IN RE: J.E. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] L.E. (“Mother”) appeals portions of the dispositional order the trial court entered following the adjudication of her child, J.E. (“Child”), as a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). She presents two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to complete a psychological evaluation and random drug screens. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Mother and S.E. (“Father”)¹ in November 2016. In July 2025, the family was evicted from their home “due to nonpayment of rent.” (App. Vol. II at 47.) Initially, the family resided in “an extended stay hotel” but later moved in with Mother's ex-boyfriend. (Id.) The family eventually moved out of Mother's ex-boyfriend's house because Father and Mother's ex-boyfriend were “not getting along.” (Id.) The family then moved to Mother's father's house but could not stay there long term “due to [Child] having issues in school and [Mother's father's] home having bugs.” (Id.)

[3] On September 19, 2025, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that the family was “residing in their vehicle in the Walgreen's Distribution Warehouse along with the family dog.” (Id.) Mother told Family Case Manager Megan Fountain (“FCM Fountain”) that the family had been living in their car for about a week and she was “not concerned about [Child] having to reside in the family car.” (Id.) FCM Fountain observed that Child was “hungry, hot, and dirty.” (Id.) Mother was unable to give the name of Child's school.

[4] DCS service provider Firefly Children and Family Alliance (“Firefly”) arranged for Mother and Child to stay at a homeless shelter, but Mother did not like the shelter because men were not allowed, which meant Father could not stay with her and Child. Firefly also helped Mother enroll Child in school. Child missed one and one half days of the four days he was enrolled in school. Mother “was not concerned about [Child] not being in school as she [could] educate [Child] better than a school system [was] able to educate him.” (Id. at 48.)

[5] On September 25, 2025, Tonya Dortch, a Child Safety Liaison with Firefly, spoke to Mother on the phone and “was not able to understand what [Mother] was saying” because Mother “appeared to be slurring her words ․ [and was] not able to make complete sentences[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 64.) Based on her conversation with Mother, Dortch visited the homeless shelter where Mother and Child were staying. When she spoke with Mother at the shelter, Dortch noted that “[Mother] again appeared to be slurring her words, not able to put sentences together[,] ․ [and] she was not able to keep her eyes open for an extended amount of time.” (Id. at 65.)

[6] Based on Mother's behavior, DCS removed Child from Mother's care. Mother denied she had used drugs or alcohol. Dortch noted that, when she removed Child from Mother's care later that evening, “[t]here was no interaction between [Mother] and [Child] ․ there was no communication verbally ․ [or a] physical hug.” (Id.) DCS asked Mother to submit an “instant oral drug test ․ [that] showed what appeared to be a positive reading for THC.” (App. Vol. II at 20.) However, DCS collected a second sample for a drug test that was sent to a lab and returned a negative result. DCS also felt that Mother's behavior could be attributed to mental illness.

[7] On September 26, 2025, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS based on the family's homelessness and Mother's possible substance use and/or mental health issues. On November 4, 2025, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing. On November 12, 2025, the trial court issued its order adjudicating Child as a CHINS based on the family's homelessness, Child's failure to attend school, and concerns expressed by DCS concerning Mother's possible substance abuse and/or mental health problems. On December 9, 2025, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. On December 26, 2025, the trial court issued its dispositional order requiring Mother to, among other things, stay in contact with her family case manager; maintain safe housing; maintain a legal source of income; refrain from using illegal substances or alcohol; complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations; complete random drug screens; complete a psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations; and attend supervised visitation with Child.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Mother does not challenge the trial court's adjudication of Child as a CHINS. Instead, she argues two of the services ordered in the dispositional decree – that she complete a psychological evaluation and submit samples for random drug screens – were not supported by the evidence. “Although the juvenile court has broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate, the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was revealed by the evidence.” Matter of R.B., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012)), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's action is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences drawn therefrom.” In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (internal quotations and citations omitted), trans. denied.

[9] Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to complete a psychological evaluation because there “was no evidence presented at detention or fact-finding that Mother had been diagnosed with a mental health disorder․ The only mention of possible undiagnosed mental health challenges was from the testimony of a family case manager.” (Mother's Br. at 9-10.) She states that “being poor and homeless does not make [her] crazy.” (Id. at 11.)

[10] During the fact-finding hearing, Family Case Manager Heidi Decker (“FCM Decker”), who was licensed social worker who “provide[d] ․ psyco [sic] therapy part-time outside of DCS[,]” testified at length regarding her concerns that Mother may have undiagnosed mental health issues. (Tr. Vol. II at 78.) She told the trial court that her concern stemmed from “the lack of stability and unable [sic] to comprehend with [sic] the seriousness of ․ not being able to provide an appropriate home for [Child][,] ․ [and] communication is very difficult[.]” (Id. at 86.) She noted Mother's suspected mental health issues were “very likely” to be an “underlying issue” related to Mother's homelessness. (Id.)

[11] Further, Mother testified that she had not participated in a mental health evaluation or received mental health treatment needed to determine whether she experienced mental illness. Therefore, Mother could not have been diagnosed with a mental health disorder. DCS is not “require[d] ․ to wait until a child is physically or emotionally harmed to intervene[.]” K.B. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Servs., 24 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Based on the testimony of FCM Decker and Dortch, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer Mother could need mental health treatment and thus it did not abuse its discretion when it ordered her to complete a psychological evaluation. See, contra, In re C.W., 172 N.E.3d 1239, 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (trial court intervention not needed when Mother was engaged in medication management and therapy to address her mental health issues).

[12] Similarly, Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to submit to random drug screens as part of its dispositional order because “[d]rug and alcohol use was not a circumstance related to the CHINS adjudication.” (Mother's Br. at 11.) Additionally, she contends “[t]he trial court did not find evidence of drug use or concerns for drug use, but instead ordered random drug screens because random drug screens are ‘typical in all cases.’ ” (Id.) (quoting Tr. Vol. II at 114.)

[13] In its order adjudicating Child as a CHINS, the trial court found, “[d]uring the evening of September 25, 2025, Fire Fly [sic] [representative Dortch] spoke with Mother. Mother was slurring her words to the point she could not be understood, had trouble putting together a coherent sentence, and couldn't keep her eyes open.” (App. Vol. II at 48.) These behaviors can be signs of intoxication. See, e.g., Jones ex. Rel Jones v. Pillow Express Delivery, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (noting appellant displayed signs of intoxication when he “slur[ed] his words ․ his eyes drooped ․ and repeatedly nodded off”). Mother's behavior when she spoke with Dortch was very similar to that in Jones. Further, as noted above we need not wait until Child was harmed to address issues that may seriously endanger Child. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when ordered Mother to submit random drug screens as part of its dispositional order. See, contra, In re A.C., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (trial court abused its discretion when it ordered mother to participate in services related to substance abuse because record contained no evidence that she used illegal substances).

Conclusion

[14] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Mother to complete a psychological evaluation and random drug screens as part of its dispositional order following Child's adjudication as a CHINS. Accordingly, we affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.