The People of the State of New York v. Christina L. Katsifas, Defendant. (2026)

The defendant stands charged by information with: one count of aggravated harassment in the second degree, a class A misdemeanor (Penal Law § 240.30[2]); one count of stalking in the fourth degree, a class B misdemeanor (Penal Law § 120.45[2]); and one count of trespass, a violation (Penal Law § 140.05).

By notice of motion dated June 17, 2026, supported by an affirmation of Andrew Ellis, Esq. and exhibits (A-F), the defendant sought various relief, including dismissal of the accusatory instruments for failure to comply with the speedy trial provisions of Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30, and the preclusion and suppression of certain evidence. The People opposed the motion by affirmation of Assistant District Attorney Sabrina Acerra, dated July 17, 2026. Mr. Ellis submitted a reply affirmation dated July 24, 2026. In ruling upon the defendant's motion, the Court has read and considered the aforementioned papers and holds as follows:

DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO CPL § 30.30

The defendant moved for dismissal of the above-referenced accusatory instruments for failure to comply with the speedy trial provisions of CPL § 30.30. In support thereof, she contends that the People have not announced their readiness for trial within the timeframe required by statute for these misdemeanor offenses. The defendant further claims that the prosecution's certificate of compliance and statement of readiness (filed on June 1, 2026) and supplemental certificate of compliance and statement of readiness (filed on June 2, 2026) are both invalid and illusory. The People oppose the requested relief.

Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30(1)(b) requires the People to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action in which, as here, a misdemeanor is the top count charged. Absent a valid certificate of compliance, the People cannot state ready for trial (CPL § 245.50[3]). "The failure to declare readiness within the statutory time limit will result in dismissal of the prosecution, unless the People can demonstrate that certain time periods should be excluded" (People v. Price, 14 NY3d 61, 61 [2010]; see also People v. Barden, 27 NY3d 550, 553 [2016]). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30, once a defendant has shown a delay of over ninety (90) days, the burden is on the People to show that certain periods within that time should be excluded (see CPL § 30.30[4]; Barden, 27 NY3d at 553 [2016]; People v. Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]).

This criminal action was commenced with the filing of above-referenced accusatory instruments against the defendant on September 24, 2025 (see CPL § 1.20[17]). The People did not announce their readiness for trial until June 1, 2026, well over ninety days after the criminal action was commenced. Thus, because the defendant has established, prima facie, a delay of over ninety days, the burden shifts to the People to demonstrate that certain periods of time should be excluded.

The defendant contends that 111 days are chargeable to the People for speedy trial purposes. In opposition, the People concede 50 days of chargeable time but otherwise oppose the requested relief. After review and consideration of the parties' moving papers, there are three (3) periods of time that remain in dispute: 9/26/25 — 10/28/25 (32 days); 5/19/26 — 6/1/26 (13 days); and 6/1/26 — 6/17/26 (16 days). The Court will now discuss each disputed period in turn.

9/26/25 — 10/28/25

The defendant was arraigned on the above-referenced charges on September 24, 2025. The action was adjourned to October 28, 2025, for the defendant to retain counsel or qualify for the services of the Public Defender's Office. On September 26, 2025, the defendant qualified for representation by the Public Defender's Office and, that same day, Mr. Ellis filed with the Court and served upon the District Attorney a notice of appearance  ¹ .

The date of the defendant's arraignment — 9/24/25 — does not count against the People for speedy trial purposes (see People v. Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 [1987], citing General Construction Law § 20). The defendant concedes that September 25 is not chargeable to the People because the defendant was "without counsel through no fault of the court" (see CPL § 30.30[4][f]) but contends that the speedy trial clock began to run against the People on September 26, the day that Mr. Ellis filed and served his notice of appearance. The Court agrees. When Mr. Ellis filed and served his notice of appearance on September 26, 2025, the defendant was no longer "without counsel" (see People v. Posillipo, 247 AD3d 1062, 1063 [2d Dept. 2026], citing People v. Yannarilli, 191 AD3d 1327 [4th Dept. 2021]). The cases cited by the People in opposition  ² do not require a different result as they do not address the specific factual circumstances present here or cast any doubt on the controlling authority of Posillipo. Accordingly, the exclusion contained in CPL § 30.30(4)(f) is not available to the People as of September 26, 2025.

The time from September 26, 2025, through October 28, 2025 (32 days) is therefore chargeable to the People for speedy trial purposes.

5/19/26 — 6/1/26

During a court appearance on April 28, 2026, the matter was adjourned to May 19, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. As of April 28, the People had not filed and served a certificate of compliance and had not announced their readiness for trial. Additionally, defense counsel clearly indicated on the record that the adjournment to May 19 was not with the consent of the defendant (which the People do not contest in their opposition).

On May 6, 2026, the Court administratively adjourned the May 19th appearance to June 3, 2026, at 4:00 p.m. (see Ellis Aff, Exhibit A). The defendant contends that the 13 days of this adjournment should be charged to the People. In opposition, the People argue that defense counsel consented to this adjournment and that the People stopped the speedy trial clock when they filed their certificate of compliance and statement of readiness on June 1, 2026.

"[P]re-readiness delays arising from court congestion or court scheduling problems are chargeable to the People, because court delays do not prevent the People from being ready or declaring readiness in a written off-calendar statement" (Barden, 27 NY3d at 553, citing People v. Chavis, 91 NY2d 500 [1998]). Contrary to the People's contention, defense counsel's lack of protest of the Court's administrative adjournment "cannot, under CPL 30.30, be considered consent to the [ ] adjournment" (id. at 556). "Adjournments consented to by the defense must be clearly expressed to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay" (id. [citation omitted]; see also People v. Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 843 [1992]; People v. Hall, 213 AD2d 558, 558 [2d Dept. 1995]).

The time from May 19, 2026, through June 1, 2026 (13 days) is therefore chargeable to the People for speedy trial purposes.

Adding the total chargeable time from these two periods (45 days) to the 50 days the People conceded in their opposition papers, results in 95 days of speedy trial time chargeable to the People as of June 1, 2026. As this exceeds the time specified by statute by which the People must be ready for trial (CPL § 30.30[1][b]), the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

Because the Court finds that the People exceeded their speedy trial time allowance prior to June 1, 2026, the Court need not, and does not, address the defendant's arguments regarding the validity of the People's certificates of compliance. Moreover, given the Court's resolution of the defendant's dismissal motion, the defendant's remaining requests for relief are denied as academic.

Based upon the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30[1][e] and 30.30[1][b] is granted and the complaints charging the defendant with aggravated harassment in the second degree, stalking in the fourth degree, and trespass are dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the defendant's omnibus motion is in all other respects denied as academic; and it is further

ORDERED that the temporary order of protection issued by this Court September 24, 2025, and extended on February 27, 2026, is vacated.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: August 19, 2026

Hopewell Junction, New York

BRIAN M. RUDNER

TOWN JUSTICE

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mr. Ellis did not include a copy of his notice of appearance as an exhibit. However, the Court's file for this matter contains a notice of appearance bearing a date stamp of September 26, 2025. The Court will take judicial notice of the contents of its own file, including this date-stamped notice of appearance. And while there is no affidavit of service or other indication of service upon the People, the People do not contest in their opposition papers that the notice was received or the date upon which it was received.

2.    People v. Acosta, 76 Misc 3d 868; People v. Huger, 167 AD3d 1042 [2d Dept. 2018]; People v. Bahadur, 41 AD3d 239 [1st Dept. 2007]; People v. Mannino, 306 AD2d 157 [1st Dept. 2003]; and People v. Aubin, 245 AD2d 805 [3d Dept. 1997] (see Acerra Aff, ¶¶ 22-23).

Brian M. Rudner, J.