IN RE: the Care and Treatment of Matthew Brent Griffin. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Matthew Brent Griffin has been committed for treatment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) since 2009. He appeals from the district court's determination that denied him the opportunity for placement in a transitional release program. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the district court's decision.

Factual and Procedural History

Griffin has two convictions for sexually violent offenses involving minors. The first one was from 1993, when he was about 18 years old, for performing fellatio on a 3-year-old boy that he was babysitting. The second, in 1996, involved the 10-year-old daughter of a woman residing with Griffin, whom he was babysitting. In 2004, Griffin's parole was revoked after it was discovered that he had engaged in multiple undisclosed contacts with the minor children of a woman he was dating.

In 2008, shortly before Griffin was to be released from prison, the State filed a petition for a probable cause hearing to determine whether Griffin was an SVP under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act), K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq. Following a bench trial on stipulated facts, the district court found Griffin to be an SVP and ordered him committed to the Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP) under the care of the Secretary of the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services (KDADS). Griffin did not appeal from his commitment. He has been housed involuntarily in Larned State Hospital as an SVP since January 2009.

Having been committed to the program for roughly 15 years, Griffin had received an examination of his mental condition annually, as required by the Act. Each of these annual reports concluded Griffin remained an SVP and recommended he remain in KDADS's custody. Until now, Griffin has not appealed from any of his annual reviews. But see Griffin v. Bruffett, 53 Kan. App. 2d 589, 590, 389 P.3d 992 (2017) (Griffin unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of his detention in an action under K.S.A. 60-1501 due to the district court's failure to conduct annual reviews during his first six years of confinement.).

In December 2024, Griffin was housed at the Miami County (MiCo) House, the reintegration facility on the grounds of Osawatomie State Hospital, after he was approved to advance to Tier Three of the SPTP on November 15, 2021. Larned State Hospital clinicians completed his 2024 annual examination, recommending that he not advance to transitional release.

Following his annual examination, Griffin timely filed a motion requesting an annual review hearing for transitional release. Because Griffin sought transitional release under K.S.A. 59-29a08(b), the issue for the district court to determine was whether probable cause existed to believe Griffin's mental abnormality or personality disorder had significantly changed so that he was safe to be placed in transitional release. See K.S.A. 59-29a08(g); In re Care & Treatment of Burch, 296 Kan. 215, 222, 291 P.3d 78 (2012) (construing prior version of statute, then codified at K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 59-29a08[c][1]). Under the statutory framework, even assuming a finding of probable cause, that determination alone would not automatically trigger Griffin's discharge or transitional release. Instead, he would next proceed to an evidentiary hearing for transitional release under K.S.A. 59-29a08(g). See 296 Kan. at 221-22; In re Care & Treatment of Miles, 47 Kan. App. 2d 429, 441, 276 P.3d 232 (2012) (a probable cause determination does not grant petitioner transitional release, rather it obligates the district court “to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether transitional release is appropriate”).

Ultimately, the district court found that Griffin still meets the definition of an SVP and that his mental abnormality or personality disorder has not so significantly changed that he is safe to be placed in transitional release. The district court concluded that Griffin had not established probable cause to warrant an evidentiary hearing and he should remain committed to the program. The district court therefore denied Griffin's request to be placed in transitional release.

Griffin timely appeals. More facts will be provided as necessary as part of our review.

Analysis

We examine the legal framework that applies under the SPTP.

Once a person has been determined to be an SVP, “the person shall be committed to the custody of the secretary for aging and disability services for control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.” K.S.A. 59-29a07(a). Under the Act, there is a hierarchy of stages before the court may release an SVP. The ultimate goal of course is final discharge from the program.

Working backwards, a person may only be granted final discharge from the program after at least five years in conditional release. K.S.A. 59-29a08(b). And a person must successfully complete the transitional release phase before being placed in conditional release. Transitional release “means any halfway house, work release, sexually violent predator treatment facility or other placement designed to assist the person's adjustment and reintegration into the community.” K.S.A. 59-29a02(i). And, continuing backwards, an SVP must successfully complete the first three tiers of the SPTP before being considered for transitional release. These tiers, as they currently exist, can be described as the treatment phase. See Johnson v. State, 289 Kan. 642, 646-47, 215 P.3d 575 (2009) (summarizing the seven different treatment phases of the SPTP as they existed at that time); Burch v. Howard, 57 Kan. App. 2d 860, 867-68, 461 P.3d 840 (2020) (describing the switch from a seven-phase plan to a three-tiered plan). Griffin was on Tier Three, Step 4 of the current three-tiered pretransitional release program when he petitioned the district court for placement in transitional release. He had been on Tier Three since November 2021. The point of Tier Three is to prepare the SVP for transitional release.

“Tier Three challenges the resident to solve several real-world problems and assume real-world responsibilities, while demonstrating an ability to maintain a low risk for re-offense. During this tier, the resident demonstrates an ability to become involved with appropriate helping agencies, maintain responsible behavior and communication with staff at the reintegration facility, conduct a job search, secure employment, maintain employment, engage in constructive maintenance therapy, and demonstrate a satisfactory degree of transparency in his lifestyle.”

For the Progress Review Panel to petition the court for transitional release, at a minimum the SVP

“will have to be actively involved in treatment to include: attending individual and group therapy sessions, having no instances of verbal or physical aggression, utilizing Resident's approved Relapse Prevention Plan, complete two consecutive polygraphs with no significant disclosures and no significant reactions within the past 12 months, have no sexual fantasies that conflict with Resident's treatment plan, have not engaged in sexual behaviors that conflict with Resident's treatment plan, maintain transparency with staff, no boundary issues with staff or other residents, and maintain a healthy peer/social support system. Additionally, the resident should maintain employment, have adequate savings in order to move toward independent living, regularly schedule and participate in outings to demonstrate one's readiness for a mostly independent lifestyle, and comply with all reintegration facility rules and requirements as outlined in the Reintegration Facility Handbook.”

See also Burch, 57 Kan. App. 2d at 867 (“And Tier III focuses on reintegration; patients go on unsupervised outings, move into a reintegration facility, obtain a driver's license, buy a car, and get a job.”).

Here, the Progress Review Panel did not petition the court for Griffin's transitional release. To the contrary, his annual review indicated that he should not be moved into transitional release. So, as is his statutory right under K.S.A. 59-29a08, he petitioned the court, over KDADS's objection, for placement in transitional release. When the court denied his petition, he appealed to this court for relief.

We review the district court's determination de novo.

Appellate courts review a district court's probable cause determination under a de novo standard. In re Burch, 296 Kan. at 222-23. The burden of proof lies with Griffin, and this court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to him, drawing inferences and resolving conflicting evidence in his favor when reviewing the probable cause determination. K.S.A. 59-29a08(d); see 296 Kan. at 224-25. To meet his burden, Griffin needed to show facts “sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and action to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief that [his] mental abnormality or personality disorder had so changed that he was safe to be placed in transitional release.” See 296 Kan. at 226.

The reviewing court considers the annual report and the findings of any qualified experts. And, if the person does not participate in the prescribed treatment plan, the person is presumed to be unable to show probable cause to believe the person is safe to be released. K.S.A. 59-29a08(d).

Griffin failed to show probable cause that his mental abnormality or personality disorder had changed to the extent that he was safe to be placed in transitional release.

Griffin's sole argument on appeal is that he met his burden to show probable cause to believe his mental abnormality or personality disorder has significantly changed so that he is safe to be placed in transitional release. He must establish probable cause that (1) his mental abnormality or personality disorder had significantly changed; and (2) it had changed to such a degree that he was safe to be placed in transitional release. See K.S.A. 59-29a08(d); In re Burch, 296 Kan. at 226-27.

Griffin argues that little has changed since it was considered appropriate for him to be placed on Tier Three in 2021. To support his argument, he highlights his scores from various tests conducted as part of his annual examinations.

The State argues that Griffin failed to establish probable cause that transitional release was appropriate, as Griffin continued to struggle with honesty, transparency, and did not recognize the importance of correcting that behavior. The State also argues that Griffin continues to be diagnosed with pedophilic disorder, cannabis use disorder, alcohol use disorder, and antisocial personality disorder.

Because each annual report is reviewed on its own merits, rather than a wholesale compilation and rehashing of all prior reports, the district court reviewed three reports—January 2024, December 2024, and January 2025—as well as statements made by counsel at the probable cause hearing. That said, we do not mean to imply that the court must be blind to the reasons for the original commitment or the person's past behavior in the SPTP. When current behavior aligns with past bad behavior, it can point to a continuing pattern of conduct. The legal standard focuses on whether the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has significantly changed from when the court decided that the person was an SVP and not safe to be at large to a current assessment of the person whose behavior indicates they are now safe to be at large. It is left to treatment professionals to assess the broader question of the person's mental condition.

So what is the evidence presented and does it support ordering an evidentiary hearing on Griffin's transitional release?

1. Static-99R: The Static-99R is an actuarial instrument used to estimate the probability that a convicted adult male sex offender will reoffend against a child or nonconsenting adult. According to Griffin's most recent examination completed in December 2024, using the Static-99R, if Griffin and an average sex offender were discharged, Griffin would have about a one-third greater chance of reoffending.

2. STABLE-2007: The STABLE-2007 is used to assess change in intermediate-term risk status, assess treatment needs, and help predict recidivism in sexual offenders. As of December 2024, Griffin's score was 6 out of 26 possible points, and the most recent report reflected an increase to 8 out of 26, due to the addition of poor problem solving and negative emotionality. The most recent report stated that “the following need areas have been identified as a clinically significant concern for [Griffin]: capacity for relationship stability (+2), hostility toward women (+1), poor problem solving (+1), negative emotionality (+1), deviant sexual interest (+2), and cooperation with supervision (+1).” Also, a score of 8 suggests that Griffin has a moderate level of criminogenic needs. The report stated that, when combined with the Static-99R, Griffin is classified as level III, indicating a recidivism rate about the same as the average individual convicted of a sexually motivated offense.

3. ACUTE-2007: The ACUTE-2007 measures dynamic factors that may change very rapidly, such as over a period of weeks or days. The ACUTE-2007 consists of seven areas of acute risk vulnerability, including hostility, emotional collapse, collapse of social supports, substance abuse, victim access, sexual preoccupation, and rejection of supervision. In December 2024, Griffin's score was 3, which is within the expected range for adult males with a Static-99R/STABLE-2007 risk profile of “ ‘Average.’ ” Griffin also exhibited clinically significant problems related to hostility and rejection of supervision.

4. Truthfulness: Griffin originally started the year on Step 1 of Tier Three, down from Step 3 the year before, due to significant issues with honesty and transparency, up to the point at which it was potentially impacting community safety. Even so, he was able to advance to Step 4 because he had no major treatment violations, which is the highest level he had reached throughout the three years he had been at the MiCo house.

But truthfulness and honesty continued to be a concern. His daily journal rarely reflected instances where he engaged in deception or thought about it. At one point, Griffin was asked to track the times he had difficulty telling the truth and embellishing or had the urge to do so, yet when he returned to therapy, he had not completed that assignment.

Another example of Griffin's lack of transparency was when he wanted to buy his stepfather's truck. However, rather than state that directly, he suggested he wanted to help his mother and stepfather financially by purchasing the truck and eliminating their car payment. Griffin also reported that he planned to sell his current vehicle to another resident. He offered to provide a loan to this resident interest-free. Griffin emphasized this resident was interested in purchasing his car, even though that was not the case. Griffin was also the resident's supervisor at work, which raised concerns that he could exert undue pressure on the resident to purchase the vehicle.

Griffin's therapist noted that he continued to show limited insight and identified his need for control as an issue, particularly in his relationship with his wife. His polygraph in February 2024 showed a significant reaction to the question, “ ‘Since your last polygraph, have you intentionally tried to deceive RF staff or someone from your treatment team?’ ” Griffin explained his reaction was due to staff agitating him. Griffin conveyed that when he heard the word “ ‘staff’ ” during the polygraph question, he became agitated, which elicited his significant reaction. Griffin had indicated that he received a write-up regarding accessing the internet through a hotspot, but it was later learned that he was not accessing the internet or the hotspot. He offered no other explanations for the polygraph result.

The State showed a pattern of lies and deception from Griffin over the preceding few years as well.

And then, while the matter was pending, Griffin was returned to Tier One. The State explained that during a random room check, staff found Griffin's prescription medication that had been prescribed a month earlier but was not listed on his medication log. The amount remaining in the bottle suggested he had not been taking it as prescribed. When questioned, Griffin gave conflicting explanations about medical providers advising him on dosage, but records showed he had not contacted the doctor's office since it was prescribed. He ultimately admitted he simply did not want to take the medication.

The State explained that after the medication incident, and in an effort to keep Griffin on Tier Three, the program gave him additional assignments intended to address transparency, but he was reportedly defiant and refused to complete them. As a result, counsel reported that the program determined Griffin should go back to Tier One because he had “missed something,” specifically the necessary skills of openness, honesty, and transparency.

Griffin's counsel confirmed this as a correct recitation of the facts.

5. Medical Compliance: Medically, Griffin followed through on several medical issues.

6. Financial Responsibility: Financially, Griffin demonstrated responsibility. He paid off his car loan. He continued to send monthly assistance to his wife.

7. Family Support: He has a consistent family support system.

8. Treatment Compliance: Griffin has attended all therapy sessions. But it was noted that Griffin was defiant about completing homework, and that he stated he was “ ‘not a child, not in school, not wanting to do this.’ ” As for his journal, he was not reporting any issues regarding honesty or transparency, which was the entire purpose of the journal. While on Tier Three, Step 1, Griffin believed he was being treated differently than others at that level. When reminded that his reduction to Step 1 was because of concerns about his lack of candor, including evidence that he accessed his supervisor's email account at work, he strongly denied it. He eventually outlined how he had met goals and revised his relapse prevention plan.

Some of his statements suggested oppositional attitudes toward the program and treatment. However, when asked about these attitudes, Griffin frequently provided answers that he believed others wanted to hear and denied such attitudes. When irritated or angry that his self-report would be independently verified, Griffin was reminded about the concerns about his history of dishonesty. The clinical and MiCo house teams viewed this issue as possibly exacerbating when Griffin has less supervision and more time in the community.

9. Physical Attraction to Children: Griffin identified his top three risk factors as babysitting, having any relationships with females who have minor children, and loneliness. When asked what he has done to address his history of being sexually attracted to minors, he stated, “ ‘it's not appropriate, but they're children—they can't think on that level and can't make those decisions and they cannot offer the kind of intimacy I'm looking for, which would be what a sexual relationship involves, not just physical intimacy, but emotional intimacy, and so, keeping that in mind, that has helped me to break that cycle.’ ” These comments do not reflect a stated lack of physical attraction to children. Rather, Griffin explained that he believes children cannot provide the type of emotional intimacy he now views as necessary to a sexual relationship. Thus, his comments focus on the perceived absence of emotional intimacy, not an express rejection of physical attraction to children. As a result, the comments do not preclude an interpretation that he remains physically attracted to children.

10. Participation in Court Proceedings and Commitments: Although the district court appointed an independent examiner, Griffin did not submit a report from that examination. Griffin elected not to appear by video for his annual review hearing before the district court.

11. Employment: Griffin does well at his job.

The most recent examination stated Griffin “continues to meet the definition of ‘a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense’ ” and “ ‘suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes it likely he will engage in repeated acts of sexual violence’ (per the DSM-5-TR).” Although Griffin bears the burden of proof, he has provided no evidence of change in these respects.

In conclusion, our de novo review of this evidence causes us to recognize that while Griffin has made some progress, there has been regression and a return to some of the unwanted behaviors. Even more problematic is his well-documented failure in the basic tenet of sex offender treatment—honesty in recognizing his deviant interests and counterproductive behaviors. The reports noted multiple examples in which Griffin failed to prioritize these critical treatment issues. As emphasized in the district court, transparency is fundamental to effective treatment and it also plays a critical role in interrupting the cycle of offending, since sexual offenses likely depend on secrecy and concealment. A lack of transparency can therefore reinforce patterns associated with offending, making openness essential to both treatment progress and risk reduction.

Ultimately, even a person of ordinary prudence viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Griffin would not reasonably believe that his mental abnormality or personality disorder had significantly changed so that he was considered safe to be placed in transitional release. Thus, he has not established the necessary probable cause, and no evidentiary hearing for transitional release was warranted.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: