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The People of the State of New York v. Michelle Pineiro, Defendant.
The defendant is charged by information with violating Agriculture & Markets Law § 353 (overdriving, torturing, and injuring animals; failure to provide proper sustenance), a class A misdemeanor. By notice of motion 1 dated July 29, 2026, supported by an affirmation of Rosalyn Akalonu, Esq., of same date, the defendant seeks various relief, including: dismissal of the information on the ground that AML § 353 is unconstitutionally vague; dismissal of the information for facial insufficiency; severance; and the suppression of statement testimony. The People oppose the motion by affirmation of Assistant District Attorney Chelsea Paglia, dated August 28, 2026. Ms. Akalonu submitted a reply affirmation dated September 8, 2026. In ruling upon the defendant's motion, the Court has read and considered the aforementioned papers and holds as follows:
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION
The defendant moves for dismissal of the information because she alleges it is: (i) unconstitutionally vague; and/or (ii) facially insufficient. The People oppose both bases for the requested relief.
In the factual portion of the information, East Fishkill Police Officer Berisha alleges, in pertinent part, that:
"Said defendant, while located at 313 Third Road, in the Town of East Fishkill, County of Dutchess, State of New York, did knowingly deprive her animal, that being a one-year-old mixed breed female dog named "Carmela," with the necessary sustenance, food or drink, resulting in the dog to suffer from starvation, become emaciated and ultimately die from cachexia, which is the severe, involuntary loss of weight, muscle mass or fat. Additionally, in October of 2025, after being advised by a veterinary clinic to seek further medical attention at an animal hospital, the defendant failed to do so, even though the dog continued to exhibit obvious signs of medical issues.
Attached to the information is a supporting deposition from Maria Luciano, a veterinary technician at Hudson Valley Animal Rescue, affirmed on March 17, 2026. In the deposition, Ms. Luciano states, in pertinent part:
On February 26, 2026, at about 9:47AM, our office received a call from a woman on the phone reporting that her one-year-old dog was deceased. When asked about the cause, the female on the phone stated the dog has a "bad belly" and may have parvo which is a contagious disease between animals. The receptionist informed the female that when she arrived at our facility to stay in the parking lot and to call us back.
At about 12:33PM, the female had called back our facility to inform us she was in the parking lot. The receptionist walked out to make contact with the female who was later identified as Samara Pineiro (DOB: XX/XX/2006). Samara stated that the dogs name was Carmela and her mom, Michelle Pineiro (DOB: XX/XX/1982) was the owner. The receptionist observed the dog in the back seat and was mortified of the dog's condition. The dog was brought in a crate soiled with urine and feces. The dog was severely emaciated, bones were visible, and the dog's eyes were sunk in. The receptionist then brought this to my attention and so I went to inquire with Samara further to understand the circumstances surrounding the dog's death.
Samara informed me that she had taken the dog to Vetco which is a veterinarian inside the store Petco about 1 month ago. Samara stated the dog had diarrhea and was told by Vetco that the dog required evaluation by a full-service veterinary hospital. Samara told me that the dog was rescued from Happy Life Animal Rescue in the fall of 2025 which is located in Pawling NY. I then went to remove the dog from the carrier which was a 24-inch crate heavily soiled with feces and urine. I observed the dog to be completely emaciated. I asked Samara a second time about the circumstances of the dog's passing and she stated that the dog has experienced diarrhea and did not seek additional veterinary care.
Section 353 of the Agriculture and Markets Law provides that:
A person who overdrives, overloads, tortures or cruelly beats or unjustifiably injures, maims, mutilates or kills any animal, whether wild or tame, and whether belonging to himself or to another, or deprives any animal of necessary sustenance, food or drink, or neglects or refuses to furnish it such sustenance or drink, or causes, procures or permits any animal to be overdriven, overloaded, tortured, cruelly beaten, or unjustifiably injured, maimed, mutilated or killed, or to be deprived of necessary food or drink, or who wilfully sets on foot, instigates, engages in, or in any way furthers any act of cruelty to any animal, or any act tending to produce such cruelty, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and for purposes of paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 160.10 of the criminal procedure law, shall be treated as a misdemeanor defined in the penal law.
a. Motion to Dismiss for Unconstitutional Vagueness
The defendant contends that the information should be dismissed because AML § 353 is unconstitutionally vague. More specifically, she asserts, relying on the trial court decision in People v. Arroyo, 3 Misc 3d 668 [Crim Ct, Kings County, 2004]), that the statute is vague on its face because the phrase "necessary sustenance" is not sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that this phrase includes veterinary care (see Akalonu Aff, ¶9). Additionally, she argues that the statute is vague as applied to her because the word "sustenance" should not include failure to provide veterinary care (id. at ¶21).
In addressing vagueness challenges, courts of this state have developed a two-part test. First, "[t]o ensure that no person is punished for conduct not reasonably understood to be prohibited, the court must determine whether the statute in question is 'sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute' " (People v. Stuart, 100 NY2d 412, 420 [2003], quoting People v. Nelson, 69 NY2d 302, 307 [1987). "Second, the court must determine whether the enactment provides officials with clear standards for enforcement" (id.; see also People v. Bright, 71 NY2d 376, 382 [1988] ["the statute must not be written in such a manner as to permit or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement"]).
A defendant may challenge a statute as unconstitutionally vague on its face, as applied to the defendant, or both (id. at 421). "[A]n as-applied challenge calls on the court to consider whether a statute can be constitutionally applied to the defendant under the facts of the case" (id., citing People v. Parker, 41 NY2d 21, 24 [1976]). "By contrast, a facial challenge requires the court to examine the words of the statute on a cold page and without reference to the defendant's conduct" (id.). "In pursuing a facial challenge, the defendant must carry the heavy burden of showing that the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its applications" (id., internal quotation marks and citations omitted [emphasis in original]). "Because facial challenges to statutes are generally disfavored and legislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, a court's task when presented with both a facial and as-applied argument is first to decide whether the assailed statute is impermissibly vague as applied to the defendant (id., internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "If it is not and the statute provides the defendant with adequate notice and the police with clear criteria, that is the end of the matter" (id.).
The defendant's motion to dismiss for vagueness is flawed in two respects. First, it fails to address authority from the Appellate Term, Second Department, holding that the term "sustenance," as set forth in the statute, has been held to "include veterinary care and adequate shelter to maintain the dog's health and comfort" (see People v. Mahoney, 9 Misc 3d 101, 103 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists, 2005], lv app denied 5 NY3d 854 [2005]; see also People v. Roth, 73 Misc 3d 147(A), *1 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists, 2021]; People v. Richardson, 15 Misc 3d 138(A), *1 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists, 2007]). In 2025, the Court of Appeals decided the case of People v. Farrell (44 NY3d 1), a case heavily relied upon by defendant in her motion. Although the issue of whether "sustenance" under AML § 353 encompasses veterinary care was briefed by the parties in the case, the Court of Appeals decided the appeal without addressing that issue (id. at 6). As such, the aforementioned Appellate Term authority remains binding upon this Court.
In any event, as will be discussed in the section of this Decision and Order addressing the facial sufficiency of the information (infra), the allegations in the information and supporting deposition provide reasonable cause to believe that defendant violated AML § 353 by failing to provide necessary sustenance beyond veterinary care — namely food and water - resulting in the dog's emaciated condition (see People v. Neira, 55 Misc 3d 149[A], *2 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists, 2017]).
Second, the Court finds that the defendant's reliance on People v. Arroyo (3 Misc 3d 668 [Sup Ct, Kings Cty, 2004]) is misplaced as Arroyo is distinguishable from the case at bar in material respects. In Arroyo, the court held that the provision of AML § 353 prohibiting depriving an animal of "necessary sustenance" was vague as applied to defendant. In that case, unlike here, the defendant refused to provide medical care to his dog, which was terminally ill with an ulcerated mammary tumor, due to limited resources and because "he was familiar with cancer because a relative had had cancer and painful chemotherapy and stated that he believed that the dog should live out her life without intervention" (id. at 670). The Arroyo court found it significant that the defendant's choice to withhold medical treatment was "not part of a pattern of neglect," and noted that the defendant's other animals were permitted to remain with him (id. at 679). Here, the information, supplemented by the supporting deposition, alleges the deprivation of food and drink, resulting in the dog becoming emaciated and suffering from starvation. It is in the context of this alleged neglect that the defendant is alleged to have failed to seek medical care for the dog, despite being advised by a veterinary clinic to do so. These factual circumstances are strikingly different from those in Arroyo.
The decision in Arroyo was also made on a motion to dismiss for unconstitutional vagueness; however, unlike in the case at bar, the decision in Arroyo followed a Huntley hearing and was largely based on the evidence adduced at that hearing, including defendant's moral justifications for inaction (see People v. Curcio, 22 Misc 3d 907, 912 [Crim Ct, Kings County, 2008]; see also People v. Torres, 46 Misc 3d 1222(A), *3 [City Court, City of Albany, 2015]).
Based upon the foregoing, defendant has failed to meet her high burden of demonstrating that AML § 353 is vague as applied to her. Defendant was "amply informed of the prohibited activity" (People v. Bunt, 118 Misc 2d 904, 910 [Justice Court, Town of Rhinebeck, 1983] [finding AML § 353 "constitutional, although [ ] not well drafted"]), and she has not shown that the statute was arbitrarily enforced by the police with regard to her conduct. Moreover, because defendant has failed to show that AML 353 is vague as applied to her, the Court need not consider whether the statute is facially vague in all applications (Stuart, 100 NY2d at 422-423; Nelson, 69 NY2d at 308 ["[T]he court will not strain to imagine marginal situations in which the application of the statute is not so clear"]; Curcio, 22 Misc 3d at 918).
Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss based upon unconstitutional vagueness is denied.
b. Motion to Dismiss for Facial Insufficiency
The defendant also moves to dismiss the information for facial insufficiency. In support thereof, she contends that the information is facially insufficient for the following reasons: (i) the word "sustenance" is improperly expanded beyond its ordinary statutory meaning of "food and drink"; and (ii) the information and supporting deposition(s) attached thereto do not allege non-hearsay facts establishing every element of the charged offense. More specifically, she argues that the arresting officer and the veterinary technician, as laypersons, lack the expert qualifications required to make diagnoses (see Akalonu Aff, ¶40). In opposition 2 , the People argue that the information, supplemented by the supporting deposition of Ms. Luciano, sets forth a facially sufficient basis for the AML § 353 charge under two independent theories: (1) defendant's failure to provide necessary sustenance, including food and water, resulting in the dog's emaciated condition; and (2) defendant's failure to obtain veterinary care despite being on notice that such care was advised and necessary (see Paglia Aff, ¶20).
"A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution" (Farrell, 44 NY3d at 5, citing People v. Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]). "An information serves the same role in a misdemeanor prosecution as a grand jury indictment does in a felony case: it ensures that a legally sufficient case can be made against the defendant" (People v. Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014], citing People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 138-139 [1987]). An information is sufficient on its face when it: (1) substantially conforms to the requirements of CPL § 100.15; (2) sets forth allegations which "provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged;" and (3) contains non-hearsay allegations which "establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (CPL § 100.40[1]; Alejandro, 70NY2d at 136-137). "[A] non-hearsay requirement is met so long as the allegation would be admissible under some hearsay rule exception" (People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 361 [2000]), and admissions of a defendant are an exception to the rule against hearsay.
As discussed supra, the defendant's argument that the statutory phrase "necessary sustenance" does not extend to veterinary or medical care is unavailing (Mahoney, 9 Misc 3d at 103; Roth, 73 Misc 3d at *1; Richardson, 15 Misc 3d at *1).
The defendant correctly contends, however, that Officer Berisha's statement in the information that the dog died from cachexia is hearsay. Officer Berisha has no first-hand knowledge of this, or the expertise required to make this type of veterinary-medical diagnosis. Additionally, Ms. Luciano, as a veterinary technician, is not qualified to make a veterinary-medical diagnosis (see Education Law §§ 6701, 6702). The same deficiency applies to any statement of co-defendant Samara Pineiro about the dog having suffered from "parvo." However, excising these hearsay statements (see People v. Kelly, 39 Misc 3d 137[A], *1 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists, 2012] ["The deposition was sufficient to convert the complaint to an information notwithstanding the superfluous hearsay statements contained therein"]; see also People v. Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1234[A], *2 [Crim Ct, Bronx County, 2025] [" uncured hearsay which is superfluous, presents no barrier to converting a complaint into an information"]; People v. Powell, 42 Misc 3d 1203[A], *2 [Crim Ct, Kings County, 2015] ["But even if the unsworn witnesses' statements were hearsay, their presence in the superseding information does not vitiate the non-hearsay character of the remaining allegations"]), the remaining allegations in the information and supporting deposition establish the facial sufficiency of the information.
Ms. Luciano observed the dog dead inside of the 24-inch crate in which co-defendant Samara Pineiro had transported it to the facility. She described the crate as "heavily soiled with feces and urine." She described the dog as "completely emaciated." Elsewhere in her deposition, Ms. Luciano expanded on her use of the word of emaciated by noting that: "bones were visible, and the dog's eyes were sunk in." The Court disagrees with defendant's claim that Ms. Luciano's use of the word "emaciation" amounted to a medical diagnosis (see Akalonu Reply Aff, ¶36). The Court finds "emaciated" to simply be a description of the dog's physical condition, requiring no scientific or medical training to make, and which is within the basis of knowledge of any lay witness.
In addition to Ms. Luciano's observations of the deceased dog's physical condition, her deposition includes several admissions made by co-defendant Samara Pineiro (defendant's daughter) which may be used against defendant in determining the facial sufficiency of the information (see People v. Leyva, 19 Misc 3d 498, 502-503 [Crim Court, New York County, 2008] [trial court found that the rule enunciated in Bruton v. US (391 US 123) as it applies to admitting a co-defendant's statement at trial does not bar its use in an information]). The supporting deposition indicates that co-defendant Samara Pineiro stated: "the dog's name was Carmela and her mom, Michelle Pineiro, is the owner." Ms. Luciano's supporting deposition further states that: "Samara informed me that she had taken the dog to Vetco which is a veterinarian inside the store Petco about 1 month ago. Samara stated the dog had diarrhea and was told by Vetco that the dog required evaluation by a full-service veterinary hospital." When Ms. Luciano again asked Samara about the circumstances of the dog's death, Samara stated that "the dog has experienced diarrhea and did not seek additional veterinary care."
The defendant's reliance on Farrell does not alter the Court's conclusion about the sufficiency of the information. In Farrell, the accusatory instrument charged a violation of AML § 353 for deprivation of sustenance for failure to provide necessary veterinary care. The accusatory instrument alleged that a dog named Mogley suffered from spondylosis, which it did not define, but which it asserted caused the dog pain and suffering (Farrell, 44 NY2d at 6). It further stated that the dog had a mass on its spine near its heart (id.). The Court of Appeals found that:
the instrument fails to allege how the investigator became aware of these conditions and there is no corresponding veterinary diagnosis attached to the instrument or assertion that a veterinarian examined Mogley. Moreover, the instrument does not indicate whether these afflictions were visible to the naked eye, and therefore we cannot infer from these allegations that the investigator personally observed them (id.).
The Court held that these hearsay allegations were insufficient to support the charge (id.). Additionally, the Court held that the observation of an investigator that the dog was "infested with fleas" was not sufficient to charge defendant with a deprivation of sustenance for failure to provide necessary veterinary care (id. at pp 6-7).
The instant matter is distinguishable from Farrell. The Farrell Court made clear that an accusatory instrument charging a violation of AML § 353 was not required to include documentation from a veterinarian, "especially in those cases where the conditions are visible or palpable" (id. at 7). As discussed supra, the non-hearsay allegations in the supporting deposition — aside from any unsupported statements about veterinary-medical diagnoses — are significantly more compelling than the investigator's observations as set forth in the information in Farrell. Here, the dog was dead when co-defendant Samara Pineiro brought it to Hudson Valley Animal Rescue. Ms. Luciano observed the dog, inside of a cage covered in urine and feces, to be completely emaciated with visible bones and sunken eyes. These observations, coupled with co-defendant Samara Pineiro's admissions, are sufficient to establish every element of the charged offense (see People v. Jean-Baptiste, 69 Misc 3d 128[A] [NY Sup App Term, 2020], lv app denied 36 NY3d 973 [2020]; see also People v. King, 84 Misc 3d 126[A] [App Term, 1st Dept, 2024], lv app denied 43 NY3d 1009 [2025]; People v. Vega, 77 Misc 3d 136[A] [App Term, 2nd, 11th, & 13th Jud Dists, 2022], lv app denied 39 NY3d 1157 [2023]; Roth, 73 Misc 3d at *1). Put another way, the sufficiency of the information does not depend upon the veterinary-medical diagnosis of cachexia; rather, the remaining non-hearsay allegations demonstrate the defendant's "failure to feed an animal and/or [ ] seek medical care when clear, objective signs are present that the animal requires such medical care" (Neira, 55 Misc 3d at *4).
While perhaps inartfully drafted, the information and supporting deposition contain allegations which, if true, establish every element of the charged offense and supply defendant "with sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy" (Roth, 73 Misc 3d at *2 [citing People v. Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]; Casey, 95 NY2d at 366). Based upon the foregoing, the defendant's motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency is denied.
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY COMPLIANCE
The defendant's motion for discovery is granted solely to the extent that the People are directed to permit the defendant to discover, inspect, copy, photograph, and test all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecutor's direction or control pursuant to CPL Article 245. The People are reminded of their continuing duty to disclose discoverable material (CPL § 245.60).
MOTION FOR SEVERANCE
The defendant moves to sever her trial from that of her co-defendant, Samara Pineiro (see East Fishkill Case No. 26030546). In support of the motion, the defendant claims that a joint trial would be prejudicial to the defendant because the prosecution will rely on inculpatory statements made by the co-defendant.
The motion for severance is denied, without prejudice, as premature. This case is still in the early pretrial stages. At this point, each defendant's trial strategy is unclear, and the Court anticipates that the defendants will not settle on theories of defense until after discovery is completed, pretrial motions are adjudicated, and defense counsel has conducted additional investigation. Additionally, the Court has not yet conducted a Huntley hearing to determine whether the co-defendant's statement will be admissible at trial. For these reasons, the motion for severance is denied, without prejudice to renewal after all pre-trial hearings have been completed.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT TESTIMONY
The defendant's motion to suppress statements alleged to have been made as contained in the CPL § 710.30 notice served by the People is granted solely to the extent that a Huntley hearing will be held prior to trial (CPL§ 710.60[4]; People v. Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]).
MOTION FOR SANDOVAL HEARING
The Court grants the defendant's motion for a Sandoval hearing to the extent that a hearing is ordered which will be held immediately prior to trial to determine which, if any, bad acts or convictions may be used as impeachment in the event that the defendant elects to testify at trial (People v. Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]). The District Attorney has provided the defendant's attorney with a copy of the defendant's Division of Criminal Justice Services Summary Case History. The Court orders the District Attorney to disclose to the defendant's attorney any and all acts upon which it intends to impeach the defendant, including without limitation all prior instances of the defendant's alleged uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct (see CPL § 245.20[3]).
MOLINEUX / VENTIMIGLIA HEARING
Should the People elect to attempt to use evidence of the defendant's prior uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct on their direct case, the Court will hold a Molineux/Ventimiglia hearing immediately prior to commencement of trial
BRADY MATERIAL
The defendant's motion to be provided with all Brady material is granted to the extent that the People shall provide the defendant with any evidence in their possession or control which is favorable to him as provided in Brady v. Maryland (373 US 83 [1963]) and United States v. Bagley (473 US 667 [1985]). The People are reminded of their continuing obligation pursuant to Brady with respect to the delivery of any materials now in their possession and/or control or which may hereafter come into their possession and/or control or which may tend to exculpate the defendant, or which is otherwise favorable to the defendant. This obligation includes any "evidence of a material nature favorable to the defense which, if disclosed, could affect the ultimate decision on a suppression motion" (People v. Williams, 7 NY3d 15, 19 [2006], quoting People v. Geaslen, 54 NY2d 510 [1981]).
LEAVE TO FILE ADDITIONAL MOTIONS
The defendant's request for leave to file additional motions is granted to the extent that the defendant may file any motion that the defendant deems fit within the forty-five (45) day limit set forth in CPL § 255.20(1). Subsequent to the forty-five (45) day limit, the defendant may make further motions only to the extent permitted by CPL § 255.20(3).
Any requests for relief not specifically addressed herein are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 28, 2026
Hopewell Junction, New York
BRIAN M. RUDNER
TOWN JUSTICE
FOOTNOTES
1. Because the defendant has challenged the constitutionality of AML § 353 in this action in which New York State is not a party, she properly provided notice to the Office of the Attorney General of her challenge (see CPLR § 1012[b]). The Attorney General has not intervened or otherwise taken any action with regard to the defendant's motion.
2. In opposition to the motion and in support of their argument that the information is facially sufficient, the People also submit an Anatomic Pathology Report from Cornell University's College of Veterinary Medicine (Paglia Aff, Ex. B) and two 710.30 statement notices (Paglia Aff, Exs. D-E). The Court has not considered these exhibits in determining the facial sufficiency of the information as the Court must limit its analysis to the four corners of the information and any supporting deposition appended thereto (see People v. Slade, 37 NY3d 127 [2021]).
Brian M. Rudner, J.
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Docket No: Case No. 26030545
Decided: October 28, 2026
Court: Justice Court, New York,
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