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The People of the State of New York v. Samara L. Pineiro, Defendant.
The defendant is charged by information with violating Agriculture & Markets Law § 353 (overdriving, torturing, and injuring animals; failure to provide proper sustenance), a class A misdemeanor. By notice of motion dated July 28, 2026, supported by an affirmation of Claire Frink, Esq., of same date, the defendant seeks various relief, including: dismissal of the information for facial insufficiency; dismissal of the information in the interest of justice; and the preclusion and/or suppression of statement testimony. The People oppose the motion by affirmation of Assistant District Attorney Chelsea Paglia, dated August 28, 2026. In ruling upon the defendant's motion, the Court has read and considered the aforementioned papers and holds as follows:
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION
The defendant moves for dismissal of the information on two grounds: (i) because it is facially insufficient; and/or (ii) because the interest of justice warrants dismissal (CPL § 170.40). The People oppose both bases for the requested relief.
In the factual portion of the information, East Fishkill Police Officer Berisha alleges, in pertinent part, that:
"Said defendant, while located at 313 Third Road, in the Town of East Fishkill, County of Dutchess, State of New York, did knowingly deprive her animal, that being a one-year-old mixed breed female dog named "Carmela," with the necessary sustenance, food or drink, resulting in the dog to suffer from starvation, become emaciated and ultimately die from cachexia, which is the severe, involuntary loss of weight, muscle mass or fat. Additionally, in October of 2025, after being advised by a veterinary clinic to seek further medical attention at an animal hospital, the defendant failed to do so, even though the dog continued to exhibit obvious signs of medical issues.
Attached to the information is a supporting deposition from Maria Luciano, a veterinary technician at Hudson Valley Animal Rescue, affirmed on March 17, 2026. In the deposition, Ms. Luciano states, in pertinent part:
On February 26, 2026, at about 9:47AM, our office received a call from a woman on the phone reporting that her one-year-old dog was deceased. When asked about the cause, the female on the phone stated the dog has a "bad belly" and may have parvo which is a contagious disease between animals. The receptionist informed the female that when she arrived at our facility to stay in the parking lot and to call us back.
At about 12:33PM, the female had called back our facility to inform us she was in the parking lot. The receptionist walked out to make contact with the female who was later identified as Samara Pineiro (DOB: XX/XX/2006). Samara stated that the dogs name was Carmela and her mom, Michelle Pineiro (DOB: XX/XX/1982) was the owner. The receptionist observed the dog in the back seat and was mortified of the dog's condition. The dog was brought in a crate soiled with urine and feces. The dog was severely emaciated, bones were visible, and the dog's eyes were sunk in. The receptionist then brought this to my attention and so I went to inquire with Samara further to understand the circumstances surrounding the dog's death.
Samara informed me that she had taken the dog to Vetco which is a veterinarian inside the store Petco about 1 month ago. Samara stated the dog had diarrhea and was told by Vetco that the dog required evaluation by a full-service veterinary hospital. Samara told me that the dog was rescued from Happy Life Animal Rescue in the fall of 2025 which is located in Pawling NY. I then went to remove the dog from the carrier which was a 24-inch crate heavily soiled with feces and urine. I observed the dog to be completely emaciated. I asked Samara a second time about the circumstances of the dog's passing and she stated that the dog has experienced diarrhea and did not seek additional veterinary care.
Section 353 of the Agriculture and Markets Law provides that:
A person who overdrives, overloads, tortures or cruelly beats or unjustifiably injures, maims, mutilates or kills any animal, whether wild or tame, and whether belonging to himself or to another, or deprives any animal of necessary sustenance, food or drink, or neglects or refuses to furnish it such sustenance or drink, or causes, procures or permits any animal to be overdriven, overloaded, tortured, cruelly beaten, or unjustifiably injured, maimed, mutilated or killed, or to be deprived of necessary food or drink, or who wilfully sets on foot, instigates, engages in, or in any way furthers any act of cruelty to any animal, or any act tending to produce such cruelty, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and for purposes of paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 160.10 of the criminal procedure law, shall be treated as a misdemeanor defined in the penal law.
a. Motion to Dismiss for Facial Insufficiency
The defendant moves to dismiss the information for facial insufficiency. In support thereof, she contends that the information is facially insufficient because neither it nor the supporting deposition appended thereto contain sufficient non-hearsay allegations to establish, if true, every element of the offense charged. The People oppose the requested relief.
"A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution" (People v. Farrell, 44 NY3d 1, 5 [2025], citing People v. Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]). "An information serves the same role in a misdemeanor prosecution as a grand jury indictment does in a felony case: it ensures that a legally sufficient case can be made against the defendant" (People v. Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014], citing People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 138-139 [1987]). An information is sufficient on its face when it: (1) substantially conforms to the requirements of CPL § 100.15; (2) sets forth allegations which "provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged;" and (3) contains non-hearsay allegations which "establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (CPL § 100.40[1]; Alejandro, 70 NY2d at 136-137). "[A] non-hearsay requirement is met so long as the allegation would be admissible under some hearsay rule exception" (People v. Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 361 [2000]), and admissions of a defendant are an exception to the rule against hearsay.
The defendant correctly contends that there are hearsay allegations in the information signed by Officer Berisha and the supporting deposition of Ms. Luciano. Officer Berisha's statement in the information that the dog died from cachexia is hearsay. Officer Berisha has no first-hand knowledge of this, or the expertise required to make this type of veterinary-medical diagnosis. Additionally, Ms. Luciano, as veterinary technician, is not qualified to make a veterinary-medical diagnosis (see Education Law §§ 6701, 6702). However, excising these hearsay statements (see People v. Kelly, 39 Misc 3d 137[A], *1 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists, 2012] ["The deposition was sufficient to convert the complaint to an information notwithstanding the superfluous hearsay statements contained therein"]; see also People v. Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1234[A], *2 [Crim Ct, Bronx County, 2025] [" uncured hearsay which is superfluous, presents no barrier to converting a complaint into an information"]; People v. Powell, 42 Misc 3d 1203[A], *2 [Crim Ct, Kings County, 2015] ["But even if the unsworn witnesses' statements were hearsay, their presence in the superseding information does not vitiate the non-hearsay character of the remaining allegations"]), the remaining allegations in the information and supporting deposition establish the facial sufficiency of the information.
Contrary to defendant's contention (see Frink Aff, ¶11), Ms. Luciano's supporting deposition does contain personal observations of the dog from which it could be inferred that defendant deprived the dog of necessary sustenance. Ms. Luciano observed the dog dead inside of the 24-inch crate in which the defendant had transported it to the facility. She described the crate as "heavily soiled with feces and urine." She described the dog as "completely emaciated." Elsewhere in her deposition, Ms. Luciano expanded on her use of the word of emaciated by noting that: "bones were visible, and the dog's eyes were sunk in." In addition to Ms. Luciano's observations of the deceased dog's physical condition, her deposition includes several admissions made by the defendant. The supporting deposition indicates that defendant informed Ms. Luciano "that she had taken the dog to Vetco which is a veterinarian inside the store Petco about 1 month ago. Samara stated the dog had diarrhea and was told by Vetco that the dog required evaluation by a full-service veterinary hospital." When Ms. Luciano again asked the defendant about the circumstances of the dog's death, the defendant stated that "the dog has experienced diarrhea and did not seek additional veterinary care."
The defendant's reliance on Farrell does not alter the Court's conclusion about the sufficiency of the information. In Farrell, the accusatory instrument charged a violation of AML § 353 for deprivation of sustenance for failure to provide necessary veterinary care. The accusatory instrument alleged that a dog named Mogley suffered from spondylosis, which it did not define, but which it asserted caused the dog pain and suffering (Farrell, 44 NY2d at 6). It further stated that the dog had a mass on its spine near its heart (id.). The Court of Appeals found that:
the instrument fails to allege how the investigator became aware of these conditions and there is no corresponding veterinary diagnosis attached to the instrument or assertion that a veterinarian examined Mogley. Moreover, the instrument does not indicate whether these afflictions were visible to the naked eye, and therefore we cannot infer from these allegations that the investigator personally observed them (id.).
The Court held that these hearsay allegations were insufficient to support the charge (id.). Additionally, the Court held that the observation of an investigator that the dog was "infested with fleas" was not sufficient to charge defendant with a deprivation of sustenance for failure to provide necessary veterinary care (id. at pp 6-7).
The instant matter is distinguishable from Farrell. The Farrell Court made clear that an accusatory instrument charging a violation of AML § 353 was not required to include documentation from a veterinarian, "especially in those cases where the conditions are visible or palpable" (id. at 7). As discussed supra, the non-hearsay allegations in the supporting deposition — aside from any unsupported statements about veterinary-medical diagnoses — are significantly more compelling than the investigator's observations as set forth in the information in Farrell. Here, the dog was dead when the defendant brought it to Hudson Valley Animal Rescue. Ms. Luciano observed the dog, inside of a cage covered in urine and feces, to be completely emaciated with visible bones and sunken eyes. These observations, coupled with the defendant's admissions, are sufficient to establish every element of the charged offense (see People v. Jean-Baptiste, 69 Misc 3d 128[A] [NY Sup App Term, 2020], lv app denied 36 NY3d 973 [2020]; see also People v. King, 84 Misc 3d 126[A] [App Term, 1st Dept, 2024], lv app denied 43 NY3d 1009 [2025]; People v. Vega, 77 Misc 3d 136[A] [App Term, 2nd, 11th, & 13th Jud Dists, 2022], lv app denied 39 NY3d 1157 [2023]; People v. Roth, 73 Misc 3d 147[A], *1 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists, 2021]). Put another way, the sufficiency of the information does not depend upon the veterinary-medical diagnosis of cachexia; rather, the remaining non-hearsay allegations demonstrate the defendant's "failure to feed an animal and/or [ ] seek medical care when clear, objective signs are present that the animal requires such medical care" (People v. Neira, 55 Misc 3d 149[A], *4 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists, 2017]).
While perhaps inartfully drafted, the information and supporting deposition contain allegations which, if true, establish every element of the charged offense and supply defendant "with sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy" (Roth, 73 Misc 3d at *2 [citing People v. Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]; Casey, 95 NY2d at 366). Based upon the foregoing, the defendant's motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency is denied.
b. Motion to Dismiss in the Interest of Justice
An information may be dismissed in the interest of justice when "such dismissal is required as a matter of judicial discretion by the existence of some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant upon such accusatory instrument or count would constitute or result in injustice" (CPL § 170.40[1]). "The discretionary authority to dismiss in furtherance of justice should be exercised sparingly and only in those rare cases where there is a compelling factor which clearly demonstrates that prosecution would be an injustice" (People v. Richman, 44 Misc 3d 34, 36 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists, 2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see also People v. Curcio, 22 Misc 3d 907, 915 [Crim Court, Kings County, 2008] [this power should be exercised "sparingly and only in that rare and unusual case when it cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations"]).
"In deciding a motion to dismiss [ ] in the interest of justice, a court must strike a 'sensitive balance between the individual and the State' interests to determine whether the ends of justice are served by dismissal" (People v. Jenkins, 11 NY3d 282, 287 [2008], quoting People v. Clayton, 41 AD2d 204, 208 [2d Dept 1973]). The determination of a motion to dismiss in the interest of justice must consider the statutory factors set forth in CPL § 170.40[1] "collectively as well as individually" (People v. Rickert, 58 NY2d 122, 132 [1983]).
Weighing the statutory factors set forth in CPL § 170.40[1] and balancing the interests of the community against those of the defendant, the Court finds that the defendant has failed to meet her burden of showing that this is one of those rare and unusual cases that warrants the dismissal of an information in the interest of justice.
Although the offense charged is only a misdemeanor, it reflects the Legislature's "societal determination that animals, including dogs, should be protected from abuse or neglect" (Curcio, 22 Misc 3d at 915). Here, the allegations, if true, demonstrate that defendant and her mother deprived the dog of food and water for so long as to cause it to become emaciated. The alleged neglect and deprivation was so severe as to cause the dog's death 1 .
The defendant's argument that cachexia occurs with chronic disease and cannot be cured by nutrition (see Frink Aff, ¶19 & Ex. B) is not a compelling factor warranting the extraordinary relief of dismissal. What the motion demonstrates is that defendant may have a viable defense to present at trial and competent defense counsel to do so on her behalf, not a compelling argument for dismissal (see People v. Morin, 41 Misc 3d 1230[A], *4 [Crim Court, New York County, 2013]; see also People v. Field, 161 AD2d 660, 661 [2d Dept, 1990] ["There may well be circumstances which mitigate the defendant's culpability, and which should properly bear upon the trial court's sentencing determination. Such circumstances, however, are not so compelling as to warrant a dismissal in the furtherance of justice"]). Additionally, as the People argue in opposition, the necropsy report found no underlying disease in the dog, thus weakening if not eliminating a medical explanation for the dog's extreme weight loss (see Paglia Aff, Ex. C).
The defendant included a photograph of herself and the dog wearing matching pajamas, in an apparent effort to demonstrate that she loved the dog (see Frink Aff, ¶¶ 21-22). Although the defendant's love for the dog may be an effective defense at trial, for the purposes of this motion it yields the opposite of its intended effect. The condition in which the dog was brought to Hudson Valley Animal Rescue "mortified" the receptionist (see Paglia Aff, Ex. B). Maria Luciano, the veterinary technician, described the dog as "completely emaciated" in its urine and feces soiled crate (id.). The necropsy report stated that the dog "was in poor bodily condition at the time of death" (see Paglia Aff, Ex. C, p 2). The report further provided that:
The eyes are markedly sunken There is urine and fecal staining on all four paws and linearly along the sternum and ventral abdomen. There is severe muscular atrophy The subcutaneous tissue is dry (dehydration) The stomach is empty (id.).
The defendant's assertions of affection for the dog present a stark factual dispute when contrasted with the severe physical deterioration alleged in the information and supporting deposition. Because a motion to dismiss in the interest of justice is not a vehicle to summarily adjudicate the merits of the charges, this defense is properly reserved for trial and carries no weight for the purposes of the instant motion.
Based upon the foregoing, the seriousness and circumstances of the offense (CPL § 170.40[1][a]) and extent of the harm (CPL § 170.40[1][b]) weigh heavily against dismissal.
The evidence of guilt, whether admissible at trial, also weighs against dismissal. The People's evidence, including the necropsy report, photographs, testimony of Ms. Luciano, and the defendant's statements, strongly suggest that the dog's emaciated condition and eventual death were caused by a sustained deprivation of adequate food and water. The defendant's repeated use of "we" (referring to herself and her mother) in her statements to law enforcement (see Paglia Aff, Ex. H) indicated a sufficient level of responsibility for the dog to permit a conviction for violating AML § 353 (see People v. Cherry, 57 Misc 3d 30 [App Term, 2nd, 11th, & 13th Jud Dists, 2017]). For the foregoing reasons, this factor weighs against dismissal (CPL § 170.40[1][c]).
The mere fact that defendant has no prior criminal record or has an exemplary personal background is insufficient to justify the exercise of the Court's discretion (see People v. Kelley, 141 AD2d 764, 765 [2d Dept. 1988], citing People v. Varela, 106 AD2d 339 [1st Dept. 1984] and People v. Andrew, 78 AD2d 683 [2d Dept. 1980]; Emmanuel, 89 Misc 3d at *2). Thus, the history, character, and condition of the defendant do not constitute a compelling factor favoring dismissal (CPL § 170.40[1][d]).
There is no evidence of exceptionally serious misconduct by law enforcement personnel (CPL § 170.40[1][e]).
If the defendant is convicted of violating AML § 353, there is a wide range of permissible sentences; she could be sentenced to as little as an unconditional discharge to as much as 364 days in jail (see Penal Law §§ 65.20; 70.15[1]). Defense counsel argues that, given the mitigating factors unique to this case, including the People's current offer of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, no penological purpose would be served by imposing a sentence in this case. The Court disagrees. "[S]entencing of defendant would serve the legitimate purpose of 'deterring individuals from committing a similar crime in the future' " (Emmanuel, 89 Misc 3d at *3, quoting People v. Snowden, 160 AD3d 1054, 1057 [3d Dept. 2018]). This factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal (CPL § 170.40[1][f]).
The arbitrary dismissal of a charge where the evidence of guilt is compelling (as discussed, supra) does not promote "the fair and evenhanded administration of justice" (Richman, 44 Misc 3d at 37). Thus, the impact of dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system weighs against dismissal (CPL § 170.40[1][h]).
Analyzing the statutory factors both individually and collectively, and balancing the interests of the defendant against those of the community, the Court finds that defendant has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating "that the continuation of this case would result in fundamental injustice, so as to require dismissal under CPL § 170.40" (Curcio, 22 Misc 3d at 916; see also People v. Selig, 47 Misc 3d 1213[A], *3 [Justice Court, Town of LaGrange, 2015]). Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss the information in the interest of justice is denied.
MOTION FOR PRECLUSION OF STATEMENT TESTIMONY
The defendant seeks an order precluding all statements for which the People have not provided notice pursuant to CPL § 710.30[1][a]. The motion is denied as academic, as the Court is presently unaware of any statements that the People seek to introduce at trial other than those contained within the People's CPL § 710.30 notice. The defendant shall be permitted to renew this motion in the event the People attempt to introduce any statements for which notice was not properly served.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT TESTIMONY
The defendant's motion to suppress statements alleged to have been made as contained in the CPL § 710.30 notice served by the People is granted solely to the extent that a Huntley hearing will be held prior to trial (CPL§ 710.60[4]; People v. Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]).
MOTION FOR SANDOVAL HEARING
The Court grants the defendant's motion for a Sandoval hearing to the extent that a hearing is ordered which will be held immediately prior to trial to determine which, if any, bad acts or convictions may be used as impeachment in the event that the defendant elects to testify at trial (People v. Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]). The District Attorney has provided the defendant's attorney with a copy of the defendant's Division of Criminal Justice Services Summary Case History. The Court orders the District Attorney to disclose to the defendant's attorney any and all acts upon which it intends to impeach the defendant, including without limitation all prior instances of the defendant's alleged uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct (see CPL § 245.20[3]).
LEAVE TO FILE ADDITIONAL MOTIONS
The defendant's request for leave to file additional motions is granted to the extent that the defendant may file any motion that the defendant deems fit within the forty-five (45) day limit set forth in CPL § 255.20(1). Subsequent to the forty-five (45) day limit, the defendant may make further motions only to the extent permitted by CPL § 255.20(3).
Any requests for relief not specifically addressed herein are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 28, 2026
Hopewell Junction, New York
BRIAN M. RUDNER
TOWN JUSTICE
FOOTNOTES
1. See Cornell University Necropsy Report, Paglia Aff, Exhibit C. Unlike the determination of a motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency where a court must contain its analysis to the four corners of the accusatory instrument, on this motion the court may consider any competent evidence presented.
Brian M. Rudner, J.
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Docket No: Case No. 26030546
Decided: October 28, 2026
Court: Justice Court, New York,
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