Ricardo M. Adkins, Appellant, v. State of Kansas, Appellee. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

While serving their sentences, Kansas prisoners have one opportunity to collaterally attack their convictions by filing a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507. The law presumes that when prisoners do file such a motion, they have listed in that motion all their grounds for relief. A court need not consider a second or successive motion unless the prisoner shows that exceptional circumstances justify the filing of another motion for relief. This is Ricardo Adkins’ appeal from a district court's summary dismissal of his successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Depending on how you count them, this is his third or fourth motion collaterally attacking his conviction. Because Adkins has shown no exceptional circumstances compelling the filing of another motion, we affirm the motion's dismissal.

Adkins exercises his due process rights.

Adkins was tried in early 2009 and convicted of “raping a legally blind, 18-year-old high school student he picked up while she waited at a city bus stop.” State v. Adkins, No. 102,560, 2011 WL 1196906, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion).

He appealed his conviction, arguing that several trial errors deprived him of a fair trial. A panel of this court affirmed Adkins’ conviction, finding he received a “legally fair trial and a legally proper verdict.” 2011 WL 1196906, at *6.

Adkins pursues collateral attacks on his conviction.

In 2011, Adkins filed his first motion for postconviction relief under K.S.A. 60-1507. He claimed several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. Adkins v. State, No. 109,586, 2015 WL 1513948, at *3 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion). The panel noted that Adkins’ argument on appeal differed from his argument before the district court. Before the district court, Adkins argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a speedy trial motion. However, on appeal, Adkins claimed that the district court violated Supreme Court Rule 183(j) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 242), which requires the district court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented.

Adkins failed to object to the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Without an objection, an appellate court presumes the district court found all the facts necessary to support its judgment. 2015 WL 1513948, at *10 (citing State v. Vaughn, 288 Kan. 140, 143, 200 P.3d 446 [2009]). Because Adkins did not object to the district court's findings, Adkins failed to preserve the issue for appellate review.

Had Adkins preserved the issue, however, the panel found it was meritless given he could not show that he suffered any prejudice because of his attorney's failure to file a speedy trial motion. Adkins filed the very motion he asserts was error for his attorney to fail to file. Thus, the speedy trial motion was filed, heard, and ruled on before the district court. 2015 WL 1513948, at *10. The panel noted that Adkins did not argue that the district court's ruling on his speedy trial motion was incorrect, but argued instead that his attorney was ineffective in seeking two continuances, delaying Adkins’ trial. 2015 WL 1513948, at *10. The panel added that this was another variance between Adkins’ arguments before the district and appellate courts and found his argument on the point unnecessary. 2015 WL 1513948, at *10.

The panel did, however, find that Adkins was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on two issues: one relating to his trial counsel's failure to call a witness; and a second issue, failing to request a mental evaluation of the victim. 2015 WL 1513948, at *10. On the remaining issues, including the speedy trial issue, the panel held Adkins was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing and affirmed the summary dismissal of those issues. 2015 WL 1513948, at *10.

After hearing evidence on remand, the court denied Adkins relief.

The district court took evidence at the remand hearing and found Adkins’ trial counsel was not deficient nor ineffective, and dismissed Adkins’ K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Adkins appealed the dismissal and another panel of this court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Adkins’ motion. Adkins v. State, No. 114,963, 2017 WL 3668916, at *5-7 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion).

Adkins claims an illegal sentence and the court considers it a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

In 2022, Adkins moved to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504(c)(1). Adkins claimed that because his right to a speedy trial was violated, the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. The district court summarily dismissed Adkins’ motion, finding that Adkins was not alleging he was serving an illegal sentence but attacking the validity of his conviction. Since a motion to correct an illegal sentence may only be used to address issues with a defendant's sentence, the court found Adkins’ motion was an improper use of K.S.A. 22-3504. Adkins did not allege any issue with his sentence.

But the district court liberally construed Adkins’ motion to be one made under K.S.A. 60-1507. Under that analysis, the court found that because Adkins had received an evidentiary hearing on his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion; his present motion would thus be successive. The district court then found that because Adkins failed to litigate this issue on direct appeal, it was precluded from considering that issue in Adkins’ second, successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Adkins appealed the dismissal.

On appeal, a panel of this court affirmed the district court's summary dismissal of Adkins’ K.S.A. 22-3504 motion. State v. Adkins, No. 124,272, 2022 WL 3018089, at *3 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion). The panel found that Adkins’ motion to correct his illegal sentence lacked merit as he did not allege any issue regarding his sentence. 2022 WL 3018089, at *2. Like the district court, the panel construed the motion as one made under K.S.A. 60-1507 and found that Adkins failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances to consider his successive motion. The panel thus affirmed the district court's summary dismissal of Adkins’ motion to correct an illegal sentence. 2022 WL 3018089, at *2;

In 2023, Adkins moved for a discharge from his judgment of guilt and his sentence. He asserted the same speedy trial claim, arguing the violation deprived the district court of the jurisdiction to convict him. The court found that the time frame was “not presumptively prejudicial, let alone prejudicial at all.” The court further found that a speedy trial violation may result in the dismissal of a case, but such a violation is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court found that it always had personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over Adkins. Adkins appealed the summary dismissal.

On appeal, Adkins’ appellate attorney moved for summary disposition of his appeal. A panel of this court granted the motion and affirmed the summary dismissal of Adkins’ motion for discharge. In its order, the panel noted that time had been given for Adkins to either respond or object to the summary disposition but had received no response.

Adkins again attempts to attack his conviction by moving for relief under K.S.A. 60-1507.

Once again, Adkins challenged his conviction, this time by moving under K.S.A. 60-1507 to allege a speedy trial violation deprived the court of jurisdiction, and his conviction should be vacated as a result. The district court summarily dismissed the motion, finding the speedy trial issue had been raised and resolved in his prior appeals. Finding that Adkins’ K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was successive, the court decided that Adkins could not prove prejudice or manifest injustice such that his successive motion should be considered. Accordingly, the court dismissed Adkins’ motion.

This case is Adkins’ appeal of that dismissal.

We follow well-established rules.

Under K.S.A. 60-1507(c), “district courts need not consider more than one habeas motion seeking similar relief filed by the same prisoner.” State v. Mitchell, 315 Kan. 156, 160, 505 P.3d 739 (2022). See also Supreme Court Rule 183(d) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. 241). A movant is presumed to have listed all grounds for relief in an initial K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and, therefore, “must show exceptional circumstances to justify the filing of a successive motion.” Mitchell, 315 Kan. at 160. Exceptional circumstances are unusual events or intervening changes in the law that prevented the movant from reasonably being able to raise the issue in the first postconviction motion. 315 Kan. at 160.

Adkins does not allege that any exceptional circumstances prevented him from raising his speedy trial claim. Thus, his claim involving a violation of his speedy trial rights is either waived or abandoned. Adkins also provides no explanation for why this successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion should be considered. Adkins also fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the alleged speedy trial violation, resulting in an approximately 36-day delay.

We note that Adkins’ claim that his speedy trial rights were violated was previously heard and resolved in his prior K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and appeal. Adkins, 2015 WL 1513948, at *9-10. This prior ruling is significant.

The ruling in Bradley v. State, No. 101,511, 2010 WL 919906, at *2 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion), is instructive. A panel of this court considered a successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, alleging, among other issues, that the defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated, thus depriving the district court of jurisdiction over his convictions. The defendant argued that lack of jurisdiction constituted exceptional circumstances such that his successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion should be considered. Bradley, 2010 WL 919906, at 2. The panel found that the defendant's “right to a speedy trial under Kansas law and the time periods involved in his trial should have been well known to him at the time of trial and when he filed his direct appeal.” 2010 WL 919906, at *3.

The panel then explained that the defendant should have presented the issue to the district court and, if it was decided against him, the issue should have been raised on direct appeal. The panel thus held that the defendant did not present exceptional circumstances “excusing his failure to raise the speedy trial issue in his direct criminal proceedings.” 2010 WL 919906, at *3.

Like Bradley, Adkins should have known about the alleged speedy trial violation at the time of his trial and when he directly appealed his conviction. Adkins’ failure to raise this issue on direct appeal likely results in the abandonment or waiver of the issue altogether.

Finally, we must consider the res judicata doctrine. Where an appeal is taken from a conviction or sentence imposed, the appellate court's judgment is res judicata as to all issues raised. Issues that could have been raised are deemed waived. State v. Salary, 309 Kan. 479, 482, 437 P.3d 953 (2019). In State v. Martin, 294 Kan. 638, 640-41, 279 P.3d 704 (2012), the Supreme Court held that issues raised and decided in prior K.S.A. 60-1507 motions or motions to correct an illegal sentence are res judicata and cannot be raised in later motions. This means that res judicata bars Adkins from raising these issues again.

To sum up, Adkins has failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances for the consideration of his second successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. He also failed to explain or show any prejudice by the delay in his trial. And Adkins did not explain why his successive K.S.A. 60-1507 motion should be considered.

We conclude that the district court did not err in summarily dismissing Adkins’ motion.

Affirmed.

Hill, J.: