People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Jason M. Cornell, Defendant. (2026)

The defendant moves to dismiss the superseding prosecutor's information filed herein upon the ground that he has been denied his statutory right to a speedy trial.

Background

The defendant is charged by information with harassment in the second degree filed with this court on July 15, 2026. On the date of filing, the court issued a criminal summons returnable on August 19, 2026. The defendant was served with the summons on July 16, 2026. On August 19, 2026, the defendant appeared for his arraignment. Contemporaneously therewith, the People filed a certificate of compliance with their discovery obligations and a statement of trial readiness. On September 16, 2026, the court denied the defendant's oral motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, and the case was set for a non-jury trial on September 23, 2026. The following day, the People filed a superseding prosector's information. Prior to the scheduled trial, on September 21, 2026, the defendant filed a renewed motion in writing. See People v Lawrence, 64 NY2d 200 (1984); People v Roper, __ NY3d __, 2026 NY Slip Op 02365, *3 (Apr. 21, 2026). The People filed a response opposing the motion on September 22, 2026. After giving counsel an opportunity to be heard in further support of their respective positions, the court now grants the motion.

Discussion

The People must declare readiness for trial within 30 days of the commencement of a criminal action where, as here, the defendant is charged with a violation-level offense. See CPL 30.30(1)(d); General Construction Law § 20; People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 (1987) (the first day of the statutory period is excluded). Commencement of a criminal action occurs upon the filing of an accusatory instrument with the local criminal court. See CPL 1.20(17). However, where the defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, commencement for speedy trial purposes is deemed to have occurred when the defendant first appears in court in response to the appearance ticket. People v Farkas, 16 NY3d 190, 193 (2011), citing CPL 30.30(5)(b) renum CPL 30.30(7)(b). Contrary to the People's contention, this provision does not extend to situations where the defendant's appearance is secured by a criminal summons.

CPL 30.30(7)(b) states, "where a defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, the criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defendant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket." By its clear terms, the commencement upon first appearance provision only applies to appearance tickets; "if 'the legislature sought to include the summons situation within the scheme established by CPL 30.30(7)(b), they would have specifically done so.' " People v Jeffers, 73 Misc 3d 1237(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 51284(U), *2 (Town of New Scotland Just Ct 2021), quoting People v Eckert, 117 Misc 23d 504, 506 (Syracuse City Ct 1983); see also People v Hauben, 12 Misc 3d 1172(A), 2006 NY Slip Op 51155(U) (Nassau Dist Ct 2006), rearg 11 Misc 3d 1026 (Nassau Dist Ct 2006); cf. People v Figueras, 72 Misc 3d 1212(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 50703(U), *3 (Poughkeepsie City Ct 2021).

The Legislature is presumed to be aware of decisions interpreting the provision; their failure to include the criminal summons (or the arrest warrant) to the "deemed commenced" provision despite amendments to the section and a renumbering of the provision "evinces an intent to apply the statute as written." People v Robinson, 95 NY2d 179, 184 (2000). Just as the courts cannot expand the list of accusatory instruments that will trigger a shorter speedy trial period, see People v Tychanski, 78 NY2d 909, 911 (1991), the courts cannot expand the list of the methods of securing a defendant's first court appearance that will trigger a longer speedy trial period. See Pajak v Pajak, 56 NY2d 394, 397 (1982) ("The failure of the Legislature to include a matter within a particular statute is an indication that its exclusion was intended"), citing McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 74. As the Supreme Court of the United States explained more than two centuries ago, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 177 (1803); it is not to pontificate on what the court may think the law should be at a particular moment in time. Thus, where, as here, the statutory text is unambiguous, "judicial inquiry is complete." Fitzgerald v New Horseheads Assoc., LLC, __ NYS3d __, 2026 NY Slip Op 26100, *3 (Horseheads Village Just Ct Jun. 18, 2026) (Brockway, J.), quoting Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 US 249, 254 (1992) (Thomas, J.).

Conclusion

The defendant having established that the People failed to declare readiness within 30 days of the filing of the initial accusatory instrument which served to commence the criminal action (from July 15, 2026 to August 19, 2026), see CPL 30.30(1)(d); 245.50(3); People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 (1986); People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 (1987), and the People having failed to identify any periods of time that are excludable, see CPL 30.30(4); Sinistaj, 67 NY2d at 239-40, the motion must be granted. While the court recognizes the burden the court's construction of the statute may impose on the People, that is the Legislature's prerogative to address as they see fit, not the court's duty to lessen under the guise of statutory interpretation. To do anything else would be to place a finger on the scales of justice.

Richard J. Brink, J.