People of the State of New York, v. Jose Salgado, Defendant. (2026)

On May 15, 2026, combined Mapp, Dunaway, and Huntley suppression hearings were held. Present were attorney for the defendant, Jeffrey J. Kane, Esq.; the defendant, Jose Salgado; and Westchester County Assistant District Attorney Claudia A. Neary, Esq. The defense challenged whether there was probable cause for the defendant to be stopped, and the admissibility of the defendant's statements.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The arresting officer, Trooper Tatiana I. Wilson (now Sergeant Wilson) of the New York State Police, testified that during her night shift on November 18, 2023, at approximately 2:00 a.m., she was a passenger in a marked police vehicle on Interstate 684 when she observed a vehicle traveling in excess of the posted speed limit of 65 miles per hour. Trooper Wilson's visual estimate was that the car was traveling at 90 miles per hour; her radar confirmed a speed of 86 miles per hour.¹ She initiated a traffic stop on Interstate 684.

The Trooper testified that she observed the vehicle cut off an 18-wheeler truck, creating a potential hazard, while attempting to pull over in response to her emergency lights. Upon approaching the vehicle, later determined to be driven by the defendant, Trooper Wilson testified that she observed the defendant with watery eyes, slurred speech, and poor coordination and judgment (he pulled out a business card instead of his driver's license when asked). The Trooper also detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant's person.

The defense raised the issue that Trooper Wilson had never previously met the defendant and was therefore unaware of his usual speech pattern. The defense also claimed that the defendant's eyes do not appear glassy in the photo taken at the barracks following the arrest. The Court notes that this photo was taken approximately two hours after the initial arrest.

Trooper Wilson asked the defendant to exit his vehicle and conducted Standard Field Sobriety Tests, including the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test ("HGN") and the Walk-and-Turn Test. Trooper Wilson testified that the defendant failed the HGN and was unable to complete the Walk-and-Turn Test.

As noted in the Trooper's testimony and observed in the body-worn camera footage played during the hearing, the defendant stated he was unable to complete the Walk-and-Turn Test because he was on a hill, wearing steel-toe boots, and had been working all day. Trooper Wilson then administered additional sobriety tests: the Reciting the Alphabet Test and counting backward. The defendant failed both tests.

The Court also reviewed the body-worn camera footage admitted at the hearing. The footage, beginning at approximately 2:08 a.m., shows Trooper Wilson speaking with the defendant during the roadside investigation. In response to the Trooper's inquiry as to whether the defendant had anything to drink that night, the defendant stated that he had "a couple of beers." The Trooper then stated, in substance, "After work you had a couple of beers," and the defendant clarified, "two or three." The Trooper asked the defendant, "Bottles or cans?" The defendant responded, "Bottles."

Trooper Wilson continued her roadside investigation. The defendant submitted to a preliminary breath test. The preliminary breath test is a roadside investigative tool used to assist an officer in determining whether alcohol is present (as opposed to drugs) and whether there is probable cause to proceed with a DWI investigation. It is not the same as a formal chemical test administered pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") § 1194.

The preliminary breath test indicated a result of 0.13. The Court does not treat the preliminary breath test as a trial-admissible chemical test result proving the defendant's blood alcohol content. Rather, the Court considers it only for the limited purpose of evaluating the Trooper's roadside investigation, her observations, and whether she had a lawful basis to form the opinion that the defendant was intoxicated and to continue the DWI investigation.

Following the administration of the preliminary breath test, Trooper Wilson stated to the defendant: "You know you drank too much to be driving," and the defendant responded, "Yes." At the time the defendant made that statement, he had not been handcuffed, placed in the patrol vehicle, transported from the scene, or restrained in a manner comparable to formal arrest.

Based on the lawful speeding stop, Trooper Wilson's roadside observations, the defendant's statements concerning alcohol consumption, and the preliminary breath test indicating the presence of alcohol, Trooper Wilson formed the opinion that the defendant was intoxicated. The facts suggest that the People met the minimum standards for reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and probable cause to arrest. Thereafter, the defendant was placed under arrest and transported to the State Police barracks.

The Court observed in the body-worn camera footage starting at 2:59 a.m. (recorded at the barracks) that the defendant refused to submit to a formal chemical test. The Refusal Warnings were given a total of six times (twice each of the three times the Trooper administered the warnings), and each time the defendant replied, "absolutely not." The refusal at the barracks does not require suppression of the defendant's earlier roadside statements, which were made before arrest-like custody began.

Trooper Wilson testified that prior to the defendant being placed into custody, statements were taken from the defendant, all of which were referenced in a Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 710.30 notice. The statements appear to be from the initial stop in response to questions posed by Trooper Wilson and relate to whether the defendant consumed alcohol prior to getting in the car and how much he drank. There is no evidence they were coerced or compelled.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. The Traffic Stop Was Lawful

A traffic stop is lawful where a police officer has probable cause to believe that the driver committed a traffic violation. People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349 (2001); People v Guthrie, 25 NY3d 130, 133 (2015). Probable cause does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the same quantum of proof necessary to establish guilt at trial. Rather, it requires information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed. People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 (1985). In People v Goldberg, the Appellate Term applied those principles in the speeding-stop context and held that probable cause existed where the officer observed the defendant traveling above the posted speed limit, paced the vehicle, and the speed was confirmed by a roadside radar device. People v Goldberg, 2018 NY Slip Op 51389 (U) (2d Dept 2018).

New York law recognizes that a qualified officer's visual estimate of speed may be sufficient to establish that a motorist was speeding. In People v Olsen, 22 NY2d 230 (1968), the Court of Appeals held that opinion testimony estimating a vehicle's speed may be competent where the witness shows experience observing the speed of moving objects or another satisfactory basis for the opinion. The Appellate Term in Goldberg relied upon Olsen in holding that an experienced patrol officer may competently estimate that a vehicle was traveling 15 miles per hour above the posted speed limit, particularly where the speed was significantly above the lawful limit.

The same principle was recognized in People v Clayton, where the Appellate Term stated that a qualified officer's visual estimate that a vehicle exceeded the speed limit by a wide margin may support a speeding conviction and, "necessarily, a probable cause determination." The court also recognized that a properly calibrated radar reading may support a speeding conviction, and that even radar evidence with a perceived deficiency may be sufficient when coupled with a qualified officer's speed estimate. People v Clayton, 2018 NY Slip Op 51388(U) (2d Dept 2018).

The combination of a visual estimate and radar confirmation is therefore legally significant. It is stronger than either an unsupported estimate or a radar reading standing alone. See also Matter of Seon v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 159 AD3d 607 (1st Dept 2018), recognizing that speed evidence may be supported by both radar testing and the officer's visual estimate.

The Court is mindful that the People must establish an adequate foundation for the officer's observations and qualifications. In People v Suttles, 214 AD3d 1313 (4th Dept 2023), the Fourth Department found suppression appropriate where officers relied only on visual estimates, did not use radar, did not pace the vehicle, and failed to establish training or qualifications to support their visual estimates. Those concerns are not present here. Unlike the facts presented in Suttles, Trooper Wilson testified to her specific training in detecting speeding, including field estimates, and to her experience in visually estimating speed and operating radar. She made a visual estimate of the defendant's speed, and then verified that estimate with radar before stopping the vehicle.

The defense argues that the stop was invalid because Trooper Wilson's patrol vehicle was also traveling above the speed limit (at a speed of 83 miles per hour, as Trooper Wilson testified). That argument is rejected. The legality of the stop does not depend on whether the Trooper exceeded the speed limit while observing, following, catching up to, or confirming the defendant's speed. The relevant question is whether the Trooper had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a traffic violation. Here, Trooper Wilson visually estimated that the defendant was speeding and then confirmed that estimate by radar, which showed the defendant's vehicle traveling 86 miles per hour in a 65-mile-per-hour zone. Under Robinson, Guthrie, Olsen, Goldberg, and Clayton, those facts supplied probable cause to believe the defendant violated VTL § 1180. Accordingly, the Court finds that the traffic stop was lawful.

II. The Defendant's Roadside Statements Are Not Suppressible Under Huntley

The defendant also moves to suppress statements made roadside to Trooper Wilson. That branch of the motion is also denied.

At a Huntley hearing, the People must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statements were voluntary. People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 (1965). Where Miranda is implicated, the People must also establish that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights. Miranda warnings, however, are required only where a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation.

A temporary roadside detention pursuant to a routine traffic stop is generally not custody for Miranda purposes. In Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that an ordinary traffic stop is more akin to a temporary investigative detention than to a formal arrest. New York courts apply the same rule. In People v Myers, 1 AD3d 382, 383 (2d Dept 2003), the Appellate Division held that "a temporary roadside detention pursuant to a routine traffic stop is not custodial within the meaning of Miranda." That rule was recently applied in People v Silva, where the court held that Miranda warnings were not required before a roadside investigation and denied suppression of statements made before the defendant's arrest. People v Silva, 2026 NY Slip Op 50508(U) (Town of Rye Ct 2026).

The fact that the defendant had been pulled over, was temporarily detained, was outside the vehicle, and the vehicle was no longer in operation does not, without more, make the encounter custodial. While a motorist is not free to leave during a lawful traffic stop, that temporary detention is not equivalent to a formal arrest. Nor does an officer's direction that a motorist exit the vehicle, standing alone, convert the encounter into custody. An officer may direct a driver to step out of a lawfully stopped vehicle. Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 (1977). In People v Morel-Gomez, 2011 NY Slip Op 52034(U) (Bronx Co Ct 2011), the court held that questioning a defendant after he exited a vehicle remained a non-custodial investigatory inquiry for which Miranda warnings were not required. Here, the defendant's statements were made during a routine roadside traffic investigation. Although the defendant had been stopped and asked to exit the vehicle, he had not been handcuffed, placed in the patrol vehicle, transported from the scene, told he was under arrest, or restrained in a manner comparable to formal arrest. The body-worn camera footage beginning at approximately 2:08 a.m. shows that, in response to Trooper Wilson's roadside inquiry as to whether the defendant had consumed alcohol that night, the defendant stated that he had "a couple of beers," and then clarified that he had "two or three [bottles of beer]." The defendant also later responded "Yes" when the Trooper stated, in substance, "You know you drank too much to be driving." This statement is not suppressible merely because it was incriminating. These statements were made in response to ordinary roadside investigatory questions concerning alcohol consumption and impairment, before arrest-like custody began.

Routine roadside questions such as "Do you know why I stopped you?", "How fast were you going?", "Where are you coming from?", "Where are you going?", or similar investigatory questions are ordinarily part of the traffic-stop investigation in a suspected VTL § 1192 matter and do not, without more, convert the encounter into custodial interrogation. Such questions do not, in and of themselves, constitute custodial interrogation merely because the motorist is outside the car or the vehicle is no longer in operation. In People v Morel-Gomez, the court denied suppression where, after the defendant exited the vehicle, the officer asked whether the defendant had been drinking, and the defendant responded that he had consumed "three Coronas"; the court held that the questioning was non-custodial and that Miranda warnings were not required. People v Morel-Gomez, supra.

The defense must show additional facts demonstrating that the stop escalated into custody comparable to a formal arrest, such as handcuffing, placement in a patrol vehicle, transport from the scene, a prolonged detention, multiple officers, drawn weapons, an announcement of arrest, or other restraints associated with formal arrest. People v Silva illustrates the distinction: the court admitted roadside statements made before arrest, but suppressed later statements made after the defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a police vehicle for transport. People v Silva, supra.

Here, the statements at issue include the defendant's responses to Trooper Wilson's roadside questions regarding how much alcohol the defendant had consumed and the defendant's statement, in substance, that he knew he should not have been driving. Those statements are not suppressible merely because they were incriminating.

The Court notes that the defendant later refused to submit to a formal chemical test at the barracks. The refusal at the barracks does not require suppression of the defendant's earlier roadside statements, which were made before arrest-like custody began. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to suppress his roadside statements, including his admission that he had consumed alcohol and his response acknowledging that he drank too much to be driving, is denied.

ORDER

The defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop is denied.

The defendant's motion to suppress statements made to Trooper Wilson during the roadside traffic investigation is denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: May 24, 2026

Bedford, New York

Hon. Jodi J. Kimmel

Town Justice

FOOTNOTES

1.   Trooper Wilson testified about her extensive training in detecting speeding, including field estimates, and her experience in visually estimating speed and operating radar. She testified that she made a visual estimate of the defendant's speed, and then verified that estimate with radar before stopping the vehicle.

Jodi J. Kimmel, J.