People of the State of New York, v. Steven Spolan, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant, Steven Spolan, moves to dismiss the accusatory instruments as facially insufficient pursuant to CPL §§ 100.15 and 100.40. The People oppose the motion.

The court has considered the following legal filings:

1. Defendant's Notice of Motion, the affirmation of William B. Fleming, Esq.;

2. The People's Affirmation in Opposition and Memorandum of Law; and

3. Defendant's Reply Affirmation.

Procedural Background and Allegations

Defendant is charged with Assault in the Third Degree, Penal Law § 120.00(1), and Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, Penal Law § 135.05.

The assault information alleges, in substance, that on or about May 6, 2025, at approximately 9:42 a.m., at Cross River Road in Katonah, New York, Defendant knowingly and intentionally grabbed the complainant, K. W., by the arm to control her body and punched both sides of her face with closed fists, causing physical injury to her face and arms. The information states that it is based upon police investigation and the supporting deposition of Ms. W.

The original accusatory instrument charging Unlawful Imprisonment in the First Degree was later superseded by a superseding misdemeanor information charging Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree. That superseding information alleges, in substance, that Defendant restrained Ms. W. by arguing with her, grabbing her by the arm, and pushing her to the ground. The People's opposition also references supporting depositions from civilian witnesses.

Facial Sufficiency

New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 100.15 requires an information to contain an accusatory part and a factual part. The factual part must contain facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges. The complainant may allege facts based upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief.

CPL § 100.40 (1) provides that an information is sufficient on its face when:

(a) It substantially conforms to the requirements prescribed in section 100.15; and

(b) The allegations of the factual part of the information, together with those of any supporting depositions which may accompany it, provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of the information; and

(c) Non-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the information and/or of any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof.

The "reasonable cause" requirement is not the same as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court must give the allegations a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading. People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354 (2000); People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677 (1999). At this stage, the Court does not resolve questions of credibility, weigh competing inferences, or determine what proof will ultimately be admissible at trial. However, conclusory allegations that merely track the statutory language are insufficient where the accusatory instrument and any supporting depositions fail to allege facts establishing each element of the offense. People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 (1987).

The Court also notes Defendant's reply argument that the accusatory instrument must stand on its own or with proper supporting depositions, and that the People may not cure a facial defect through attorney argument in opposition papers. The Court agrees with that general principle. Accordingly, the Court considers the People's factual summaries only as argument, and considers the supporting depositions only to the extent they accompany, support, or are otherwise properly before the Court as part of the facial-sufficiency review contemplated by CPL § 100.40.

Assault in the Third Degree

Penal Law § 120.00(1) provides that a person is guilty of Assault in the Third Degree when, with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he or she causes such injury to that person or to a third person. "Physical injury" means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain. Penal Law § 10.00(9).

Defendant argues that the assault count is facially insufficient because Police Officer Carelli did not personally observe the incident and because the complainant's supporting deposition does not expressly state that she suffered physical injury, impairment of physical condition, or substantial pain.

The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. Although the information is based upon information and belief, it is supported by the complainant's deposition. The complainant's non-hearsay allegations do not merely state that Defendant made incidental or slight contact. Rather, the supporting deposition alleges that Defendant held her arm, punched her in the face with a closed fist, punched her again, placed her in a choke hold, threw her to the ground, and was on top of her while she screamed for help. The information itself alleges physical injury to the complainant's face and arms.

The fact that the complainant did not use the precise statutory phrase "substantial pain" is not dispositive. At the pleading stage, the Court may draw reasonable inferences from the facts alleged. Closed-fist punches to both sides of the face, coupled with allegations of a choke hold and being thrown to the ground, are sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of physical injury for pleading purposes. See People v Henderson, supra. This is not a case, like People v A.S., 28 Misc 3d 381 (Crim Ct, NY County 2010), where the accusatory instrument contains an utter absence of any description of the alleged injury, its location, the force used, or facts from which substantial pain may be inferred.

Nor is dismissal warranted because Defendant disputes the complainant's ability to recall precisely how the incident became physical or because Defendant characterizes the conduct as harassment rather than assault. Those arguments go to the weight of the evidence and credibility, not facial sufficiency.

Accordingly, giving the accusatory instrument and supporting deposition a fair reading, the Court finds that the charge of Assault in the Third Degree is facially sufficient under CPL §§ 100.15 and 100.40 and Defendant's motion to dismiss that count is denied.

Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree

Penal Law § 135.05 provides that a person is guilty of Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree when he or she restrains another person. Penal Law § 135.00(1) defines "restrain" as restricting a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such manner as to interfere substantially with that person's liberty by moving the person from one place to another, or by confining the person either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which the person has been moved, without consent and with knowledge that the restriction is unlawful.

Defendant argues that the allegations describe, at most, a physical altercation or scuffle, not unlawful imprisonment. Defendant further argues that the superseding misdemeanor information merely states that Defendant "restrained" the complainant without factual allegations establishing the restraint element.

The Court agrees that the unlawful imprisonment count is facially insufficient.

The superseding misdemeanor information alleges that Defendant argued with the complainant, grabbed her by the arm, pushed her to the ground, and restrained her. The allegation that Defendant "restrained" her is conclusory because it merely repeats the statutory element. The remaining allegations describe physical force used during an alleged assaultive encounter. They do not allege facts showing that Defendant moved the complainant from one place to another, confined her in a particular place, blocked an exit, locked or barricaded a door, prevented her from leaving a bounded area, or otherwise restricted her movement in a manner that substantially interfered with her liberty within the meaning of Penal Law § 135.00(1).

The complainant's supporting deposition states that Defendant threw her to the ground, was on top of her, and would not let her up to walk away until others intervened. Those allegations are serious and support the assault charge. However, for purposes of Penal Law § 135.05, they do not sufficiently plead a restraint separate from and independent of the alleged assaultive conduct. The facts alleged do not describe the duration of any alleged restriction, the manner in which the complainant's movement was confined beyond the physical struggle itself, or facts establishing that Defendant's conscious objective was to substantially interfere with the complainant's liberty, rather than to commit the alleged assault.

In People v Parkman, 20 Misc 3d 52 (App Term, 1st Dept 2008), the Appellate Term held that allegations that a defendant forcefully grabbed the complainant by the arm, without any indication of the temporal length of the incident or the effect of the touching in terms of confinement, were insufficient to plead attempted unlawful imprisonment. Similarly, in People v Cruz, 44 Misc 3d 640 (Crim Ct, Queens County 2014), the court dismissed an unlawful imprisonment count where the complaint alleged pushing and shoving and conclusorily alleged that the defendant prevented the complainant from leaving, but failed to set forth facts showing how the complainant's movement was restricted.

Here, as in those cases, the accusatory instrument does not allege sufficient facts of restraint, confinement, movement, duration, or substantial interference with liberty. To hold otherwise would convert every assault involving forceful grabbing, pushing, holding, or bodily contact into a separate unlawful imprisonment charge.

Accordingly, the count charging Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree is facially insufficient under CPL §§ 100.15 and 100.40 and is dismissed.

Readiness Argument

Defendant also raises in his Reply Affirmation, in substance, that because the accusatory instruments are facially insufficient, the People's certificate of compliance and statement of readiness were not effective and time should be chargeable to the People. The People respond that the accusatory instruments are facially sufficient and that their readiness was proper.

The motion before the Court is made pursuant to CPL §§ 100.15 and 100.40. No separate CPL § 30.30 motion, calculation, or requested speedy-trial dismissal is presently before the Court. Accordingly, the Court does not decide any CPL § 30.30 issue in this Decision and Order.

Conclusion

Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL §§ 100.15 and 100.40 is granted in part and denied in part.

The charge of Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, Penal Law § 135.05, is dismissed as facially insufficient.

The charge of Assault in the Third Degree, Penal Law § 120.00(1), is facially sufficient and remains pending.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: July 10, 2026

Bedford, New York

Hon. Jodi J. Kimmel

Town Justice

Jodi J. Kimmel, J.