State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Raena Grana, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Raena Grana appeals her convictions for aggravated battery and interference with law enforcement alleging the district court erred by failing to include two required jury instructions, one for a lesser included offense and one related to unanimity. This court finds no reversible error from the district court's failure to include either jury instruction and thus affirms Grana's convictions.

Factual and Procedural Background

A jury convicted Grana of aggravated battery and interference with law enforcement by concealing evidence related to an incident in June 2024. At the time of the incident, John Blue (a pseudonym) lived in the apartment complex where Grana and her family also lived. There was some history between Grana and her family, and Blue that is not relevant here, but which apparently contributed to the relevant events.

At some point Blue and his son Jackson (a pseudonym), who was visiting that day, got into a physical altercation with Grana's father. Blue testified he had a pocketknife that day but denied ever brandishing it during the skirmish, although he admitted the knife is typically sheathed on his belt and visible to everyone. Blue also testified that Jackson did not have any weapons, nor did he threaten to use any weapons. After being declared unavailable to testify, Jackson's preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury where he denied having a weapon except for a pocketknife that remained in his pocket during the altercation. Officer testimony revealed that the only witness report of someone brandishing a weapon involved Grana's father.

At some point during the altercation, Grana stabbed Jackson from behind. During an interview with law enforcement, Grana agreed she thought her dad was getting hurt by the men, so she stabbed Jackson one time in the lower-middle part of his back. She said Jackson then immediately got up off her dad, telling the interviewing officer, “I did exactly what I wanted to do.” She said that she wanted to make sure Jackson “could not do any more motor functions like that” and admitted she “was very close to stabbing the other guy” as well. Grana never said that she believed “her dad was going to get seriously hurt” or that “she thought his life was in danger.”

At trial, Grana testified that she stabbed Jackson and believed her father was in danger at the time. She admitted she did not see either Blue or Jackson with any weapons. Grana said she used the amount of force she deemed necessary and stopped using such force when Jackson removed himself. Grana denied trying to conceal any evidence and said she consented to allow officers to retrieve the knife. Grana told an officer she had washed the knife and placed it in a cabinet under the kitchen sink. An officer confirmed that Grana told officers the location of the knife and gave them consent to search the apartment. The detective testified that without being told where the knife was located “it would have been difficult to find” but that he believed officers probably would have eventually found the knife.

At the end of the day on the penultimate day of trial, the district court informed the parties that it “deleted the battery as a lesser included because it's undisputed that a knife was used.” The next day, after the defense rested and the parties were discussing the jury instructions, the State requested “that the lesser included of battery be included” because, counsel argued, “[t]he jury could find ․ that the knife in this situation was not a deadly weapon ․ because we do not define ․ a deadly weapon as the knife itself.” The district court judge responded by expressing his opinion as to the knife's status as a deadly weapon: “I'm going to go out on a limb and say I saw the damage done to the victim's back. I think it clearly meets the definition of a deadly weapon.” After referencing the fact that Grana may have a valid self-defense argument, the court then denied the simple battery instruction, saying, “And so I'm ․ not going to give battery. I may get reversed on it. But I think it's clearly an aggravated battery or a not guilty. That's a decision for the jury.” At no point did Grana or her counsel object to the court's decision.

Jury instruction No. 8, which concerned the charge of aggravated battery, provided:

“The defendant is charged in Count 1 with aggravated battery. The defendant pleads not guilty.

“To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:

“1. The defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to [Jackson] with a deadly weapon, to-wit: knife, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted[.]

“2. This act occurred on or about the 1st day of June, 2024, in Lyon County, Kansas.

“A ‘deadly weapon’ is an instrument which, from the manner in which it is used, is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.”

Jury instruction No. 9 instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of reckless aggravated battery:

“The offense of aggravated battery with which defendant is charged in Count 1 includes the lesser offense of reckless aggravated battery.

“You may find the defendant guilty of aggravated battery, reckless aggravated battery, or not guilty.

“When there is a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more offenses defendant is guilty, she may be convicted of the lesser offense only, provided the lesser offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

․

“To establish the charge of reckless aggravated battery, each of the following claims must be proved:

“1. The defendant recklessly caused bodily harm to [Jackson] with a deadly weapon, to-wit: knife, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted.

“2. This act occurred on or about the 1st day of June, 2024, in Lyon County, Kansas[.]

“A ‘deadly weapon’ is an instrument which, from the manner in which it is used, is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.”

Jury instruction No. 12 instructed the jury on Grana's claim “that her use of force was permitted as the defense of another person”:

“Defendant is permitted to use physical force against another person, including the use of a weapon, when and to the extent that it appears to her that she reasonably believes such physical force is necessary to defense [sic] someone else against another person's imminent use of unlawful force. Reasonable belief requires both a belief by Defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable person to that belief.

“Defendant is permitted to use against another person physical force that is likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when and to the extent that it appears to her that she reasonabl[y] believes such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to someone else from another's imminent use of unlawful force. Reasonable belief requires both a belief by Defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable person to that belief.

“When the use of force is permitted as defense of another, there is no requirement to retreat.”

The jury found Grana guilty of both aggravated battery and interference with law enforcement by concealing evidence. Grana now appeals.

Discussion

Grana challenges both of her convictions. First, Grana alleges that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple battery. Second, she alleges the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on unanimity regarding the interference with law enforcement charge.

I. Simple Battery Jury Instruction

The district court is generally required to provide lesser-included jury instructions that are legally and factually appropriate. State v. Gentry, 310 Kan. 715, 721, 449 P.3d 429 (2019); see K.S.A. 22-3414(3). A jury instruction for “ ‘a lesser included crime is legally appropriate.’ ” 310 Kan. at 721. A lesser included crime includes a “lesser degree of the same crime.” K.S.A. 21-5109(b)(1).

On appeal, jury instruction errors are reviewed using a three-step process. First, this court determines whether it has jurisdiction and the issue is preserved for appellate review. Second, the court considers the merits of the claim to determine whether the district court erred in instructing the jury. In this second step, the court determines whether the instruction was legally and factually appropriate, using a de novo review of the entire record. Third, if an error occurred, the reviewing court must determine whether the error requires reversal. State v. Hollins, 320 Kan. 240, 242, 564 P.3d 778 (2025).

This means a party may challenge a jury instruction error for the first time on appeal, but any error only warrants reversal if it amounts to clear error. State v. Shields, 315 Kan. 814, 820-21, 511 P.3d 931 (2022). At trial, the State requested that the district court instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple battery, but the court denied its request. Grana concedes she did not object to the omission of the instruction at trial. Thus, this issue is preserved, but this court must determine whether the district court's failure to give the lesser included offense instruction was clearly erroneous. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3); State v. Turner, 318 Kan. 162, 166-67, 542 P.3d 304 (2024).

The second step is determining whether the omission was an error, that is, whether the omitted instruction was legally and factually appropriate. Only if this court finds the omission an error will it then determine whether the error is reversible—that is, if the omission was clearly erroneous. The omission of a jury instruction is clearly erroneous if this court is firmly convinced that the jury would have entered a different verdict without the error. State v. Sinnard, 318 Kan. 261, 291, 543 P.3d 525 (2024).

This court exercises unlimited review over whether the omission of a jury instruction was an error—that is, whether it was legally and factually appropriate. Hollins, 320 Kan. at 242. The parties do not dispute that simple battery is a lesser included offense of aggravated battery, meaning it was a legally appropriate instruction. This court agrees. See State v. Simmons, 295 Kan. 171, 175, 283 P.3d 212 (2012). Having found the omitted instruction legally appropriate, the court must consider whether it was factually appropriate.

A jury instruction is factually appropriate if viewing the evidence in the most favorable light to the defendant, there was sufficient evidence to support the instruction. This is not an onerous standard—the “court must consider whether there is some evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, emanating from whatever source and proffered by whichever party, that would reasonably justify the defendant's conviction for that lesser included crime.” State v. Lowe, 317 Kan. 713, Syl. ¶ 1, 718, 538 P.3d 1094 (2023).

The State charged Grana with aggravated battery, defined as “knowingly causing bodily harm to another person with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted.” K.S.A. 21-5413(b)(1)(B). The jury also received an instruction on reckless aggravated battery, defined as: “recklessly causing bodily harm to another person with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted.” K.S.A. 21-5413(b)(2)(B). In comparison, simple battery is “[k]nowingly or recklessly causing bodily harm to another person.” K.S.A. 21-5413(a)(1).

Aggravated battery and simple battery both require either a knowing or reckless mindset that results in the bodily harm of another. The difference is that to find Grana guilty of aggravated battery the jury was required to find either that she used a deadly weapon or that she acted in a way that “great bodily harm, disfigurement or death” could be inflicted. See K.S.A. 21-5413(b)(1)(B); see State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, 853-54, 295 P.3d 1020 (2013) (identifying alternatives for aggravated battery). Grana argues that here the jury could have found the knife was not a deadly weapon or that it was not used in a manner to produce great bodily harm. She focuses on the size of the knife, the location of the stabbing—Jackson's shoulder blade area—and that Jackson only required stitches and suffered no lasting injuries.

The State maintains “evidence that the knife was not a deadly weapon was scant,” but concedes the district court erred in failing to give the instruction, making no argument that the simple battery instruction was factually inappropriate. Notably, at trial the State included simple battery in its proposed instructions and asked the district court to use the instruction after the district court removed it because the State believed “[t]he jury could find that ․ the knife in this situation was not a deadly weapon.” Therefore, the State, at trial, believed a simple battery instruction was factually appropriate. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Grana, this court finds the facts would have supported a conviction for simple battery. See Lowe, 317 Kan. 713, Syl. ¶ 1, 719 (discussing the definition of deadly weapon); State v. Moore, 271 Kan. 416, 419, 23 P.3d 815 (2001) (discussing how bodily harm is determined).

Having found the simple battery jury instruction factually and legally appropriate, the inquiry now shifts to the third step—whether the failure to give the instruction was clearly erroneous. See Sinnard, 318 Kan. at 291. The State argues for application of the “ ‘skip-rule’ ” to find no error because the jury found Grana “guilty of the greater offense”—meaning knowing aggravated battery rather than reckless aggravated battery. The skip rule refers to the idea that if one of several lesser included offense instructions was provided to the jury, but it still found the defendant guilty of the greater offense, any error from the failure to instruct on “ ‘another still lesser offense is cured.’ ” State v. Barrett, 309 Kan. 1029, 1037, 442 P.3d 492 (2019). The Kansas Supreme Court has explained that the skip rule is not “a hard and fast rule” but is rather “a logical deduction that may support a finding of harmless error, along with the record in a particular case.” 309 Kan. at 1037-38.

Relevant here, the Kansas Supreme Court has clarified that the skip rule would only suggest harmlessness “where the elements of the crime of conviction, as compared to a rejected lesser included offense, necessarily show that the jury would have rejected or eliminated a still lesser included offense.” Simmons, 295 Kan. at 179. Like in Simmons, the lesser jury instruction rejected by the jury here does not include the same elements as the omitted lesser instruction. See 295 Kan. at 180. Therefore, the jury's rejection of reckless aggravated battery in favor of knowing aggravated battery does not demonstrate that the jury would have rejected a simple battery instruction. The difference between reckless aggravated battery and knowing aggravated battery relates to mens rea, whereas the difference between knowing aggravated battery and simple battery depends on the degree of injury or use of a deadly weapon.

Here, the jury rejected the idea that Grana acted recklessly, which aligns with the facts because Grana expressed her intent to stab Jackson. However, a person can be found guilty of simple battery with either a knowing or reckless mindset. See K.S.A. 21-5413(a)(1). Therefore, the jury's rejection of reckless aggravated battery sheds no light on whether it would have also rejected simple battery based on the degree of harm or a determination that the knife was not a deadly weapon. Thus, the skip rule does not apply to this case.

So, the question is whether Grana has firmly convinced this court that the jury would have entered a different verdict without the error. The evidence showed that Jackson had a stab wound near the area around his shoulder blade that required stitches but no other treatment. The jury could have found this amounted to a simple battery involving minor or moderate harm but not great bodily harm. See State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 522-23, 286 P.3d 195 (2012) (finding stab wound to head that required 100 stitches could have been determined by a jury to be bodily harm rather than great bodily harm because the victim “minimized the pain she had suffered and said that she did not require any follow-up medical services other than to remove the stitches”). There is no bright line rule that a stab wound requiring stitches constitutes great bodily harm. See, e.g., State v. Frazier, No. 112,368, 2016 WL 1545628, at *5 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion) (“[C]ases involving the existence of broken bones and internal injuries have not established a bright-line rule for when a particular set of injuries becomes great bodily injury as a matter of fact beyond dispute.”).

However, just because the jury here could have convicted Grana of simple battery she has not firmly convinced this court they would have. See Williams, 295 Kan. at 523-24 (“[J]ust because we find that a rational jury could have found Williams guilty of the lesser included offense does not necessarily mean that we believe that the jury would have convicted her of the lesser offense.”). Grana fails to argue why the jury would have been more likely to convict her of simple battery. Instead, Grana argues the district court “determined that the knife was a ‘deadly weapon,’ ” which “took that determination away from the jury” and allowed “the State ․ to short-circuit the defense of others instruction.” As Grana notes, the district court instructed the jury on defense of another, which permitted the jury to find Grana's actions justified if it determined that Grana reasonably believed her use of physical force was necessary to defend her father against Jackson's imminent use of unlawful force. See K.S.A. 21-5222(a). While Grana does not challenge the jury instruction for defense of others, she claims that the court's failure to give the simple battery instruction foreclosed the jury's ability to find she lawfully acted in the defense of another.

Grana's argument is unpersuasive. It is not clear how the jury would be unable to find Grana presented an affirmative defense under K.S.A. 21-5222 simply because it was not provided an instruction on simple battery. Given the language of the defense of others instruction, this court finds no reason that the jury could not have found that Grana properly used a deadly weapon or inflicted great bodily harm in the defense of others.

Grana's second argument—that the district court made the legal conclusion for the jury that the knife was a deadly weapon—is also inaccurate. While the district court concluded, outside the jury's presence, that a simple battery instruction was inappropriate because the knife was a deadly weapon, no such comment was made to the jury. Grana argues that because the jury was not given a simple battery instruction, that omission somehow indicated to them that the knife was necessarily a deadly weapon. Yet the jury instruction included the definition of deadly weapon and permitted the jury to reach its own conclusion as to whether the knife met that definition, as it instructed that: “A ‘deadly weapon’ is an instrument which, from the manner in which it is used, is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.” The district court's failure to give a simple battery instruction did not imply or cue the jury that the knife must be considered a deadly weapon, and the jury was properly left to reach that decision. See State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439, 1452, 430 P.3d 448 (2018) (“[T]he district court invaded the province of the jury by instructing that ‘ “a firearm is a deadly weapon as a matter of law.” ’ ”).

Grana has failed to firmly convince this court that the jury would have convicted her of simple battery instead of aggravated battery if given the opportunity. See Sinnard, 318 Kan. at 291. Therefore, this court finds no reversible error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury on simple battery.

II. Unanimity Instruction

Grana claims the district court made another jury instruction error related to her conviction for interference with law enforcement. Specifically, Grana contends that she committed two separate acts—cleaning the knife and then hiding the knife—which each could have sustained her interference conviction. Therefore, Grana contends the district court erred by not giving the jury a unanimity instruction requiring them to unanimously identify the act underlying the guilty verdict.

At the preliminary hearing, the district court expressed skepticism that the State could meet its burden to show Grana interfered with law enforcement's investigation by concealing evidence. However, the court determined that the State only needed to show probable cause at that stage so it permitted the State to proceed but it left open the possibility of dismissing the charge “[i]f the defendant is consistent at trial with her statements that she's made on the video and through the officers that I did it and this is the knife and everything ․”

Grana later moved to dismiss the interference charge. In opposing the motion, the State argued it needed to only prove that Grana concealed evidence to hinder the investigation. Grana then requested the court rule that the State was limited to its theory of concealment of evidence as the sole means for sustaining its conviction. At the hearing, the court inquired if this charge implicated a “multiple means” scenario, and the prosecutor said she did not believe the State needed to specify but that it just needed to show Grana “concealed, destroyed, or materially altered” evidence. The judge said he would “let the evidence play out” at trial and decide how to instruct the jury.

Following the State's presentation of evidence, Grana moved for a directed verdict on the interference charge by arguing the officers testified Grana told them where to find the knife. The State responded by saying there was evidence Grana “concealed or altered the evidence.” The district court denied Grana's motion.

Grana concedes she did not request a unanimity instruction at trial. As with the other jury instruction error at issue here, Grana may challenge the failure to give a unanimity jury instruction for the first time on appeal, but any error only warrants reversal if it was clearly erroneous. See State v. Voyles, 284 Kan. 239, Syl. ¶ 3, 160 P.3d 794 (2007).

In determining whether the district court erred in not providing a unanimity instruction, the appellate court must first decide whether it is “presented with a multiple acts case.” 284 Kan. at 244. “In a multiple acts case, several acts are alleged and any one of them could constitute the crime charged.” State v. Kesselring, 279 Kan. 671, Syl. ¶ 5, 112 P.3d 175 (2005). Therefore, if there are not multiple acts, a defendant is not entitled to a unanimity instruction. Whether multiple acts were involved is a question of law subject to unlimited review by this court. State v. King, 297 Kan. 955, 981, 305 P.3d 641 (2013).

While there is no precise test to determine whether a defendant's conduct constitutes a single act or separate and distinct multiple acts, this court typically considers a set of four factors in making this determination. See State v. Allen, 290 Kan. 540, 544, 232 P.3d 861 (2010). This court will consider the timing, location, causal relationship, and motivation for the acts, meaning:

“ ‘(1) whether the acts occur at or near the same time; (2) whether the acts occur at the same location; (3) whether there is a causal relationship between the acts, in particular whether there was an intervening event; and (4) whether there is a fresh impulse motivating some of the conduct.’ ” King, 297 Kan. at 981.

To sustain Grana's interference with law enforcement conviction, the State needed to prove she “conceal[ed], destroy[ed], or materially alter[ed] evidence with the intent to prevent or hinder the apprehension or prosecution of a person for a felony.” See K.S.A. 21-5904(a)(2). The evidence showed Grana cleaned the knife and hid it in a cabinet under the kitchen sink.

Grana contends her actions of cleaning the knife and then her actions of hiding the knife constituted two separate acts—cleaning and hiding—of interference with law enforcement. As to timing and location, Grana's actions in cleaning and hiding the knife occurred at or near the same time in her family's apartment. There was no evidence of intervening events or a fresh impulse causing or precipitating Grana to hide the knife after cleaning it. Rather, the evidence shows that Grana intended to conceal evidence of the stabbing, which she did by cleaning blood from the knife and hiding it under the sink. It was a single act. See State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 194, 284 P.3d 977 (2012) (“[D]escribing a material element or a factual circumstance that would prove the crime ․ does not create alternative means ․”). Thus, her claim on appeal fails, and the district court did not err in failing to provide a unanimity instruction.

Even assuming the district court erred by not including the unanimity instruction, the error is only reversible if this court is firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it been included. See State v. Reynolds, 319 Kan. 1, 18, 552 P.3d 1 (2024). Here, because there was sufficient evidence that Grana both cleaned the knife and hid the knife, this court is not convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict if the unanimity instruction had been included.

Conclusion

Grana challenges her convictions for aggravated battery and interference with law enforcement by arguing the district court committed clear error in failing to give the jury instructions on simple battery and unanimity. While it was error not to give the simple battery instruction, because this court is not firmly convinced the jury would have convicted Grana of simple battery, the error is not reversible. Additionally, this court finds no error in the district court's failure to give a unanimity instruction. Therefore, Grana's convictions are affirmed.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: