People of the State of New York v. Holly Storm, Defendant. (2026)

This suppression motion requires the court to determine whether the People have met their burden to establish that the evidence obtained during defendant Holly Storm's January 23, 2026 DWI investigation and arrest was lawfully obtained. In doing so, the court must resolve three issues: whether the Trooper had probable cause to arrest the defendant even if the standardized field sobriety tests were not administered in strict accordance with National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) standards; whether the chemical breath test results must be suppressed because the Trooper did not provide full and accurate refusal warnings; and whether the defendant's statements were voluntary and preceded by adequate Miranda warnings. In addressing these issues, the court must assess whether the Trooper's on-scene observations, the defendant's involvement in a motor vehicle accident, and the subsequent interactions at the police barracks satisfy New York's standards for establishing probable cause, securing valid and voluntary consent to chemical testing, and ensuring that any statements made by defendant were obtained in compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards.

On or about January 23, 2026, the People charged defendant Holly Storm with driving while intoxicated (common law) (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]); operating a motor vehicle with .08 of one percent or more of alcohol in the person's blood (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [2]) and following too closely (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]). At her arraignment on February 5, 2026, she entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, defendant moved to suppress her statements, physical evidence, field sobriety tests and chemical breath test results and the People and defendant stipulated to a Huntley/Dunaway/Mapp hearing. The hearing was held on June 18, 2026, at which State Trooper Seaburg testified—who the court finds to be a credible and truthful witness. The Trooper's body worn audio/video camera footage was admitted into evidence at the hearing as People's Exhibit 1.

Trooper Seaburg testified that on January 23, 2026, he was dispatched to a reported two-car motor vehicle collision on Delaware Turnpike in Clarksville, New York. Upon arriving at the scene, the Trooper observed two cars present: a white Kia SUV and a blue four door Ford sedan. Defendant Holly Storm was present at the scene, and she identified herself as the operator of the Kia SUV. People's Exhibit 1 in evidence plainly shows damage to the blue Ford sedan and Ms. Storm states on the body camera footage in evidence that she ran into that vehicle. She reported to the Trooper that she had been driving to her sister's home for her birthday gathering when the crash occurred.

When speaking with the defendant, Trooper Seaburg immediately noted indicia of intoxication: defendant's eyes appeared watery; defendant's eyes appeared glassy; and she emitted an odor of alcohol. The Trooper testified that these observations were made before any sobriety field testing and based on his training and experience as a New York State Trooper trained in DWI detection.

The Trooper administered three standardized field sobriety tests (the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-leg stand test), all of which the defendant failed. A preliminary breath test (PBT) administered roadside produced a positive result for alcohol, at which point the Trooper placed defendant under arrest for suspected driving while intoxicated.

Defendant was transported to the State Police barracks, where, prior to questioning, the Trooper read Ms. Storm her initial DWI warnings and Miranda rights verbatim from a printed

card (People's Exhibit 2).¹ Defendant stated that she understood her rights and did not invoke her right to counsel. Then Trooper Seaburg requested that she submit to a chemical breath test (CBT). The Trooper testified that defendant agreed to take the test. The defendant asked a question about the consequences of refusing to take the test but did not refuse to take it. In response to the question, the Trooper stated that a refusal could result in "losing your license for a year"—an incomplete description of the process but not a misstatement of the ultimate consequence of a refusal.

Defendant contends that the People failed to establish probable cause for the arrest because the field sobriety tests were not administered in a manner consistent with the standards promulgated by the NHTSA. Without the field sobriety test results, defendant maintains there were insufficient indicia of intoxication to establish probable cause.² Defendant also contends that the results of the CBT should be suppressed because the Trooper did not read the entirety of the DWI refusal warning, including the consequences of refusing to take the test. To the extent that the Trooper did provide the defendant with information concerning the consequences of her refusal to take the test (that she would automatically lose her license for a year), such information was inaccurate because the only automatic result of her refusal to take the test would be a temporary 15-day suspension of her license at arraignment.

The People oppose the relief requested by the defendant. They contend that, even if the results of the field sobriety tests are suppressed, there was probable cause for the arrest of the defendant based on indicators of intoxication such as her watery eyes, her glassy eyes, and the odor of alcohol emanating from her. The People further maintain that the results of the CBT should not be suppressed because the Trooper was not required to read defendant the full refusal warning because she never refused the CBT. Finally, the People contend that defendant's statements should not be suppressed because they were voluntary.

On a motion to suppress evidence claimed to have been unlawfully obtained, the People have the initial burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]). To establish probable cause for an arrest of an individual for driving while intoxicated, "[t]he standard to be followed is that it is more probable than not that defendant is actually impaired" (People v Vandover, 20 NY3d 235, 239 [2012]). "Probable cause [to arrest] does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed . . ." (People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985] [Simons, J.]). In the context of a DWI arrest, the presence or absence of one or more indicia of intoxication is not determinative because a probable cause determination is based on "the totality of the circumstances" (People v Mojica, 62 AD3d 100, 114 [2d Dept 2009]). Probable cause to arrest "need not always be premised upon the performance of field sobriety tests or any specific number of such tests" (People v Wallgren, 94 AD3d 1339, 1341 [3d Dept 2012]; People v Kowalski, 291 AD2d 669, 670-671 [3d Dept 2002]). In short, the absence of field sobriety test results does not diminish the strength of the remaining proof of intoxication.

The People have established probable cause for the defendant's arrest. The Trooper testified that Ms. Storm had glassy and watery eyes and that she emanated the odor of alcohol. Critically, the finding of probable cause is also supported here by virtue of defendant's involvement in a car accident. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (1) (a) expressly authorizes warrantless arrest for violations of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 when coupled with an accident, even when the police officer did not witness the accident, so long as indicia of impairment by alcohol are present. Further, the fact of an accident may be viewed as circumstantially suggesting diminished motor control or impaired driving judgment by reason of alcohol consumption, without regard to proof of fault (People v Zoghby, 85 Misc 3d 136[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50496[U], *3 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2025]; People v Padmore, 44 Misc 3d 129[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50988[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]). There is undisputed evidence that defendant was the operator of one of the cars involved in a two-car accident. On the Trooper's body camera footage Ms. Storm states that her vehicle struck the blue Ford sedan. This evidence together with the Trooper's direct observations of indicia of impairment by alcohol establish probable cause for the arrest.

The defendant points to the fact that there was testimony concerning the improper administration of three pre-arrest standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs).³ The Trooper acknowledged that the SFSTs have standardized instructions, grading procedures and administration steps. Defendant contends that in administering the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, the walk-and-turn test and the one leg stand test the Trooper admitted that he deviated from standardized test procedures, thereby compromising the validity of the tests. Even assuming deviation from the standardized instructions occurred, however, suppression is not warranted.⁴

New York law does not require the SFSTs to be administered in strict compliance with NHTSA standards for them to be considered at the probable cause stage of the case—probable cause may exist even when the SFSTs are improperly administered if there is other probative evidence of intoxication (People v Wallgren, supra). Therefore, the Trooper's observations, the motor vehicle accident and defendant's statements at the accident scene provide sufficient probable cause. Any alleged irregularities in administration of the SFSTs need not be resolved at the suppression stage because the exclusion of the SFST test results would not alter the probable cause determination.

Turning to the CBT results, defendant contends that the test results should be suppressed because the Trooper failed to read the full refusal warning. Specifically, according to defendant, the Trooper should have stated that "a refusal will result in the immediate suspension and subsequent revocation of the driver's license." Instead, in response to her question about the consequences of a refusal, he stated that "you will lose your license for a year."

The court denies the request to suppress the CBT results. Under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2) refusal warnings must be given only if defendant declines to take the CBT (People v. Whelan, 165 AD2d 313 [2d Dept 1991]). As stated by the Court of Appeals, "law enforcement authorities have developed a standardized verbal warning of the consequences of refusal to take the test" and "[t]he duty to give the warning is triggered if the motorist is asked to take a chemical test and declines to do so" (People v Smith, 18 NY3d 544, 548-549 [2012]). In determining whether the defendant's words or actions constitute a refusal to submit to a CBT, courts must view defendant's actions considering all surrounding circumstances (People v Warren, 160 AD3d 1132 [3d Dept 2018]). There is no requirement that the defendant's consent be written or expressed verbally in any specific manner. Here, Trooper Seaburg credibly testified more than once that Ms. Storm agreed to take the CBT.

Indeed, the credible proof at the hearing establishes that defendant did not refuse to take the CBT; indeed, she consented to take the test at the first request of the Trooper ⁵ . Although the Trooper's verbal explanation of the consequence of the refusal was incomplete, it did not constitute coercion or misrepresentation. After giving consent, defendant asked a question; the Trooper provided an answer; and defendant agreed to proceed with the testing. This does not amount to a refusal to take the test nor is there evidence of coerced consent.

Regarding the voluntariness of the defendant's statements to law enforcement, there is no basis for suppression under People v Huntley (15 NY2d 72 [1965]). In this case, all the statements made roadside by defendant occurred prior to her arrest—they were spontaneous and not the product of custodial interrogation (People v Zapata, 41 AD3d 109, 110 [1st Dept 2007]). Any statements made by defendant on the audio of the Trooper's body camera are admissible as they were voluntary and not the product of custodial interrogation. Trooper Seaburg testified that once he placed her under arrest and transported her to the station, he read defendant her Miranda rights from his Miranda card, a copy of which was admitted into evidence (People' s Exhibit 2). Following the reading of the Miranda card, the defendant then agreed to speak with law enforcement. At no time did she indicate an unwillingness to speak with the Trooper, nor did she invoke her right to counsel.

Under People v Huntley, suppression is not warranted where statements are voluntary, non-coerced and preceded by proper warnings. The People have met their burden of demonstrating the legality of the police conduct throughout the encounter. The observations made at the scene of the accident, defendant's spontaneous admissions and the physical indicators of intoxication establish probable cause under New York law. The alleged irregularities in SFST administration, even if true, do not vitiate probable cause. Defendant's consent to the chemical breath test was voluntary, and the Trooper was not required to issue refusal warnings where no refusal occurred. Defendant's statements were lawfully obtained and are admissible.

All other requests for relief not specifically addressed above are hereby denied. defendant has the right to be personally present at all appearances in this action. Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED, that defendant's suppression motion is in all respects DENIED.

Dated: 8/25/26

David J. Wukitsch, Town Justice

Papers Considered:

1. Body Warn Camera Footage-People's Exhibit 1

2. Miranda/DWI Warning Card-People's Exhibit 2

3. Transcript of Suppression Hearing

4. People's Letter Brief

5. Defendant's Letter Brief

FOOTNOTES

1.   The video camera footage confirms that the Trooper advised Ms. Storm that she was under arrest for DWI. Reading from the card admitted in evidence as People's Exhibit 2, he then asked her if she would submit to a chemical test for the purpose of determining the alcohol and/or drug content of her blood. She agreed to take the test. The Trooper also read the defendant her Miranda warnings directly from the same card.

2.   For example, defendant points out that it was winter and a person's eyes may appear watery due to the cold.

3.   For example, defendant contends that in administering the walk-and-turn test the Trooper artificially extended the instructional phase of the test causing the defendant to (a) start to soon, and (b) fail to maintain balance. Defendant also maintains that the body worn camera footage shows that she did not completely step off the line on two occasions in her first nine steps for that clue to be indicated. As to the one-leg stand test, defendant argues that the failed result should be excluded because the Trooper interrupted the test mid-performance to remind defendant of one of the instructions. The reminder is not part of the standardized protocol and, according to defense counsel, it caused his client to put her foot down and sway.

4.   Any deviations from the standards governing the administration of the field sobriety tests are proper subjects for cross examination at trial.

5.   The Trooper testified that Ms. Storm indicated she would take the test and that "she shrugged her shoulders yeah." The video camera footage introduced as People's Exhibit 2 in evidence confirms that she agreed to take the test.

David J. Wukitsch, J.