State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Andres Mendoza-Rodriguez, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Andres Mendoza-Rodriguez, while driving his car, was stopped by an Olathe police officer for not wearing his seat belt. The State's charges and resulting jury trial all arise from that traffic stop. Mendoza-Rodriguez, in his timely appeal, presents three issues from his jury trial where the jury found him guilty of possessing methamphetamine and transporting an open container. He now claims the district court erred by denying both of his motions to suppress evidence. Mendoza-Rodriguez argues (1) the traffic stop was improperly prolonged and the fruits of the stop should have been suppressed; (2) the district court abused its discretion in failing to suppress laboratory results because the evidence was spoiled before it was tested; and (3) the State committed a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), violation by failing to turn over a prior police report from an unrelated traffic stop involving the same police officer. After a careful review of the record, we find no error by the district court. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 25, 2023, an Olathe police officer performed a traffic stop on Mendoza-Rodriguez for failing to wear a seatbelt. The officer recognized Mendoza-Rodriguez from a previous traffic stop. When the officer approached the vehicle, he saw an open bottle of Fireball whiskey in the center console cupholder. Mendoza-Rodriguez also had a passenger in the vehicle with him. While gathering Mendoza-Rodriguez’ information, the officer asked for backup and if a K9 unit could respond. The officer returned to his vehicle to conduct a records search and issue Mendoza-Rodriguez a notice to appear for the open container. The K9 unit was close and arrived on scene “fairly quickly.”

Upon reapproaching Mendoza-Rodriguez’ vehicle, the officer noticed the open container of Fireball whiskey was no longer in plain view. At this time the officer asked Mendoza-Rodriguez and his passenger to exit the vehicle and had the K9 handler and his drug-sniffing dog perform an open-air sniff. The K9 sniffed around the vehicle for about five minutes and did not alert to the odor of narcotics. Then both officers searched the vehicle for the container of Fireball whiskey.

During the search, the officers found the bottle of Fireball whiskey, along with a red fanny pack Mendoza-Rodriguez had on his person and left on the driver's seat when he exited the vehicle. The K9 handler opened the fanny pack and found $390 in cash and a baggie of white crystal substance. The officer believed, based on his training and experience, the substance resembled methamphetamine.

The officer took the sealed baggie to the hood of his patrol vehicle and attempted to open it to conduct a field test. The baggie ripped open and spilled onto the hood of the officer's patrol vehicle. The officer then used a gloved hand to gather the substance into a new baggie and performed the field test, which was presumptive positive for methamphetamine. Mendoza-Rodriguez told the officer he purchased the fanny pack from a thrift store and the money in the fanny pack was his, but the methamphetamine was not.

The State charged Mendoza-Rodriguez with possession of methamphetamine and transporting an open container. Mendoza-Rodriguez filed two motions to suppress evidence—one to suppress the laboratory test results confirming the substance the officer collected was methamphetamine based on alleged contamination; and one suggesting the traffic stop was not justified, was unreasonably prolonged, and law enforcement lacked probable cause to search the bag where the K9 handler found the methamphetamine.

Mendoza-Rodriguez claimed in his motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence that

“this was ․ not the first time that the Olathe Police Department stopped [him] and searched his car. This was at least the third time he had been stopped in a few short months. It was at least the second time [the officer] stopped him and searched his car. During the prior stops, Mr. Mendoza-Rodriguez was never given a traffic ticket, arrested, or charged with a crime.”

Mendoza-Rodriguez argued the traffic stop in this case was unreasonably prolonged because the officer waited just over 11 minutes for a K9 unit with no explanation or basis for the K9 request. Mendoza-Rodriguez claims law enforcement lacked probable cause to search his red bag where the methamphetamine was found as it was too small to hold an alcohol container. The district court held a hearing on Mendoza-Rodriguez’ two motions to suppress evidence and denied both motions.

Four days before trial, at the pretrial conference, Mendoza-Rodriguez moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, impose sanctions on the State for failing to turn over a police report of a traffic stop involving Mendoza-Rodriguez and the same officer about three weeks before the stop on February 25. In the prior traffic stop, the officer pulled Mendoza-Rodriguez over, searched the vehicle, and found what he believed were drugs. The field tests returned negative results. The officer testified at Mendoza-Rodriguez’ preliminary hearing he had recognized Mendoza-Rodriguez from prior traffic stops. Mendoza-Rodriguez alleged the State's failure to provide the prior police report prevented him from properly questioning or impeaching the officer about the reliability of his field testing and the fact he previously misidentified a powdered substance found in a plastic baggie in Mendoza-Rodriguez’ vehicle. Thus, Mendoza-Rodriquez asserted the failure to produce the records from the prior stop created a Brady violation because the prior stop's records would have led to exculpatory evidence he could have used in his defense if timely provided to him. Mendoza-Rodriguez further asserted he only became aware of such records once he subpoenaed the Olathe Police Department.

The district court addressed Mendoza-Rodriguez’ motion to dismiss at the pretrial conference. The district court denied Mendoza-Rodriguez’ motion, finding the State did not commit a Brady violation and did not act in bad faith. The district court explained the preliminary hearing was months before the pretrial conference, and Mendoza-Rodriguez waited until the Friday before trial to address the State's failure to turn over the police report mentioned at the preliminary hearing. Mendoza-Rodriguez asked for a standing objection on the suppression motions.

Mendoza-Rodriguez proceeded to jury trial and again asked for a standing objection related to the suppression issues. The jury heard testimony from the officer about the traffic stop on February 25, 2023, but not about any prior stops. The jury also heard testimony from the K9 handler, another law enforcement officer who had arrived on scene, and a Johnson County forensic scientist.

The jury found Mendoza-Rodriguez guilty of possession of methamphetamine and transporting an open container. The district court sentenced Mendoza-Rodriguez to an underlying prison sentence of 11 months for possession of methamphetamine and then granted Mendoza-Rodriguez supervised probation for 18 months. The district court imposed a $100 fine for the transportation of an open container.

Analysis

Suppression of Evidence

Mendoza-Rodriguez argues law enforcement unreasonably extended his traffic stop by calling a K9 unit to the scene for an open-air sniff of his vehicle, and the evidence discovered during the vehicle search should be suppressed. Mendoza-Rodriguez also claims the Kansas Bureau of Investigation laboratory test results establishing the substance found in his vehicle was methamphetamine should be suppressed because the substance was materially altered when it spilled on the hood of the patrol vehicle.

Standard of review

The standard of review of a district court's decision on a motion to suppress has two components. We review the district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. “ ‘Substantial competent evidence is legal and relevant evidence a reasonable person could accept to support a conclusion.’ ” State v. Talkington, 301 Kan. 453, 461, 345 P.3d 258 (2015). The ultimate legal conclusion, however, is reviewed using a de novo standard. State v. Martin, 318 Kan. 538, 558, 544 P.3d 820 (2024). “ ‘If there are no disputed material facts, the issue [of whether to suppress evidence] is a question of law over which the appellate court has unlimited review.’ ” State v. Crudo, 318 Kan. 32, 34, 541 P.3d 67 (2024). We do not reweigh the evidence, assess witness credibility, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. Talkington, 301 Kan. at 461.

Extended traffic stop

Mendoza-Rodriguez argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence collected from his vehicle by the officers during the traffic stop. Mendoza-Rodriguez claims the traffic stop was unlawfully extended because the officer called a K9 unit to perform an open-air sniff of his vehicle without his consent and with no reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Mendoza-Rodriguez asserts that the district court should have suppressed the evidence collected from his vehicle and now asks us to vacate his convictions and sentence and remand to the district court for a new trial.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 15. A traffic stop in which a law enforcement officer pulls over a vehicle and “restrains an individual's liberty” constitutes a seizure. State v. Jones, 300 Kan. 630, 637, 333 P.3d 886 (2014). For such seizure to be constitutionally reasonable, a law enforcement officer must have “specific and articulable facts that create a reasonable suspicion the seized individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime or traffic infraction.” 300 Kan. at 637. “ ‘A traffic violation provides an objectively valid reason to effectuate a traffic stop, even if the stop is pretextual.’ ” State v. Moore, 283 Kan. 344, 350, 154 P.3d 1 (2007).

Here, the officer performed a traffic stop on Mendoza-Rodriguez for failing to wear a seat belt under K.S.A. 8-2503(a)(1). Mendoza-Rodriguez does not challenge the reason for the initial traffic stop but claims the traffic stop was unreasonably extended to allow time for the K9 unit to arrive at the scene.

The scope and duration of the stop must be no longer than necessary to serve the legitimate purpose of the stop. State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 733, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 [1968]).

“Consistent with these principles, the legitimacy of the duration of a traffic stop is measured by the time it takes for an officer to ask for, obtain, and record the driver's license, proof of insurance, and vehicle registration; run a computer check; and issue a citation. As a general principle, once the officer determines that the driver has a valid license and the purpose for the traffic stop has ended, the driver must be allowed to leave without further delay. [Citation omitted.]” Jones, 300 Kan. at 640.

A temporary seizure justified by a traffic stop “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005). To lawfully extend a traffic stop an officer must have objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; Jones, 300 Kan. at 641. The reasonable suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable cause standard and requires considerably less than a showing of preponderance of the evidence. But there must be “at least a minimal level of objective justification” in which the officer can “articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000). Law enforcement has probable cause to search a vehicle “ ‘ “if the totality of the circumstances indicates there is a ‘fair probability’ that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence [of a crime].” ’ ” State v. Stevenson, 299 Kan. 53, 64-65, 321 P.3d 754 (2014).

An officer's conduct is viewed “ ‘in light of common sense and ordinary human experience’ ” while giving deference to law enforcement training and experience. DeMarco, 263 Kan. at 735. Absent reasonable suspicion, a traffic stop extended to conduct a dog sniff violates the United States Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 353-55, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015). “Detaining a driver for even a few minutes in order to allow a drug-sniffing dog to arrive unreasonably extends the detention when the officer did not need additional time to ask exploratory questions or to write a traffic citation.” State v. Jones, 47 Kan. App. 2d 866, 876-77, 280 P.3d 824 (2012).

Here, the officer approached Mendoza-Rodriguez, asked for his license and insurance, and saw an opened bottle of Fireball whiskey in the center console—a traffic violation. Mendoza-Rodriguez did not have proof of insurance. After the officer gathered Mendoza-Rodriguez’ information, he returned to his patrol vehicle to conduct a records check, look for warrants, and issue a notice to appear for transporting an open container of alcohol. See K.S.A. 8-1599(b). The officer testified that, while he was gathering Mendoza-Rodriguez’ information, he had determined he was going to search the vehicle for alcohol as evidence of the crime of transporting an open container. The officer was required to call for backup before searching the vehicle for officer safety because there was a passenger. The backup officer—a K9 unit, which was the closest unit to the stop location at the time—arrived while the officer was still writing the notice to appear.

About 5 to 10 minutes after the officer's first contact with Mendoza-Rodriguez, he reapproached the vehicle and, as he was getting ready to ask Mendoza-Rodriguez to step out of the vehicle, noticed the Fireball whiskey was no longer in the center console. Mendoza-Rodriguez and the passenger exited the vehicle, the drug dog performed an open-air sniff, and both officers searched the vehicle for alcohol only. While searching for the alcohol, the officers believed they found marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The officer noted Mendoza-Rodriguez was talking in a loud manner as if trying to distract the drug dog. The drug dog did not alert to the odor of narcotics.

The district court denied Mendoza-Rodriguez’ motion to suppress, stating:

“When [the officer] approached the vehicle, asked for the information, the defendant did not have proof of insurance, which was another traffic violation. But I think most importantly that he saw an open container. And I think that that changes the traffic stop when he did see evidence of an open container.

“And then important to the suppression issue I think is when [the officer] returned to the vehicle, the opened container was no longer in the position where he saw it in plain view when he first approached the vehicle. At that point, as both sides, I think, cited some law to that issue, that the officer searched the vehicle for that container. During that search, found what he believed to be a marijuana leaf. Also found a bottle, the bottle of alcohol. And in addition, a fanny pack ․ which was opened to see if it contained the open container and had, what he believed to be methamphetamine.”

The district court's factual findings are supported by substantial competent evidence. While the district court did not explicitly address whether the stop was extended to allow the K9 unit to arrive, it explained the dynamics of the traffic stop changed when the officer saw the open container in plain sight. It is undisputed the officer was writing Mendoza-Rodriguez a citation and stopped what he was doing when the K9 unit arrived on scene. The purpose of the traffic stop had not ended when the K9 unit arrived because the officer was still completing the records check before issuing Mendoza-Rodriguez a citation for transporting an open container. The vehicle needed to be searched to recover the open container, which also required the presence of a backup officer. See Jones, 300 Kan. at 640. The traffic stop was not impermissibly extended, and the district court did not err in denying Mendoza-Rodriguez’ motion to suppress the evidence law enforcement collected from his vehicle during the traffic stop and related search.

Laboratory test results

Mendoza-Rodriguez argues the district court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the laboratory test results confirming that the substance found in the fanny pack in his car was methamphetamine. Mendoza-Rodriguez claims the substance was materially altered when it spilled onto the hood of the officer's patrol vehicle. Mendoza-Rodriguez asserts the district court should have suppressed the laboratory test results and now requests us to suppress the laboratory test results.

Mendoza-Rodriguez acknowledged before the district court his motion to suppress was an “unusual” way of approaching the laboratory results and the results “are usually more of a credibility issue or go to weight and circumstances.” Mendoza-Rodriguez still asked the district court either to suppress the laboratory test results or find the State could not present the results to the jury.

We review a district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. The district court abuses its discretion if its decision is based on an error of fact or law or is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. State v. Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 947, 287 P.3d 245 (2012).

“ ‘A party offering an object into evidence must show with reasonable certainty that the object has not been materially altered since the object was taken into custody. However, the party is not required to keep the object under lock and key or continuously sealed up. The test for chain of custody is a reasonable certainty that the object has not been materially altered. Any deficiency in the chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.’ ” State v. Hillard, 315 Kan. 732, 760, 511 P.3d 883 (2022).

The State, as the party offering the lab results into evidence, had to show with reasonable certainty the substance tested was not materially altered once taken into custody. See 315 Kan. at 760. While searching the vehicle for alcohol, the officer moved a backpack on the passenger floorboard and heard the clink of glass. The officer moved the backpack and saw “a torn-off top of a baggie with a green leafy substance in it,” which the officer presumed was marijuana. The search then became broader as both officers looked for alcohol, narcotics, and paraphernalia. The officer opened the backpack and found the Fireball whiskey. Meanwhile, the K9 officer saw a red fanny pack on the driver's side of the vehicle large enough to contain a small bottle of alcohol. When opened, the fanny pack revealed about $390 in cash and a crystalline substance sealed in a small plastic bag. Based on training and experience, the officer believed the substance was methamphetamine and performed a field test on the hood of his patrol vehicle, where he had often field-tested substances as a matter of safety.

When the officer tried to open the baggie to test the substance, “it pretty much just exploded all over the hood of [his] car.” The officer wore gloves, noted the hood of his patrol vehicle appeared clean and had no debris on it, and, to his knowledge, there were no other drugs or anything else on the hood of the car before the bag broke and the contents spilled on the hood. The officer admitted he did not take the time to stop and examine the hood before he started the testing, and it was dark outside except for the police lights and streetlights.

The officer scooped the substance with his gloved hand from the hood of his vehicle into a clean baggie and tested the substance, which was positive for methamphetamine. The baggie was sealed and submitted to the Johnson County Crime Lab for further testing, which also yielded positive results.

The district court explained the issue relating to the sealed bag's content before it spilled on the hood of the car and the laboratory test results was “more a chain of custody issue or alteration of sample than a suppression issue,” and there was “sufficient indicia of reliability pursuant to [K.S.A.] 60-445.” The district court noted this was an issue on which Mendoza-Rodriguez could argue, present testimony, and cross-examine the State's witnesses.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the laboratory test results into evidence. The State presented sufficient evidence to establish with reasonable certainty the substance was, in fact, methamphetamine and was not materially altered. The deficiency in the officer's collection of the substance off the hood of his vehicle goes to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility. See Hillard, 315 Kan. at 760. Mendoza-Rodriguez cross-examined the officer extensively and highlighted facts suggesting the substance could have been materially altered. Mendoza-Rodriguez ultimately argued the laboratory test results were prejudicial as there was no way for the officer to guarantee accurate test results after the substance spilled onto the hood of his patrol vehicle where he regularly field-tested narcotics. Mendoza-Rodriguez is essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence—something we cannot do. See Talkington, 301 Kan. at 461.

Brady Violation

Mendoza-Rodriguez next claims the State committed a Brady violation by failing to turn over favorable evidence—a police report from another traffic stop a few weeks prior involving Mendoza-Rodriguez and the officer. Mendoza-Rodriguez claims the officer previously pulled him over in a traffic stop, searched his vehicle, found a substance that resembled methamphetamine, and conducted a field test that was negative for methamphetamine. Mendoza-Rodriguez claims evidence of this prior event was favorable to him as he could have used it to impeach the officer on the reliability of field testing and the officer's ability to identify and test suspected narcotics.

We review de novo the district court's findings as to the existence of a Brady violation while giving deference to the district court's factual findings. State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 510, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012). There are three elements of a Brady violation: “(1) ‘ “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching’ ”; (2) “ ‘that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently’ ”; and (3) the evidence must be material so as to establish prejudice. [Citations omitted.]” Warrior, 294 Kan. at 506. If there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would differ had the evidence been disclosed, the evidence is considered material. 294 Kan. at 507. We examine the three Brady elements below.

Favorable evidence

Mendoza-Rodriguez claims the suppressed evidence was favorable to him as he could have used it to impeach the officer during the suppression hearing, question the reliability of the evidence, and show law enforcement acted in bad faith. Mendoza-Rodriguez claims the district court would have ruled differently at the suppression hearing if he had presented this information. Evidence favorable to the defense includes exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Warrior, 294 Kan. at 506.

“It is ‘the well-established rule that an appellant has the burden to designate a record sufficient to establish the claimed error. Without an adequate record, an appellant's claim of alleged error fails.’ ” State v. Vonachen, 312 Kan. 451, 460, 476 P.3d 774 (2020); see also Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4), (a)(5) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36) (appellant has burden to furnish sufficient record to support claims of error; appellant's claims of error must be supported with specific citations to record on appeal). Mendoza-Rodriguez failed to provide the police report in the record on appeal. Therefore, we cannot review the document to determine whether it would favor Mendoza-Rodriguez.

Even if the police report was in the record on appeal, it is unclear how prior police involvement and evidence of a presumptively negative substance test from an unrelated traffic stop would impeach the officer or establish the field test in this stop was unreliable. As explained above, the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle as the circumstances indicated there was a “ ‘fair probability’ ” the vehicle contained contraband, particularly after the officer saw an open container of Fireball whiskey. See Stevenson, 299 Kan. at 64-65. The officer testified at the suppression hearing that it is agency protocol to perform a field test, and the purpose of the test is to establish the substance is what the officer purports it to be before making an arrest.

With respect to the bad faith argument, Mendoza-Rodriguez asserts a conclusory argument that law enforcement acted in bad faith “in the alteration of the substance found” and “during the mishandling of evidence in the subsequent car stop.” Before the district court, Mendoza-Rodriguez argued the Olathe Police Department was targeting him but only incidentally raises this claim on appeal. This issue is thus abandoned. See State v. Meggerson, 312 Kan. 238, 246, 474 P.3d 761 (2020) (“Issues not briefed or not adequately briefed are deemed waived or abandoned.”). The evidence Mendoza-Rodriguez complains he did not have was not favorable to him.

Suppression by the State

Mendoza-Rodriguez claims the State suppressed evidence by failing to turn over evidence the officer had previously stopped him, searched his vehicle, and performed a negative field test on suspected narcotics. The State admits it did not turn over the police reports from Mendoza-Rodriguez’ previous traffic stop but asserts Mendoza-Rodriguez had no right to Brady material before a suppression hearing and, even if he did, he could have reraised the objection as late as when the evidence was presented at trial. Mendoza-Rodriguez responds, asserting the State cannot argue for the first time on appeal there was no right to Brady material before the suppression hearing.

Suppressing or withholding evidence violates the defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-87. The State's delayed disclosure may not constitute a Brady violation if the defendant was not prejudiced. See State v. Breitenbach, 313 Kan. 73, 98-99, 483 P.3d 448 (2021) (finding disclosure was delayed rather than suppressed under second Brady prong but moved on to materiality component); State v. Hirsh, 310 Kan. 321, 335-36, 446 P.3d 472 (2019) (delayed disclosure may constitute Brady violation if defendant was prejudiced under materiality component).

If anything, there was a delayed disclosure of the evidence here. Mendoza-Rodriguez admitted he obtained the police report from the earlier stop through a subpoena before the trial. Even if the State failed to turn over the report, Mendoza-Rodriguez still had the report days before the trial and could have used it to impeach the officer. Again, Mendoza-Rodriguez could have reraised the suppression issue at trial and outside the presence of the jury. The delayed disclosure could constitute a Brady violation if Mendoza-Rodriguez was prejudiced under the materiality component.

Material evidence

Mendoza-Rodriguez contends there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the suppression hearing would have differed if he had evidence from his prior traffic stop by the officer. Mendoza-Rodriguez claims that, without the police report of the prior traffic stop, the district court was unable to fully evaluate whether law enforcement acted in bad faith or to evaluate the reliability of evidence found in his car, which was a critical issue.

The State cannot withhold favorable evidence from the defendant “where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. “ ‘[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” State v. Soto, 301 Kan. 969, 980, 349 P.3d 1256 (2015). The reasonable probability burden is less than that required to show the evidence would more likely than not have changed the verdict. Hirsh, 310 Kan. at 337.

We cannot determine whether the police report was material as it is not in the record on appeal. Even if the report was in the record on appeal, it is not reasonably probable that, had the State turned over the police report of the prior traffic stop, the result of the suppression hearing would have been different. The police report at issue was not relevant to this case and, even if it was—perhaps to show law enforcement was acting in bad faith and targeting Mendoza-Rodriguez (a claim raised below but not argued on appeal)—the substance found during the prior traffic stop did not test positive for narcotics. The police report from the prior stop likely would not provide information establishing whether the field test here was conducted in an appropriate and reliable manner.

Mendoza-Rodriguez also had the opportunity at trial to question the officer about the credibility and reliability of field testing:

“[Defense counsel]: There is a reason for you to conduct [field] tests?

“[Officer]: Yes.

“[Defense counsel]: And that's typically to kind of establish a basis for making an arrest?

“[Officer]: Correct.

“[Defense counsel]: And that's because ․ we heard a lot about your training and experience, you're not necessarily like a lab tech or a doctor?

“[Officer]: Correct.

“[Defense counsel]: You're not [a drug dog], you can't smell meth?

“[Officer]: Right.

“[Defense counsel]: So there's [got] to be something more because you can't personally look at something and know definitively what the chemical makeup is; right?

“[Officer]: Correct. I can see what it resembles, but not what the chemical makeup is.

“[Defense counsel]: And so there's a more substantial process where, you know, you do field testing and eventually submit it to the lab?

“[Officer]: Yes.”

This line of questioning at trial highlighted the officer's ability, or inability, to identify narcotics on scene. Mendoza-Rodriguez claims the prior police report would have established the officer misidentified narcotics in the past—a point this line of questioning already addresses. In fact, that is the purpose of the field test—to confirm a seized substance is what the officer purports it to be.

The district court was correct in finding that police contact is generally not favorable to a defendant. The fact the field test from Mendoza-Rodriguez’ prior traffic stop was negative supports law enforcement's protocol to test discovered substances before making an uninformed arrest. Mendoza-Rodriguez obtained the police report days before the trial and failed to include it in the record on appeal. He has also failed to establish how the police report contained favorable and material evidence. Therefore, we find no Brady violation.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: