NESTL USA INC v. MADISON COUNTY ASSESSOR (2026)

Nestlé USA, Inc. appeals from a final determination by the Indiana Board of Tax Review and raises two issues common in property tax valuation disputes: the operation of Indiana's property tax burden-shifting statute and the proper weight for the Board to assign to competing evidence. Both Nestlé and the Madison County Assessor provided the Board with an appraisal of Nestlé’s industrial facility and both supported these appraisals with expert testimony at the administrative hearing. The Board ultimately found the Assessor's appraisal to be the most persuasive evidence of value for each of the six tax years at issue. However, the Board's application of Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2—the now-repealed statute governing shifts in the burden of proof in certain property tax appeals—prevented the Board from adopting the Assessor's value for every disputed year. For 2019 to 2021, the Board found neither party's appraisal met its burden and reverted the assessments to the 2018 assessment. For the 2018, 2022, and 2023 assessments, the Board adopted the Assessor's appraisal valuation. Nestlé challenges both the Board's application of Section 17.2 and the sufficiency of the evidence it relied upon to adopt the Assessor's values and to reject Nestlé’s values. The Court finds that the Board correctly applied Section 17.2, made its findings based on substantial evidence, and did not abuse its discretion. The Court affirms the Board's final determination in its entirety.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Nestlé owns an industrial building of approximately one million square feet situated on roughly 183 acres in Anderson, Indiana. The facility is used to manufacture coffee creamers and other ready-to-drink beverages. The facility has interstate and rail access and houses a mix of food-grade and general manufacturing, warehouse, dock, office, and utility space, a portion of which is chilled for cold storage. Most of the facility was constructed in 2008, with smaller additions in later years.

The Madison County Assessor assessed the subject property as follows:

Tax Year Land Value Improvement Value Total Assessment 2018 $3,916,500 $44,648,400 $48,564,900 2019 $3,916,500 $46,901,800 $50,818,300 2020 $3,916,500 $47,556,600 $51,473,100 2021 $3,916,500 $48,028,100 $51,944,600 2022 $3,916,500 $50,234,000 $54,150,500 2023 $3,916,500 $50,238,500 $54,155,000

Nestlé appealed these assessments to the Madison County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals (“PTABOA”), which issued determinations upholding the values for tax years 2018 to 2022. Nestlé then appealed the determinations for 2018 to 2022 to the Indiana Board of Tax Review and later appealed the 2023 assessment after the PTABOA failed to issue a determination within 180 days.

The appeals for all years were heard together before the Board during a multi-day evidentiary hearing at which both parties presented appraisal testimony. At the outset of the hearing, the administrative law judge asked the parties for any argument on the burden of proof; Nestlé acknowledged that it bore the burden and the Assessor concurred.

Both parties submitted expert appraisals to estimate the value of the subject property. Nestlé’s appraisal employed a cost approach and a sales comparison approach, but no income approach to value the property, and did not develop an independent land value determination, instead concurring in the existing land assessment. The Assessor's appraisal employed the cost, sales comparison, and income approaches and independently valued the land. Each appraisal certified compliance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), and the two reached materially different opinions of value, with Nestlé’s yielding the lower valuation for every year.

Tax Nestlé’s Reconciled Value Assessor's Reconciled Value 2018 $32,000,000 $48,000,000 2019 $31,900,000 $50,000,000 2020 $31,500,000 $53,500,000 2021 $31,900,000 $55,500,000 2022 $33,300,000 $57,000,000 2023 $33,900,000 $55,000,000

The Board found that Nestlé’s appraisal was supported by only one reliable approach to value—its sales comparison approach estimate—and that its conclusions lacked support along several dimensions. Regarding Nestlé’s cost approach, the Board concluded it had little persuasive value, explaining (i) that the appraisal did not independently value the subject property's land, (ii) that the case-study underlying the appraisal's external-obsolescence estimate was unverified and unsubstantiated, and (iii) that the external-obsolescence estimate lacked evidence to support the combination of data used by the appraiser. Regarding Nestlé’s sales comparison approach, the Board found it to be only “marginally credible” because (i) most of the comparable sales were much older than the subject property, (ii) the appraiser conceded that all but one was inferior to it, and (iii) the appraiser made significant adjustments to the leased comparables without ever comparing their lease rates to market rent. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3001 ¶ 32.) Lastly, the Board found that the appraiser's failure to develop an income approach was inconsistent with the appraiser's reliance on leased comparables in his sales comparison approach.

Turning to the Assessor's appraisal, the Board concluded that it was “reliable evidence of value for each of the dates at issue.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3017 ¶ 68.) The Board explained that it presented three reliable approaches to value “with good quantity and quality of data” and found that it provided “excellent explanations for [its] adjustments.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3013 ¶ 59, 3024 ¶ 88.) Regarding the Assessor's cost approach, the Board concluded it was “a reliable and persuasive estimate of the subject property's value for each of the dates at issue.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3015 ¶ 63.) It credited the appraiser's independent land valuation, found that the depreciation estimate “appropriately accounted for the physical condition of the property,” and determined its obsolescence estimate was the “most reliable” in the record. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3014–15 ¶¶ 60–63.) The Board also noted that the appraisals use of data from its income approach in its cost approach “undercut[ ] the independence of [the] cost approach.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3014–15 ¶ 62.) Regarding the Assessor's sales comparison approach, the Board found that it was credible and probative though not “particularly persuasive” because of the “lack of good comparable sales.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3016 ¶ 65, 3023–24 ¶ 86.) Finally, regarding the Assessor's income approach, the Board found it to be a reliable estimate while expressing reservations that the “depth” of underlying data “was not ideal.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3024 ¶ 87.)

The Board compared the two appraisals and concluded that the Assessor's appraisal supplied the most persuasive evidence of the subject property's value in the record. The Board found that “[n]either appraiser presented a single comparable that reflected the subject property in all ․ aspects” because of its unique size, age, and physical characteristics. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3022 ¶ 82.) It found the Assessor's cost approach to be the only reliable estimate between the two appraisals, driven in large part by Nestlé’s failure to independently value the land and the relative strength of the Assessor's obsolescence adjustments. It found the Assessor's sales comparison approach superior to Nestlé’s but found that both appraisals were “not particularly persuasive” because both “suffered from a lack of compelling data.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3023–24 ¶ 86.) Finally, it rejected Nestlé’s contention that an income approach was inappropriate and concluded that the Assessor's valuation—the only one in the record— was a reliable estimate.

Applying the governing burden-of-proof statutes, the Board adopted the values in the Assessor's appraisal for the 2018, 2022, and 2023 assessment years, but could not do so for 2019 through 2021 because the burden had shifted. The Board found that the Assessor's appraisal did not exactly and precisely match the assessments for the 2019 through 2021 assessment years and therefore concluded that the Assessor did not carry its burden to prove the assessment correct. It found that Nestlé met its burden of production but not its burden of persuasion in those years, because the Assessor's appraisal persuaded the Board that Nestlé’s conclusion of value was incorrect. Because neither party carried its burden of persuasion, the assessments for those years (2019 to 2021) reverted to the value the Board determined for 2018.

Nestlé timely initiated this original tax appeal, and the Court heard oral argument.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court's review of the Board's final determinations is governed by Indiana Code § 33-26-6-6, the provisions of which closely mirror those controlling judicial review of administrative decisions under Indiana's Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (“AOPA”). The party seeking to overturn a final determination of the Board bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. Ind. Code § 33-26-6-6(b) (2018). To prevail, Nestlé must demonstrate that it has been prejudiced by a final determination that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations; without observance of the procedure required by law; or unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence. Ind. Code § 33-26-6-6(e); Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Monroe Cnty. Assessor, 160 N.E.3d 263, 268 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2020).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Nestlé claims that the Board's final determination should be overturned for two principal reasons: first, it contends that the Board misapplied the burden-shifting statute and, second, it argues that many of the Board's conclusions were outside its discretion or unsupported by substantial evidence. The Assessor defends the Board's valuation but advances two counterclaims of its own. It contends that the burden-shifting statute should not have applied to the 2019 through 2021 assessment years because assessments based on structural improvements are excluded and that it did not have the opportunity to discuss the burden-shifting application at the Board's administrative process. Before turning to Nestlé’s claim about the evidentiary support of the Board's findings, the Court will address both parties’ arguments regarding the burden-shifting statute.

I. The Board correctly applied Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2.

Because the Board's decision in this appeal determined the subject property's assessment values for tax years 2018 through 2023, two different burden-shifting statutes govern allocation of the burden of proof, but the parties argue about only one— Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2. Previously, Section 17.2 explained the circumstances which would shift the burden of proof from the taxpayer to the county. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2 (2018). However, in 2022, the Indiana legislature repealed Section 17.2 and replaced it with Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-20. Pub. L. No. 174-2022, § 34, 2022 Ind Acts 2347–49. The parties and the Board all agree that this change leaves tax years 2018 to 2021 governed by the old statute and tax years 2022 to 2023 governed by the new statute. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3017–18 ¶¶ 69–71; Pet'r’s Br. at 10; Resp't Br. 11, 33.) As neither party raises an argument challenging the Board's application of Section 20, the Court will focus its statutory analysis on Section 17.2.

Both parties take issue with the Board's application of Section 17.2's legal framework and ask the Court to remand the case, but the parties disagree about what Board action requires a remand. Nestlé argues that the Board exceeded its statutory authority in its application of Section 17.2 to the facts in this case when it (1) used the Assessor's appraisal to evaluate Nestlé’s appraisal and (2) found that Nestlé’s appraisal did not meet its burden while also finding that same appraisal was “sufficiently supported” and a “credible opinion of value.” (Pet'r’s Br. 8.) The Assessor focuses on the procedural aspects of the Board's application of Section 17.2, claiming that the Board (1) failed to correctly apply the law by ignoring the exclusion from Section 17.2, which prevents burden shifting when the assessment is based on structural improvements, and (2) abused its discretion by failing to give the Assessor the chance to address the burden-shifting statute at the administrative level.

The Court finds none of these four arguments persuasive and will address Nestlé’s challenges first before turning to the Assessor's two alternative arguments.

A. The Board correctly applied Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2 by examining all evidence to find that Nestlé did not carry its burden.

Nestlé first claims that the Board violated Section 17.2 by considering the Assessor's appraisal alongside Nestlé’s appraisal to determine whether Nestlé had met its burden to “prove the correct assessment” for tax years 2019 through 2021. Nestlé argues that, once the Board found the Assessor's appraisal fell short of the burden of proof because it did not exactly and precisely match the assessment, the burden shifted to Nestlé and “the Board should have considered only Nestlé’s [a]ppraisal.” (Pet'r’s Br. at 7.) From Nestlé’s perspective, Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2 does not allow the Board to consider an assessor's appraisal when evaluating whether the taxpayer has met its burden of proof. The Court disagrees. The statute is silent on the question, and an appraisal that is insufficient to prove “the assessment is correct” may still be probative of the value of the subject property.

Subsection (b) of Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2 is the locus of the dispute. It is straightforward and applies only to appeals when an assessment has increased by more than five percent over the previous year. It provides:

[T]he county assessor or township assessor making the assessment has the burden of proving that the assessment is correct in any review or appeal under this chapter and in any appeals taken to the Indiana board of tax review or to the Indiana tax court. If a county assessor or township assessor fails to meet the burden of proof under this section, the taxpayer may introduce evidence to prove the correct assessment. If neither the assessing official nor the taxpayer meets the burden of proof under this section, the assessment reverts to the assessment for the prior tax year[.]

Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2(b) (2018). The statute has three primary functions, two of which directly alter the normal rules of property tax appeals: (1) The first reallocates the initial burden of proof from the taxpayer to the assessor, reversing the normal rule assigning the burden to the taxpayer as the one challenging the assessment. (2) The second follows the normal appeal process, allowing the taxpayer to prove the correct assessment. And (3) the third specifies that the default remedy is the prior year's assessment in the event that neither party meets their burden, reversing the normal rule that would otherwise leave the challenged assessment in place. See Eckerling v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 841 N.E.2d 674, 677 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006); Lake Cnty. Assessor v. O'Day Holdings, LLC, 249 N.E.3d 677, 685 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024); Madison County Assessor v. Kohl's Indiana, LP, 272 N.E.3d 592, 600 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2025).

Indiana courts look to the plain language of statutory text to determine its meaning. Indiana Alcohol & Tobacco Comm'n v. Spirited Sales, LLC, 79 N.E.3d 371, 376 (Ind. 2017). When interpreting statutes, a court must first decide “whether the Legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question.” City of Carmel v. Steele, 865 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ind. 2007). “Clear and unambiguous statutes leave no room for judicial construction” and do not require “any rules of construction.” Id. Instead, the words of such a statute are understood in their “plain, or ordinary and usual, sense” unless doing so would be “plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature or of the context of the statute.” Ind. Code § 1-1-4-1 (2026). Courts cannot expand or contract the meaning of an unambiguous statute by reading in language to correct supposed omissions or defects and may not substitute language that they feel the legislature may have intended. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 281 N.E.3d 97, 102 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2026).

The plain language of Section 17.2 does not speak to whether the Board may consider an assessor's evidence regarding the correctness of the assessment in evaluating the taxpayer's burden. Fidelity to the plain and ordinary meaning requires equal accounting of what a statute does not say just as much as what it does say. See ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep't, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016). Section 17.2 addresses only the allocation of the burdens of proof and the default remedy; there is nothing in the text that indicates an intention to alter the normal adjudicative process for weighing evidence and evaluating it against the burden of persuasion. The only thing that Section 17.2 says about the taxpayer's evidence is that “the taxpayer may introduce evidence to prove the correct assessment.” IND. CODE § 6-1.1-15-17.2. But that is just an affirmative grant of permission to the taxpayer to offer proof of an alternative value. It is not a limitation on the use of evidence offered by the assessor. Section 17.2 does not place any limitation on or provide any direction about the Board's use of the evidence presented by each party.

Examining the precise contours of an assessor's burden of proof is instructive in resolving the question presented here. Section 17.2 requires the assessor to prove that the challenged “assessment is correct.” IND. CODE § 6-1.1-15-17.2. Under that text, a determination by the Board that the assessor's evidence does not satisfy the assessor's burden of proof is not a determination that the assessor's evidence lacks all probative force. It is only a determination that the evidence does not exactly and precisely prove the accuracy of the assessment. See Southlake Indiana, LLC v. Lake Cnty. Assessor, (“Southlake III”) 181 N.E.3d 484, 489 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2021) (holding that the word “correct” in Section 17.2 requires that an appraisal “exactly and precisely conclude to” the challenged assessment), trans. denied. Even when it does not exactly match the assessment, an assessor's evidence may still shed light on the true tax value of the property. It may still persuasively demonstrate, for example, that the subject property should be assessed at a higher or lower value than the challenged assessment, as was the case here. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 3024–25 ¶ 90 & n.11.) In establishing the burden of proof, Section 17.2 sets a high bar for the assessor, but it does not direct the Board to ignore persuasive evidence of value offered by the assessor when evaluating the taxpayer's proposed assessment.

Nestlé insists that the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Southlake Indiana, LLC v. Lake Cnty. Assessor, (“Southlake II”) unequivocally answers the question presented and bars consideration of the Assessor's appraisal. 174 N.E.3d 177, 180 (Ind. 2021). But Nestlé presses the Supreme Court's holding too far. The holding of Southlake II is a narrow one. There the Court held that, when the Board determines that the parties’ evidence is “lacking” and thus “that neither party met its burden of proof,” the assessment reverts to the assessment for the prior tax year. Southlake II, 174 N.E.3d at 179. As was the case in Southlake II, that means that the Board cannot fashion its own assessment value by “[m]aking the adjustments it [finds] warranted” to the parties’ evidence or appraisals. Id. The Supreme Court's holding, therefore, only resolves the question of whether the Board may assign a value other than the reversionary value (i.e., the prior year assessment) when the Board finds that both parties’ appraisals are insufficient to prove the value of the property. It says nothing about whether evidence introduced by the party not having the burden of proof may be brought to bear on the evaluation of whether the party having the burden of proof has met that burden.

In its attempt to avoid the narrowness of the holding in Southlake II, Nestlé points to a comment by the Supreme Court that the legislature is empowered to limit the Board's discretion in property tax appeals. Responding to this Court's then-articulated concern that restricting the Board's ability to resolve conflicting evidence would be problematic, the Supreme Court said:

In the tax court's view, applying section 17.2's plain language would mean the state board could not resolve conflicting probative evidence, an outcome the tax court viewed as improper: “To require the Indiana Board to determine weight and credibility subject to the rigid and formulaic approach advocated by Southlake (i.e., that it should have examined the [assessor's] appraisal on a ‘stand-alone’ basis) would actually remove the Indiana Board's ability to resolve any issues arising from conflicting evidence.” Southlake, 160 N.E.3d at 1169–70. How the tax court described the state board's limited discretion may be correct. But that result, whatever its policy merits, is the legislature's call and not ours. We apply the statute as written and do not second guess the legislature's decision to limit the state board's flexibility when assessed values increase by more than the five-percent threshold.

Southlake II, 174 N.E.3d at 179–80 (alteration in original). Nestlé asserts that this statement establishes a rule requiring the Board to examine the Assessor's appraisal on a stand-alone basis.

Nestlé’s interpretation of this analysis is wrong. Contrary to Nestlé’s contention, Southlake II expresses neither an endorsement nor a refutation of the Tax Court's concern. Instead, the opinion acknowledges that such a concern “may be correct” and places the resolution of the concern with the legislature. Southlake II, 174 N.E.3d at 180 (emphasis added). The opinion provides no analysis of the statute that would support the position advanced by Nestlé here. It provides context for the Supreme Court's important point about the separation of powers and the discretion of the legislature to make policy determinations.¹

The statutory silence is dispositive, leaving the status quo undisturbed. The legislature is presumed to know the prevailing law when it adopts new legislation and to craft legislation with that background in mind. See Garrison v. Sevier, 165 N.E.3d 996, 999 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021); IBEW Loc. 305 v. Allen Cnty. Assessor, 278 N.E.3d 395, 403 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2026). Accordingly, absent language altering the background law, a statute should be read in harmony with that law. The relevant background law here is the law that governs the adjudicative process and the consideration of the parties’ evidence. “[I]t is a well-established principle of law that all relevant evidence introduced in the trial court must be considered regardless who introduced it.” Ellis v. Thompson, 8 N.E.2d 430, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 1937) (en banc). For more than a century, Indiana's fact-finding courts and administrative bodies have operated according to the principle that “[when] a fact in issue is established by competent relevant evidence, it matters not which party introduced it, or what other purpose he had in view in offering it.” Inland Steel Co. v. Ilko, 103 N.E. 7, 9 (Ind. 1913); cf. Mirant Sugar Creek, LLC v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, No. 71T10-0803-TA-18, 2010 WL 2400436 at *3 (Ind. Tax Ct. June 16, 2010) (allowing testimony by the respondent's agent to be offered by the petitioner against the respondent). As Section 17.2 says nothing about the application of these principles, the Court must conclude that the legislature did not alter them and that they continue to apply under Section 17.2.

It is no surprise that Section 17.2 is silent on the question raised by Nestlé. Barring consideration of contrary evidence from an adverse party would neuter the adversarial process altogether and lead to conflicting findings of fact. Reviewing evidence from both parties when acting as a fact-finder is axiomatic in an adversarial system and a fundamental part of the truth-seeking function inherent in the adjudicative process. Courts and adjudicative bodies like the Board are not in the habit of siloing evidence based on the identity of the party offering the evidence. A party is therefore free to make their adversary's case by admitting key facts or by offering other evidence proving their point; a defendant who admits the elements of the plaintiff's case on the stand has no one to blame but himself. Cf. Peak v. Campbell, 578 N.E.2d 360, 361 (Ind. 1991) (“If an element [of the case] is admitted by the defendant, then the plaintiff no longer has the burden of proving the admitted element.”). Moreover, siloing evidence risks conflicting findings of fact where the one party's evidence demands an inference while the second party's evidence demands the directly opposite inference (e.g., Party A's evidence requires an inference of a $1M assessment and Party B's evidence requires an inference of a $500k assessment). These challenges are in direct tension with the fundamental structure of the adjudicative process and undermine its very purpose.

This is not to say that the legislature could not have prescribed how the Board was to weigh the evidence by statute. As the Supreme Court aptly explained in Southlake II, the Board is a creation of the legislature and subject to its mandates. The legislature is, of course, free to exercise its legislative authority as it chooses. Southlake II, 174 N.E.3d at 180. It could have, subject to applicable constitutional limitations, crafted Section 17.2 to limit the Board to looking only at the evidence of the party with the burden in reaching its judgment as to that burden. Yet the text is silent on that issue, and this Court may not read such a limitation into the text where one does not exist. See Universal Health Realty v. Fluty, 144 N.E.3d 857, 862 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2020) (clear, unambiguous statutory language “may not be expanded or contracted” by the courts).

B. Nestlé did not meet its burden of proof because it did not meet the burden of persuasion.

Regardless of whether Section 17.2 allows the Board to consider the Assessor's appraisal in evaluating whether Nestlé met its burden to prove the correct assessment, Nestlé did not carry its burden of proof.

As noted by the Supreme Court in Southlake II, the legislature used the phrase “burden of proof” in Section 17.2 and not “burden of production.” Southlake II, 174 N.E.3d at 180. The burden of proof includes both a burden of production and a burden of persuasion. Id. This requires a party to both (1) “introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by the fact-finder,” id. at 180 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)), and (2) “convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors that party,” Burden of persuasion, Black’s Law Dictionary 244 (11th ed. 2019). The burden of persuasion in property tax appeals is defined by statute and requires proof to the level of a preponderance. See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-4(j) (2018); Madison Cnty. Assessor v. Kohl's Indiana, LP, 272 N.E.3d 592, 600 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2025). Applied here, the preponderance standard required Nestlé to prove that its proffered value more likely than not represented the value of the subject property. See Kohl's, 272 N.E.3d at 600.

In its final determination, the Board, as the finder of fact, found that Nestlé satisfied the burden of production by presenting a minimally credible valuation but did not satisfy its burden of persuasion. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3024–25 ¶¶ 90–91.) That distinction is decisive. A party does not carry its burden of persuasion merely by offering credible evidence; it must persuade the trier of fact that its proposed assessment value is more likely than not correct. See Kohl's, 272 N.E.3d at 600–01 (an appraisal's “analysis and conclusions of value must stand on their own ․ [and] convince the finder of fact to the level of a preponderance”; conclusory assertions of credibility “are not enough”). Weighing the evidence in the record, the Board found that the most persuasive assessment value was proffered by the Assessor's appraisal, but that this value was different from the original assessment. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3024–25 ¶¶ 88–90.) Persuaded that the valuation presented by the Assessor more likely than not represented the value of the subject property, the Board concluded that Nestlé failed to meet its burden of proving the correct assessment. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3024–25 ¶¶ 90–92 & n.11, 3026 ¶ 94.)

Even if the Board had set aside the Assessor's appraisal entirely, Nestlé’s evidence would not require the Board to adopt Nestlé’s appraisal valuation, as the Board's findings repeatedly note the lack of persuasive value in Nestlé’s appraisal. In its final determination, the Board found Nestlé’s sales comparison approach “minimally credible” and the appraisal's conclusions to be “sufficiently supported (albeit barely).” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3001 ¶ 33.) It concluded that Nestlé’s reconciled value was “supported by only one reliable approach, the sales-comparison approach” and that “th[e] approach [was not] particularly persuasive given the data presented.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3024 ¶ 88.) The Board found that Nestlé’s appraiser did not develop an independent land value, meaning his cost approach was incomplete. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3022–23 ¶ 84.) Likewise, it found that Nestlé’s appraiser failed to adequately support his five percent functional-obsolescence adjustment with objective evidence, demonstrated a lack of understanding of the case study underlying his external obsolescence adjustment, and omitted critical supporting data for these adjustments from his work file. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3000–01 ¶ 31.) The Board noted that Nestlé’s comparable sales were mostly much older than the subject property and that its appraiser even concluded that all but one were inferior to Nestlé’s property. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3001 ¶ 32.) The Board took issue with the appraiser's large adjustments to leased comparables without analyzing whether those properties were leased at market rent, concluding that those adjustments were “suspect at best.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3024 ¶ 86.) And, finally, the Board expressed skepticism with Nestlé’s choice not to develop an income approach at all. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 3001 ¶ 33.)

A finding of credibility is not a finding of persuasiveness as evidenced by the Board's findings that both appraisers presented credible estimates of value. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 3001 ¶ 33, 3016 ¶ 68.) The Board's half-hearted determination that Nestlé’s appraisal is “minimally credible” in no way requires a finding of persuasive value; on the contrary, the deficiencies identified in the appraisal are enough, on their own, to support the Board's conclusion that Nestlé’s appraisal is unpersuasive. The Board's conclusion rests on findings the Board made about Nestlé’s appraisal on its own terms, not in comparison with competing evidence. Because neither party carried its burden of persuasion, as articulated in Section 17.2, for the 2019 through 2021 assessment years, the Board correctly reverted the assessment to the value the Board determined for 2018.²

C. The Assessor waived its structural-improvements exclusion argument by failing to raise it before the Board.

The Assessor first contends that the burden-shifting provision of Section 17.2 should not have been applied to the 2019 to 2021 tax years because the assessment was based on structural improvements that qualified for a statutory exception. He claims that the increase in the 2019 assessment was attributable to the ASRS addition completed in 2018 and that such an improvement prevents the burden from shifting under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2(c).³ The application of the burden-shifting rule to the Assessor in this case is consequential—if the Assessor were relieved of the exactitude required by the burden of proof in Section 17.2, then the Assessor's appraisal might well have been accepted. The Court disagrees with the Assessor.

The Assessor waived this exception by failing to raise it before the Board. Generally, the Tax Court is “bound by the evidence and issues raised at the administrative level,” meaning that any issue not raised before the Board is waived and “may not be considered by the Court.” Kosciusko Cnty. Assessor v. Dalton Corp., 158 N.E.3d 1286, 1291 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2020) (citation omitted); Ind. Code § 33-26-6-3. At the outset of the hearing, the administrative law judge invited argument on the burden of proof, and the Assessor concurred that Nestlé bore the burden without asserting any exception. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3032–33.) The Assessor acknowledged the same at oral argument. (Oral Arg. at 59.) The Board was not obligated to construct, on its own initiative, an exception the Assessor neither asserted nor supported. See CVS, 149 N.E.3d at 327.

D. The Assessor had an adequate opportunity to address the correct application of the burden-shifting statute before the Board.

The Assessor also argues that it lacked notice and a fair opportunity to address the application of Section 17.2 to the 2019 through 2021 assessment years because the Board allocated the burden to Nestlé at the hearing and only later, in its final determination, shifted the burden to the Assessor for those years. (See Resp't Br. at 10–13.) The Assessor disclaimed any constitutional due-process challenge at oral argument, confirming that it was not making a due-process claim. (Oral Arg. at 58.) The Court therefore confines its analysis to the Assessor's statutory and procedural argument. So confined, the argument fails.

The operation of the burden-shifting statute is a matter of law, and its application to multi-year challenges before the Board has been made clear by this Court. When determining whether an assessment increase triggers a burden shift, Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-17.2(a) explains that the prior year's assessment “as determined by the reviewing authority” should be used to calculate the change. As this Court explained in Marion Cnty. Assessor v. Square 74 Assocs., LLC, the plain language of Section 17.2 places no timing restriction on this determination by the reviewing authority, meaning that a determination made for a prior year during an appeal should be used when performing the statutory inquiry for the following year during that same appeal. 228 N.E.3d 542, 548–49 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024). Such an approach is consistent with the goal of judicial economy, allowing for the resolution of multi-year disputes with a common issue in a single appeal. Id. at 549. One consequence of such efficiency is the interdependence of the burden allocation for a given tax year and the Board's assessment determination for the prior year. This interdependence is inherent in a consolidated, multi-year posture like the one accepted by both parties in their joint case management plans in this case. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 81–84, 96–99, 116–120.) The Board's preliminary allocation of the burden at the hearing could not bind its ultimate allocation, which could not be fixed until the prior-year values were determined.

The Assessor presented evidence for every year under appeal and had a full opportunity to do so. The administrative law judge even invited argument on the burden of proof and the parties chose not to examine the issue further. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3032–33.) That the Assessor, in hindsight, might have marshaled its proof differently is a matter of litigation strategy, not a deprivation of a fair opportunity to be heard. This Court's guidance from Square 74 was published prior to the Board's hearing, and the Assessor should have anticipated the possibility that the burden could change in subsequent years based on the evidence. Compare Square 74, 228 N.E.3d 542 (opinion issued February 14, 2024), with (Cert. Admin. R. at 2989 ¶ 6) (Board hearing began July 29, 2024). The Court declines to remand on this ground.

II. The Board did not abuse its discretion when evaluating the subject property's use and based its findings on substantial evidence.

Nestlé frames its remaining challenge as a single, multi-faceted claim of the Board “fail[ing] to give weight to the evidence presented by Nestlé and adopt[ing] the values in the Assessor's [a]ppraisal in contravention of Indiana's [true tax value] ([market value-in-use]) standard.” (Pet'r’s Br. at 13.) However, this challenge is appropriately understood as two different claims: first, that the Board abused its discretion by failing to correctly apply the market value-in-use standard when evaluating the parties’ evidence of the subject property's use; and, second that the Board failed to support several of its findings with substantial evidence. The Court will address each of these claims in turn.

A. The Board did not err in finding that the Assessor's comparable sales reflected the subject property's current use.

Nestlé argues that the Board erred by adopting the values in the Assessor's appraisal, which Nestlé believes identified the subject property's use too broadly. (Pet'r’s Br. at 13, 15–18.) In Nestlé’s view, that overbroad identification led the Assessor's appraiser to draw from too broad a market when selecting comparable sales, which negatively affected his obsolescence analysis and each of his three valuation approaches. (Pet'r’s Br. at 15–18; Oral Arg. 7–8, 13–14, 85.) Nestlé argues that, by crediting the Assessor's appraisal as the most persuasive evidence of value, the Board effectively adopted the flawed conception of use running through it. Nestlé advances two specific claims in support of this contention. First, it argues that the Board's acceptance of the Assessor's sales comparison approach “runs afoul” of Indiana Code § 6-1.1-31-6(d).⁴ (Pet'r’s Br. at 15.) Second, it argues that the comparable sales used in the Assessor's sales comparison approach valuation do not meet the standard for similarity required by Indiana law.

The Court is satisfied that the Board's determination regarding the similarity of the comparable sales used by the Assessor's appraiser in his sales comparison approach is not an abuse of discretion and is supported by substantial evidence. An abuse of discretion requires a finding that the Board's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or a misinterpretation of the law. Hubler Realty Co. v. Hendricks Cnty. Assessor, 938 N.E.2d 311, 315 n.5 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010). The Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence if “more than a scintilla” of evidence supports the findings so that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion. Starke Cnty. Assessor v. Porter–Starke Servs., Inc., 88 N.E.3d 814, 820 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2017). Here, the Board determined that the Assessor's sales comparison approach was probative and credible though “not particularly persuasive” because of the lack of “compelling data” on comparable sales. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3016 ¶ 65, 3023–24 ¶ 86.) Nestlé’s challenge amounts to a claim that the Board's finding—that the Assessor's comparable sales reflected the subject property's current use—is inconsistent with the evidence in the record. After review, the Court finds that the evidence reasonably supports the Board's conclusions.

Real property in Indiana is assessed at its “true tax value,” which the legislature has directed the Department of Local Government Finance to define in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-31-6(f). True tax value is neither fair market value nor the value of the property to the user. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-31-6(c), (e) (2018). True tax value is instead defined as market value-in-use or the value of a property for its current use, as reflected by the utility received by the owner or by a similar user. 2021 Real Property Assessment Manual (“Manual”) (incorporated by reference at 50 Ind. Admin. Code 2.4-1-2) at 2. Unlike market value, which reflects the price a property would fetch in an open market regardless of its use, market value-in-use is “the price that would induce the owner to sell the real property, and the price at which the buyer would purchase the real property for a continuation of use of the property for its current use.” Manual at 2 (emphasis added). Thus, unlike market value which seeks to ascertain the price a property would fetch in the open market, market value-in-use seeks to ascertain the price a property would command for the use to which it is currently being put.

For purposes of assessment, this Court has long construed current use broadly when evaluating comparable uses. Howard Cnty. Assessor v. Kohl's Indiana LP, 57 N.E.3d 913, 918 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2016). Properties used for “the same general purpose” are understood to deliver the same utility. Stinson v. Trimas Fasteners, Inc., 923 N.E.2d 496, 501 n.10 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010). “[T]he Court has repeatedly rejected the contention ․ that a property's market value-in-use can only be measured in relation to other identical users and not in relation to participants within [a] market generally.” Marion Cnty. Assessor v. Washington Square Mall, LLC, 46 N.E.3d 1, 9 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2015).

Identifying whether a property's current use is sufficiently similar to the use of another is a case-specific inquiry that requires a fact-finder to compare the utility received for a specific use of a given property. See Majestic Props., LLC v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Assessor, 241 N.E.3d 642, 645 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024). A valuation does not reflect true tax value if the purportedly comparable sales “have a different market or submarket than the current use of the improved property based on a market segmentation analysis” conducted in conformity with generally accepted appraisal principles. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(d).

In its determination, the Board correctly applied these legal standards to the facts in this case to determine that the Assessor's appraisal did not violate Indiana Code § 6-1.1-31-6(d). Nestlé had argued to the Board that the Assessor's sales comparison approach ran afoul of Section 6-1.1-31-6(d) because the Assessor's appraiser used sales of food distribution and warehouse properties rather than food processing or manufacturing properties. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3021 ¶ 81; see Cert. Admin. R. at 2952–53, 2962.) It argued that its own appraiser's non-food-processing comparables were acceptable because they were cold storage facilities with physical characteristics similar to the subject property. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3021–22 ¶ 81.) As noted above, Section 6-1.1-31-6(d) excludes sales of purportedly comparable properties that compete in a different market or submarket than the subject property. See IND CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(d). In considering Nestlé’s argument, the Board concluded that the properties the Assessor's appraiser selected as comparables do compete in the same market as the subject property and therefore satisfy the statute. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3022 ¶ 82.) The Board based its conclusion on the fact that “similar users to Nestlé would consider purchasing non-food processing facilities and converting them to their use.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3022 ¶ 82.) It also relied on the fact that both appraisers used the “same sale of a food distribution facility” and that “both appraisers agreed that it was acceptable to use comparables beyond food manufacturing or processing facilities.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3022 ¶ 82.) Nestlé points to testimony from its appraiser that food processing and manufacturing facilities do not compete in the same market as general manufacturing facilities because they have different physical characteristics. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 3330–32.) The presence of competing testimony, however, does not compel a different conclusion in this case. The facts relied upon by the Board are capable of supporting the inference that the two types of properties do compete in the same market. The Board was well within its discretion to weigh the evidence as it did and accept the view advanced by the Assessor's appraiser over the one advanced by Nestlé’s.

As to Nestlé’s second claim, the Board's finding that the Assessor's sales comparison approach was probative and credible, if not very persuasive, is consistent with the evidence. The Assessor's six comparable sales included five used for food distribution, food packaging production, ethanol and sugar or sweetener production, or beverage manufacturing and distribution, and one used for general industrial manufacturing. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3007 ¶ 46.) That “similar users to Nestlé would consider purchasing non-food processing facilities and converting them to their use” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3022 ¶ 82,) more than supports a finding of comparability under Indiana's broad use standard. It suggests that non-food processing facilities can offer similar utility to users like Nestlé, meaning such comparables cannot be categorically excluded.

Similarity is measured based on the comparative utility for each use. See Majestic Properties, 241 N.E.3d at 645. Adapting non-food processing facilities to the needs of users like Nestlé may require significant renovations to accommodate the specific use of food processing. But this was accounted for by the Assessor's appraiser through adjustments to his comparable sales for factors such as office space, clear height, docks, HVAC, and functional utility. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 3008 ¶ 47.) Adjustments like these are why property valuation is seen as a matter of forming opinions, rather than an exact science. See Washington Square Mall, LLC, 46 N.E.3d at 11–12. Adjustments, even those based on strong data, are hypotheticals requiring reliance on assumption and extrapolation, which in turn supports the Board's hesitation to assign much persuasive weight to the comparables despite finding them probative and credible. The presence of contrary testimony from Nestlé’s appraiser regarding comparability simply created an issue of fact for the Board to resolve. The evidence in the record does not dictate a different result.

B. The Board's findings are supported by evidence and align with the facts and circumstances in the record.

Nestlé contends that several issues exist with the Board's analysis of the two appraisals in this case. Nestlé contends that the Board erred in its evaluation of Nestlé’s land valuation, functional obsolescence, external obsolescence, sales comparison approach, lack of an income approach, and evaluation of appraiser expertise. For appeals such as this, the Board is the trier of fact and must determine the relevance and weight to be assigned to the evidence before it. See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-4(p); 52 Ind. Admin. Code 2-7-2(c). The Court may not substitute its judgment for the Board's by reweighing the evidence or reassessing the credibility of witnesses. Chevrolet of Columbus, Inc. v. Bartholomew Cnty. Assessor, 230 N.E.3d 400, 403 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024). The Court finds no reason to set aside the Board's determination on any of these grounds and will address each of Nestlé’s claims in turn.

1. Land Valuation

Nestlé argues that the Board abused its discretion in finding that Nestlé’s appraiser did not value the subject property's land and finding that the omission undercut the reliability of his cost approach and his credibility. (Pet'r’s Br. at 18–20.) Nestlé contends that its appraiser did value the land because “[h]e undertook significant research of land sale comparables and discussed them at the hearing.” (Pet'r’s Br. at 19.) But despite this review and testimony, the record supports the Board's finding.

The Board's findings were not “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Hubler Realty, 938 N.E.2d at 315 n.5 (stating the abuse of discretion standard). Nestlé’s appraiser did not present an independent analysis regarding the value of the land, which he explicitly acknowledged in his testimony to the Board:

So while I guess there as an indication that I didn't do a land valuation, we didn't have or I didn't have a problem with the value that the Assessor had applied to the property, so therefore, I think we concurred with the value that the Assessor has on the land.

(Cert. Admin. R. at 3062.) While Nestlé’s appraiser did discuss comparable land sales in his testimony before the Board, he did not include that review or the accompanying analysis in his appraisal report or present sufficient detail in his testimony to permit the Board to evaluate his conclusion. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 253, 3061–61, 3492–96.) In his appraisal report, Nestlé’s appraiser merely says:

Based upon my analysis of the market and considering the Madison County Assessor's estimate of land value, I concur with the land value estimate of $3,916,500, or $21,358 per acre. Therefore, no appeal of the land value estimate [is warranted] for the purpose of this appraisal and the value estimate contained herein.

(Cert. Admin. R. at 253.) Statements unsupported by probative evidence are conclusory and of little use to the Board. See, e.g., Marinov v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Assessor, 119 N.E.3d 1152, 1156 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019) (noting generalized statements without supporting evidence are merely conclusory and are not sufficient to overturn an assessment). Taken together, the evidence does not compel a different conclusion than the one the Board reached. The lack of analysis and supporting data, especially in light of the Assessor's independent land valuation indicating that the current land assessment was approximately forty-five percent too low in 2018, (Cert. Admin. R. at 3023 ¶ 84,) firmly supported the Board's conclusion.

2. Functional Obsolescence 5

Nestlé argues that the Board abused its discretion by finding that Nestlé’s appraiser did not adequately support his five percent functional-obsolescence adjustment factor. In his appraisal report, Nestlé’s appraiser explained that he arrived at his functional-obsolescence adjustment factor based on interviews with “a number of brokers from several national real estate firms throughout the U.S.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 256.) The Board agreed that the property suffers functional obsolescence, but it found the appraiser's five percent quantification poorly supported, observing that vague references to brokers’ opinions carry little weight, particularly when set against objectively verifiable evidence. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3000 ¶ 31.) The Court is unpersuaded that the Board's decision was against the logic and effect of the facts before it.

The Board was well within its discretion to conclude that Nestlé’s obsolescence adjustment was not well supported. The record is consistent with the Board's characterization of the facts: the appraiser's report attributes the figure to interviews with brokers at several national firms and to a review of building height multipliers, without tying the resulting percentage to verifiable market data. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 256, 296, 3168–69.) Nestlé’s appraiser testified that these interviews were simply “general discussions” with the brokers about the “perceptions of buyers” based on their “years of discussion[s] ․ on these types of properties.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 1594–96.) Reports of opinions expressed by other persons who are not witnesses before the Board are of little value as they cannot be tested or evaluated. Here, Nestlé’s appraiser provided no further data or analysis to support the opinions on which his functional-obsolescence adjustment was based. The Board is the finder of fact and as such is empowered to weigh the credibility and reliability of the evidence before it, which is precisely what it did in reaching its conclusion.

3. External Obsolescence 6

Nestlé also challenges the Board's finding that Nestlé’s appraiser failed to sufficiently support his external-obsolescence conclusions. (Pet'r’s Br. at 22–25.) Nestlé’s appraiser concluded that the subject property suffered fifty percent external obsolescence, a figure derived from a case study of four food-processing sales that had transacted at between roughly thirty-nine and fifty-four percent of their estimated depreciated replacement cost. (Cert. Admin. R. at 2996 ¶ 24.) The Board took issue with two aspects of the appraiser's case-study analysis—the lack of supporting data for the analysis and the comparability of the case-study data to other data used in the cost approach estimate—and concluded that the external-obsolescence estimate was unreliable and lacked credibility. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3000–01 ¶ 31.) Nestlé responds that providing the underlying appraisal work file for the case study is not required by appraisal standards and that the Board categorically rejected Nestlé’s market-extraction case-study technique. (Pet'r’s Br. at 24–25.) After reviewing each of these claims, the Court finds no reason to disturb the Board's findings.

Regarding the first concern, the Board was well within its discretion to accord less weight to appraiser's case-study analysis due to Nestlé’s failure to include corroborating evidence in the record. The Board found that this failure diminished the appraiser's credibility because of the relatively large impact (50% decrease in value) of the external-obsolescence adjustment on the study's conclusions. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3000–01 ¶ 31.) Nestlé does not contest the Board's conclusion that its appraiser did not include all of the supporting data underlying his case-study analysis. (See Pet'r’s Br. at 25.) Instead, Nestlé points to the fact that inclusion of the underlying work file is not required by appraisal standards and that the Board admitted the case study without the underlying work file. (Pet'r’s Br. at 25.) But neither of these considerations affect the Board's ability to evaluate the credibility of the case study. Appraisal standards define best practices for performing appraisals, while admissibility is fundamentally a question of relevance. See Ind. Evid. R. 402. The Board's credibility finding does not depend on whether appraisal standards compel the inclusion of underlying work files or their relevance to the matters to be proved; it is instead grounded in the Board's judgment of believability. See Evidence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 699 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “credible evidence” as evidence “worthy of belief”). The absence of corroborating data prevented the Board from reviewing and testing the analysis that resulted in the appraiser's conclusion. Analysis tends to become conclusory when it is not accompanied by the data, assumptions, and methodology underlying it. It was reasonable for the Board to find conclusory statements less believable.

Regarding Nestlé’s second concern, the Board's finding about the reliability of the external-obsolescence adjustment was consistent with the evidence before it. The Board concluded that the external-obsolescence adjustment could not be reliably compared to the replacement cost estimate for the subject property. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3000 ¶ 31, 3023 ¶ 85.) This is because the appraiser mixed apples and oranges in his cost approach valuation by netting actual, property-specific costs from the properties in his case study against general, market-wide averages of the subject property's replacement cost new drawn from the Marshall Valuation Service (MVS). (Cert. Admin. R. at 2996 ¶ 24, 3000–01 ¶ 31; see Cert. Admin. R. at 546–47, 3306–07 (both appraisers recognizing the generality of MVS data).) The Board found that this mixing of two different types of data (ad hoc actuals and generalized estimates) significantly diminished the reliability of the analysis because the appraiser “did not know whether the actual cost estimates were similar or dissimilar to the MVS cost figures.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3000–01 ¶ 31.) The Board did not hold that a market-extraction case study is an impermissible technique; it found Nestlé’s study unreliable for reasons rooted in the appraiser's own testimony.

Nestlé’s response to the Board's critique reflects a misunderstanding of the findings on which this case turns. Nestlé needed to convince the Board that two types of data could be compared, but Nestlé instead focuses on the actual versus estimated cost distinction, relying on an unstated premise that actual costs are per se more accurate than estimated costs for the analysis its appraiser completed. (See Pet'r’s Br. at 23–25.) The Board's expressed concern, however, was not about the comparative accuracy of estimated and actual costs; it was about comparing an obsolescence percentage extracted by measuring a sale price against one property's actual costs with a replacement cost for the subject property drawn from estimates derived from broad groups of market data. That Nestlé’s appraiser could not say whether the two sets of figures were similar directly impacts the obsolescence adjustment because the size and direction of that gap are unknown.

Despite Nestlé’s claim, the Board's determination does not require an appraiser to “perform an appraisal-level analysis of every comparable used in his report.” (Pet'r’s Br. at 23 (quoting Cert. Admin. R. at 3001 ¶ 31).) It simply faulted Nestlé’s appraiser for being unable to say whether the actual costs he used for the case-study properties were comparable to the MVS figures he used for the subject property. Now, before this Court, Nestlé has not identified any generally accepted appraisal principles to support its appraiser's analysis or otherwise explain how the two cost figures are comparable. Failing that, there is no basis to overturn the Board's conclusion here.

4. Sales Comparison Approach

Nestlé argues that the Board's criticism of its appraiser's sales comparison approach is unsupported. It contends that his comparable sales were more physically similar to the subject property than the Assessor's and that he performed a comparative analysis that the Board ignored. (Pet'r’s Br. at 26–28.) The Board found that Nestlé’s comparable sales lacked similarity to the subject property, that they were older and inferior to it, and that the appraiser's “significant adjustments to the leased comparables were largely unsupported” because he did not compare the lease rates to market rent. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3001 ¶ 32.) The Court does not agree with Nestlé’s criticisms.

The record evidence is more than sufficient to support the Board's findings that the comparables were, on the whole, older and inferior to the subject property. Nestlé’s appraiser's own reconciliation of his sales comparables shows that his comparables were built between 1958 and 2007, with effective ages ranging from fifteen to fifty years, compared to an effective age of eighteen years for the subject property. (Cert. Admin. R. at 295.) He confirmed in testimony that one comparable was built “30 years prior to the date of construction for the subject” and that another, on which he had applied a fifty-year effective age against the subject's eighteen, was built in 1958 with additions only through 1996. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3209, 3230–31.) Nestlé’s appraiser rated most of his fourteen comparables inferior to the subject property and adjusted their indicated values upward accordingly—for submarket location, for land-to-building ratio, for age and condition, for clear height, and for percentage of office space, treating one or two comparables as similar or superior in each category. (Cert. Admin. R. at 293–97.) Finally, Nestlé’s appraiser testified that his report did not compare the quality of his comparables and the subject property, did not separately rate their condition, and made percentage adjustments to the comparables “primarily based on subjective judgment.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3301–02.) Nestlé’s contrary evidence, including its appraiser's testimony about physical characteristics and his qualitative property rights adjustments, does not compel a different finding. By raising these arguments that the Board has already considered, Nestlé effectively asks this Court to weigh them differently. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 2998 ¶ 28, 3001 ¶ 32.) The Court will not do so, and Nestlé’s preference for a different weighing is not a ground for reversal.

5. Lack of Income Approach

Nestlé argues that the Board erred in faulting its appraiser for declining to develop an income approach and in finding that choice inconsistent with the appraiser's reliance on leased, income-generating comparables. (Pet'r’s Br. at 28–30.) The premise of Nestlé’s argument is that the Board was bound to accept its appraiser's professional judgment that market participants would not consider an income approach for a property of this kind. The Board was not required to accept that judgment, and the record it examined supports the finding it made instead.

The Board's findings are supported most clearly by two facts in the record. First, Nestlé’s appraiser relied on leased-fee sales in his own sales comparison approach, adjusting those sales downward because only leased-fee interests were acquired. (Cert. Admin. R. at 290, 2998 ¶ 27, 3015–16 ¶ 66.) Second, the Assessor's appraiser included a fully developed income approach using comparable lease and rent data, including an extensive market-rent analysis for one comparable that was sold subject to a lease. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 3007 ¶ 47.) The Assessor's appraiser expounded in his testimony on his decision to complete an income approach, explaining that “there's market evidence out there that buyers and sellers do, in fact, acquire leased properties or rent properties like this” and that “it's typical market practice to consider income.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3383, 3456.) From these facts, in context, the Board found that data from leased comparable facilities was considered by both appraisers and that “some portion of market participants consider the income approach.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3016 ¶ 66, 3024 ¶ 87.) While Nestlé’s appraiser testified that he did not develop an income approach because “[b]ased on [his] experience and knowledge with these types of properties, they do not lease,” (Cert. Admin. R. at 3226), the Board was not required to find that testimony persuasive.

Nestlé’s appraisal and its appraiser's testimony are sufficient evidence to support the Board's finding that the appraiser's stated reason for omitting an income approach was in tension with his own use of leased comparables. The Board did not hold that an income approach must be completed in all appraisals; it found the explanation Nestlé’s appraiser gave for declining to develop one—that properties like the subject do not lease—difficult to reconcile with his reliance on leased-fee sales, and it weighed his credibility accordingly. Nestlé offered explanations for its appraiser's choices, but again, those explanations were before the Board, which was entitled to weigh them and to find them incapable of resolving the tension in the position of Nestlé’s appraiser. An expert's opinion does not compel the fact-finder to adopt it. Despite this list of grievances, Nestlé remains unable to show that its complaints amount to more than requests to reweigh evidence.

6. Appraiser's Familiarity with Indiana Standards

Nestlé contends that the Board contradicted itself by recognizing its appraiser as a skilled expert with significant experience in industrial property while discounting that experience because of his limited familiarity with Indiana and the market value-in-use standard. (Pet'r’s Br. at 19, 30–31.) In its final determination, the Board makes the following finding:

[Nestlé’s appraiser] is a skilled expert with significant experience in the appraisal of industrial property, though the value of this experience is tempered somewhat by his lack of familiarity with Indiana and the market value-in-use standard. In particular, his decision to rely on the current assessment rather than develop his own independent land valuation drastically undercuts the reliability of his cost approach.

(Cert. Admin. R. at 3000 ¶ 30.) The Board does not offer any other explanation for its conclusion that Nestlé’s appraiser is unfamiliar with Indiana's valuation standards. The Court agrees that the Board's finding was unsupported but finds the error harmless.

Nestlé’s argument here is more persuasive, as the failure to develop an independent land value says little about its appraiser's familiarity with Indiana law or with the market value-in-use standard in particular. The Assessor identifies no other evidence in the record substantiating the finding, and the record contains the appraiser's testimony describing a substantial history of appraising industrial properties in Indiana and his understanding of the market value-in-use standard. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 3046–47; 3125–27.)

Nonetheless, Nestlé has not shown that this error was prejudicial, as required by Indiana Code § 33-26-6-6(e). Only those errors that are likely to alter the outcome warrant reversal. See Ciceu v. Knox Cnty. Assessor, 232 N.E.3d 662, 666–67 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024); accord Kohl's, 272 N.E.3d at 602 (“An error is generally considered harmless when it would not affect the outcome of the case.”). The Board's conclusions rejecting Nestlé’s appraisal are well-supported by its critique of its substantive analysis and evidentiary shortfalls. As explained above, the Board separately found the cost approach incomplete due to the lack of an independent land valuation, the lack of support for obsolescence adjustments, dissimilar and inferior comparable sales, unsupported leased-comparable adjustments, and the lack of an income approach. Each of those findings rests on evidence in the record and stands independently of any finding by the Board about the familiarity of Nestlé’s appraiser with Indiana law. Nestlé has not shown that setting this one finding aside would require a reevaluation of the Board's conclusion of value. The error is therefore harmless, and the Court will not remand on this basis.

CONCLUSION

The final determination of the Indiana Board of Tax Review is therefore AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Nestlé also argues that this Court's decision in Madison Cnty. Assessor v. Kohl's Indiana, LP bears on the analysis here. 272 N.E.3d 592, 600 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2025). Nestlé quotes the decision for the principle that an appraisal must meet the preponderance standard “standing alone and independent of the Assessor's competing appraisal.” (Pet'r’s Br. at 8–9 (quoting Kohl's, 272 N.E.3d at 600).) In Kohl's, the Court found that the Board failed to perform the statutorily required preponderance analysis when it found only that the Kohl's appraisal valuation was more likely the true tax value of the property than the Assessor's appraisal valuation but did not find that the Kohl's valuation was more likely than not the value of the subject property. Id. Accordingly, Nestlé reads the quote out of context. When read within the context of the holding in Kohl's, it is clear that the Court was distinguishing between a preponderance analysis and the evaluation of two appraisals exclusively against each other without regard for the burden of persuading the Board of the property's true tax value. The Court's references to an appraisal “standing alone and independent” is not a disallowance of competing evidence, but instead a requirement that the Board “determine (1) if the assessment is ‘more likely than not’ incorrect and (2) what alternative value is ‘more likely than not’ the true tax value of the property.” Kohl's, 272 N.E.3d at 600.

2.   Nestlé also claims that the Board exceeded its authority and made the Assessor's argument for it. The decisions Nestlé invokes condemn other, broader practices like the Board's supplying evidence, legal theory, or arguments that a party failed to provide. See CVS Corp. #2519-01 v. Prince, 149 N.E.3d 323, 328 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2020); Long v. Wayne Twp. Assessor, 821 N.E.2d 466, 471 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2005). Here, the Board did none of this. It simply weighed evidence that both parties placed in the record and discharged its duty, as trier of fact, to determine the relevance and weight of that evidence. See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-4(p); 52 Ind. Admin. Code 2-7-2(c) (2018).

3.   An automated storage and retrieval system (ASRS) is a series of steel racks with a protective covering that holds palletized products and uses automated cranes traveling along the racks to store and retrieve pallets. (Cert. Admin. R. at 0233, 0498, 1504–05, 1540–41.)

4.   Nestlé frames part of this argument in terms of highest and best use, contending that its appraiser's identification of the property's highest and best use as continued use as an industrial food processing and distribution facility “directly aligns” with Indiana market value-in-use standard. (Pet'r’s Br. at 15.) However, the Board made no independent findings of highest and best use; the phrase appears in its final determination only in its description of Nestlé’s appraisal. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 2993 ¶ 18.) A property's highest and best use has a limited relationship with its market value-in-use: if the property's current use is consistent with its highest and best use, and there are regular exchanges within its market so that ask and offer prices converge, the property's market value-in-use will equal market value because the sale price fully captures the property's utility. Millennium Real Estate Inv., LLC v. Benton Cnty. Assessor, 979 N.E.2d 192, 196 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2012). Outside that circumstance, highest and best use is an inquiry directed to market value, not to the current use that governs market value-in-use. The Court therefore has no occasion to decide whether “industrial” or “industrial food processing” is the correct label for the subject property's highest and best use.

MCADAM, J.