State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Troy Michal Chambers, Appellant. (2026)

Troy Michal Chambers appeals the Shawnee County District Court's imposition of offender registration requirements under the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq., after Chambers entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and two counts of criminal threat. For the first time, Chambers challenges his registration under KORA as a violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, as well as comparable provisions of the Kansas Constitution. He argues we must consider the issues for the first time on appeal under the authority granted by the Kansas Constitution and K.S.A. 20-3001. For the reasons explained below, we disagree, decline to reach his unpreserved constitutional questions, and affirm the imposition of his registration requirements.

Background

On April 10, 2024, Chambers went to various places in Topeka, threatening people with a handgun and, on one occasion, discharging the weapon. We need not detail Chambers’ conduct for purposes of this appeal.

The State originally charged Chambers with four counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, three counts of criminal threat, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building, and criminal use of a weapon in committing domestic violence. After the evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing, the State amended the complaint to add another charge of aggravated burglary.

Chambers ultimately negotiated a plea agreement, under which he agreed to enter guilty pleas to one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and two counts of criminal threat. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining seven counts. This agreement specifically contemplated that Chambers would register as a violent offender under KORA. During the plea hearing, the district court advised Chambers of his rights and the consequences of his pleas before accepting the pleas. The court also advised Chambers of his duty to register as a violent offender. Chambers did not object to registration under KORA at any time during the plea hearing.

Because his presentence investigation report revealed a more substantial criminal history than he anticipated, Chambers voiced his intent to withdraw his plea, complaining that defense counsel failed to inform him of the true consequences of his plea, including the duty to register as an offender under KORA for 15 years. The district court concluded that these claims created a conflict of interest with his attorney's continued representation at sentencing and appointed Chambers new counsel.

Chambers did not then seek to withdraw his plea, but he moved for a downward sentencing departure. At sentencing, the district court denied the departure motion. The court imposed a 31-month prison sentence for Chambers on Count 1—aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—and consecutive 7-month prison sentences for each of Chambers’ criminal threat convictions for a controlling prison term of 45 months, with a 12-month postrelease supervision term. The court again advised that, under KORA, Chambers was required to register as a violent offender for 15 years.

Chambers timely appeals.

Analysis

His appeal is limited to challenging the registration requirements under KORA as unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As a threshold argument, Chambers contends that this court must address the constitutional challenges even though Chambers did not raise them in the district court because of the constitutional and statutory composition of this court. We first address whether we are compelled to consider his arguments.

I. Must the court consider Chambers’ unpreserved constitutional issues?

Chambers’ first claim requires interpretation and application of constitutional provisions and statutes, questions of law subject to unlimited appellate review. State ex rel. Kansas Highway Patrol v. Fuleki, 322 Kan. 237, 239, 588 P.3d 1187 (2026) (interpretation of statute); State v. Gleason, 320 Kan. 726, 740, 571 P.3d 522 (2025) (interpretation of constitutional provision).

His argument hinges on a reading of K.S.A. 20-3001, the implementing statute for the Kansas Court of Appeals.

“On January 10, 1977, there shall be and is hereby established a court of record which shall be known as the court of appeals. The court of appeals shall be a part of the court of justice in which the judicial power of the state is vested by section 1 of article 3 of the constitution of the state of Kansas and shall be subject to the general administrative authority of the supreme court. The court of appeals shall have such jurisdiction over appeals in civil and criminal cases and from administrative bodies and officers of the state as may be prescribed by law, and shall have such original jurisdiction as may be necessary to the complete determination of any cause on review. During the pendency of any appeal, the court of appeals, on such terms as may be just, may make an order suspending further proceedings in the court below, until the decision of the court of appeals.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 20-3001.

Chambers pulls a single phrase—“such original jurisdiction as may be necessary to the complete determination of any cause on review”—from this implementing statute and draws a conclusion that this phrase requires our court to consider any matter brought that is necessary to the complete determination of a case before it. The argument is unpersuasive.

As Chambers notes, only one appellate court in Kansas has referenced K.S.A. 20-3001 in a decision. In State v. Delgado, No. 109,601, 2014 WL 1707718, at *2 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion), a panel of this court invoked the “original jurisdiction” language of K.S.A. 20-3001 to consider a criminal defendant's argument concerning a motion for extension of time to file a motion to withdraw a plea when the district court had not ruled on the motion because the criminal defendant had taken an appeal before the court ruled on the motion.

Delgado is distinguishable from this case. The Delgado panel that invoked K.S.A. 20-3001 did so to reach the substance of a claim—the motion for extension of time—raised by a criminal defendant but undecided by the district court. Here, Chambers seeks to invoke the language of K.S.A. 20-3001 to force this court to consider an unpreserved issue.

Chambers argues that the legislative grant of original appellate jurisdiction to this court in K.S.A. 20-3001 compels appellate consideration of all issues raised on appeal. In support of this position, Chambers argues that K.S.A. 20-3001 exceeds the grant of original appellate jurisdiction provided to the Kansas Supreme Court in the Kansas Constitution. Even if true, the legislative grant of appellate jurisdiction must be read in the context of the entire statute, but Chambers ignores the end of the sentence on which he focuses—“necessary to the complete determination of any cause on review.” (Emphasis added.) The Kansas Court of Appeals possesses original jurisdiction necessary to exercise its function solely as a court of review. Chambers reads this provision in conjunction with section 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights to argue that the Kansas Court of Appeals is compelled to consider any issue related to the case on review that is necessary to complete a determination of the case on review.

Section 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides that “[a]ll persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without delay.” Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 18. Chambers reads this provision to apply to appellate courts, requiring them to consider issues raised for the first time on appeal to provide “justice administered without delay.” In making this argument, Chambers attempts to distinguish section 18 from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. But the Kansas Supreme Court has generally construed the due process provision of both Constitutions to afford the same rights. State v. Boysaw, 309 Kan. 526, 537-38, 439 P.3d 909 (2019) (“Historically, our courts have analyzed sections 10 and 18 as coextensive with their federal counterparts.”).

Whether the Kansas Supreme Court continues to read section 18 consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment remains to be seen, but Chambers’ argument to this court to take an expansive view of the rights provided in section 18 is not supported with authority.

Moreover, Chambers does not provide a cogent argument for suggesting that the “justice administered without delay” phrase within section 18 requires an appellate court to consider an unpreserved issue. Occasionally, the principle of justice, in the sense that the court reaches the correct result, lies in tension with the principle of expediency. It would be expedient to find every district court decision conclusive of a party's rights without possibility of appeal, but the Kansas Legislature has balanced the expediency of a final judgment by a trial court with the need to determine if the court reached the correct legal result through an appeals process.

A similar balance was established when the Kansas Supreme Court devised its exceptions for appellate consideration of an unpreserved issue. Schutt v. Foster, 320 Kan. 852, 856, 572 P.3d 770 (2025) (recognizing preservation exceptions). These exceptions are designed to permit a court to consider unpreserved issues where the record provides fully developed facts so that the issue involves only a question of law. The Kansas Supreme Court has emphasized that consideration of an issue without full development of the applicable facts is error. See State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 284, 497 P.3d 566 (2021) (“An appellate court abuses its discretion to take up a newly raised issue if deciding its merits would require the court to make factual findings such as credibility determinations, resolving evidentiary conflicts, and reweighing evidence. These are typically tasks an appellate court may not perform when the factual issues could have been fully litigated before the appeal.”). This strikes a balance between expediency and justice by ensuring that the appellate court possesses the necessary facts to reach a correct result.

Incongruously, though not a consideration in the analysis, Chambers’ case does not provide a clear case for placing expediency over justice. The delay imposed by requiring Chambers to properly raise the constitutional challenges before a fact-finding tribunal before seeking appellate review does not cause him any prejudice. He is currently serving a controlling 45-month sentence. His obligations to register under KORA begin after he is released from prison. See K.S.A. 22-4906(a)(1). Accordingly, while the registration obligation hangs over his head, he is not actively harmed by any potentially unconstitutional aspect of the registration requirements.

K.S.A. 20-3001 does not independently require the Court of Appeals to consider an issue for the first time on appeal. Chambers does not provide a compelling argument that K.S.A. 20-3001 requires us to consider an argument regardless of its preservation status.

II. Should we reach whether KORA is unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment's protection against compelled speech?

Chambers contends that the obligation to register as a violent offender under KORA violates his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 11 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights to be free from compulsion to speak at the government's behest.

Chambers acknowledges that this issue was not presented to the district court and argues for the applicability of one of two preservation exceptions—denial of fundamental rights and resolution of question of law.

An appellate court generally does not review constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal, but, as Chambers notes, our courts have recognized exceptions to this rule, including issues involving fundamental rights or furthering justice and questions of law requiring no fact resolution. See Schutt, 320 Kan. at 856. But even though an appellate court is authorized to consider certain unpreserved legal issues and a litigant demonstrates the applicability of one of the preservation exceptions, the court is not compelled to consider the unpreserved issue for the first time on appeal. State v. Genson, 316 Kan. 130, 135-36, 513 P.3d 1192 (2022) (“[I]f the issues were not being raised for the first time on appeal, the panel would not have had discretion to refuse to consider them. But since these arguments were newly raised before the panel, the panel could exercise its discretion to consider whether to apply a prudential exception to the general rule that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

This court has almost universally declined to exercise any prudential exception to consider similar unpreserved First Amendment claims for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Spillman, 63 Kan. App. 2d 550, 575, 534 P.3d 583 (2023) (collecting cases); State v. Morris, No. 125,537, 2024 WL 3219311, at *21-22 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 319 Kan. 835 (2024); State v. Baker, No. 126,151, 2024 WL 2873121, at *6 (Kan. App. 2024) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 320 Kan. 863 (2025); State v. Pearson, No. 125,033, 2023 WL 2194306, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion). To date, the Kansas Supreme Court has not indicated that the appellate court's refusal to consider the matter constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion. See Morris, 2024 WL 3219311, at *22 (“[G]iven our Supreme Court has denied petitions for review on these claims, it would seem the Kansas Supreme Court does not disagree with this court's discretion in refusing to consider these claims for the first time on appeal.”). Although Chambers relies in part on State v. Mills, the Kansas Supreme Court ultimately did not grant review of this court's decision on the First Amendment issue in Mills, No. 127,057, 2024 WL 4799513 (Kan. App. 2024) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 320 Kan. 866 (2025). Rather, although the Kansas Supreme Court originally granted full review of the Court of Appeals’ decision, it later limited its review only to the jail credit issue.

The Pearson panel articulated a compelling reason for declining to address this complex constitutional argument for the first time on appeal.

“Identifying the compelling government interests KORA is meant to protect and then determining whether it is sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve those interests involves examining a host of issues best explored first at the district court level. Analyzing the proportionality of KORA requires an in-depth balancing of its benefits and costs, along with exploring potential alternatives to achieving those benefits and the accompanying costs and anticipated effectiveness of those alternatives. It may even involve evaluating KORA's effectiveness in protecting the compelling governmental interests it is meant to serve, which could involve the presentation of evidence and fact-finding. And ‘[f]act-finding is simply not the role of appellate courts.’ State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 488, 243 P.3d 343 (2010) (citing State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 161, 199 P.3d 1265 [2009]).” Pearson, 2023 WL 2194306, at *1.

We agree with the Pearson court's analysis. An appellate court's consideration of this issue—even if it were properly preserved for review—is frustrated by the lack of development of the factual basis for the claim in the district court. Accordingly, even if we were willing to exercise our discretion to reach the issue, consideration of the issue does not dispose of the case because we would be required to remand the case to the district court for factual development. Judicial efficiency is not promoted by considering an issue only to remand the case to the district court for consideration. Stated differently, even if this court could conclude as a matter of law, as Chambers contends, that KORA registration constitutes impermissible compelled speech within the meaning of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the imposition on Chambers’ First Amendment rights is unconstitutional only if those restrictions cannot survive strict scrutiny. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1994) (“Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny” as laws that “suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”); U.S.D. No. 503 v. McKinney, 236 Kan. 224, 235, 689 P.2d 860 (1984). Strict scrutiny requires the State to demonstrate a compelling government interest justifying the restriction on the fundamental right in a way that is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. See Hodes & Nauser, MDs v. Schmidt, 309 Kan. 610, 680, 440 P.3d 461 (2019). None of those burden shifting considerations are appropriate on appeal because they require the development of facts outside the appellate record.

Chambers’ challenge to the KORA registration requirements under the First Amendment and section 11 is not properly preserved for appellate review, and we decline to apply a prudential preservation exception to address the issue in this appeal.

III. Should we reach whether KORA violates equal protection by authorizing some offenders to seek release from reporting requirements?

Chambers also contends that the registration requirements of KORA violate equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 2 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights by permitting some offenders early release from the registration requirements but not extending the same option to other offenders, namely violent offenders.

Again, Chambers acknowledges that he did not challenge KORA on equal protection grounds in the criminal proceedings before the district court. He asserts that two preservation exceptions—question of law on settled facts and denial of fundamental rights—apply to permit judicial inquiry in this appeal. Again, although the court has discretion to consider the issue, it is not compelled to do so. See Genson, 316 Kan. at 135-36.

Whether a legislative scheme violates equal protection is a question of law. See State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 702, 510 P.3d 706 (2022). Courts have also considered unpreserved equal protection claims to serve the ends of justice or prevent the denial of a fundamental right. See State v. Dixon, 60 Kan. App. 2d 100, 132, 492 P.3d 455 (2021). But consideration of these claims is only appropriate where the equal protection claims do not require fact development. Allen, 314 Kan. at 284 (concluding that an appellate court abuses its discretion to entertain an unpreserved issue on appeal where resolution of the issue requires determination of facts); State v. Shipley, 62 Kan. App. 2d 272, 281, 510 P.3d 1194 (2022) (“[T]his panel would have benefitted from a full factual development and the district court's analysis of this important equal protection argument that Shipley failed to raise.”).

Chambers argues that this court does not need further development of the fact record, but his challenge to KORA's classification invokes rational basis scrutiny. That standard requires further development of the factual record. We decline to exercise discretion to consider the unpreserved issue for the first time on appeal.

Affirmed.

Coble, J.: