State of Kansas, Appellee, v. De'Andrew V. Dixon, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

De'Andrew V. Dixon timely appeals, claiming the district court erred in denying the motions he filed in two cases to void restitution and court costs due to his incarceration. We granted Dixon's motion for summary disposition under Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 48). After reviewing the record and the arguments in Dixon's motion, we affirm the district court's judgment.

In August 2018, a jury convicted Dixon of multiple person felonies and one misdemeanor in two consolidated cases. Despite the consolidation, Dixon was sentenced in each case consecutive to each other. Dixon appealed his convictions and sentences to our court, where the panel affirmed Dixon's convictions but vacated his sentences. State v. Dixon, 60 Kan. App. 2d 100, 102, 492 P.3d 455 (2021). The panel found Dixon should have received the benefit of the “double rule” at sentencing and should not have been sentenced to more than double the length of his primary crime of conviction. 60 Kan. App. 2d at 139. The panel vacated Dixon's sentences and remanded to the district court for resentencing, instructing the maximum sentence the district court could impose was double the length of the base sentence of 653 months. 60 Kan. App. 2d at 132, 140-41.

On remand, the district court resentenced Dixon to 1,306 months in prison and 6 months in jail. At the sentencing hearing, the district court did not consider the durational departure requested by Dixon, believing it lacked jurisdiction. Dixon again appealed to our court, and the panel found the district court had jurisdiction to consider a durational departure. The panel vacated Dixon's sentences and remanded for resentencing. State v. Dixon, No. 125,752, 2024 WL 1476783, at *1 (Kan. App. 2024) (unpublished opinion).

On remand again, the district court resentenced Dixon to 1,306 months in prison and denied Dixon's motion for durational departure. Dixon did not appeal. The district court imposed $390 in court costs; $192 in witness fees; $66 in booking/fingerprint fees; and $1,450 in sexual assault kit/exam fees. No order for restitution was imposed.

Dixon then filed a pro se motion to void restitution and court costs due to his incarceration in each of his two cases. Dixon relied upon State v. Jamerson, 54 Kan. App. 2d 312, 316-17, 399 P.3d 246 (2017), for its holding that a district court must unambiguously announce the defendant is to pay court costs or restitution while incarcerated. But Jamerson applies only to restitution and not to court costs and fees. Here, the district court denied Dixon's motions, finding no authority to void a valid order to pay court costs and fees while Dixon was serving his sentence.

Dixon now argues the district court should void his restitution and courts costs because he is incarcerated and the district court failed to specify he must begin paying the costs immediately while he is incarcerated. “[W]hether a district judge must announce an order to pay fees at the sentencing hearing is dictated by statutory requirements and, as a result, requires our interpretation of various statutes relating to sentencing procedures and the imposition of costs.” State v. Phillips, 289 Kan. 28, 32, 210 P.3d 93 (2009). We have unlimited review of questions of statutory interpretation. 289 Kan. at 32.

“If the defendant in a criminal case is convicted, the court costs shall be taxed against the defendant and shall be a judgment against the defendant which may be enforced as judgments for payment of money in civil cases.” K.S.A. 22-3801(a). The defendant need not be present for the imposition of costs; a journal entry would suffice as the statement of costs. See K.S.A. 22-3803; Phillips, 289 Kan. at 40. Nonpunitive costs need not be stated in open court to be valid. See 289 Kan. at 38-39. While a district court should announce imposition of costs at the sentencing hearing, failure to do so will not void an order to pay costs. 289 Kan. at 45. Here, only court costs and fees were imposed at sentencing, and no restitution was ordered. Court costs and fees are not the same as restitution.

The district court properly denied Dixon's motions to void restitution and court costs due to his incarceration because only court costs and fees were imposed.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: