the challenged judgment and his notice of appeal did not use catch-all language. The denial of Reynolds’ motion to reconsider was based solely on his filing restriction violations, while the district court's earlier journal entry focused on application of the Albright exceptions—that is, the order denying reconsideration contains fundamentally different issues than the journal entry.

Unlike the facts before us, in Key, the Kansas Supreme Court found a pro se litigant's notice of appeal included an earlier order not specified in the notice of appeal because both orders contained the same issues. 265 Kan. at 130. As described, though, here the order identified in the notice of appeal does not contain the same issues as the earlier journal entry.

Likewise, we can easily distinguish this case from Bowens, where we found a notice of appeal specifying only a motion to reconsider summary judgment sufficient to grant jurisdiction over the underlying judgment. 2021 WL 3042249, at *6. There, jurisdiction was proper because the motion to reconsider and the underlying summary judgment motion contained identical issues, were inseparable, and review of one required review of the other. 2021 WL 3042249, at *6. Unlike the facts in Bowens, though, Reynolds’ motion to reconsider was denied for violation of filing restrictions and addressed wholly separate issues than those identified in the district court's earlier journal entry finding no Albright exceptions applicable. See 292 Kan. 193, Syl. ¶ 5.

In conclusion, the subject Reynolds now briefs on appeal was not apparent from his notice of appeal, and this court only obtains jurisdiction over rulings identified in the notice. We do not obtain jurisdiction over the underlying judgment on the timeliness of his appeal because the denial of Reynold's motion to reconsider identified in the notice of appeal involves fundamentally different issues than the journal entry he now challenges. Consequently, we lack jurisdiction to decide the issue Reynolds now briefs on appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

Per Curiam: